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Abstract
This PhD thesis starts from the puzzle of striking differences in civil war occurrence 
across Sub-Saharan Africa, exemplified by the two countries of Uganda and Zambia. 
While post-colonial Uganda has experienced no less than 15 cases of civil war, Zambia 
has been able to avoid civil war since independence in 1964. To explain this extreme 
variation in the two countries’ vulnerability to civil war, I first review the five most 
influential theoretical approaches in the civil war literature. While most of these 
approaches fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need 
for elite power-sharing offer a promising starting point. Against this backdrop, I go on 
to develop a theoretical approach that focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I 
argue that a country’s propensity for war or peace is determined by the inclusiveness of 
the ‘elite bargain’, i.e. the distribution of access to positions of state power (political, 
military, economic and territorial) between contending social groups. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by my empirical findings, which are based on 103 interviews, a 
comprehensive set of original data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, 
economic and territorial posts, and in-depth historical analysis. In Uganda, I trace 
recurrent civil war back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. By contrast, 
Zambia has been able to contain the spectre of civil war by forging and maintaining 
inclusive elite bargains. My detailed two-country comparison reveals that differences in 
civil war occurrence reflect variation in the relative trend, depth, scope, authenticity and 
perception of the elite bargain. There is also evidence for the relevance of several 
complementary explanatory factors, including violent state repression, socioeconomic 
inter-group inequalities, political leadership, levels of urbanisation, and regional 
spillover effects.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Puzzle
Sub-Saharan Africa is commonly associated with images of violence and war. Such 
perceptions have spiralled since the early 1980s, greatly reinforced by Western 
journalists who have tended to paint the continent in gloomy terms.1 More recently, 
Robert Kaplan described Africa as littered with tribalism, failed states and endemic civil 
war.2 Similarly, The Economist decried a ‘hopeless continent’ where ‘wars rage from 
north to south and east to west’ and the ‘few candles of hope are flickering weakly’.3 
Even respected Africanists such as Jean-Francois Bayart or Patrick Chabal & Jean- 
Pascal Daloz seem to suggest that the entire continent is plagued by violent disorder and 
state breakdown.4
Figure 1: Civil wars, 1945-19995
1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
□  E u ro p e  Q  Latin A m erica  3  Asia ■  Africa
At first sight, such unchecked pessimism seems justified. Along with Asia, Africa has 
been the world’s most civil war prone region since the end of World War II (see figure 
1). Significantly, no less than 24 out of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have
1 Mamham 1979; Lamb 1982; Harden 1990.
2 Kaplan 1994.
3 ‘The Hopeless Continent’, The Economist, 13-19 May 2000.
4 Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal & Daloz 1999.
5 Compiled based on a civil war dataset by Sambanis 2004a, available at http://pantheon.yale.edu/ 
~ns237/index/research/CivilWarList.xls. For the underlying definition of civil war see chapter 2.1.
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experienced at least one period of civil war over the past 50 years (see table 1). This is 
not to deny that there are important differences between these 24 civil war countries. 
Some countries have been affected by recurrent civil war that has covered much of their 
territory, including -  among others -  the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, 
Chad, Burundi and Sudan. Others such as Senegal or Mali have suffered from only one, 
more regionally confined conflict. Nevertheless, civil war has been present in all parts 
of the continent with no discernible pattern of sub-regional concentration.
Table 1: Civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1945-20086
Countries having experienced civil war (24) Countries having avoided civil war (22)
Angola (4 civil wars), Burundi (4), Central 
African Republic (2), Chad (4), Congo-Brazzaville
(2), Cote d’Ivoire (1), Democratic Republic o f 
Congo (5), Djibouti (1), Ethiopia (3), Guinea 
Bissau (1), Kenya (2), Liberia (3), Mali (1), 
Mozambique (1), Namibia (1), Nigeria (2), Rwanda
(3), Senegal (1), Sierra Leone (2), Somalia (2), 
South Africa (1), Sudan (3), Uganda (5), 
Zimbabwe (2).
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia.
The pervasiveness of violent conflict notwithstanding, one should however not lose 
sight of the fact that almost half of Africa’s countries have so far been able to avoid 
civil war (see table 1). This is very significant and shows that many states have proved 
remarkably immune to the allegedly inescapable ‘civil war epidemic’ for almost five 
decades of independent statehood. Such resilient states can be found across the entire 
continent, even in the midst of sub-regional instability. Examples include Botswana in 
the South, Tanzania in the East, Benin in the West, and Cameroon in the Centre.
Uganda and Zambia are two countries that exemplify these striking differences in civil 
war occurrence across Sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in figure 2, Uganda has witnessed 
a total of 15 civil wars since its independence in 1962 -  a figure that makes it one of the 
most conflict-intensive countries on the African continent. The current government by 
Yoweri Museveni has faced the highest number of armed insurrections (7), followed by 
the Obote II government (5), the Amin military dictatorship (2) and the Obote I
6 Sambanis 2004a. As Sambanis’s list ends in 1999,1 have added new cases o f civil war for the period 
between 2000 and 2008, including recent civil wars in Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Sudan.
7 In contrast to Sambanis (2004a) who amalgamates different instances o f civil war during one period into 
one (and thereby underestimates the actual number of wars), I treat every rebellion as separate as long as 
it fulfils my definition of civil war (see chapter 2.1). This explains why I count 15 cases of civil war in 
post-colonial Uganda (see figure 2), whereas Sambanis counts only five (see table 1).
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government (1). Only 17 out of the 47 years of independent Uganda have been entirely 
civil war free. Zambia, by contrast, has not experienced civil war since its independence 
in 1964.
Figure 2: Civil war onset and avoidance in Uganda and Zambia, 1962-2008
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FRONASA = Front of Salvation; UNLA = Uganda National Liberation Army; UNRF = Uganda National Rescue 
Front; FUNA = Former Uganda National Army; UFM = Uganda Freedom Movement; NRA = National Resistance 
Army; Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO); UPDA = Uganda People’s Democratic Army; HSM = Holy Spirit 
Movement; UPA = Uganda People’s Army; LRA = Lord’s Resistance Army; WNBF = West Nile Bank Front; ADF 
= Allied Democratic Forces.
The puzzling contrast between recurrent civil war onset in Uganda and enduring civil 
war avoidance in Zambia raises the following research question:
Why has Uganda experienced recurrent civil war, while Zambia has managed to 
hold together?
1.2 Pre-existing Theories o f  Civil War Onset
Theories on the causes of civil war are abundant.9 In what follows, I will review what I 
consider the five most influential theoretical schools of thought in the study of civil war, 
including arguments focused on (1) natural resources; (2) economic performance; (3) 
inequality; (4) ethnicity; and (5) political institutions. While most of these approaches
8 Own compilation.
9 Useful recent literature reviews include Kalyvas 2007; Collier & Hoeffler 2007; Bussmann et al. 2009; 
Fearon 2010; Blattman & Miguel 2010.
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fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need for elite 
power-sharing offer a promising starting point.
CIVIL WAR AND NATURAL RES SOURCES
Since the early 1990s, there has been a flood of research on the relationship between a 
country’s natural resource endowment and its vulnerability to violent conflict. While 
early research focused on the impact of natural resource scarcity, the more recent debate 
has centred on the effects of natural resource abundance.
Resource scarcity: As early as in 1803, Thomas Malthus expected that food production 
would grow arithmetically, while the human population would grow exponentially, 
eventually causing serious food shortages and conflict.10 Drawing on this argument, 
‘Neo-Malthusian’ scholars generally assume that violent conflict is driven by the 
scarcity of environmental resources. Most prominently, Kaplan interpreted the West 
African civil wars of the early 1990s as clear evidence of Africa’s gathering 
environmental crisis.11 More systematic research was done by the ‘Toronto group’ 
around Thomas Homer-Dixon and the ‘Zurich group’ around Gunther Baechler . 
Both groups conducted a considerable number of case studies but found no evidence for 
a direct connection between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. They conclude 
that environmentally-induced scarcity can contribute to a dynamic of violent conflict, 
albeit only indirectly in combination with a broad range of political, economic, social 
and cultural factors.14 Corresponding quantitative research also shows that there is little 
evidence for a direct link between natural resource scarcity and civil war. Hauge & 
Ellingsen, for example, conclude that while deforestation, land degradation and low 
freshwater availability are positively correlated with the incidence of civil war, the 
magnitude of their effects is minimal.15 De Soysa finds no direct links from renewable 
resource scarcity, measured by the per capita stock of total renewable resources, to 
violent conflict.16 And Urdal reports that high population growth is not associated with 
armed conflict, while land scarcity -  measured by population density -  is mostly
10 Malthus 1803/ 1992.
11 Kaplan 1994. For an excellent critique see Richards 1996.
12 Homer-Dixon 1994,1999.
13 Baechler et al. 1996.
14 Case studies confirming these results for Sub-Saharan Africa include Rwanda, Sudan and Mali.
15 Hauge & Ellingsen 1998.
16 De Soysa 2002a.
17
negatively associated with civil war.17 However, where land scarcity combines with 
high population growth, there is generally a positive and significant association with 
violent conflict.
Can ‘Neo-Malthusian’ approaches explain differences in civil war occurrence in 
Uganda and Zambia? Uganda is clearly the more resource-scarce country, evident in the 
fact that it exhibits higher population pressure and lower arable land per capita than 
Zambia and the Sub-Saharan African average (see figures 3a and 3b). Moreover, its 
renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (1498m3 in 2002) are smaller than 
those of Zambia (7309 m3) and the Sub-Saharan African average (5468m3).18 Yet, both 
the literature and my own interviews in Uganda reveal that there is no evidence that 
these scarcities were directly behind any of Uganda’s 15 civil wars since independence. 
This is not to deny that there is currently growing competition over land and water in 
the context of global climate change, especially among the Karamajong in the north­
eastern parts of the country.19 While this has occasionally caused low-level conflict at 
the local level, it has so far not led to civil war. Is the relative abundance of natural 
resources in Zambia part of the reason why the country has been able to avoid civil war? 
Some insiders seem to think so and argue that it is especially the country’s extremely 
low population density that make the mobilisation of violence difficult to achieve.20 
While this cannot be entirely discounted, it is generally difficult to see why and how the 
absence of resource scarcity by itself would prevent violent conflict. If abundant 
resources are distributed inequitably between competing social groups, alienation and 
violent conflict is a plausible scenario. This draws attention to the fact that -  in line with 
the findings of the above-cited research -  the ultimate effects of the given degree of 
natural resource availability depend heavily on a wide range of socioeconomic and 
especially political factors. But then why not invert the argument and take differences in 
political organisation as a starting point?
17 Urdal 2005.
18 World Bank 2009.
19 USAID 2005.
20 Interview, Guy Scott.
18
Figure 3: Resource scarcity in Uganda and Zambia21
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Resource abundance: Research on the relationship between natural resource wealth 
and civil war onset has been extremely influential. While the ‘resource curse’ argument 
comes in many different variants, the following two can be identified as predominant.22
(1) The ‘honey p o t’ variant: Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler hypothesise that natural 
resources constitute a ‘honey pot’ that generates violent forms of rent seeking.23 It is 
suggested that resource-rich countries are more prone to civil war by providing 
insurgent groups with the opportunity to use the ‘looting’ of natural resources as a 
means to finance the ‘start-up costs’ of rebellion. This argument implies that natural 
resources to which rebel groups can gain access should be robustly associated with civil 
war. This is however not the case. First, there is no robust association between primary 
commodities -  a broad category including both mineral wealth and agricultural goods -  
and civil war. While Collier & Hoeffler find that a country’s dependence on primary 
commodities -  measured as the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP -  is 
strongly correlated with the risk of civil war, other scholars disprove such association.24 
Second, and this is a particularly severe blow to the ‘honey pot’ hypothesis, there is also 
no robust association between civil war and more easily lootable commodities (e.g.
21 World Bank 2009.
22 Ross 2004a, b, 2006. A third influential argument focuses on the relationship between resource wealth 
and secessionist civil wars. This is however o f limited relevance for my study since separatist conflicts 
are the great exception rather than the norm on the African continent (see Englebert 2007).
23 Collier & Hoeffler 2002, 2004.
24 Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; De Soysa & Neumayer 2007.
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gemstones, drugs or timber).25 Significantly, both Lujala et al. and Ross find little 
evidence for the often-assumed link between secondary (i.e. lootable) diamonds and 
civil war.26 Third, case-study research provides no support for the ‘Collier-Hoeffler 
argument’. Sambanis, for instance, summarises a series of case studies (including eight
for Sub-Saharan Africa) meant to refine the Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war and
11finds no evidence for the ‘looting mechanism’. Similarly, Ross examines 13 cases of 
civil war (including six civil wars in Africa) and concludes that
‘nascent rebel groups never gained funding before the war broke out from the extraction or 
sale of natural resources, or from the extortion of others who extract, transport, or market 
resources’.28
(2) The ‘political Dutch disease ’ variant: A second argument links the ‘resource-civil 
war nexus’ to the phenomenon of the ‘rentier state’.29 Rentier states are late-developers 
that live largely off unearned income (natural resource rents and foreign aid), which 
relieves them from the need to raise revenue through domestic taxation. This is said to 
favour the emergence of certain ‘political pathologies’, including -  among others -  the 
absence of developmental ambitions, weak bureaucratic structures, and vulnerability to
 ^t
violence. James Fearon & David Laitin have introduced this line of reasoning into the 
quantitative civil war literature arguing that resource wealth -  in particular oil -  causes 
weak and non-responsive state structures, which in turn increases the probability of civil 
war.32 If they are right, oil and other resources that generate large and secure 
government revenue (i.e. non-lootable resources) should be robustly associated with 
civil war. At first sight, this seems to be the case as many studies find that oil wealth 
increases the risk of civil war. Also, Ross comes to the conclusion that ‘rents from fuel 
minerals’ (oil, gas, hard coal, lignite) are robustly associated with the onset of civil war, 
especially when located onshore.34 On the downside, Sambanis reports that oil exports
25 Ross 2004a.
26 Lujala et al. (2005) find that secondary diamonds are only associated with lower-scale ethnic conflict, 
while Ross (2006) shows that secondary diamonds are only linked with separatist conflict.
27 Sambanis 2005.
28 Ross 2004b: 50.
29 Beblawi 1990; Karl 1997; Moore 2004.
30 The post-1945 international system has created opportunities for elites in developing countries to 
‘gamer very large economic surpluses (rents) from controlling or managing economic and political 
relations with the core’ (Moore 2004: 305). This contrasts sharply with state formation processes in 
Europe where a hostile external environment forced state-builders into alliances and bargains with interest 
groups (see Tilly 1990).
31 Moore 2004.
32 Fearon & Laitin 2003.
33 De Soysa 2002b; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2005; Fearon 2005.
34 Ross 2006.
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are not robust to different civil war models,35 while Hegre & Sambanis conclude that 
dependence on oil exports may be considered at best marginally robust. Smith even 
finds that oil wealth is robustly linked with lower likelihoods of civil war.37 Also, there
<30
is no robust association between primary diamonds and civil war onset. Finally, the 
causal mechanisms that may link natural resource rents to state weakness and, even 
more problematically, state weakness to conflict remain diffuse and subtle.
The ‘resource curse’ argument also falls to explain differences in civil war occurrence 
in Uganda and Zambia. According to the ‘honey pot’ hypothesis, we should expect no 
civil war in Uganda and Zambia since both countries are characterised by the absence of 
‘lootable’ natural resources. Uganda is an agrarian economy with coffee, cotton and tea 
among its main exports. Yet, the missing opportunity to use the ‘looting’ of natural 
resources as a means to finance armed insurgency has not prevented Uganda from 
becoming one of the most conflict-prone countries on the African continent. In the case 
of Zambia, the ‘honey pot’ argument seems to be more relevant. Whereas the country is 
abundant in copper (a non-lootable resource whose exploitation requires high 
investments in capital and technology), it lacks -  a least until recently -  lootable natural 
resources. Against this backdrop some might be tempted to argue that the absence of 
lootable resources has prevented potential rebels from launching armed insurgency 
against the government. If this was true, we should expect violent conflict once lootable 
resources become available. Yet, the recent discovery of alluvial (i.e. lootable) 
diamonds in Western Zambia is said to have inspired secessionists39 but has by no 
means led to civil war. The ‘Political Dutch disease’ hypothesis has even less 
explanatory power. Zambia can be considered a ‘rentier state’ that lives largely off 
unearned income from copper, whereas Uganda faces the need to raise revenue by 
taxing its farmers. Accordingly, one should expect civil war in Zambia and peace in 
Uganda -  a prediction that is in sharp contradiction with the real world.
Altogether, the influential ‘resource curse’ thesis turns out to be remarkably 
inconclusive.40 This suggests that there is something fundamentally wrong with 
deterministic models of violent rent seeking. Significantly, almost all contributions fail
35 Sambanis 2004a.
36 Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
37 Smith 2004.
38 While Ross (2006) discovers such association, Lujala et al. (2005) come to the opposite conclusion.
39 ‘Diamonds Inspire Lozi Secessionists’, The Post, 12 October 1999.
40 Ron (2005) has therefore labelled the resource curse thesis ‘a paradigm in distress’.
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to answer why natural resource rents are associated with war and collapse in some 
countries and stability and development in others. Interestingly, the few contributions 
that try to resolve this puzzle can only do so by taking account of the political processes 
that govern the extraction and distribution of natural resources rents.41 This draws 
attention to a fundamental point. Natural resource rents are not damaging per se,42 and 
instability and violent conflict are by no means inevitable. Instead, it is equally plausible 
to assume that natural resource rents are used by state leaders to co-opt political 
opposition through patronage-based networks. What matters most in explaining 
differences in civil war occurrence is therefore the political use and distribution of 
natural resource rents. In the end, ‘resource curse’ theorists fail to understand that 
politics is decisive to the trajectory of natural-resource rich countries -  ‘the nature of 
conflicts in mineral-dominant economies does not exist prior to politics’.43
CIVIL WAR AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
A second school of thought assumes that a country’s vulnerability to civil war onset 
depends on its economic performance. The two most commonly discussed factors to 
assess the impact of economic performance are income levels and economic growth.
Income levels: A first hypothesis holds that civil war is related to economic poverty; i.e. 
low levels of income measured by GDP per capita. There is strong support for this 
hypothesis as a large number of quantitative studies -  both cross-regional ones44 and 
those that focus on Africa45 -  find that lower income levels are significantly associated 
with higher civil war risks. This finding is robust to different sets of countries and time 
periods, as well as to different measures of civil war onset.46 Also, case study evidence 
suggests that many countries had low and declining per capita income in the years 
preceding the start of their civil wars.47 On the downside, income per capita (just as 
economic growth) may be partially endogenous to civil war:
41 E.g. Snyder & Bhavnani 2005; Snyder 2006.
42 See Khan 2000a, b.
43 DiJohn 2002: 13.
44 Hauge & Ellingsen 1998; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004.
45 Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
46 Sambanis 2004a; Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
47 Sambanis 2004b: 186.
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‘Something that all quantitative studies miss is that low-level violence precedes civil war 
and this should reduce both income and growing by reducing investment and encouraging 
capital flight.’48
It may therefore well be that the correlation between income and civil war onset runs in 
the opposite direction.49 Moreover, the causal mechanisms remain unclear. The 
observed correlation could in principal support the two predominant models in the 
literature, namely the ‘state-weakness hypothesis’50 where low income encourages 
violent conflict by increasing state weakness, and the ‘opportunity cost hypothesis’51 
where low income encourages civil war by decreasing the opportunity cost of rebellion. 
Unfortunately, existing case-study evidence offers little, if any support that such causal 
relationships are really at work.52 While still poorly understood, the link between low 
per capita incomes and higher propensities for internal war is however clearly one of the 
most robust empirical relationships in the civil war literature.
Economic growth: A second hypothesis assumes a link between a country’s economic 
growth rate and civil war onset. Here most scholars expect a negative linear relationship 
whereby low economic growth makes a country more prone to civil war. The empirical 
support is however more contradictory than in the case of per capita income. Hegre & 
Sambanis find that low rates of economic growth are robustly associated with civil war 
onset54 -  a relationship that also holds for Sub-Saharan Africa.55 An earlier study by 
Sambanis, by contrast, comes to the conclusion that economic growth is not robust to 
different civil war models.56 Case-study evidence is subject to similar contradictions. 
While many countries experienced negative economic growth in the years preceding the 
start of their civil wars (e.g. Senegal, Mali and Sierra Leone), there is also evidence that
r<7
rapid growth may actually increase the risk of large-scale violent conflict.
While arguments focused on economic performance help to identify general 
dispositions for civil war, they cannot explain differences in civil war occurrence in 
Uganda and Zambia. In Uganda, economic performance has been extremely poor, 
especially until the 1990s (see figures 4a and 4b). Yet, this poor economic record can
48 Sambanis 2005: 307.
49 See Stewart & Fitzgerald 2001.
50 Fearon & Laitin 2003.
51 Collier & Hoeffler 2004.
52 Collier & Sambanis 2005.
53 See also Blattman & Miguel 2010.
54 Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
55 Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
56 Sambanis 2004a.
57 Sambanis 2004b, 2005.
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hardly be considered the main driver behind recurrent civil war onset. During the first 
administration of Milton Obote (1962-1971), Uganda experienced slowly rising GDP 
per capita and positive, albeit erratic growth rates. In this sense, it would be difficult to 
link the 1966 ‘Battle of Mengo’ to poor economic performance. Similarly, the 
insurgencies against the second Obote administration (1981-1985) can hardly be 
explained by economic decline since the early 1980s were characterised by positive 
economic developments, including growing GDP per capita, positive economic growth 
rates of about 5%, falling inflation and growing prices for cash crop producers.58 The 
reign of Idi Amin, by contrast, gave rise to a disastrous economic performance with 
sharply declining GDP per capita and negative growth rates, especially in the late 
1970s. Particularly ruinous was the expulsion of the Asian community in the early 
1970s, which resulted in a dramatic reduction in skilled human resources and highly 
unproductive forms of rent-seeking. Under ‘Operation Mafutamingi’ (Operation Get- 
Rich-Quick), the new owners typically showed little interest in the acquired Asian 
properties and preferred conspicuous consumption over productive investment -  a 
situation that resulted in a tremendous destruction of wealth.59 Against this background, 
scholars have argued that economic crisis and the corresponding decline in distributable 
wealth ultimately caused the violent overthrow of Amin’s regime.60 Even though this 
seems plausible at first sight, there is reason to argue that economic decline during the 
1970s was largely endogenous to Amin’s extreme minority regime.61 Finally, if low 
economic performance was really the main driver of conflict in Uganda, why would 
most of the country’s civil wars occur in the 1980s and 1990s when per capita income 
and economic growth were on the rise?62
58 ACR 1981/82: B299p.; Tindigarukayo 1988: 615p.
59 Jorgenson 1981: 283; Mamdani 1983: 53; Mutibwa 1992: 117.
60 Kasozi 1994: 116pp.; Brett 1995; 137p.
61 As shown in chapter 4, Amin established a minority regime based on tribal groups from West Nile, his 
home area. Since his regime had only a very limited stake in Ugandan society, it lacked an ‘encompassing 
interest’ and thereby resembled Olson’s (1993) roving bandit who prefers predation and consumption 
over public goods provision and productive investment -  a constellation that is prone to economic 
decline. While economic decline did weaken the financial and repressive capacity o f the regime and made 
it more vulnerable to violent challenge, the origins of economic ruin arguably go back to Amin’s 
exclusionary policies.
62 On post-1986 economic recovery in Uganda see Reinikka & Collier 2001.
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Figure 4: Economic performance in Uganda and Zambia, 1962-200863
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In Zambia, civil war avoidance was achieved despite persistently poor economic 
performance. After a brief copper-based economic boom during the late 1960s, the 
Zambian economy declined due to a number of external shocks.64 Oil prices increased 
threefold, while the reduced demand for copper resulted in a price drop of 40% in 1975. 
The shocks led to rising trade deficits, escalating inflation and mounting foreign debt. In 
1978, Zambia entered into a conflict-ridden relationship with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) but subsequent rounds of structural adjustment could not halt the continued 
economic decline. As a consequence, the country experienced below African average 
growth rates and one of the worst declines in per capita income in the history of post-
63 Calculated based on data by Angus Maddison, available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.
64 See Andersson et al. 2000; Chisala et al. 2006.
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colonial Africa (see figures 4a and 4b). After the transition to multi-party rule in 1991, 
the new government engaged in a new round of IMF-sponsored structural adjustment, 
which aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation, trade liberalisation and public sector 
reform. Economic performance continued however to be undermined by the enduring 
decline of the mining sector that suffered from another collapse of world copper prices. 
The result was low economic growth and declining GDP per capita throughout the 
1990s. It is only more recently that the copper boom has helped to slowly reverse 
Zambia’s long-standing economic stagnation.
CIVIL WAR AND INEQUALITY
One of the oldest and most intuitive ideas about violent conflict is that it stems from the 
existence of inequalities. This ‘inequality-civil war hypothesis’ comes in two variants. 
The dominant variant focuses on the impact of inter-personal inequalities, while the 
minority variant points to the significance of inter-group inequalities.
Inter-personal inequalities'. Inter-personal inequalities relate to the distribution of 
income across the whole population of individuals from richest to poorest, typically 
measured through Gini coefficients. It is assumed that the existence of such ‘vertical 
inequalities’ constitutes an important source of grievance and thereby encourages 
violent conflict. However, this hypothesis receives only limited empirical support as 
there is no robust statistical relationship between income inequality and civil war onset. 
Whereas Nafziger & Auvinen find that ‘objectives grievances’ of income inequality 
contribute to civil war and humanitarian emergencies,65 Fearon & Laitin and Collier & 
Hoeffler come to the opposite conclusion.66 Cramer, finally, establishes that neither 
bivariate nor multivariate analysis produces generally accepted patterns between income 
distribution and civil war onset.
With respect to Uganda and Zambia, the ‘vertical inequality-civil war hypothesis’ is 
similarly inconclusive. If vertical inequality was a key driver of civil war, we should 
expect high income inequality in Uganda and low income inequality in Zambia. Yet, as 
shown in table 2, the reverse is true. With an average Gini coefficient of 0.552 since the
65 Nafziger & Auvinen 2002.
66 Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004.
67 Cramer 2006.
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1960s, Zambia has been among the countries with the highest degree of inequality on 
the African continent. Uganda, by contrast, exhibits lower degrees of income inequality 
even though its Gini coefficient has been on the rise since the 1990s.
Table 2: Gini coefficients in Uganda and Zambia.68
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total
Uganda No data 0,345 (5) 0,361 (4) 0,432 (6) 0,491 (3) 0,408 (18)
Zambia 0,476 (3) 0,569 (5) No data 0,578 (12) 0,464 (2) 0,552 (22)
All this does not necessarily dismiss inequality as an explanatory factor. Instead, the 
lack of a statistically significant association may be due to the extremely poor quality of 
the inequality data.69 Gini coefficients are often either very poorly measured or entirely 
missing, not least in Sub-Saharan Africa. This makes claims based on large samples of 
countries extremely unreliable. One way to further explore the role of inequalities in
• 7 0  *large-scale violent conflict could therefore be to improve the data quality. But there is 
a second, arguably more promising option. Significantly, the main problem may not be 
data quality as such but rather that Gini coefficients simply do not measure the kind of 
inequality that is relevant to civil war onset. From a theoretical point of view, this is a 
plausible possibility since it is by no means clear why and how inter-personal inequality 
-  that involves important collective action problems -  would encourage the ability to 
organise a civil war. As a consequence, other scholars have proposed to consider the 
impact of a different kind of inequality, namely inequality between social groups.
Inter-group inequalities: A second hypothesis relates the onset of civil war to the 
existence of severe inter-group inequalities. Frances Stewart argues that violent conflict 
is not ‘exclusively a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against 
others’.71 Instead, civil wars normally occur when ‘culturally defined groups’ -  i.e. 
ethnic and religious groups -  mobilise against each other. The material basis for such 
violent group conflicts are ‘horizontal inequalities’, which are defined as inequalities in 
political participation, economic assets, social services and cultural status. It is 
suggested that violent political mobilisation is especially likely when there are 
consistent horizontal inequalities, i.e. when political inequalities at the leadership level
68 UNU-WIDER 2008. The numbers in brackets indicate the number of surveys that were available to 
calculate the Gini averages.
69 Cramer 2005: 11pp.
70 See Milanovic 2005.
71 Stewart 2000: 246. See also Stewart 2008.
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and socioeconomic inequalities at the mass level run in the same direction. The 
‘horizontal inequality’ hypothesis is supported by considerable case study evidence, 
including a number of African case studies.72 Large-N research by Gudrun 0stby finds 
that horizontal economic and social inequality between ethnic, religious and regional 
groups in 55 developing countries has a positive significant effect on violent conflict. 
Similarly, a quantitative study by Cederman et al. shows that economic horizontal 
inequalities between ethnic groups increase the risk of violent conflict.74 Both 0stby 
and Cederman et al. demonstrate that violent conflict is especially likely when there are 
also political horizontal inequalities.
The ‘horizontal inequalities approach’ is also promising when trying to explain 
differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. I argue however that there is 
reason to mainly focus on the role of horizontal inequalities at the elite level. Stewart 
and colleagues maintain that violent conflict requires horizontal inequalities not only at 
the elite level but also at the mass level since only the latter will enable leaders to recruit
n  r
followers. While I agree that situations where elite and mass level inequalities run in 
the same direction greatly facilitate violent mobilisation, I do not think that horizontal 
inequalities at the mass level are a necessary condition for violent conflict. Instead, I 
expect that group leaders can mobilise their groups even in the absence of mass-level 
horizontal inequalities, not least since the ‘masses’ tend to expect that they will be 
worse-off if their leaders do not have access to positions of state power. This 
expectation is confirmed in the cases of Uganda and Zambia. Even though horizontal 
inequalities at the mass level have mattered, horizontal inequalities at the elite level 
were arguably the main driver behind patterns of war and peace in the two countries 
(see chapters 4-7).
72 Stewart 2002, 2010; Langer 2005, 2009; Langer et al. 2007; Caumartin et al. 2008; Brown 2008; 
Murshed & Gates 2005.
73 0stby 2008a. A different study finds that horizontal social inequality between ethnic groups has a 
positive significant effect on violent conflict, while a measure for horizontal economic inequality turns 
out to be insignificant (see 0stby 2008b). A separate study for Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that both 
economic and social inequalities between regional groups increase the likelihood of violent conflict (see 
0stby et al. 2009).
74 Cederman et al. 2010a.
75 Stewart 2008: 12.
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CIVIL WAR AND ETHNICITY
A fourth school of thought has sought to establish a link between civil war onset and 
ethnicity. This argument comes in two variants, one focusing on a country’s degree of 
ethnic fractionalisation/polarisation and one privileging patterns of ethnic exclusion.
Ethnic fractionalisation/  polarisation: A first hypothesis holds that high degrees of 
ethnic fractionalisation make a country more prone to civil war. While perennialists
nr
stress the primordial nature of conflict between ethnic groups, modernists attribute 
ethnic violence to the politicisation of cultural difference in the context of the modem 
nation state.77 The basic idea that ethnic diversity breeds conflict has been taken up in 
the quantitative civil war literature by testing for the effects of demographic proxies
no
such as the ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalisation’ (ELF) index. However, there is no 
evidence for a positive association between high ethnic fractionalisation as measured by 
the ELF index and civil war.79 For Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic fractionalisation is even 
negatively associated with civil war, which may indicate that the continent’s high levels
OA
of ethnic diversity act as a source of safety for the most heterogeneous countries. A 
second hypothesis holds that the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict is 
non-monotonic, with less violence for highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous 
countries. Most influentially, Donald Horowitz has argued that the most severe ethnic 
conflicts tend to arise in countries where a significant ethnic minority faces the 
dominance of an ethnic majority.81 This claim has also been taken up in quantitative 
models by testing for the effects of ethnic polarisation -  again with inconclusive 
findings. This is true for both Montalvo & Reynal-Querol’s ‘index of polarisation’ and 
Collier & Hoeffler’s measure of ‘ethnic dominance’83. For Sub-Saharan Africa, Collier
OA
& Hoeffler find ‘ethnic dominance’ to be unrelated to civil war onset.
76 Smith 1986; Huntington 1996.
77 Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983.
78 ELF measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong 
to the same ethnolinguistic group (Taylor & Hudson 1972).
79 Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004. The same is true for fractionalisation indices 
constructed by Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005) and Fearon (2003, cited in Sambanis 2004a).
80 Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
81 Horowitz 1985.
82 Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005) find that ethnic polarisation does indeed increase the likelihood of 
civil war -  a finding that has however been challenged by Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2006).
83 While Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Hegre & Sambanis (2006) find this measure to be positively 
related with civil war, others come to the opposite conclusion (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol 2005).
84 Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
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Degrees of ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation per se are also of little 
relevance when trying to understand differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and 
Zambia. As shown in table 3, ethnic fractionalisation can hardly be behind these 
differences as both countries exhibit similarly high levels of fractionalisation. Given 
that Uganda exhibits considerably lower degrees of ethnic polarisation, the latter has 
even less explanatory power. At the same time, the polarisation data illustrate the 
limited usefulness of macro-level indices describing a country’s demography. Based on 
population statistics, Zambia may be relatively polarised, with Bemba-speakers (about 
40%) opposing other larger groups such as Nyanja-speakers (about 25%) and Tonga- 
speakers (about 15%). Yet, as I will show below, this polarisation has been politically 
accommodated. Uganda, by contrast, is formally less polarised but suffers from the 
historically grown political polarisation between the Baganda on the one hand, and the 
other ethnic groups on the other85. This underlines that ethnic cleavages are never static 
conditions but always subject to complex processes of political bargaining -  a 
complexity that single fractionalisation or polarisation indices simply cannot 
meaningfully capture.86 In this sense, the indeterminate relationship between 
demographic indices of ethnic diversity and civil war is everything but surprising.
Table 3: Indices of ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation in Uganda and Zambia
Country Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation 
(ELF) (Taylor & 
Hudson 1972)
Ethnic 
fra ctio nalis atio n 
(Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol 
2005)
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
(Fearon 2003)
Ethnic 
polarisation 
(Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol 
2005)
Ethnic 
dominance 
(Collier & 
Hoeffler 2004)
Uganda 0,909 0,932 0,93 0,279 0
Zambia 0,818 0,787 0,726 0,606 0
Ethnic discrimination/exclusion'. A third hypothesis by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
project relates violent conflict to political discrimination against ethnic minority
0* 7
groups. The empirical findings are however again inconclusive. While some find 
strong evidence that ethnic discrimination increases the likelihood of civil war,88 others
85 See Mutibwa 2008.
86 This is confirmed in case studies meant to refine the ‘Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war’. Domestic 
political institutions are identified as an important variable to consider in interaction with ethnic 
fractionalisation or ethnic dominance (Sambanis 2005: 313).
87 Gurr 1993a, 2000.
88 Regan & Norton 2005.
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come to the opposite conclusion.89 Moreover, the MAR approach is undermined by its 
focus on disadvantaged minority groups only, which prevents it from fully capturing the 
dynamics of political exclusion at the level of the state. The latter dynamics take centre 
stage in a fourth approach that was recently put forward by Andreas Wimmer and 
colleagues.90 Here, the focus is on the state as an organisation that is captured to 
different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic groups whereby civil wars 
become the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. This hypothesis 
is tested based on the new Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set, which identifies all 
politically relevant ethnic groups around the world and measures access to executive- 
level state power for members of these ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2005. 
The finding is that exclusion and competition along ethnic lines are strongly and 
robustly associated with civil war, with rebellions in the name of excluded ethnic 
groups being much more likely than violent conflict in the name of included groups.
How does the ‘ethnic exclusion’ hypothesis fare in resolving my puzzle?91 As for 
Zambia, the EPR data provide no evidence for ethnic exclusion from executive-level 
state power. Uganda, by contrast, is coded as having suffered from enduringly high 
levels of ethnic exclusion.93 It may therefore well be that differences in civil war 
occurrence in Zambia and Uganda reflect varying degrees of ethnic inclusion in the two 
countries. On the downside, the EPR dataset relies solely on expert estimates of ethnic 
inclusiveness rather than on primary data detailing the actual distribution of access to 
state power. This raises some questions about the accuracy of the EPR data. Moreover, 
due to the quantitative nature of the project, Wimmer et al. cannot distinguish between 
degrees of representativity of leaders who claim to speak for an ethnic group. Finally, it
89 Gurr 1993b. Olzak (2006) reports the contradictory finding that both ethnic discrimination and the 
granting of ethnic group rights are associated with ethnic rebellion.
90 Wimmer et al 2009; Cederman et al. 2010b.
91 Note that the following paragraph focuses on the explanatory power of the EPR approach only. While 
the MAR coding of ethnic exclusion in Zambia and Uganda is similar to the EPR coding, it focuses on 
selected ‘minorities at risk’ only and is therefore less useful when trying to understand ethnic competition 
over the state as a whole.
92 While the country’s four major ethno-linguistic groups (Bemba-, Nyanja-, Tonga, and Lozi-speakers) 
are coded as senior partners in government between 1964 and 2005, the North-Western groups are 
consistently identified as junior partners.
93 Some of the ethnic groups who are coded as ‘excluded’ or ‘discriminated’ against have indeed been 
behind the Uganda’s civil wars. Examples include the Langi/Acholi in the early 1970s, the Baganda and 
West Nilers during the early 1980s and the Iteso during the late 1980s. Yet, the EPR data also raise many 
questions. If the Baganda were a senior partner in government between 1962 and 1966, how can we then 
explain the ‘Battle of Mengo’ in 1966? If the Basoga were discriminated against during the 1980s, why 
didn’t they take up arms against the Obote II government? And if  the West Nile groups were really 
politically irrelevant between 1990 and 2005, why did the region witness two insurgencies against the 
Museveni government from the mid-1990s?
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is important to keep in mind that ethnicity is only one source of social fragmentation 
along with religious, regional or class cleavages. All this means that I will further 
explore the ‘ethnic exclusion’ hypothesis from a broader political organisation 
perspective and in the context of a small-N study based on primary data.
CIVIL WAR AND POLITICAL INSTIUTIONS
A final school of thought in the study of civil war tries to account for the effects of 
political institutions. Here one can broadly distinguish between arguments focusing on 
formal regime type on the one hand, and hybrid neo-patrimonial rule on the other.
Regime type: Many scholars assume a link between regime type and a country’s 
vulnerability to civil war. Here, the most common distinction is between ‘democracies’, 
‘semi-democracies’ (or anocracies) and ‘autocracies’, typically measured by relying on 
the well-known ‘Polity score’. The latter is an index composed of five variables, which 
focus on constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of political 
participation, and the regulation of political participation.94 A first hypothesis holds that 
the more democratic a country, the less likely it is to experience civil war. The 
underlying rationale is that only democracies permit the expression of opposition and 
thereby facilitate the non-violent resolution of conflicts. However, this hypothesis 
receives no support as most quantitative studies find the ‘level of democracy’ measure 
to be insignificant.95
A second hypothesis holds that civil war risks are highest not among democracies or 
autocracies, but among intermediary regimes. The idea is that anocracies neither permit 
the expression of opposition (like democracies) nor are they in a position to suppress 
dissidents effectively (like autocracies) -  a situation that makes them especially prone to 
civil war. This assumption receives strong empirical backing: Many studies find a 
significant association between anocracies and civil war onset,96 which seems to be
94 Marshall & Jaggers 2005. The ‘Polity Score’ captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point 
scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores are usually 
converted to regime categories, including ‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5), and 
‘democracies’ (+6 to +10).
95 Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
96 Hegre et al. 2001; Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003.
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robust to different civil war models.97 Moreover, recent work by Goldstone et al. shows 
that the predictive power of the ‘anocracy favours civil war’ argument can be 
significantly increased by further distinguishing among partial democracies according to 
the presence or absence of ‘factionalism’.98 The worst situation in terms of risks of 
instability is a political landscape that combines factionalism with a relatively high level 
of open competition for office (i.e. a partial democracy with factionalism). Vreeland 
argues the observed link between anocracies and civil war onset is undermined by 
endogeneity concerns.99 Most problematic within the Polity index is the factional 
category, where political competition is defined as
‘intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the
establishment o f rival governments and a civil war’.100
In the light of this definition, Vreeland finds it almost tautological that the factional 
component exhibits a strong relationship with the onset of civil war. He demonstrates 
that once the factional component is removed from the Polity index, the original 
relationship between anocracies and civil war onset disappears.101 Goldstone and 
colleagues, by contrast, show that the association between anocracies and civil war
• 109persists even after accounting for the endogenous coding of the Polity IV data.
With respect to Uganda and Zambia, there is no clear relationship between the given
level of democracy and differences in civil war occurrence. If democracy was the key
driver behind civil war, we should expect consistently high levels of democracy in
Zambia and low levels of democracy in Uganda. This is however only partially the case
(see figure 5). In Uganda, democracy levels have indeed been low since the mid- 
1 0^1960s. Accordingly, political insiders locate the beginnings of recurrent war in the 
1966 abrogation of the Independence Constitution, which set a bad precedent and
97 Hegre & Sambanis 2006. Evidence on the robustness of this association is however contradictory. 
While the anocracy measure is not robust to different civil war models for the period between 1960 and 
1993, it becomes more robust for the period from 1945 to 1999 (Sambanis 2004a).
98 Goldstone et al. 2010. As measured by Polity, factionalism occurs when political competition is 
dominated by ethnic or other parochial groups that regularly compete for political influence in order to 
promote particularist agendas and favour group members to the detriment of common, secular or cross­
cutting agendas.
99 Vreeland 2008. See also Hegre & Sambanis 2006: 527.
100 Gurr 1989, cited after Vreeland 2008: 401.
101 Vreeland 2008: 407pp. Further endogeneity concerns arise due to the fact that ‘[p]olity IV coders 
sometimes code the democracy and autocracy variables, the difference of which is polity2, as missing 
when a war is ongoing, and missing values of polity2 are then either interpolated or coded as ‘O’. This 
makes it likely for a country at war to be coded as an anocracy’ (Sambanis 2004b: 178).
102 Goldstone et al. 2010.
103 Note that even the improved Polity IV score during the early 1980s (see figure 5) is somewhat 
deceiving in that this period was characterised by intense controversies over the allegedly rigged 1980s 
elections that brought the country’s first Prime Minister Milton Obote back to power (ACR 1980/81: 
B370; Mutibwa 1992: 138pp.).
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deprived the country of an ‘institutionalised mechanism for peaceful and democratic 
change of government’.104 Similarly, Yoweri Museveni -  the current President -  claims 
that the successful insurgency by his National Resistance Army (NRA) was motivated 
by the absence of democracy, evident in the rigged elections of 1980.105 Yet, as I will 
show below, the various civil wars in Uganda originated precisely among those tribal 
groups that were denied access to the structures of the post-colonial state. In this sense, 
it seems more plausible to argue that recurrent civil war goes back to the exclusionary 
nature of the post-colonial regimes rather than to the absence of democracy per se.106 
The case for democracy as a driver of peace and stability is further undermined when 
looking at Zambia -  a country that has been able to maintain peace despite high levels 
of autocracy during the one-party state of the Second Republic (1971-1991) (see figure 
5). Moreover, in contrast to claims by Burnell, improved levels of democracy during the 
Third Republic (1991-2008) have hardly yielded a ‘democratic domestic peace’.107 
Instead, the return to multi-party competition in 1991 -  and more specifically the option 
of defection into the opposition -  favoured political fragmentation along tribal lines, 
which has arguably made Zambia’s stability more fragile (see chapter 7).
If anocracy was the main driving force behind differences in civil war occurrence, only 
Uganda should be coded as a partial democracy. But again, this is not the case as 
Zambia has been able to avoid civil war despite displaying all signs of an anocracy 
during the First (1964-1972) and Third Republic (1991-today) (see figure 6). Moreover, 
Uganda has experienced violent conflict even during the extremely autocratic military 
regime of Idi Amin (1971-1979), which shows that even full-developed autocracies are 
not always able to effectively suppress political challenges to the state.
104 Interview, Paul Ssemogerere.
105 Museveni 1997.
106 This is underlined by an NRA insider who reveals that most combatants were motivated not by 
‘idealistic notions such as democracy’ but rather by patterns of self-experienced discrimination and 
repression along tribal lines (Amaza 1998: xiv).
10 Burnell (2005: 122pp.) argues that Zambia’s ‘democratic domestic peace’ goes back to regular multi­
party elections since the early 1990s, declining levels o f political repression, a burgeoning civil society, 
and an independent media. However, as Burnell himself recognises, several elections were deemed 
unsatisfactory by observer organisations. In 1996, the elections were overshadowed by constitutional 
changes that made the former President Kenneth Kaunda ineligible and prompted an electoral boycott by 
the former ruling party (Baylies & Szeftel 1997). In 2001, the elections were undermined by irregularities 
whose significance was heightened by the closeness of the declared result (Burnell 2002, 2003).
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Figure 5: Democracy in Uganda and Zambia, 1962-2008108
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All this does however not necessarily dismiss democracy as an explanatory factor. 
Instead, the problem may just be Polity’s five component definition of democracy, 
which arguably misses what is a key aspect of democracy, namely the existing degree of 
institutional inclusion. As a consequence, a country may be regarded as democratic, 
while majorities actively discriminate against minorities. This is especially likely in 
divided societies -  a problem that became the starting point of Arendt Lijphart’s 
consociational theory.109 Consociationalism is a group-based form of democracy where 
elite power-sharing prevents deep social divisions from destabilising democracy. 
Drawing on case studies of both European and non-European countries, Lijphart was 
able to show that consociational arrangements -  including the four elements of grand 
coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy -  make peaceful 
democracy possible even in sharply divided societies. Further evidence for the peace 
enhancing role of elite power-sharing can be found in the work of Arthur Lewis110, 
Gerhard Lehmbruch111, Eric Nordlinger112, Michal Burton & John Higley113, Donald 
Horowitz114, Donald Rothchild115, and John McGary & Brendan O’Leary116. In the
108 Compiled based on the Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2008, available at 
http ://www. sy stemicpeace. org/inscr/p4 v2008.xls.
109 Lijphart 1977, 2008.
110 Lewis 1965.
111 Lehmbruch 1967.
112 Nordlinger 1972.
113 Burton & Higley 1987, 1998, Higley & Burton 2006.
114 Horowitz 1985. Note however that Horowitz advocates an ‘integrative approach’ to power-sharing that 
eschews ethnic groups as the main organising principle for democracy and instead favours incentives for 
moderation and cooperation across ethnic divides, mainly by means o f ‘electoral engineering’.
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burgeoning postconflict power-sharing literature, by contrast, the evidence is more 
ambiguous. First, quantitative studies come to contradictory conclusions on whether 
political, military, economic and territorial power-sharing leads to lasting peace in the 
wake of violent conflict.117 Second, case study evidence shows that experiments with
110
postconflict power-sharing have so far had at best mixed outcomes. On the whole, 
however, most theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that elite power-sharing is 
likely to favour peace and stability. Moreover, the power-sharing lens is also very useful 
when trying to explain differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. As I 
will show below, conflict-ridden Uganda has been characterised by enduringly low 
levels of elite power-sharing, while the reverse is true for peaceful Zambia.
Neo-patrimonial rule: A second influential argument relates civil war to the neo- 
patrimonial character of the African state. The concept of neo-patrimonialism is derived 
from one of Max Weber’s historical types of rule -  patrimonial domination. While ‘the 
patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the ‘private’ and 
‘official’ sphere (...) and political administration, too, is treated as a purely personal 
affair’,119 neo-patrimonialism involves the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational 
domination. Neo-patrimonial rule is therefore
‘a form of organisation in which relationships o f a broadly patrimonial type pervade a 
political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. 
Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally 
defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service but of 
private property’.120
Such forms of political rule are often identified as a quasi-universal feature of African 
politics making neo-patrimonialism the main concept in Africanist political science.121
The main argument is that neo-patrimonialism favours economic mismanagement and is 
therefore prone to crisis and breakdown, especially if combined with a deteriorating 
external environment. Most prominently, Chabal & Daloz portray African states as 
‘vacuous and ineffectual’ shells that were never properly institutionalised and function 
through a ‘political instrumentalization of disorder’. As internal and external resources 
to lubricate the neo-patrimonial system decline, ‘there is inevitably a tendency to link
115 Rothchild & Foley 1988; Rothchild 1997.
116 McGary & O’Leary 2004; O’Leary 2005.
117 See Walter 2002; Hoddie & Hartzell 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie 2005; Jarstad & Nilsson 2008.
118 See, for example, Spears 2002; Rothchild 2005; Tull & Mehler 2005; Sriram 2008; Mehler 2009.
1,9 Weber 1978: 1028p.
120 Clapham 1985: 48.
121 Influential ‘neo-patrimonialists’ include, among others, Medard (1982), Clapham (1985) and van de 
Walle (2001). See Erdmann & Engel (2006) for a literature review.
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politics to realms of increased disorder, be it war or crime’.122 In a similar vein, Bayart 
et al. suggest the emergence of a ‘new form of la politique du ventre’ whereby the 
combined effects of economic crisis, neo-liberal structural adjustment and globalisation 
favour the implosion and criminalisation of the state in Africa.123 Unfortunately, ‘neo- 
patrimonialists’ remain highly unspecific about why only some neo-patrimonial states 
experience war and collapse. If neo-patrimonial rule is a quasi-universal feature of 
African politics, why have some neo-patrimonial states managed to hold together? 
Given that both Uganda and Zambia are regularly described as neo-patrimonial states124, 
why has only Uganda experienced recurrent civil war? In the end, neo-patrimonialists 
fail to recognise that rent seeking along patron-client ties is common to all developing 
countries and can have both positive and negative effects depending on the 
‘configuration of political forces’.125 Seen from this perspective, general concepts of 
‘disorder as a political instrument’ or ‘the criminalisation of the state in Africa’ explain 
little, if anything. In this simplistic version, neo-patrimonialism remains little more than 
an undifferentiated ‘catch-all variable’.126
But even more differentiated versions of the neo-patrimonial argument remain 
insufficient. William Reno, for instance, seeks to explain the ‘distinct political logic of 
weak states’ that he distinguishes from ‘stronger bureaucratic states’. 127 He claims that 
the end of the Cold War and the imposition of structural adjustment led to the disruption 
of state-based patronage politics and made conventional state-building strategies highly 
dangerous for weak states’ rulers. The latter reacted by setting up a violent ‘shadow 
state’, whereby they intentionally weakened or even destroyed state institutions to retain 
control over markets and discipline rivals. Reno traces why some African states have 
experienced war and collapse but largely avoids the question of why others have not. In 
doing so, he remains vague about what exactly makes a state ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ and 
how the stronger states manage to accommodate internal and external shocks. Is Uganda 
really a weaker and less bureaucratic state than Zambia? And if so, how does this -  by 
itself -  explain differences in civil war occurrence?
122 Chabal & Daloz 1999: 162.
123 Bayart etal. 1999.
124 On neo-patrimonialism in Uganda see Barkan et al. 2005; Rubogoya 2007; Cammack et al. 2007. On 
neo-patrimonial rule in Zambia see Rakner 2003; Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003; von Soest 2007.
125 Khan 2000a: 39.
126 Mkandawire 2001: 299.
127 Reno 1998.
Chris Allen’s approach is more promising in that he distinguishes between two types of 
neo-patrimonial politics in Africa.128 Faced with the instability of clientelism after 
decolonisation, some countries are said to have introduced ‘centralised-bureaucratic 
politics’ whereby clientelist resources were distributed through a bureaucracy directly 
answerable to the President (e.g. Senegal, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Zambia). 
Others are said to have continued to rely on ‘spoils politics’, characterised by ‘winner- 
takes all’ clientelism, pervasive corruption, economic crisis, lack of political mediation 
and violent repression (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda). Allen considers 
these differences as key to understanding differences in civil war occurrence. This is 
however only partially convincing as it does not become clear why and how more 
centralised clientelist systems are able to avoid violent disintegration. In general, it may 
well be that control over patronage in Uganda has been less centralised than in Zambia. 
But how can this -  by itself -  causally explain recurrent civil war in Uganda and 
persistent peace and stability in Zambia? This is not to deny that hierarchical and firmly 
rooted organisational structures may be important for maintaining political unity. But it 
seems more plausible to focus on the inclusiveness of the clientelist system. What 
matters most in the end is not how patronage is distributed but to whom.
SUMMARY
My literature review reveals that most of the dominant explanations of civil war fall 
short of resolving my puzzle. Some theories are inconclusive both in general and for 
Uganda and Zambia in particular. This concerns arguments on natural resources, 
income inequality, ethnic fractionalisation, and neo-patrimonial rule. Other explanatory 
factors such as income per capita, economic growth and anocracy are robustly related to 
civil war onset and therefore help to identify general dispositions for violent conflict. 
Yet, they cannot account for differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. 
By contrast, some approaches seem to be promising both in general and for Uganda and 
Zambia in particular. This is true for Frances Stewart’s ‘horizontal inequalities’ 
hypothesis, Andreas Wimmer’s work on ethnic power relations and power-sharing 
theories as advocated by Arendt Lijphart and others. Significantly, all of these 
approaches point to the need for inclusive political arrangements at the level of elites.
128 Allen 1995.
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1.3 The Argument
Against this backdrop, my own theoretical approach to the study of civil war focuses on 
the inclusiveness of elite politics. I argue that a country’s propensity for conflict or 
peace is determined by the inclusiveness of the ‘elite bargain’, which I define as the 
distribution of access to positions of state power (political, military, economic and 
territorial) between contending social groups. I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains 
facilitate civil war avoidance, whereas exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of 
civil war.
This theoretical approach helps to resolve my puzzle of striking differences in civil war 
occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. In Uganda, I trace recurrent civil war back to the 
persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. By contrast, Zambia has been able to contain 
the spectre of civil war by forging and maintaining inclusive elite bargains. My research 
reveals that the two countries’ varying vulnerability to civil war reflects differences in 
the relative trend, depth, scope, authenticity and perception of the elite bargain. There is 
also evidence for the relevance of several complementary explanatory factors, including 
violent state repression, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, political leadership, 
levels of urbanisation, and regional spillover effects.
1,4 Originality of the argument
My theoretical approach draws on pre-existing arguments on horizontal inequalities, 
ethnic power relations and power-sharing, which have all pointed to the need of 
inclusive political arrangements at the level of elites. As a consequence, the theoretical 
contribution of my argument may be modest. However, my use of the concept of 'elite 
bargain' not only integrates existing work on inclusive elite politics but also goes 
beyond it by including the distribution of economic privileges and sources of rent within 
a political inclusiveness framework.
The main contribution this thesis makes is the collection and analysis of extensive 
primary data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, economic and 
territorial posts in Uganda and Zambia. Significantly, my dataset is -  at least to my 
knowledge -  a lot more comprehensive than any comparable data not only for Uganda 
and Zambia but also for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, my data are
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complemented by a total of 103 interviews, which provide original insights into 
Ugandan and Zambian politics, and in-depth historical analysis.
7.5 Structure of the PhD
Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the PhD. I begin 
by defining what I understand by civil war onset, the dependent variable of my research 
(section 2.1). Then I go on to lay out my own theory of civil war, which focuses on the 
inclusiveness of the ‘elite bargain’, my independent variable (section 2.2). To develop 
my argument, I first establish that colonial rule left Sub-Saharan Africa with a legacy of 
high social fragmentation. Then I argue that African leaders responded to this challenge 
in distinct ways, namely by forging inclusive vs. exclusionary elite bargains. I 
hypothesise that exclusionary elite bargains lead to civil war, whereas inclusive elite 
bargains facilitate civil war avoidance. In a third step, I provide details on research 
methods and data sources (section 2.3).
Chapter 3 provides the historical background to my two case studies by tracing the 
genesis of social fragmentation in Uganda and Zambia and identifying the dominant 
social cleavages that structure political competition in both countries. I show that 
colonial rule left both Uganda and Zambia with high levels of social fragmentation. In 
Uganda, the main sources of social cleavage are tribe, region and -  albeit to a declining 
extent -  religion (section 3.1). In Zambia, the most salient social dividing lines include 
language, tribe and -  albeit to a lesser extent -  class (section 3.2). Even though the 
legacy of high social fragmentation represented an important challenge for post-colonial 
governments in both countries, social divisions in Uganda were clearly more 
pronounced than in Zambia.
Chapter 4 includes the first part of the Uganda case study. I begin by showing that the 
country experienced a total of eight civil wars between 1962 and 1986 (section 4.1). 
Trying to explain this recurrent violence, I first demonstrate that Uganda’s first post­
colonial governments all failed, albeit to different degrees, to overcome the colonial 
legacy of high ethno-regional fragmentation. This became evident in low levels of 
political, economic, military and territorial power-sharing under Obote I, Amin, the 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Obote II (section 4.2). Then I go on to 
argue that the failure to forge and maintain more inclusive elite bargains became a key
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driver behind the various insurgencies that ravaged the country during its first two and a 
half decades of independence (section 4.3). At the same time, I find that the seemingly 
never-ending cycles of civil war in Uganda were not only caused by patterns of tribal 
exclusion but also by concurrent violent repression against the marginalised groups 
(section 4.4).
Chapter 5 consists of the second part of the Uganda case study. I begin by showing that 
the country has experienced a total of seven civil wars since 1986 but seems to have 
become more peaceful recently (Section 5.1). Trying to explain these developments, I 
first demonstrate that the distribution of political, military and economic power under 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) has been heavily biased in favour of 
Southern and Western Uganda, whereas territorial power has been shared more 
equitably, evident in the country’s comprehensive decentralisation policy (see section
5.2). Then I go on to argue that the enduring absence of an inclusive elite bargain at the 
centre has become a key driving force behind the various anti-NRM insurgencies since 
1986 (section 5.3). At the same time, some of these tensions have been eased by 
increased territorial power-sharing since the mid-1990s, which has provided the local 
leadership in all parts of the country with access to jobs and resources and thereby 
integrated them into the elite bargain. Finally, I show that recurrent civil war since 1986 
is again also due to violent repression against the excluded groupings (section 5.4). 
Altogether, the story of Uganda’s post-independence instability is therefore a story of 
exclusion and repression along tribal lines.
Chapter 6 lays out the first part of the Zambia case study. I begin by showing that 
Zambia managed to maintain peace and stability throughout its First and Second 
Republic (1994-1991) (section 6.1). To explain civil war avoidance, I first demonstrate 
that the country’s first President Kaunda and his United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) forged and maintained an inclusive elite bargain under the motto of ‘One 
Zambia, One Nation’, which manifested itself in high degrees of political, economic and 
military power-sharing between the country’s major linguistic and tribal groups (section
6.2). Then I argue that this practise of ‘tribal balancing’ has helped to accommodate the 
colonial legacy of social fragmentation, prevented the emergence of cohesive group 
grievances and thereby laid the foundations for Zambia’s lasting peace (section 6.3.). In 
a last step, I find that Zambia’s national unity was also facilitated by a number of other 
factors, including Kaunda’s role as an effective ‘mediator above tribe’, the existence of
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an external threat in the form of regional instability, high levels of urbanisation, and 
one-party rule during the Second Republic (section 6.4).
Chapter 7 provides the second part of my Zambia case study. As in the previous 
chapter, I start by showing that Zambia continued to enjoy peace and stability after the 
return to multi-party politics in 1991 (section 7.1). To make sense of this lasting peace, I 
first illustrate that both the Chiluba and Mwanawasa governments made a continued 
attempt to maintain an inclusive elite bargain, evident in the largely inclusive 
distribution of access to positions of political, economic and military power (section
7.2). Afterwards, I suggest that this has again helped to prevent the emergence of 
cohesive group grievances and thereby cemented Zambia’s lasting peace (section 7.3). 
At the same time, the decline of socioeconomic inter-group inequalities as well as high 
levels of urbanisation have made violent conflict even less likely (section 7.4).
Chapter 8 summarises the argument and outlines avenues for future research. Trying to 
refine my initial hypothesis, I first argue that Uganda and Zambia’s varying 
vulnerability to civil war reflects differences in the relative trend, depth, scope, 
authenticity and perception of the elite bargain (section 8.1). Then I show that the 
observed differences in civil war occurrence also depend on a number of other factors, 
including violent state repression, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, political 
leadership, levels of urbanisation, and regional spillover effects.. I conclude by outlining 
three different avenues for future research, which focus on extending the number of 
cases, explaining the inclusiveness of the elite bargain and theorising the link between 
the elite bargain and economic development (section 8.2).
The eight main chapters are followed by the bibliography (section 9), a detailed list of 
interview partners (section 10) and the annex (section 11). The latter includes my 
dataset on the inter-group distribution of political, military and economic posts in 
Uganda and Zambia (section 11.1) and my interview guidelines (section 11.2).
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2 Theoretical and methodological framework
This chapter develops the theoretical and methodological framework of my PhD thesis. 
First, I briefly define the concept of civil war onset, the dependent variable of my 
research (section 2.1). Then I lay out my own theory on the causes of civil war, which 
focuses on the inclusiveness of the ‘elite bargain’, my independent variable (section
2.2). In a third step, I provide details on research methods and data sources (section
2.3).
2.1 Defining civil war onset
‘How would we know a civil war if  we saw one?’129
The search for a definition of civil war is fraught with contradictions and problems. 
There are many other types of political violence, including assassinations, terrorism, 
communal violence, riots, state-led massacres, military coups and interstate wars. But 
what exactly distinguishes a civil war from these phenomena?
The first point of reference when looking for a definition of civil war is typically the 
seminal Correlates of War (COW) project, which defines civil war as
‘any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active 
participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides’.130
This definition clarifies that the distinction between a civil and an international war 
concerns the intemality of the war to the territory of a sovereign state. Moreover, the 
requirement that the government needs to actively participate as a combatant and that 
violence should be reciprocated distinguishes civil war from other types of political 
violence such as communal violence and state-led massacres. Finally, the specification 
that civil wars need to exceed a certain threshold of deaths -  by introducing the by now
j i j
infamous criterion of at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year -  sets them apart 
from riots, terrorism and most coups.
129 Sambanis 2004a: 816.
130 Small & Singer 1982: 210.
131 Ibid.: 213.
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While the COW definition of civil war seems relatively straightforward at first sight, it
nonetheless raises a number of questions.132 To begin with, the boundary between civil
and international war is often more blurred than it seems since many of the recent civil
wars were internationalised in their origins and conduct. Among the most obvious
examples are the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone
and Liberia, which were all characterised by heavy regional involvement and 
1spillovers. Moreover, the government may sometimes not be a formal combatant but 
still be fighting a war using militias as proxies. To give only one of many possible 
examples, this is precisely what happened recently in the Sudanese region of Darfur.134 
Finally, and arguably most importantly, the battle-related death threshold is problematic 
for a number of reasons. First, the choice to set a threshold of deaths with a single cut­
off point is arbitrary, especially given the poor quality of data on battle-related deaths. 
Second, an absolute threshold does not reflect a civil war’s intensity as well as a relative 
(per capita) measure would. As the 1000-deaths criterion does not show whether the 
given number of deaths reflect a small or big share of the population, any dataset will be 
skewed towards larger population counties such as India or Nigeria where insurgencies 
with high levels of deaths are more likely. Third, it is simply not plausible why a death 
threshold would include only battle-related deaths and exclude civilian deaths.
To address some these problems, scholars have subsequently proposed alternative 
definitions of civil war, the majority of which are modifications of the original COW 
definition. One of the more original and most influential contenders has been the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which defines violent conflict as
‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths’.135
However, this definition does not resolve most of the problems underlying the COW
definition and even introduces a 25 battle-related deaths criterion, which blurs the
dividing line between civil war as a phenomenon involving large-scale destruction and
more low-intensity conflicts. Accordingly, a close look at the UCDP dataset reveals that
a non-negligible number of the recorded violent conflicts are in fact military coups -  a
problem that seems particularly pronounced in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Altogether, there has been a proliferation of competing war lists that exhibit similar
132 Sambanis 2004a: 816pp.; Cramer 2006: 49pp.
133 Prunier 2009; Marchal 2002.
134 Flint & De Waal 2008.
135 UCDP 2009.
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1 * \( \conceptual problems but show substantial variation in the coding of civil war. This 
makes accurate and robust predictions of civil war onset extremely difficult -  a problem 
that has become strikingly evident in my review of the quantitative civil war literature 
in chapter 1.
In the light of these shortcomings, I rely on a comprehensive definition of civil war that
1 ^ 7was put forward by Nicholas Sambanis. The main criteria of this definition can be 
summarised as follows:138
An armed conflict is classified as a civil war if
• the parties are politically and militarily organised, and they have publicly stated 
political objectives;
• the government (through its military or militias) is a principal combatant;
• the main insurgent organisation(s) are locally represented and recruit locally, 
though there may be additional external involvement and recruitment;
• the conflict causes at least 500 to 1000 deaths (civilian and battle deaths 
combined) during the first year or at least 1000 cumulative deaths in the next 
three years;
• the conflict is characterised by sustained violence, with no three-year period 
having less than 500 deaths; and
• the weaker party is able to mount effective resistance, measured by at least 100 
deaths inflicted on the stronger party.
Even Sambanis’s careful and nuanced effort cannot resolve all problems and 
contradictions surrounding the definition of civil war. On the one hand, he is unable to 
introduce a relative (per capita) measure of the death threshold, the creation of which is 
said to be too ‘difficult and labor intensive’.139 On the other hand, he does not allow for 
the possibility of several instances of civil war during one period -  an approach that 
amalgamates separate cases into one and thereby underestimates the actual number of 
wars.140 Yet, Sambanis’s definition has arguably become the benchmark in that it
136 See Sambanis 2004a: 831pp.
137 Ibid.: 829pp.
138 Note that I have shortened Sambanis’s extremely long definition of civil war (especially the detailed 
statistical coding rules), while preserving its substance.
13* Ibid.: 822.
140 Note that only the UCDP (2009) dataset contains information on the conflict behaviour involving the 
government and each of the different rebel groups.
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addresses many of the key problems underlying the COW definition, including the 
inclusion of civilian deaths, a more flexible threshold of deaths, the problem of proxy 
wars using militias and a clear definition of effective resistance.
2.2 Explaining civil war onset:
The inclusiveness of the elite bargain matters
What drives civil war onset and avoidance in Uganda and Zambia? My review of the 
civil war literature in chapter 1 has shown that while most of the dominant theoretical 
approaches fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need 
for elite power-sharing offer a promising starting point. In what follows, I will therefore 
build on this pre-existing work and propose a civil war theory, which focuses on the 
inclusiveness of what I label the ‘elite bargain’. To develop my argument, I will first 
establish that colonial rule left Sub-Saharan Africa with a legacy of high social 
fragmentation. Then I will go on to argue that African leaders responded to this 
challenge in distinct ways, namely by forging inclusive vs. exclusionary elite bargains. I 
hypothesise that exclusionary elite bargains lead to civil war, whereas inclusive elite 
bargains facilitate civil war avoidance.
COLONIAL RULE AND THE LEGACY OF HIGH SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION141
Pre-colonial Africa evolved a large variety of traditional political structures.142 Most of 
the continent was dominated by stateless societies, usually composed of small, 
autonomous communities of cultivators or pastoralists organised at the village or kin- 
group level. Where state-like political systems existed, they typically consisted in a core 
whose control over the peripheries fluctuated depending on internal stability and 
military strength. Pre-colonial boundaries were generally characterised by fuzziness and 
flexibility, with Africans living in the reality of multiple and often overlapping 
collective identities.143 Politics was more about the control of people than of territory 
and functioned through the personalised hierarchies of chiefly power. In this context, 
the advent of colonial rule represented an important, albeit partial, break with the past.
141 I acknowledge that Africa’s colonial history is extremely diverse. This section merely attempts to 
sketch the dominant pattern of African colonialism without pretending to capture the latter’s full 
diversity.
142 Sandbrook 1985: 42pp.; Clapham 1996: 29pp.
143 Southall 1979; Berry 1993.
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The break with the pre-colonial past was important in that
‘previously fuzzy borderlands between indigenous centres o f government, together with the 
large areas which possessed no formalised government structures at all, were replaced (...) 
by precisely demarcated frontiers of the sort that European concepts of statehood deemed to 
be necessary’.144
As these frontiers were rarely guided by any concern for the identity of the indigenous 
societies, African colonies usually came to contain ‘several traditional societies, each of 
which valued its own political traditions, myths and symbols’.145 Beyond this ‘lumping 
together’ of heterogeneous groups in common territories, the colonially imposed 
introduction of both bureaucratic state institutions and capitalist forms of labour, 
property and production involved the diversification of identities whereby pre-existing 
social cleavages were supplemented by occupational and class groupings.
However, the break with the pre-colonial past was only partial in that political and 
economic transformation in colonial Africa remained incomplete. Colonial rule 
destroyed the pre-colonial modes of production but established a new pre-capitalist 
mode based on independent peasant production.146 This ‘anti-capitalist bias’ arose out 
of a fundamental contradiction between the quest for colonial exploitation and the need 
for political stability.147 As early attempts for transformation had met local resistance, 
colonialism refrained from imposing the full-scale development of agrarian capitalism -  
which would have involved primitive accumulation and caused landlessness among the 
African peasantry -  for fear of revolt and disorder. Instead, the colonial powers spent 
little energy and few resources on the creation of modem state infrastructure and mled 
‘indirectly’ through alliances with local chiefs.148 While ‘indirect mle helped to contain 
destabilising class formation, it also allowed traditional authorities to consolidate their 
power. As ‘native’ authorities were preserved, strengthened or even entirely 
‘invented’149, the colonialists’ assumption that Africans lived in tribes became a self- 
fulfilling perception. The result was a ‘bifurcated’ colonial state inhabited by ‘citizens 
and subjects’ and deeply anchored in the ‘decentralised despotism’ of the local state.150
144 Clapham 1996: 31.
145 Sandbrook 1985: 45.
146 Phillips 1989: 3.
147 Berman 1984; Phillips 1989; Boone 1994.
148 ‘Indirect rule’ is arguably the dominant pattern of African colonialism. While forms of colonial rule 
are commonly said to have ranged from French ‘direct rule’ to British ‘indirect rule’ and Belgian ‘quasi- 
indirect rule’ (Coleman 1975), these typologies tend to be overdrawn (Mamdani 1996). French ‘direct 
rule’, for instance, often had little alternative than to govern through local chiefs (Delavignette 1950). 
Also, Catherine Boone (2004) has shown that patterns of colonial (and post-colonial) rule across and even 
within countries reflected local power structures rather than consistent colonial ideology.
149 Ranger 1983; Amselle & M’Bokolo 1999.
150 Mamdani 1996.
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Moreover, ‘indirect rule’ through local chiefs made patron-client relations not only the 
main mode of access to the state, but also -  as in pre-colonial society -  the fundamental 
relationship between ordinary people and those with wealth and power.151
Unsurprisingly, the ‘indirect rule state’ produced very high degrees of social 
fragmentation across the African continent, not least when compared to their
1 S9counterparts in Asia or Latin America. This is not to deny that a few territories were 
less fragmented in that they were largely congruent with pre-existing political systems
1 SIand identities (e.g. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). Such differences 
notwithstanding, the great majority of African colonies came to be characterised by 
multiple, often overlapping social cleavages.154 The main source of cleavage were 
ethnic identities, defined as
‘a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by 
attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent’.15
Other group identities developed based on regional affiliations, not least in the context
of uneven capitalist penetration that introduced significant regional disparities in many
of the colonies.156 Again other group identities reflected religious divisions, which arose
from the spread of Christianity and Islam and their interaction with indigenous
1 ^ 7religions. The existence of multiple ethnic, regional or religious groups was further 
complicated by the (albeit limited) development of ‘functional’ cleavages around 
economic class identities, evident in the spread of occupational groupings (e.g. 
businessmen, clerks and teachers) or trade unions. Following a ‘historically
1 CO
grounded’ constructivist perspective, none of these group identities were primordial 
in nature but rather constantly moulded by political interaction with other groups and 
the institutions of the colonial state.
151 Berman 1998: 316.
152 See Kohli 2004.
153 On differences in social fragmentation and ‘state legitimacy’ across Africa see Englebert 2000.
154 For the classical treatment of social cleavages in Europe see Lipset & Rokkan 1967. On cleavages in 
Sub-Saharan Africa see Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999.
155 Chandra 2006: 398. Characteristics such as common culture, common history, common territory, and 
common language are only sometimes associated with identities that one thinks of as ethnic and thus 
cannot be thought of as defining characteristics. For a similar definition of ethnicity see Fearon & Laitin 
2000: 20 .
156 Following the above-cited definition of ethnicity, regional groups are not considered as ethnic groups 
as long as the membership rule takes into consideration the region in which an individual currently 
resides, rather than the region of origin o f an individual’s parents and ancestors.
157 Again, religious groups are not considered ethnic groups if  the attributes for membership are acquired 
by choice rather than by descent.
158 See Berman 1998: 31 Op.
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Altogether, colonially-induced fragmentation gave rise to what Jean-Francois Bayart 
has termed a ‘hegemonic crisis’, i.e. an intensified struggle for hegemony between a 
multitude of competing social groups.159 This had far-reaching implications for the 
process of post-colonial state formation across Sub-Saharan Africa. Fragmentation 
involves a ‘system of multiple veto players’ -  a situation that makes the across-group 
production of collective goods rather difficult.160 Rulers that manage to establish 
political control may be unable or unwilling to share access to state structures as this 
could help potential opponents to gain leverage or create competing power centres. This 
dilemma has led Joel Migdal to conclude that fragmented ‘social control’ inevitably 
gives rise to weak post-colonial states and the destabilising ‘politics of survival’.161 
While fragmentation certainly represents an important problem, I argue that its ultimate 
effects are highly contingent on subsequent political organisation. The real question is 
therefore whether or not high social fragmentation was successfully accommodated by 
forging and maintaining stable forms of political organisation.
THE CHALLENGE OF STABLE POLITICAL ORGANISATION: 
INCLUSIVE VERSUS EXCLUSIONARY ELITE BARGAINS
Overcoming the legacy of social fragmentation in Africa was (and often still is) a 
formidable challenge. From a political science perspective, political organisation is the 
key to addressing fragmentation. In the words of Samuel Huntington, political 
organisation can be defined as
‘an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders,
and thus promoting two or more social forces’.162
While political organisation is crucial in every society, it becomes even more important 
the more complex and heterogeneous a society. As a consequence, African post-colonial 
leaders had to find ways to create political organisations capable of integrating 
competing social groups, consolidating the state structures and fostering economic 
development.
The quest for political organisation was mostly undertaken through the creation of 
political parties. Historically, political parties have been the most effective types of
159 Bayart 1989.
160 Bardhan 2000: 258.
161 Migdal 1988.
162 Huntington 1968: 8p.
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political organisation as they develop strategies and ideology, structure participation and 
aggregate interests.163 In the context of the newly emerging African states, their creation 
was of particular importance. Whereas European parties had developed within well- 
established state frameworks, in Africa they constituted ‘a premise for the formation of 
national structures, they are to a great extent originators of these structures’.164 This 
means that the formation and consolidation of the African state came to depend directly 
on the working of the dominant political party in the pre- and post-independence period:
‘[I]nstead of the party reflecting the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and 
the instrument of the party’ -  the party becomes the veritable ‘institutional embodiment o f  
national sovereignty’. 65
But which kind of political party organisation is likely to resolve disputes, stabilise 
competition and prevent Africa’s fragmented societies from declining into violent 
conflict? I argue that what is at the heart of stable political organisation is the ability of 
ruling political parties to forge and maintain an inclusive settlement at level o f elites}66 
This argument resonates with the influential work by Douglas North and colleagues 
who claim that the problem of endemic violence in the natural state can only be 
contained through the formation of a ‘dominant coalition’ whose members possess 
special privileges.167 By limiting access to rents to members of the dominant coalition, 
elites create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves. 
Conversely, the exclusion of powerful elites from access to privileges and rents is likely 
to result in violent conflict. Unfortunately, North et al’s otherwise theoretically 
sophisticated work does not elaborate much on the inclusiveness of the ‘dominant 
coalition’ and its implications for peace and stability. This raises a number of questions. 
Which elites need to be included and by what means? And -  more importantly -  how 
are the included elites related to social groups and organisations?
Building on the work by North et al, scholars at the Crisis States Research Centre 
(CSRC) have advanced the related notion of the ‘elite bargain’.168 The CSRC defines
163 See Duverger 1959.
164 Chodak 1964, cited by Randall 2001: 254.
165 Huntington 1968: 91.
166 Elites are defined as ‘holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, 
including dissident ones, who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and significantly’ 
(Dogan & Higley 1998: 15). According to this functional (or positional) definition, elites thus comprise 
the top leadership o f all relevant organisations and movements in a country (e.g. leading national and 
local politicians, leaders of political parties, high-ranking bureaucrats, key military personnel, heads of 
business associations, trade union leaders, traditional and religious authorities, etc.).
167 North et al. 2009: 18pp.
168 http://www.crisisstates.com/. See also CSRC 2006.
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the elite bargain as the ‘distribution of rights and entitlements’ across groups and classes 
in society, on which any state is based.169 The elite bargain, which is typically embodied 
in political parties, is therefore essentially about the allocation of rents between 
contending elites. While this is a plausible approach, I adopt a somewhat different focus 
and propose to reconceptualise the notion of the ‘elite bargain’ in terms of elite power- 
sharing, not least since those who are in positions of state power ultimately determine 
the distribution of rights and entitlements. Accordingly, my concept of the elite bargain 
is defined as the distribution o f access to positions o f state power between contending 
social groups. This concept draws on the insights from pre-existing work on horizontal 
inequalities, ethnic power relations and consociationalism as discussed in chapter 1.
Figure 6: Inclusive versus exclusionary elite bargains
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More specifically, I propose that elite bargains in post-colonial Africa can be captured 
in two ideal types that describe the extent to which ruling political parties have used the 
distribution o f access to positions o f state power to accommodate the dominant group 
cleavages in society. In general, all political parties that first managed to gain control of 
the post-colonial state sought to build alliances and support by providing the leadership 
of social groups with access to state patronage. But they did so, and here I depart from 
the conventional ‘neo-patrimonial’ argument (see chapter 1), in significantly different
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169 DiJohn & Putzel 2009.
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ways. In a first group of countries, the ruling political party managed to forge and 
maintain an inclusive elite bargain by providing all major contending social groups with 
balanced access to positions of state power. This scenario is exemplarily illustrated in 
the first part of figure 6 where all ethnic, religious and class groupings are represented -  
albeit to different degrees -  in the realm of state power. Such inclusive elite bargains, 
which roughly correspond to what Africanist political scientists have called the ‘fusion
♦ 170of elites’ , successfully accommodate social fragmentation and thereby stabilise the 
inter-group competition over the control of the postcolonial state. In a second group of 
countries, by contrast, political parties have established exclusionary elite bargains by 
providing biased access to positions of state power.171 This scenario is illustrated in the 
second part of figure 6 where only selected ethnic and religious groups are represented 
in the realm of state power. Such exclusionary elite bargains privilege certain social 
groups at the expense of others and therefore fail to accommodate the legacy of social 
fragmentation.
The forging of inclusive versus exclusionary elite bargains via the distribution of access 
to state power took (and still takes) many different forms, not least depending on local 
circumstances. Nonetheless, I argue that differences in the inclusiveness of the elite 
bargain across Sub-Saharan Africa can generally be measured by assessing the extent to 
which positions of political, military, economic and territorial power are shared between 
competing social groups.172
Political power-sharing: Access to positions of political and administrative power is 
important for competing social groups in that it provides them with visible recognition, 
a ‘say’ in decision-making and control over government resources. A first obvious 
indicator in this respect is the composition o f government. An analysis of the 
composition of government should however not -  as it is often done -  be limited to the 
distribution of minsters and deputy ministers. Instead, one should also separately 
consider the distribution of the most important leadership positions in what may be 
labelled the ‘inner core’ of political power, not least to uncover strategies of ‘window
170 Bayart 1981; Londsdale 1981; Boone 1994.
171 Here, I depart from the above-cited scholars who seem to suggest that the ‘fusion of elites’ is a quasi- 
universal feature of African politics,
172 Note that I borrow Hartzell & Hoddie’s (2003) four-part typology of power-sharing but propose an 
alternative operationalisation of these four categories.
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dressing’.173 As a consequence, the composition of government is measured by the 
inter-group distribution of
• deputy ministers;
• ministers (Cabinet);
• the ‘ inner core of political power’,174 and
• an ‘index of representation’, which combines175 the forgoing measures.
A second indicator for political power-sharing is the composition o f the ruling political 
party, measured by the inter-group distribution of
• positions in the top party organ.
A third and final indicator for political power-sharing is the composition o f the civil 
service, measured by the inter-group distribution of
• permanent secretary positions.176
Military power-sharing: Access to military power is crucial for competing social 
groups in that it shapes their feelings of physical security and survival. While balanced 
recruitment at the level of the rank-and-file may be considered important, it is especially 
representation at the upper levels of the army that give groups a real stake in the security 
sector. Key in terms of military power-sharing is therefore the composition o f the officer 
corps, measured by the inter-group distribution of
173 For a similar notion see Langer 2005.
174 The number and nature of positions included in the ‘inner core’ of political power needs to be 
determined separately for each country and time period. This is obviously an extremely difficult and 
contentious undertaking. Many of my interviewees in both Uganda and Zambia rightly emphasised that it 
is not enough to simply focus on key ministers since certain presidential advisors, deputy ministers or 
permanent secretaries may really be more influential behind the scenes. One interviewee even argued 
that, given the extremely personalised nature of political power in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Jackson & 
Rosberg 1982), any analysis of the ‘inner core’ would need to concentrate on the President’s Office/ State 
House (Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango). While there is certainly some truth to these objections, a 
detailed analysis of the ‘true’ powerholders behind the scenes turned out to be impossible for two main 
reasons. First, it would have been difficult time-wise, not least since I am concerned with the composition 
of two post-colonial governments since independence. Second, it would have been difficult logistically, 
not least since foreign students asking questions around who’s who in State House are typically reason for 
distrust. As a consequence, I have decided to focus on the President, the Vice-President (or Prime 
Minister) and what my interviewees considered the key ministers at the time. Even though this may be a 
‘second-best approach’, it arguably still tells us more about where real power lies than simply focusing on 
all ministers and deputies. For a detailed overview of the composition of the ‘inner core’ of political 
power in Uganda and Zambia since independence see Annex 11.1.
75 To calculate my ‘index of representation’, I have taken the average of my scores for deputy ministers, 
ministers (Cabinet) and the ‘inner core’ o f political power. This means that the President, Vice-President 
and the key ministers are counted twice -  once as part o f Cabinet, and once as part of the ‘inner core’. 
This is intentional in that it reflects the particular power and influence of these few individuals.
176 It would have been preferable to also consider the composition o f the lower levels of the civil service 
(under-secretaries, department heads, etc.), which was however impossible due to time constraints and the 
non-availability/non-accessibility of suitable administrative records.
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• the top command positions; and
• the higher ranks.
Economic power-sharing: Access to economic power is of immediate material interest 
for competing social groups. Economic-power-sharing is however more difficult to 
define, not least because all other types of power-sharing involve control over economic 
resources and are therefore -  albeit indirectly -  also a form of economic power-sharing. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, a first useful indicator may be control over key state- 
owned enterprises, which are among the most lucrative public institutions in the 
patronage-based political systems of Sub-Saharan Africa.177 Over the past decades, the 
parastatal sector has come under pressure with international donors calling on African 
governments to privatise their state-owned enterprises. While privatisation programmes 
have made progress since the 1990s, they have often opened new opportunities for 
patronage deployment. A second relevant indicator for economic power-sharing may 
therefore be control over key privatised companies. Both indicators178 can be measured 
by the inter-group distribution of
• board directors; and
• senior management positions.
Territorial power-sharing: Territorial power-sharing provides social groups -  at least 
if territorially defined -  with an autonomous base from which they may protect their 
interests. This may be very significant for competing groups and their leaders, not least 
since high degrees of territorial power-sharing may compensate for low levels of power- 
sharing at the centre. Territorial power-sharing can take different forms depending on 
both the type of constitution (unitary vs. federal)179 and the type of decentralisation, 
mainly including administrative, fiscal and political.180 Administrative decentralisation
177 See Tangri 1999.
178 These are only two among many possible indictors for economic power-sharing. Others could include 
the distribution o f private businesses, permits and licences (especially trade-related ones), or land titles. 
Yet, such indicators are even more difficult and time-intensive to research and therefore beyond the scope 
of this study.
179 Norris 2008: 164pp. Unitary constitutions are defined as those states with national and subnational 
tiers, where the national government is defined as sovereign over all its territorial units. Federal 
constitutions are understood as those which distinguish between the national and subnational tiers of 
government, where each tier has certain specified areas of autonomy. For the classic study on the ‘federal 
bargain’ see Riker 1964. Note that territorial power-sharing in federal states is not automatically more far- 
reaching since centralised federal constitutions may grant only very limited territorial autonomy to 
subnational tiers.
180 Treisman 2007; Norris 2008.
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transfers bureaucratic decision-making authority and managerial responsibilities from 
central to local government, which may cover the delivery of a variety of services or 
decisions on budgetary expenditure and in some cases revenue raising. Even though this 
is the most basic form of decentralisation, it provides local groups with access to 
lucrative employment, at least as long as the administrative positions are filled by 
locals. Fiscal decentralisation gives subnational tiers either tax-raising powers or control 
over a significant proportion of total government spending (or both). Political 
decentralisation, finally, means that subnational tiers are granted a degree of policy­
making authority.181 The fiscal and political forms of decentralisation tend to be more 
consequential in that they involve independent control over financial resources and 
political decision-making. A key indicator for territorial power-sharing is the degree o f
1 R9territorial autonomy, measured by the extent to which local groups
• benefit from proportional employment in local government and administration;
• have substantial tax-raising powers (and capacity) and/or receive a proportional 
share of decentralised budgets; and
• have a substantial degree of policy-making authority.
Altogether, I argue that there are two distinct types of elite bargains:
• Inclusive elite bargains involve a ruling party that provides competing social 
groups with balanced access to positions of political, military, economic and 
territorial power.
• Exclusionary elite bargains involve a ruling party that provides certain social 
groups with privileged access to positions of political, military, economic and 
territorial power.
PEACE OR CIVIL WAR?
How do differences in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain relate to civil war onset and 
civil war avoidance?
181 If local elections are held for local leaders, this is appointment decentralisation (see Treisman 2007). If 
local authorities also have a say in national policy-making, this is constitutional decentralisation.
182 I acknowledge that territorial power-sharing is especially difficult to measure. Assessing the degree of 
territorial autonomy requires data on whether local employment and decentralised budgets are distributed 
proportionally between competing social groups -  data that are rarely available. As a result, I often had to 
rely on more interpretive analysis (see chapters 4-7).
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I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains accommodate the historical legacy of high 
social fragmentation, stabilise the inter-group competition over the control of state 
power and thereby favour trajectories of civil war avoidance. As competing social 
groups enjoy inclusive access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial 
power, their leadership does not have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest or 
even violence against the post-colonial state. African states based on an inclusive elite 
bargain are therefore likely to enjoy relatively secure and stable hegemony as a 
collective system. This is especially true the more extensive the power-sharing across 
the four dimensions of state power. Seen from this perspective, the avoidance of civil 
war over time must be understood as resulting from the ability and/or willingness of 
ruling political parties to forge and maintain high degrees of elite accommodation.
Exclusionary elite bargains, by contrast, fail to accommodate the historical legacy of 
high social fragmentation, intensify inter-group struggles over the distribution of state 
power and ultimately favour trajectories of civil war onset. As certain groups enjoy 
privileged access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power, the 
excluded leaders will have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest against the state. 
The latter is especially likely to escalate into violent rebellion if exclusionary elite 
bargains are maintained over time and consistent across the four dimensions of state 
power. Seen from this perspective, the onset of civil war must be understood as 
resulting from the inability and/or unwillingness of ruling political parties to achieve 
sufficient degrees of elite accommodation.
The hypothesis underlying my PhD thesis can be summarised as follows:
Post-colonial differences in civil war occurrence across Sub-Saharan Africa are 
determined by the inclusiveness o f the elite bargain. While inclusive elite bargains 
facilitate civil war avoidance, exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset o f civil 
war.
2.3 Methodology
How do I plan to test the plausibility of my argument? In what follows, I will first 
discuss my research methods. This means that I explain why I have opted in favour of a
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small-N comparison, lay out my criteria for case selection and detail the structure of the 
two country case studies. In a second step, I provide information on my data sources.
RESEARCH METHODS
My PhD thesis is based on comparative case studies of civil war onset and avoidance in 
two African countries, namely Uganda and Zambia. Why small-n comparison rather 
than large-N analysis? I argue that a quantitative study is not possible at this stage since
suitable data on the inclusiveness of elite politics across Sub-Saharan Africa are simply
1 0*1not available. Such data need to be arduously collected on a case by case basis for 
each of the four types of power-sharing and will therefore not be available for large-N 
samples in the short- and medium term. The only possible alternative in this regard 
would be to rely on data based on expert estimates as recently compiled by Andreas 
Wimmer et al.184 -  an undoubtedly admirable effort that could however hardly capture 
the level of detail and accuracy that I am looking for. Moreover, there is also reason to 
argue that further quantitative work is not necessarily desirable at this stage. This is 
especially true in the light of a civil war literature that has so far been dominated by 
rather superficial and mostly inconclusive quantitative models (see chapter 1). It may 
therefore be time to shift the research agenda towards ‘more paired down but detailed 
sets of comparisons and contrasts’. They would arguably also add to the pre-existing 
qualitative civil war literature, which has so far been dominated by edited volumes 
typically lacking a common research framework.186
1 R7What are the strengths and weaknesses of a case study approach? The main strengths 
of case studies are arguably at least fourfold. First, case studies enable the researcher to 
achieve high levels of internal (or conceptual) validity, i.e. to identify and measure the 
indicators that best represent the underlying theoretical concepts. Whereas statistical 
studies involve the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ by lumping together dissimilar cases, 
case studies allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a 
limited number of cases. In the context of my study, this means that I can carefully 
identify and measure the most relevant indicators for inter-group power-sharing in
183 On the broader implications of data availability for research design see Gerring 2007: 57pp.
184 Wimmer et al. 2009; Cederman et al. 2010b.
185 Cramer 2006: 136.
186 See, among others, Clapham 1998; Ali & Matthews 2000; Boas & Dunn 2007.
187 The following discussion draws on Ragin 1987; George & Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007. See also 
Zartman 2005a; Abu-Lughod 2007.
57
Uganda and Zambia -  an undertaking that would have been impossible in the context of 
a large-N study. Second, case studies are a very useful means to closely examine the 
hypothesised role of causal mechanisms. While statistical studies mainly identify 
correlations between inputs and outputs, small-N studies enable the researcher to 
determine whether and how inputs and outputs can really be connected in a plausible 
fashion. In the context of my work, this means that I can gather and interpret all 
available evidence to determine if and how differences in elite power-sharing in Uganda 
and Zambia can really be causally linked to the observed patterns of war and peace. 
Third, case studies can -  when compared with large-N studies -  better accommodate 
complex causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects, and path 
dependency.188 As a consequence, I can not only explore the role of and interactions 
between multiple causes but also consider how contemporary decisions are constrained 
by decisions that were made in the past. Finally, only a case study approach and the 
accompanying fieldwork allow me to identify left-out variables and new hypotheses.
At the same time, case studies also suffer from a number of weaknesses. These may 
include a trade-off between parsimony and richness, a weak capability for estimating 
the average ‘causal effect’ of variables, and indeterminacy problems. Most importantly, 
however, small-N studies suffer from low external validity, i.e. a problem of 
representativeness between sample and population. Large-N research is always more 
representative of the population of interest than case study research, at least as long as a 
sensible procedure of case selection is followed (i.e. random sampling). Case study 
research suffers from problems of representativeness because it includes, by definition, 
only a small number of cases of a more general phenomenon. As a consequence, case 
study researchers cannot claim that their findings are applicable to the whole population 
of interest. In the context of my own study, this means that I cannot generalise my 
findings beyond Uganda and Zambia.
Why Uganda and Zambia? I selected cases to ensure maximum variation in the 
dependent variable, i.e. to compare and contrast cases of civil war onset with cases of 
civil war avoidance. As Uganda and Zambia exhibit such maximum variation in civil 
war occurrence (for details see chapter 1), the two countries were very suitable
188 The question whether case studies can really better accommodate causal complexity is however 
controversial (see Gerring 2007: 61pp.).
58
candidates.189 Note that selecting cases on the dependent variable is now widely 
regarded a legitimate alternative to case selection on the independent variable as long as 
sufficient variation in the values of the dependent variable is ensured.190 In the context 
of my study, the case for selection on the dependent variable was even reinforced by an 
important fact: I could not select cases on the independent variable -  the ‘best 
intentional design’191 -  simply because I ignored its value(s) beforehand. This means 
that I initially did not know to which extent an elite bargain was inclusive or 
exclusionary, which could only be established in the course of my research.
Table 4: Time per iods under investigation
Country Time period Chapter
Uganda
1. Obote I, Amin, Obote II (1962-1986)
1.1 Obote I (1962-1971)
1.2 Amin (1971-1979)
1.3 Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), 
Obote II, the Okellos (1979-1986)
Chapter 4
2. Museveni (1986-2008) Chapter 5
Zambia
1. Kaunda (1964-1991)
1.1 First Republic (1964-1972)
1.2 Second Republic (1972-1991)
Chapter 6
2. Movement for Multiparty Democracy (1991 -2008)
2.1 Chiluba (1991-2001)
2.2 Mwanawasa (2001-2008)
Chapter 7
To compare and contrast civil war occurrence in Uganda with civil war avoidance in 
Zambia, I have divided the history of both countries into different time periods (see 
table 4). For each time period, I will proceed as follows: In a first step, I determine the 
values of the dependent variable, i.e. I discuss whether or not civil war(s) has occurred.
189 Uganda and Zambia are of course not the only possible candidates when trying to contrast cases of 
civil war onset with cases of civil war avoidance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other possible -  and equally 
suitable -  country pairs could have been Chad/Cameroon, Sierra Leone/Botswana, DRC/Zambia, 
Sudan/Gabon, etc. The ultimate decision to compare Uganda and Zambia was admittedly guided by two 
pragmatic concerns. First, and most importantly, Uganda and Zambia are both among the core countries 
of the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC). Accordingly, the decision to study these two core countries 
provided me with important intellectual, logistical and material support. Second, Uganda as the conflict- 
prone of the two countries is now relatively stable and therefore suitable in terms of conducting field 
research. Undertaking fieldwork in Chad, DRC or Sudan, by contrast, would have been a lot more 
difficult.
190 See Ragin 2004; George & Bennett 2005.
191 King et al. 1994: 140.
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In a second step, I establish the values of the independent variable, i.e. I present data on 
political, military, economic and territorial power-sharing between contending social 
groups and thereby determine the inclusiveness of the elite bargain. In a third step, I 
engage in ‘process tracing’, which means that I attempt to ‘identify the intervening 
causal process -  the causal chain and causal mechanism -  between an independent
1 0 9variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’. In other words, I 
trace to what extent the given inclusiveness of the elite bargain can plausibly explain the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of civil war during the period under investigation. In a 
last step, I briefly discuss whether or not other factors (i.e. left-out variables) are better 
or at least complementary explanations.
DATA SOURCES
What are my sources of data? To begin with, I conducted desk studies to review the 
very comprehensive secondary literature on Uganda and Zambia. Here, the first focus 
was to collect information on the various violent conflicts that have ravaged Uganda 
since 1962 in order to determine which of them match my definition of civil war (see 
section 2.1). This turned out to be difficult since there are very few reliable estimates for 
the total number of deaths caused by each of these conflicts. Similarly, information on 
‘effective resistance’ (i.e. the number of deaths among government troops) is typically 
scarce and contested. As a consequence, I conducted detailed searches of the 
LexisNexis News database, which includes full-text of more than 50 major English- 
language newspapers from around the world, hundreds of magazines, journals, and 
newsletters as well as broadcast transcripts from the major television and radio 
networks. On this basis, and using additional information from the secondary 
literature, I was able to identify the 15 different cases of civil war mentioned in chapter 
1, even though some doubts remain (see chapters 4 and 5). The fact that I had great 
difficulties in finding reliable data on violent conflicts in a country that I know 
reasonably well raises some serious questions about the civil war data used in the 
quantitative literature. This may be another example for what Laurie Nathan has 
referred to as the ‘the frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics’.194
192 George & Bennett 2005: 206.
193 http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/home/home.do?randomNum=0.07463397155869711.
194 Nathan 2005.
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A second focus during the desk study phase was to establish to what extent previous 
studies had already addressed questions pertaining to the distribution of access to 
positions of state power between competing social groups. While these questions are -  
unsurprisingly -  a prominent topic in the literature on both countries, very few studies 
have actually bothered to provide substantial data. For Uganda, data on the inter-group 
distribution of positions in government and the army can be found in the work of Kasfir, 
Hansen, Jorgenson, Omara-Otunnu and (to a lesser extent) Carbone, albeit only for 
short time periods and in limited detail.195 The only exception in this regard is Omara- 
Otunnu’s landmark study on the Ugandan military, which provides very detailed data on 
the ethno-regional distribution of military power until 1986 and is therefore of 
considerable use for my own study (see chapter 4). For Zambia, data on the composition 
of government and the ruling party has been published by Dresang, Tordoff, Gertzel et 
al. and Hulterstrom, albeit again only for short time periods and in limited detail.196 No 
previous work has been done on the distribution of positions in the administration, the 
parastatals and the military. Altogether, the considerable gaps in the existing literature 
underlined the need to collect my own data.
As a consequence, the first pillar of my fieldwork in Zambia (June 2008-October 2008) 
and Uganda (November 2008-February 2009) was to collect data on the inter-group 
distribution of all four types of state power (political, military, economic, territorial). 
Here, the first challenge was to compile lists of all ministers, deputy ministers, 
permanent secretaries, parastatal directors, army officers, etc. since independence. This 
turned out to be an extremely difficult task. As there is no tradition of centralised 
record-keeping in both countries, the information I was looking for was either scattered 
in different libraries/ministries across the capital city or (said to be) not available at all. 
Initially, I suspected that the responsible authorities maybe did not want to share the 
information with me. Soon, however, I realised that this kind of data had either never 
been systematically collected or was lost over time. In one extreme case, my contact 
person in one of the ministries even asked whether he could make a photocopy of a 
document that I had brought from London for his own records.
These difficulties notwithstanding, I still managed to find what I was looking for, albeit 
unfortunately in greatly varying detail. Compiling the names of all ministers and deputy
195 Kasfir 1976; Hansen 1977; Jorgenson 1981; Omara-Otunnu 1987; Carbone 2008.
196 Tordoff & Molteno 1974b; Tordoff 1980a; Dresang 1974; Gertzel et al. 1984; Hulterstrom 2004.
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ministers since independence turned out to be the easiest task since I soon discovered 
that they are regularly listed in the official reports of parliamentary debates in both 
countries. Finding the names of top party officials, permanent secretaries and parastatal 
directors proved a lot more difficult, especially in Uganda where the violent excesses of 
the 1970s and 1980s seem to have destroyed most of the records. In Zambia, it was 
ironically sometimes easier to find information on the Kaunda period, not least due to 
the excellent UNIP archives. As a consequence of all this, some of my lists suffer from 
gaps (see annex 11.1) and/or are based on unofficial information received through 
personal contacts. Unsurprisingly, the biggest challenge was to find information on the 
inter-group distribution of positions in the armed forces. In both countries, my attempts 
to approach the Ministry of Defence were unsuccessful, not least due to the sensitive 
nature of the matter. I therefore had to limit myself to unofficial and partial information, 
again received through personal contacts.
Once I had compiled the different lists including a total of more than 1000 names for 
each country, the real trouble began. I had to find ways to identify the group 
affiliation(s) of every single individual197 -  information that is not written anywhere. 
Fortunately, I managed to get very patient help from a large variety of people, including 
former and current politicians, long-standing civil servants, former army personnel or 
academics. This means that people agreed to sit down with me, sometimes for hours, to 
help me fill in the tribal, linguistic, regional, or religious background of the 
officeholders (see Annex 11.1). For each name, I made sure to get at least 4-5 different
10Ropinions, preferably from people who knew the individual personally. In the great 
majority of cases, this produced highly congruent answers, especially in Uganda where 
the task of identifying someone’s ethno-regional background seemed relatively 
straightforward. In Zambia, a country with a long history of urbanisation and high rates 
of inter-tribal marriage, things were often a bit more complicated -  an observation that 
may by itself already be part of the answer why the country has been able to avoid 
large-scale violent conflict (see chapters 6 and 7). One intellectual who I had asked for 
help even openly challenged the possibility of determining group affiliations in Zambia,
197 On the question which group cleavages are most salient in Uganda and Zambia see chapter 3.
198 This sometimes led to remarkable encounters. In Zambia, for example, I sat down with a long-standing 
civil servant who had worked in the Zambian civil service for his entire life and seemed to know every 
single permanent secretary since independence personally. For each name I brought up, he would start 
telling stories about where the individual had grown up, how he had died and how beautiful his wife had 
been. This lasted for a few hours but gave me good confidence that he would make relatively few 
mistakes when identifying the group affiliation of the individual.
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vehemently criticising my approach as a typically ‘Western’ compulsion to categorise 
social relations:
‘One of the basic problems of Western education is that they like compartmentalising 
things. Unless it comes out of a box it does not make sense. You need a box and a label on 
it. In fact, the Americans are probably the greatest exponents of this labelling tendency.
They label things to a level o f idiocy. It does not even make sense. If they cannot 
compartmentalise it, then they won’t understand it. When they are looking at the world, 
they see a world made up of neatly packed societies. Societies are not like it. Most societies 
that I know are not neat and compartmentalised’.199
Altogether, I managed to collect a substantial set of original data (see Annex 11.1). 
Even though I found less data than I had hoped for, my dataset is -  at least to my 
knowledge -  still a lot more comprehensive than any comparable data not only for 
Uganda and Zambia but also for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of 
reliability, I acknowledge that my data may include occasional errors but am 
nonetheless convinced that it does closely reflect the actual distribution of inter-group 
access to positions of state power in both countries.
The second pillar of my fieldwork was to conduct interviews with a wide range of 
stakeholders, including key members of all relevant political parties (current and 
former), civil servants, army leaders, businessmen, trade-unionists, clergymen, 
academics and staff of international organisations. In total, I conducted 103 interviews, 
54 in Zambia and 49 in Uganda (for a list of all interviewees see section 10). The great 
majority of these interviews took place in the capital cities, Lusaka and Zambia, but I 
also spent some time interviewing people on the Zambian Copperbelt (in Kitwe) and in 
Northern Uganda (in Gulu).
The interviews were semi-structured in nature. I used an interview guideline for each of 
the two countries (see Annex 11.2) but made sure to handle it in a flexible manner. The 
more interviews I had done, the more I focused on open questions in order to avoid 
excessive repetition and to close remaining gaps. Every interview started with a broad 
and open question on why the country had experienced/avoided civil war. This was very 
important not only to hear my interviewees’ own ideas but also to see whether they 
would themselves relate the occurrence or non-occurrence of violent conflict to inter­
group competition over access to state power. In many cases, the answers to this broad 
opening question turned out be very long and elaborate (up to 30 minutes at times),
199 Interview, Dr. Bright Chungu.
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which I took as a sign that people had very precise ideas about the drivers of peace and 
war. Afterwards, I typically focused on what my interviewees considered the main 
cleavages in society (tribe, region, religion, class, etc.) before turning to questions on 
the shape of the elite bargain (without calling it the elite bargain of course) and its 
impact on patterns of civil war onset and avoidance. The subjective perceptions of how 
access to positions of state power has been distributed over time were a very important 
complement to the ‘objective’ data I collected, not least since one may be inclined to 
think that they are equally, if not more consequential than the actual distribution of 
power (see chapter 8). My interviews typically ended with questions on the explanatory 
power of some of the most prominent competing hypotheses, including the impact of 
economic performance, democracy and international factors.
The length of my interviews varied greatly, lasting from a minimum of 20 minutes to a 
maximum of three hours. The average duration was however somewhere in between 60 
and 80 minutes. During the interviews, I took as detailed notes as possible. Moreover, 
almost all of my interviews were recorded, with only three out of the 103 interviewees 
asking not to be recorded. This obviously raises the question whether my interview 
partners would have been more talkative if I had not recorded them. While this cannot 
be excluded in some cases, the great majority of the people I interviewed appeared to be 
very comfortable and openly talked even about the more sensitive issues. This was not 
least due to the fact that both Uganda and Zambia have a relatively free press with 
extremely critical opposition newspapers (The Daily Monitor in Uganda and The Post in 
Zambia). As many of my interviewees are key protagonists in past and current public 
debates, they did not seem particularly worried to be linked to controversial statements.
After my return from the field, I first edited the collected data according to the 
indicators specified in my theoretical framework. This means that I calculated the inter­
group distribution of political, military, economic and territorial power over time, 
always related to the respective groups’ population shares as detailed in census reports -  
an extremely time-consuming process. In a second step, I listened to the recorded 
interviews. While I decided not to transcribe the interviews in full, I carefully extracted 
the main messages and key quotes in order to be able to use them as supporting 
evidence.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have first defined what I understand by civil war and then gone on to 
develop my own theory of civil war that focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I 
argue that a country’s propensity for conflict or peace is determined by the 
inclusiveness of the elite bargain, which I define as the distribution of access to 
positions of state power (political, military, economic and territorial) between 
contending social groups. I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war 
avoidance, whereas exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.
In the following five empirical chapters, I will probe the plausibility of my hypothesis 
based on a paired comparison of Uganda and Zambia, which draws on 103 interviews, a 
comprehensive set of original data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, 
economic and territorial posts, and in-depth historical analysis.
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3 Historical perspectives -  The genesis of social 
fragmentation in Uganda and Zambia
In this chapter, I trace the genesis of social fragmentation in Uganda and Zambia and 
identify the dominant social cleavages that structure political competition in both 
countries. This comparative historical perspective is indispensable for understanding the 
fundamental conflict lines in Ugandan and Zambian society and therefore serves as an 
important backdrop to my subsequent analysis of post-colonial differences in civil war 
occurrence (chapters 4-7). I proceed as follows: In each case, I first briefly review the 
main features of pre-colonial and colonial history and then go on to establish the most 
salient group cleavages in society.
3.1 Uganda
PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL HISTORY
The territory that would become known through colonial rule as Uganda is home to 
many tribal groups, none of whom forms a majority of the population. The largest ones 
include the Baganda in the centre, the Banyankole, Bakiga, Batoro and Banyoro in the 
West, the Basoga, Bagisu and Iteso in the East and the Langi, Acholi, Lugbara and 
Karamojong in the North (see map 1). Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the 
situation in Zambia, these groups are also part of different linguistic communities, 
including Bantu-speakers in the South-West, Nilotic-speakers in the North-East, and 
Sudanic- (or Madi-Moru) speakers in the North-West.
Politically, pre-colonial Uganda contained at least 200 distinct entities, which varied 
greatly in terms of size and complexity.200 These differences can be summarised into 
two categories, including stratified and nonstratified societies. In nonstratified (or 
segmentary) societies, power was spread horizontally through the clan as the main 
social unit. Typically, the clan leader had no power to extract labour, demand taxes, or 
enforce laws. While most people in the northern and eastern parts of the territory lived 
under such nonstratified social systems (e.g. the Madi, Alur, Lugbara, Acholi, Langi,
200 Jorgenson 1981: 36p. Busoga and Acholi alone each contained more than 50 mini-states.
201 Kasozi 1994: 17pp.; Mutibwa 1992: 1pp.
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Karamojong, Iteso, or Bagisu), there were also a few segmentary societies in the 
South (e.g. the Bagisu, Bakonzo or Bakiga). In stratified (or hierarchical) societies, by 
contrast, power was distributed vertically and centralised in the hands of the leader 
whereby the political system resembled a pyramid at whose apex was a clan leader, a 
paramount chief or a king. Such hierarchical social systems were concentrated in the 
South-West and mainly included the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro 
and Busoga. The process of concentrating power was a gradual and uneven one across
tVithese kingdoms, typically greatly reinforced in times of prevalent war. By the 19 
century, the Kingdom of Buganda had become the most stratified society, with the King 
(the Kabaka) having an absolute right to use violence and an uncontested right to make 
war or peace. The Kings of Ankole and Bunyoro were also powerful but their authority 
was moderated by other sources of political power. Altogether, the colonial state came 
to contain a multitude of groups that were at different stages of political development. 
Significantly, the beginnings of external trade during the 19th century strengthened the 
already strong states in the South (especially Buganda and Bunyoro), whereas the 
penetration by the world economy had more disruptive effects in the North, especially
OA'Jduring the Egyptian period of administration.
The advent of British rule from the early 1890s heightened pre-existing differences and 
divisions. In 1890, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) entered into a 
military alliance with the powerful Buganda Kingdom in order to extend its reach 
throughout the territory.204 The most prominent joint military campaign was the 
conquering of Bunyoro in 1893, after which the Baganda were rewarded with land tom 
away from Bunyoro (the ‘lost counties’) -  an issue of enduring conflict between the two 
kingdoms. The preferential treatment of the Baganda continued after the British 
government took over from the IBEAC in 1894 and turned the territory into a 
Protectorate. Most importantly, the 1900 Buganda Agreement provided the kingdom 
with considerable autonomy and gave substantial land rights to the Kabaka, his family 
and collaborating chiefs, which resulted in the creation of a land-owning elite. The 
special role accorded to the Buganda Kingdom was due to two reasons. First, the 
colonial officers admired the Kingdom’s highly sophisticated political system, in which 
territorial chiefs enforced law and order, collected taxes and mobilised labour, and
202 For the example of Lango see Tosh 1978.
203 See Jorgenson 1981: 37p.
204 Jorgenson 1981: 44pp.
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90Stherefore viewed the Baganda as superior to other tribal groups. This perception was 
reinforced by the fact that the earlier introduction of Christianity in Buganda had given 
its people early access to Western education and thereby equipped them with a level of 
literacy unseen in other parts of the territory. Second, and arguably more important, the 
preferential treatment of the Baganda -  especially the granting of extremely generous 
land rights under the mailo system206 -  reflected the weakness of the British colonial 
state vis-a-vis the Kabaka and the chiefs.207 Fearing the high costs of violent conflict, 
the British preferred to give in to Buganda’s far-reaching demands and thereby won 
loyal allies in the Kingdom.
Moreover, the colonial administration tried to establish control over the rest of the 
territory by imposing the hierarchical Buganda model of administration even on 
segmentary societies and appointing Baganda chiefs as administrators and tax 
collectors.208 This ‘indirect rule’ through Baganda chiefs created long-lasting anti- 
Baganda sentiment throughout much of the colony, especially in the segmentary 
societies of the North-East where the stratified Kiganda institutions were perceived as 
entirely alien. The perception of Baganda ‘sub-imperialism’ was reinforced by the 
importation of Luganda as the official language of state administration, education and 
religion.209 While most of the Baganda agents had been withdrawn by the early 1920s, 
the colonial state continued to rule indirectly through chiefs who were presented as 
representing local customs. In some cases, these ‘traditional’ chiefs were entirely 
invented. In other cases, the British perverted the functions of pre-colonial chiefs by 
transforming the originally constrained authority structures into more authoritarian and
91 narbitrary systems -  Mamdani’s ‘decentralised despotisms’. In almost all cases, these 
native administrations followed tribal boundaries, which in turn strengthened tribal 
identification and antagonism.
205 Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 3p.
206 Significantly, the chiefs won control over half o f the land in Buganda, including the better agricultural 
land.
207 Jorgenson 1981: 44pp. This underlines Catherine Boone’s (2004) thesis that the course and pace of 
colonisation were mostly shaped by patterns of local political organisation.
208 Kasozi 1994: 22pp.; Jorgenson 1981: 78pp.
209 According to Kasozi (1994: 227pp.), certain members of the colonial administration later tried to 
introduce Kiswahili as the official language of administration but were successfully opposed by Christian 
missionaries (who controlled the schools) and the Baganda ruling elite. While Christian missionaries 
suspected Kiswahili of transmitting Islamic values, the Baganda dismissed it as the language of 
prostitutes, thieves and liars. By 1948, six African languages were used for teaching, including Luganda, 
Lunyoro, Lwo, Ateso, Lugbara, and Kiswahili (dropped in 1952). As a consequence there was no 
common language to weld the various tribal groups together.
210 Mamdani 1996.
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Map 1: Tribal and regional cleavages in Uganda211
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The latter were further reinforced by extreme discrepancies in regional development. 
Significantly, all development opportunities were concentrated in the southern parts of 
the territory, including education, cash crops (cotton and coffee) and infrastructure. In 
terms of education, the Baganda held twice as many secondary school places as the rest 
of the country by 1960 and were also greatly over-represented at Makerere University 
College -  the only university in East Africa during colonial rule and an undisputed
9 1 “7gateway to positions of political and economic power. In terms of economic 
opportunities, the higher levels of commerce, industry, and agriculture were 
monopolised by Europeans, while Asians dominated small and medium business.213 
Africans were therefore not only excluded from the processing and marketing stages of 
agricultural production -  the most lucrative sector in the colony’s commodity-based 
economy -  but were also left far behind in business expertise and capital. To make 
matters worse, the few economic opportunities that existed for Africans were spread 
very unevenly between regions. The greatest, and arguably most explosive, disparity 
was again between the centre, Buganda, and the rest of the country, or, geographically,
2,1 Own compilation.
212 Kasfir 1976.
213 For details on the position of the Asian community in Uganda see Mamdani 1976: 65pp.
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between North and South.214 Cash crops -  initially cotton, later coffee -  were first 
introduced in Buganda and spread rapidly whereby the Kingdom came to contain more 
than 40% of the country’s agricultural wealth. By 1958, almost 80% of gross money 
income was concentrated in Buganda and the Eastern Province, especially in Mengo, 
Busoga, Masaka and Bugisu districts. The Northern and Western regions, by contrast, 
were designated to become the labour reserves of the Protectorate, exporting migrant 
labourers to the urban centres and rural cash crop areas and plantations. This uneven 
development was a deliberate policy designed to ensure the continued flow of labour to 
the cash-crop areas. As a consequence, the production of cash-crops in the affected 
areas was actively and openly discouraged. In 1925, for example, an agricultural officer 
in West Nile District was asked ‘to refrain from actively stimulating the production of 
cotton or other economic crops in outlying districts’ because of the country’s 
dependence on migrant labour who carry out ‘essential services in the central or 
producing areas’. Even though cotton was later introduced in the North, it remained 
much less lucrative than the coffee grown in the South. Altogether, regional economic 
disparities were extremely pronounced, with the impoverishment of the North becoming 
the condition for the relative prosperity of the South.
The only notable exception to Southern dominance was the security sector where the 
British pursued a deliberate policy of tribal imbalance in favour of the people from the 
North.217 Initially, the IBEAC had recruited a standing army from the Emin Pasha’s 
Sudanese troops, which were taken over into the newly created Uganda Rifles in 1895. 
The situation changed however with the Sudanese mutiny in 1897 that ended the 
confidence in the foreign troops’ loyalty. During the ensuing reorganisation of the army, 
recruitment came to be concentrated in the northern parts of the territory, especially 
among the Acholi, Langi, Iteso and West Nilers. This did not change until the end of the 
colonial period when the bulk of the army still consisted of the four foregoing groups. 
Similarly, the Uganda police was dominated by Northerners, in particular by the Acholi 
(15.5%), Iteso (15.2%), Langi (7.5%), Alur (6.1%) and Lugbara (4.5%).218 As a 
consequence, much of Uganda, including the Northerners themselves, came to believe 
that only groups from the North had the right to bear arms.
2.4 Kasozi 1994: 48pp.
2.5 Jorgenson 1981: 109pp. Ankole and Kigezi were designated labour reserves for Buganda, whereas 
West Nile and Acholi were designated for Bunyoro and the Eastern districts.
216 Mamdani 1976: 52.
217 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 12pp.
218 Jorgenson 1981: 119pp.
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Beyond ethno-regional antagonism, colonial rule also reinforced religious divisions. In 
the last quarter of the 19th century, British Protestants and French Catholics had fought 
for control over Buganda. When Kabaka Mwanga II acceded to the throne in 1884, he
910attempted to expunge all foreign religions by ordering persecutions of Christians. As 
a reaction, Catholic, Protestant and Muslim chiefs armed themselves, united and 
overthrew the Kabaka in 1888. However, the cooperation between the three 
denominations soon broke down and the Muslim chiefs managed to expel the two 
Christian groups from government. Buganda was briefly turned into a Muslim state 
headed by Kabaka Kalema and much blood was spilled. In 1889, the Christian chiefs 
formed an alliance with the exiled Kabaka Mwanga and succeeded in returning him to 
the throne. While Muslim chiefs were exiled, the Catholic and Protestants factions -  the 
former backed by the French, the latter backed by the British -  divided the chiefly 
offices between themselves. Disputes about control of land and usufruct persisted 
however and by 1891 the Protestant chiefs, numerically in the minority, found their 
position eroding. These tensions culminated in the 1892 Battle of Mengo for control of 
the state where the Protestant faction defeated the Catholics with the assistance of 
IBEAC troops. The Protestant victory empowered a minority wing of the Baganda elite 
and was subsequently enshrined in the 1900 Buganda Agreement. Anglican 
Protestantism became the established religion, whereas the Catholics -  the majority -  
took second place and the Muslims were fully marginalised. Throughout the colonial 
period, the British continued to favour Protestants in access to land and authority, 
leading to grievances among both Catholics and Muslims.
In the light of these divisions, it is hardly surprising that no united nationalist movement 
developed. Until the mid-1940s, African political opposition was expressed by the 
Native Civil Servants’ association (1922) and various tribal movements, which were 
typically led by emerging traders, farmers and professionals who were pressing for 
changes in European and Asian domination. In 1946, the Bataka party -  the successor 
of the Bataka movement in the 1920s -  was formed in Buganda and started voicing 
popular grievances over low prices for cotton and coffee growers, the indirect elections 
of chiefs and the Buganda government, which was perceived as a stooge of the British. 
One year later, Ignatius Musazi established the Uganda African Farmers’ Union 
(UAFU) with the goal of mobilising all farmers in Uganda to take control of the
219 Kasozi 1994: 27pp.; Jorgenson 1981: 47pp.
220 Jorgenson 1981: 179pp.
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marketing of cash crops. These combined political activities in favour of an 
Africanisation of trade led to the cotton hold-up of 1949, after which both the Bataka 
Party and the UAFU were banned. In 1952, Musazi founded the Uganda National 
Congress (UNC) -  the first countrywide political party that had its strongholds in the 
export-commodity producing areas. It was initially controlled by predominantly 
Baganda and Protestant leadership. Within Buganda, the UNC appealed to growers of 
cash crops and opponents of the Mengo hierarchy, while concentrating on cotton 
producers in other parts of the territory. From the mid-1950s, the UNC was however 
riddled by divisions between members from outside Buganda (who favoured a unitary 
post-colonial state) and members from within Buganda (who took a pro-federal or even 
pro-separatist stance). These tensions escalated in 1958 when two anti-Buganda UNC 
members of the Legislative Council broke away to establish the Uganda People’s Union 
(UPU) with other non-Baganda members of the Council. Two years later, the UPU 
merged with the anti-Buganda wing of the UNC to form the Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC), headed by Milton Obote. As the UNC fully disintegrated, the originally 
Buganda-bom party was replaced by the anti-Buganda but still Protestant UPC.
The second main political party that emerged during the 1950s was the Democratic
991Party (DP). It was founded in 1954 by Catholics who not only resented the privileges 
of the Protestant-dominated Mengo hierarchy but also perceived the UNC as just 
another vehicle of Protestant hegemony. Accordingly, the DP -  whose leadership was in 
the hands of professionals rather than chiefs -  recruited mainly in predominantly 
Catholic territory. Its strongholds lay in areas with limited or no export-commodity 
production (West Nile, Ankole and Kigezi) and in Bunyoro where people were still 
alienated by the Mengo’s annexation of the ‘lost counties’ (see above). The third 
political party emerged from within the Buganda government at Mengo. Faced with the 
anti-Buganda UPC and the Catholic DP, the Mengo first tried to declare the Kingdom 
independent in 1960. This separatist bid was rooted in an alliance between 
traditionalists (royal family, higher functionaries, saza chiefs), rentier landlords and
9 9 9capitalist farmers. While the former group was interested in the perpetuation of 
traditional privileges, the latter two perceived secession as a means to protect the mailo 
land system and their economic hegemony, including access to cheap migrant labour. 
After the secessionist bid failed, the Buganda government launched its own political
221 Mutibwa 1992: 13pp.; Jorgenson 1981: 193pp.
222 Jorgenson 1981: 190pp.
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party in 1961, the Kabaka Yekka (‘The King Alone’, or KY), which was soon infiltrated 
by Musazi’s pro-Buganda UNC faction.
Altogether, the nationalist movement gave birth to three largely sectarian political 
parties, including the anti-Buganda and Protestant UPC, the Catholic and anti-Mengo 
DP and the Mengo-dominated KY. As the country proceeded towards independence, 
Obote’s UPC and the KY entered into an unlikely alliance in October 1961.223 This was 
mainly due to the fact that the DP had ignored the Mengo’s boycott of the March 1961 
parliamentary elections and thereby easily won 20 of 21 seats in Buganda (with only 
about 2% of the eligible votes). As the DP also won a majority in the rest of the country, 
it provided the country’s first Prime Minister in the person of Benedicto Kiwanuka -  a 
Catholic Muganda commoner. Unsurprisingly, the Protestant establishment at Mengo 
was furious that Kiwanuka had not only ignored the boycott but also dared to place 
himself in a position superior to the Kabaka. To remove the DP from power, the KY 
and UPC joined forces in what was essentially an anti-Catholic pact and together won 
the parliamentary elections of April 1962. As a consequence, Obote -  who’s UPC had 
won the majority of seats -  became Prime Minister of Uganda and led the country to 
independence in October 1962.
Despite the peaceful transition to independence, the alliance between the conservative 
and monarchist KY and the anti-Buganda and nationalist UPC was extremely uneasy 
and fragile. During the 1961-62 constitutional negotiations in London, the UPC had had 
to give in to Buganda’s demands for a federal state with strongly entrenched powers for 
Buganda and indirect election of Buganda’s representatives to the National 
Assembly.224 Accordingly, the Independence Constitution granted full federal status to 
Buganda and a semi-federal status to other kingdoms, while the other districts were 
governed from the centre in a unitary fashion. This meant that post-colonial Uganda 
came to consist of the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, the territory 
of Busoga, and the districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, 
Sebei, Teso and West Nile. While this complex nature of the Constitution reflected the 
unavoidable need for power-sharing, it created significant ‘pockets of power’ that were 
beyond the reach of the central government. Moreover, there was no strong sense of 
nationalism with all of the manifold social divisions remaining unaddressed.
223 Mutibwa 1992: 19pp.
224 Ibid.: 22pp.
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SOCIAL CLEAVAGES
As argued in the previous section, colonial rule produced extremely high levels of social 
fragmentation in Uganda. But which are the dominant social cleavages around which 
political competition is structured in post-colonial Uganda? Or, asked differently, which 
are the main cleavages that need to be accommodated to prevent violent group 
mobilisation?
Establishing the dominant cleavages in society is not an easy task, neither in Uganda 
nor elsewhere. Implicit in the notion of social groups is the idea that both members and 
non-members recognise the group boundaries and expect that significant social actions 
are -  or could be -  conditioned on them.225 In this sense, the main social cleavages are 
what people think they are at a given point in time.226 It follows that the best way to 
establish the dominant social cleavages would be a countrywide survey. As the latter is 
beyond the scope of my study, I rely on my impressionistic interview evidence, census 
reports and the interpretation of other secondary sources.
The main source of social cleavage in post-colonial Uganda has been tribe. As 
discussed above, the country contains a multitude of tribal groups. The first census in 
1959 listed 35 different indigenous tribes, while the most recent one in 2002 identified
9 9 7even 56. In line with my definition of ethnicity, these tribes are ethnic groups in that
membership is determined by the tribal background of the individual’s parents, i.e. by 
descent. None of these groups are primordial in character but at least partially the 
product of divisions and amalgamations imposed by both colonial and post-colonial 
rule. Despite some changes in classification, one can identify a fairly stable set of 19 
tribes with a population share of more than 1% (see table 5). In 2002, the ten largest 
ones included the Baganda (17.7%), Banyankole (10.7%), Basoga (10.4), Bakiga 
(7.2%), Iteso (6.7%), Langi (6.4%), Bagisu (5.6%), Acholi (4.9%) and Lugbara (4.4%). 
Needless to say that these groups are not fully homogeneous but affected by more or 
less pronounced internal divisions. The most prominent example for intra-group
225 Fearon 2003: 6.
226 Such perceptions of group boundaries are o f course not wholly exogenous. Instead they vary with a 
broad range of other variables such as a country’s political institutions or economic circumstances (see 
Posner 2005).
227 Note that the censuses in 1969, 1980 and 1991 excluded questions on an individual’s tribal affiliation, 
mainly for political reasons.
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divisions would be the Banyankole tribe, which has traditionally been divided into the 
Bahima (cattle-owners) and Bairn (agriculturalists) subgroups.
Table 5: Tribal groups in Uganda and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)228
Tribal group 1959 2002
Baganda 16,3 17,7
Iteso 8,1 6,7
Banyankole 8,1 10,0
Basoga 7,8 8,9
Baldga 7,1 7,2
Banyarwanda 5,9 3,3
Langi 5,6 6,4
Bag is u 5,1 4,8
Acholi 4,4 4,9
Lugbara 3,7 4,4
Batoro 3,2 2,6
Banyoro 2,9 2,9
Karamajong 2,0 1,1
Ahir 1,9 2,3
Bagwere 1,7 1,8
Bakonzo 1,7 2,6
Japadhola 1,6 1,5
Banyole 1,4 1,5
Madi U 1,3
Others 10,3 8,1
Total 100,0 100,0
As I will show in detail in chapters 4 and 5, tribal divisions have played a major role in 
political competition and conflict over the Ugandan state since 1962. While party 
formation during the nationalist struggle was shaped by the conflict between the 
Buganda Kingdom and an anti-Baganda coalition of other tribes (organised in the UPC), 
these tensions persisted throughout Obote’s first Presidency during the 1960s. Under Idi 
Amin, the main conflict line was between the tribal groups from West Nile (Amin 
himself being a Kakwa from West Nile) and the rest of the country. While some of my 
interviewees felt that tribal divisions have become less salient over time, recent political 
debates in the country underline that competition over the state continues to be framed 
in tribal terms.229 This becomes evident on the occasion of every cabinet reshuffle when 
the different groups not only publicly gauge how many of their tribesmen have been 
appointed to government but also send delegations of elders and prominent leaders to
228 East African Statistical Department 1960: 1; UBOS 2006b: 46.
229 Various interviews.
75
the president to demand a fair share of the national cake. Also, tribal undertones have 
been omnipresent in recent debates about government appointments, decentralisation 
and land reform. Even though the importance of the tribal question is often 
downplayed,231 it clearly remains -  to use the words of one of the country’s foremost 
academics -  the ‘elephant in the room that nobody wants to talk about’.232
Table 6: Ethno-regional groups in Uganda and their population share, 1959-2002 (in 
lercent)233_______________________________________________________________________
Regional group 1959 2002
Buganda (Southern) 17,2 18,8
Eastern 30,1 28,4
Northern 20,7 22,3
Western 32,1 30,5
Total 100,1 100,0
A related, yet broader source of cleavage in Ugandan society has been region. During 
colonial rule, the territory was divided into four regions, including Central (Buganda), 
Eastern, Northern and Western region. Even though colonial and post-colonial local 
administration has always -  except for a brief period under Idi Amin -  revolved around 
the district as the highest unit,234 the four regions have over time remained an important 
vehicle of group identification, evident in the ubiquitous distinction between 
Southerners (Baganda), Northerners, Easterners and Westerners. Such distinctions are 
shaped by the historically grounded disparities in regional economic development, 
especially between the North and the rest of the country. Significantly, membership in 
these regional groupings is determined not by the region in which an individual 
currently resides but by descent from one of the region’s tribal groupings, which makes 
them ef/zwo-regional groups.235 Easterners, for example, comprise all members of tribes 
from Eastern region, including Iteso, Basoga, Bagisu, Bagwere, Japadhola, Banyole,
230 Muhereza & Omurangi Otim 1998: 195.
231 The tendency to downplay the salience of tribal affiliation has recently been criticised by the 
outspoken opposition MP Bety Kamya in her letter ‘There is nothing wrong with tribalism’, The Monitor, 
5 January 2009.
232 Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango.
233 Compiled based on East African Statistical Department 1960: 1; UBOS 2006b: 46.
234 Sathyamurthy 1982: 16pp.
235 Note that newspaper reports often define regional groups as comprising all individuals who currently 
live in the respective region (see, for example, ‘National cake: Who eats the chunk, who picks the 
crumbs?’, The Independent, 8 - 2 1  February 2008). This is problematic since common residency in a 
region does not automatically yield a cohesive group identity. In Central Region, for instance, only 63% 
of the local residents are actually Baganda (UBOS 2006b: 23). When Ugandans think of the ‘Baganda’ as 
a group with a common identity, they think of these 63% rather than of the entire population in Central 
Region.
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Basamia, etc. In terms of population share, Westerners constitute the largest ethno- 
regional group, followed by Easterners, Northerners and the Baganda (see table 6).
How salient are the broader ethno-regional cleavages when compared with tribal 
divisions? In general, interview evidence suggests that the four ethno-regional groups 
exhibit a considerable degree of common identity and solidarity. The distribution of 
jobs and resources, for example, is often analysed in ethno-regional terms, typically 
accompanied by claims about regional neglect and marginalisation. Nevertheless, 
there are considerable divisions within each of the four ethno-regional groups. The 
Northern group, for instance, has experienced recurrent conflict not only between the 
Acholi-Langi and West Nile factions, but also within both of these subgroups (see 
chapters 4-5). In the end, ethno-regional cleavages do matter but determine political 
behaviour less than tribal affiliation. To use an extreme example, if people take up arms 
against the government, they do so as Acholi or Lugbara rather than as Northerners.
Table 7: Religious groups in Uganda and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)237
Religious group 1959 2002
Protestant 28,2 36,6
Catholic 34,5 41,6
Muslim 5,6 12,3
Other 31,7 9,5
Total 100,0 100,0
A third social cleavage in Uganda has been religion. As discussed above, colonial rule 
introduced divisions between Protestants, Catholics and Muslims, which became a key 
driver behind the formation of the first political parties. Numerically, Catholics have 
always been the largest of these three religious groups , followed by Protestants and 
Muslims (see table 7). The salience of religious cleavages was particularly pronounced 
during the first Obote regime and under Idi Amin who tried to turn the predominantly 
Christian country into a Muslim state (see chapter 4). According to interview evidence, 
the significance of religious divisions has decreased since the 1980s and is now clearly 
outweighed by tribal and regional cleavages. Even though there is still evidence for
236 See, for example, recent parliamentary debates in GOU 2009a: col. 3.11.
237 East African Statistical Department 1960; UBOS 2006b.
238 Uganda’s three religious groups are not ethnic in character since membership is determined not only 
by descent but also by the choice of a religion. While family ties remain important in determining 
religious affiliation, interview evidence suggests that religious conversions are not uncommon in Uganda.
77
9^Qreligious grievances, it seems rather unlikely that significant social action will be 
conditioned on religious divisions. This is not least due to the fact that Catholics, 
Protestants and Muslims are present throughout the territory, which means that 
religiously-based collective action tends to be countered by tribal divisions.240
In contrast to tribal, regional and religious divisions, class can only to a very limited 
extent be considered a salient cleavage in Uganda. During the colonial period, the 
British deliberately avoided full-scale capitalist transformation, which was not only 
considered morally repugnant but also a threat to political stability.241 Even though there 
was of course social stratification in both urban and rural areas, class formation 
remained limited in that very few people had nothing to sell but their labour. Rural 
peasants retained their land as a means of production and subsistence, while urban 
workers were typically peasants first and workers second, which means that they 
maintained their roots in the countryside to which they returned after earning money in 
the city. There is reason to think that this situation has not changed much since 
independence. President Museveni himself, for example, has argued that
‘[b]ecause o f our backward, pre-industrial economies, there are no pan-national social 
forces which can ensure horizontal linkages. The only organised groups are either tribes or 
religious factions’.242
The main thrust of this argument is that Uganda mostly remains a rural society mainly 
composed of peasants and therefore lacks salient class cleavages. Nelson Kasfir has 
taken issue with Museveni’s ‘one class’ analysis on the grounds that it negates a 
‘considerable degree of class differentiation in rural Uganda’, opposing capitalist
94^farmers and rich peasants to poor peasants and mere labourers. While this is certainly 
true, it is nonetheless a matter of fact that this social stratification in rural areas has 
hardly given rise to distinct class-based group identities that shape collective behaviour 
(i.e. in form of political parties). Similarly, class issues may be becoming more 
important in the context of rising urban poverty but are still far from being the main 
determinant of social action. This became evident in the 2009 ‘Buganda riots’ in 
Kampala that were rooted in the central government’s unresolved conflict with the
239 Although Catholics are the largest religious group in Uganda, the country has never been ruled by a 
Catholic President. This is still an emotional issue among many Catholics. See ‘The battle to succeed 
Museveni’, The Independent, 18 March 2009.
240 To give an example, Catholics in Northern region (59.2% of the population) will have relatively little 
in common with Catholics in Central region (41.2% of the population). Moreover, and in sharp contrast to 
countries like Nigeria or Sudan, Muslims in Uganda are not concentrated in the North but evenly spread 
throughout all four regions (see UBOS 2006b: 28).
241 Jorgenson 1981: 109pp.; Kasozi 1994: 40pp.
242 Museveni 1997: 31.
243 Kasfir 1998: 59p.
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Buganda Kingdom and therefore reflected tribal rather than class divisions (see chapter 
5). Altogether, it seems safe to argue that class cleavages in Uganda continue to be 
overshadowed by tribal, regional and -  to a lesser extent -  religious cleavages.
3.2 Zambia
PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL HISTORY
In pre-colonial times, the territory of present-day Zambia contained a multitude of tribal 
groups. The largest ones included the Bemba and Lunda in the North, the Ngoni and 
Chewa in the East, the Tonga in the South and the Lozi in the West (see map 2). 
Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the situation in Uganda, all groups are part of the 
Bantu-speaking family.
Politically, almost all groups were governed by chiefs by the end of the 19th century.244 
Among the people in the central and north-eastern parts of the territory, the first chiefs 
came from the country of the Luba in south-eastern Congo, while chiefly traditions in 
the North-West originated among the Lunda in south-western Congo. A few groups, 
including the Bemba, Lunda, Ngoni and Lozi, came to be organised around centralised 
chieftainships that possessed developed bureaucracies. The Bemba Kingdom in the 
North, for example, exhibited an important degree of cohesion, with political power 
becoming increasingly centralised during the 19th century. Even more centralised was 
the Lozi Kingdom in the West where the King (the Litunga), as the guardian of land, 
had built up a following of loyal chiefs by allotting them land on the Zambezi flood 
plain. The Lozi Kingdom consisted of a highly centralised heartland, inhabited by the 
Lozi themselves, surrounded by a larger but more loosely controlled region inhabited by 
subject groups such as the Mbunda, the Kwangwa or the Totela. The great majority of 
tribes, by contrast, lived in rather decentralised societies. Here, chiefs were part of 
traditional social organisation but bureaucratic institutions remained underdeveloped 
and weak. Among the Bantu-Botatwe, or Tonga-speaking people, in the South, finally, 
the Luba- or Lunda-derived chieftainship had made the least impact. As a consequence, 
chiefs were largely uncommon among the Ila and Tonga -  acephalous communities of 
cattle herders with a weak sense of common identity.
244 Roberts 1976: 80pp.
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Map 2: Tribal, linguistic and provincial cleavages in Zambia245
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The advent of colonial rule did little to fully integrate all groups into one national 
community. In 1889, the millionaire Cecil Rhodes was able to persuade the British 
government to grant a charter to his British South Africa Company (BSAC).246 This 
allowed him to make treaties with African chiefs and helped him to establish 
administrative powers over Northern Rhodesia until the turn of the century, using 
remarkably little force.247 The most important treaty was the Lochner concession (1890) 
whereby the Lozi King Lewanika -  unwittingly -  signed away mineral rights 
throughout his Kingdom. In the aftermath, the BSAC administered the territory with 
two goals in mind.248 On the one hand, it sought to extract labour from the local 
population to be able to sustain its mining efforts, while trying to minimise its costs on 
the other. The solution to achieving both goals was taxation that not only generated 
revenue but -  because taxes were payable in cash only -  also forced Africans to engage 
in wage-labour in the mines of Southern Rhodesia and Katanga (in which the BSAC 
had direct or indirect financial interests). To ensure efficient tax collection, the BSAC 
entered into an alliance with local chiefs who agreed to use their authority to extract
245 Own compilation.
246 Roberts 1976: 156pp.; Hall 1976: 8pp.
247 Only the Ngoni in the East were submitted by the mere force of arms in 1898.
248 Posner 2005: 26pp.
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revenue from their subjects and, in return, were recognised and protected by the 
company.249 While this strategy worked well in the highly centralised chieftaincies250, it 
was difficult to implement in decentralised societies. As a consequence, the BSAC 
introduced the Administration of Natives Proclamation (1916), which standardised the 
role of chiefs throughout the territory and boosted their authority, not least in areas 
where chiefs had previously been weak.251 Moreover, the BSAC acted to rationalise 
previously fuzzy tribal boundaries whereby the territory was parcelled up into tribal 
areas that were enforced on the ground. These measures paved the way for the 
‘tribalisation’ of the territory’s local authority structures.
This transformation was taken even further after the British colonial office took over 
from the BSAC in 1924 and turned Northern Rhodesia into a Protectorate. In 1929, a 
system of Indirect Rule was introduced through the Native Authority Ordinance, which 
was -  according to the Legislative Council -  meant to establish
‘a more advanced form of native administration, which gives to chiefs the management of 
their own affairs within their tribal areas, and it is hoped it will preserve and maintain all 
that is good in native custom and tribal organisation’.2
As the tribe became the main unit of rural administration, chiefs were given -  through 
their positions as heads of the newly created Native Authorities -  control over valuable 
resources (e.g. treasury funds and land) and unprecedented judicial powers.253 This 
provided the population with extremely strong incentives to cultivate their relationship 
with both the chief and their tribe. Accordingly, Native Authorities became the drivers 
behind tribal identities throughout the territory. As Posner has shown, tribes with Native 
Authorities tended to grow in size, whereas those without Native Authorities shrank.254
249 In fact, the BSAC relied upon a small body of white civil servants who were dispersed among a 
number o f stations all over the territory. But as the BSAC had less than fifty of such administrators, it 
urgently needed the help of chiefs.
250 The position o f Barotseland in the West was unique (Roberts 1976: 162pp.). Under the Lewanika 
concession (1900), the Lozi Kingdom had been divided into an inner ‘reserved area’ and a region more 
open to European enterprise, which allowed the Lozi to retain substantially more autonomy under 
colonial rule than others peoples. Lozi chiefs had to collect tax for the Company, but they were the only 
chiefs to receive a fixed percentage of the taxes paid by their subjects.
251 There is some disagreement on whether this policy really strengthened the role of chiefs. In contrast to 
Posner, Hall (1976: 50pp.) takes the view that the chiefs’ role as agents of the BSAC quickly reduced 
their stature in the eyes of their people. To support his argument, Hall cites the colonial officer Lord 
Hailey as follows: ‘The general effect of the policy was to preserve the outward form of the indigenous 
systems, but to undermine the authority of the chiefs both by making them depend on the administrative 
officer and by taxation which obliged large numbers of men to leave their villages for considerable 
periods o f time’.
252 Cited after Hall 1976: 51p.
253 Posner 2005: 30pp.
254 Ibid.: 36pp.
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Beyond the entrenchment of tribal divisions, colonial rule also favoured the emergence 
of distinct linguistic group cleavages. The latter became evident in the progressive 
consolidation of four dominant regional languages, including the Bemba-speakers in the 
North, Nyanja-speakers in the East, Tonga-speakers in the South, and Lozi-speakers in 
the West (see map 2).255 This process was driven by three features of colonial rule. 
First, missionary schools were unable to teach Africans in all local languages and 
therefore used Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi as the only languages of instruction. 
Second, colonial education policies formally adopted the four languages as official 
languages of instruction in 1927 in order to simplify the administration’s job.256 Third, 
intra-territorial labour migration had a profound effect on the country’s language map. 
Once the labour migrants settled in the major urban areas along the Tine of rail’257, their 
patterns of language use changed and a single language naturally emerged as a common 
medium of communication, including Bemba on the Copperbelt, Nyanja in Lusaka and 
Lozi in Livingstone. A fifth, albeit looser language group came to exist in the North- 
West where no single dominant regional lingua franca emerged but Lunda, Kaonde and 
Luvale enjoyed first-among-equals status.258 On the whole, the process of language 
consolidation meant that national conflicts were increasingly seen in linguistic terms, 
while local interactions continued to be framed in tribal terms. The picture was further 
complicated by the fact that the different communal identities were clustered into eight 
(later nine) administrative provinces (see map 2).
Colonial economic policies had an ambiguous impact in terms of national integration. 
On the one hand, the rapid growth of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 
1930s led to the emergence of an export-oriented mono-economy that was mined by 
foreign multi-national corporations and characterised by highly uneven economic 
development.259 The manufacturing and agricultural sectors remained underdeveloped
255 Ibid.: 56pp.
256 Moreover, Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi were also chosen, along with English, as languages o f  
both the African newspaper Mutende and Northern Rhodesian radio broadcasting.
257 The ‘line o f rail’ refers to the area, which is served by the railway linking the Copperbelt with Lusaka, 
the capital, and with the border town of Livingstone.
258 This unique position of the North-West goes back to the absence of the very factors that favoured 
language consolidation in the rest of the country (ibid.: 78p.). First, there were very few missions in 
North-Western Province. Second, none of the three languages was privileged by colonial education 
policies. And third, even though labour migration to the Copperbelt existed, it never equalled the number 
of Bemba-speaking migrants.
259 Roberts 1976: 185pp.; Hall 1976: 71pp. Copper from one of the world’s richest deposits was 
discovered in the late 1920s. As four large mines were developed from the early 1930s, the value o f  
exports increased five-fold between 1930 and 1933, and the contribution of copper rose from 30% to 
90%.
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with infrastructure development almost exclusively geared towards the needs of the 
mining industry. Investment in agriculture was minimal and most rural areas remained 
condemned to subsistence farming, which was in turn undermined by the absence of 
able-bodied men who worked in the mines for most of the year. As the rural areas off 
the ‘line of rail’ were left behind, the Copperbelt became ‘an island of comparative 
plenty in a vast sea of rural poverty’, evident in wide income gaps between rural and 
urban dwellers. All this played out in a context of a racially segregated colonial society. 
While the European minority monopolised managerial, professional and skilled artisan 
occupations, Asians were given control over much of the country’s middle-range retail 
trade. The African majority suffered from institutionalised racialist practises, including 
wage discrimination, exclusion from many occupations, segregated public services and 
alienation of the best land to European settlers.
On the other hand, the rise of mining involved rapid urbanisation and transformed the 
previously sparsely populated Central African plateau into a tribally-diverse melting 
pot. This did not automatically weaken tribal cleavages as the colonial government 
adopted a series of policies to avoid a ‘detribalization’ of urban society and contain 
destabilising class formation.260 A first set of policies attempted to structure urban life 
as much as possible along tribal lines. This involved the creation of a system of Tribal 
Elders, the setting up of Native Urban Courts, the practise of segmenting tribes into 
particular occupational niches in mining, and the encouragement of inter-tribal 
recreational competition and chiefly visits. A second set of policies attempted to 
encourage migrant workers to maintain their linkages with their rural homes. Most 
importantly, migrants had no access to housing, social services and food without formal 
employment and were denied the right to buy land -  a situation that provided them with 
powerful incentives to retain a foot in the rural camp. Nevertheless, there were 
considerable forces working against the attempt to fully prevent the ‘detribalisation’ of
Ofk 1the urban workforce. From the late 1940s, the companies placed increasing emphasis 
on mechanisation, which meant that the mines began to develop an interest in stabilising 
at least some African mineworkers so that they could acquire and retain certain skills. 
Moreover, many families preferred to take their chance in the towns rather than to 
starve in the poverty-stricken rural areas. In 1953, tribal representatives were abolished 
throughout the entire Copperbelt, at the insistence of more than 80% of the total African
2t,u Posner 2005: 43pp.
261 Roberts 1976: 188pp.
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labour force. African migrants on the Copperbelt could therefore best be described as 
‘men of two worlds’262: They were still tribesmen, with homes in distant villages, but 
they were also workers and townsmen. In the end, the multi-tribal Copperbelt became 
the cradle of the modem political history of Northern Rhodesia and gave rise to a broad- 
based nationalist movement.
Political resistance -  fuelled by racial discrimination and the authoritarianism of 
colonial rule -  began with voluntary welfare societies organised by the tiny minority of 
Africans with a Western primary school education. These societies became 
widespread in towns along the ‘line of rail’ from the early 1930s and clearly represented 
a ‘detribalised force’.264 After a lull in political activity from the mid-1930, welfare 
societies resurfaced from the early 1940s and amalgamated into the Northern Rhodesian 
Federation of Welfare Societies in 1946, which became the Northern Rhodesian African 
National Congress (NRANC) two years later -  the colony’s first political party. The 
African National Congress (ANC) -  as the NRANC soon became -  was initially led by 
Harry Nkumbula and worked hard to unite the whole territory in a sense of common 
purpose, namely fierce opposition to the planned Central African Federation (CAF) 
between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Even though the failure 
to prevent the imposition of the Federation in 1953 had initially a demoralising effect, 
the existence of the Federation -  that triggered massive immigration by white settlers 
and was clearly dominated by Southern Rhodesian interests -  ultimately stimulated the 
growth of African nationalism.
By the mid-1950s, the ANC had recovered its pre-Federation strength and could boast 
of more than 400 branches throughout the country.265 At the same time, there was 
growing dissent within the ANC leadership, opposing a conservative faction by Harry 
Nkumbula to a radical faction led by Kenneth Kaunda. In 1958, Kaunda and his radical 
followers broke away to form the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and won 
widespread allegiance from party branches in the northern and eastern parts of the 
country within a matter of weeks. Following its boycott of the territorial elections in
262 Ibid.: 20lp.
263 Ibid.: 196pp. The beginnings of political opposition in Northern Rhodesia were greatly influenced by 
educated Africans from Nyasaland. David Kaunda -  a Nyasalander and father of Kenneth Kaunda -  
founded the Mwenzo Welfare Association as the country’s first welfare association in 1912.
264 Hall 1976: 59pp. To give an example, nine of the fourteen officials o f the Livingstone Welfare 
Association came from Northern Province.
265 Ibid.: 123pp.
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early 1959, ZANC was banned but soon re-emerged as the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP). In the aftermath, UNIP led a widespread civil disobedience 
campaign -  the Cha-cha-cha movement -  that brought the country to a standstill and 
forced the British government to revise the constitution and clear the way to majority 
rule. In 1962, UNIP and the ANC together won a majority of Legislative Council seats 
against the settler-dominated United Federal Party (UFP) and entered into an uneasy 
coalition. This provided the death blow to the Federation, which fell apart in 1963. In 
the same year, UNIP alone won a decisive majority in the colony’s first universal adult 
suffrage election, including one third of the European vote and almost the entire Asian 
vote, and formed a government that led the country to independence in October 1964.
UNEP disposed of a powerful, mass-party organisation, especially on the Copperbelt,
'yf.n
and functioned as an important agent of integration among Africans. Even though 
Bemba-speakers dominated, non-Bemba speakers from all parts of the country played 
important roles in the leadership of UNIP. Nevertheless, UNIP’s support was far from 
complete. To begin with, the relationship with the powerful trade union movement 
remained ambiguous. Building on a tradition of militant strike action during 1930s and 
1940s, the trade unions -  led by the African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) -  organised 
successful industrial activity during the 1950s and became the second centre of African 
political organisation. Significantly, however, the authority of UNIP stopped at the 
union doors. Even though the party enjoyed close personal links with the union through 
its Copperbelt leadership, there was no formal association with AMWU repeatedly 
resisting its subordination under the party.268 As a consequence, UNIP found it hard to 
obtain any direct control over mineworkers who tended to look to AMWU for the 
solution of their problems.
Moreover, the impact of the nationalist movement was uneven across the country. 
While the liberation struggle was deeply rooted in Copperbelt, Northern and Luapula
266 More than 50 of ZANC’ key leaders -  including Kaunda -  were arrested and jailed. The policy o f the 
government was to detain the African leaders at places as remote as possible from their tribal homes, so 
that they should not influence local people. Accordingly, Sikota Wina from Western Province was 
detained in Bembaland, while Simon Kapwepwe from Northern Province was detained in Barotseland. 
Sikota Wina recalls that this policy ironically cemented the process of elite integration (Interview, Sikota 
Wina).
267 Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 124p.
268 In 1953, for example, AMWU ignored the ANC’s call for work stoppage on the Copperbelt, which 
was meant to mobilise protest against the Federation. This caused a long-standing sense of betrayal 
among ANC/ UNIP party activists.
85
Provinces, other parts of the country -  especially Western and North-Western Provinces 
-  remained largely untouched. In Southern and parts of Central Province, the ANC 
retained mass support among the Bantu-Botatwe (a synonym for the Tonga, Ila and 
Lenje tribal groups), which owed much to a deliberate ‘southemisation’ of the party 
structures and a tribalisation of its support base from the early 1960s. There was 
however also a political economy dimension to the ANC survival in that it represented 
the interests of ‘rich peasants’ in Central and Southern Provinces who felt discriminated
9 7 0against by the colonial state’s credit and marketing systems. Macola shows that UNIP 
handled the persistence of organised opposition in an extremely intolerant manner 
harassing ANC leaders and denying them the right of full political citizenship.271 In 
turn, the ANC relied on anti-Bemba propaganda and successfully used violence against 
local UNIP members to prevent UNIP from making substantial inroads into the Bantu- 
Botatwe areas. Just before independence, Harry Nkumbula -  the ANC leader -  rebuffed 
UNIP’s offer to form a national front based on the merger of the two parties.
UNIP suffered from a similarly fragile position in Western Province where the Barotse 
Agreement with the British had granted the Lozi Kingdom the status of a ‘protectorate 
within the protectorate’ and thereby enabled the traditional government to maintain a
97 9high degree of autonomy throughout the colonial period. The growth of African 
nationalism was perceived as a fundamental challenge by the traditional leadership who 
made repeated, albeit ultimately unsuccessful secessionist bids from the late 1950s in
971
order to preserve its independence and privilege. Young educated Lozi, by contrast,
9 7  A
played a key role in the growth of urban nationalism on the Copperbelt -  a situation 
that gave rise to a bitter struggle between Lozi ‘traditionalists’ (who dominated the Lozi 
government) and Lozi ‘nationalists’ (who were prominently represented in the UNIP 
leadership).275 Even though the ‘traditionalists’ could not prevent the penetration of the 
province by the ‘nationalists’ (UNIP won massive Lozi support in the 1962 and 1963
269 Macola 2008: 29pp.
270 Ibid.; Momba 1989.
271 Macola 2008: 21p. Macola argues that Kaunda saw party and nation as being coterminous and 
therefore identified opposition as illegitimate and ‘treasonable’. Even though it seems exaggerated to 
accuse Kaunda of an ‘exclusionary nation-building paradigm’, UNIP’s hegemonic project left little room 
for alternative views.
272 Gertzel 1984b: 206pp.
273 On the unsuccessful secessionist bids see Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 178pp.; Hall 1976: 184pp.
274 The striking prominence of young educated Lozi within the nationalist movement was due to the fact 
that Barotse-speakers had gained a head start in education over other Africans. Significantly, the Barotse 
National School was created in 1906 and remained the only government school in the territory until 1930.
275 For details on the intra-Lozi conflict see Caplan 1968.
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elections), they managed to win concessions in the form of the May 1964 Barotseland 
Agreement, which made Barotseland an integral part of Zambia but guaranteed the Lozi 
Kingdom a special status and preserved its traditional rights.276
Altogether, the broad-based nationalist movement faced more opposition than it is 
generally acknowledged. The accommodation of leaders in Western, North-Western, 
Central and Southern Provinces remained incomplete and there were even pockets of 
resistance in the UNIP strongholds in the northern parts of the country. This became all 
too evident in July 1964 -  four months before independence -  when Northern Province 
witnessed the extremely violent conflict between UNIP cadres and the followers of the 
Lumpa Church in July 1964 277 At least 1000 people died as a consequence of army 
action and Lumpa retaliatory attacks.
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES
The previous section has shown that colonial rule in what used to be Northern Rhodesia 
produced high levels of social fragmentation. But which are the dominant social 
cleavages around which political competition is structured in post-colonial Zambia?
The main source of social cleavage in post-colonial Zambia has arguably been 
language. As discussed above, colonial rule favoured the progressive emergence of four 
main language groups, including Bemba-, Nyanja-, Tonga- and Barotse-speakers. While 
no single common language emerged in the North-West, Lunda-, Luvale- and Kaonde- 
speakers are commonly considered -  i.e. in the 1980 and 2000 censuses -  to form a 
North-Western language group. Zambia’s five main language clusters are not ethnic in 
nature since membership is determined by the predominant language that an individual 
uses for his/her daily communication rather than by descent. In terms of population 
share, the group size has slightly varied over time (see table 8). In 2000, Bemba- 
speakers accounted for 41.7% of the population, followed by the Nyanja (23.8%), 
Tonga (13.9%), North-Western (7.7%) and Barotse (6.9%) groups.
276 The concessions made by UNIP were however limited as the Barotseland Agreement was not made 
part of the Independence Constitution. Sichone & Simutanyi (1996: 178pp.) argue that this was due to the 
fact that the central government held all economic cards and was therefore in a strong bargaining position.
277 For details on this neglected episode of Zambian history see Gordon 2008.
278 Various interviews; CSO 2003: Instructions manual, Appendix 7.
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Table 8: Language groups in Zambia and their population share, 1969-2000 (in percent)279
Language group 1969 1980 1990 2000
Bemba 38,8 42,9 43,1 41,7
Nyanja 21,7 22,3 23,8 23,8
Tonga 15,2 13,3 14,8 13,9
North-Western 10,6 7,7 8,8 7,7
Barotse 9,2 8,0 7,5 6,9
Other 4,5 6,0 1,9 6,0
Total 100,0 100,2 99,9 100,0
As I will show in chapters 6 and 7, language group cleavages have remained the main 
axis of political competition in Zambia since independence in 1964. This became first 
apparent during the 1967 crisis when elections for UNIP’s Central Committee (CC) 
opposed a coalition of Bemba- and Tonga-speakers to an alliance between Nyanja- and
non
Barotse speakers. Afterwards, the competition for resources and influence continued 
to be structured along linguistic divides. This becomes evident when looking at the 
main opposition parties during the First Republic (1964-1972). While the ANC retained 
its stronghold among Tonga-speakers, the rise of the United Party (UP) and the United 
Progressive Party (UPP) during the late 1960s reflected grievances of the Barotse- and 
Bemba-speaking groups. Language group cleavages remained salient after the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) took over in 1991. Again, the main 
opposition parties have had their strongholds among distinct language groups, including 
the Lozi-based National Party (NP), the Tonga-based United Party for National 
Development (UPND), and the Bemba-based Patriotic Front (PF).
A second important source of social cleavage in Zambia has been tribe. The country is 
commonly said to be home to 73 tribes -  an almost mythical figure that is omnipresent 
in popular usage and was mentioned in every single of my interviews. According to 
Posner, this enduringly influential classification goes back to J. Moffat Thomson’s 1934
981Memorandum on the Native Tribes and Tribal Areas o f Northern Rhodesia. Even 
publications by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CEO) make reference to the 
country’s 73 tribes, yet their own listings typically include a smaller number of tribes. 
The 1969 census, for example, counts only 60 indigenous tribal groupings, while the
279 CSO 1985: 3, CSO 2003: 46. Note that the 2000 Census distinguishes two further language groups, 
namely Mambwe- and Tumbuka-speakers. According to interview evidence, these two smaller language 
groups are however usually subsumed under the Bemba (Mambwe) and Nyanja (Tumbuka) clusters.
280 Rotberg 1967.
281 Cited after Posner 2005: 54p.
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one in 2000 lists a total of 61 tribes. These tribal groups are ethnic in nature since 
membership is commonly determined by the tribal affiliation of an individual’s parents. 
In terms of population share, one can identify 18 tribal groups who have over time 
accounted for more than 1% of the country’s total population (see table 9). In 2000, the 
ten largest included the Bemba (18.1%), Tonga (12.7%), Chewa (7.2%), Lozi (5.6%), 
Nsenga (5.5%), Tumbuka (4.2%), Ngoni (4%), Lala (3.3%), Kaonde (3%), Namwanga 
(2.7%), and Lunda (2.5%). Note that these smaller tribal groupings taken together make 
up the larger language groups (see map 2). The Bemba language group, for example, is 
mostly283 composed of Bemba tribesmen and members of the other Bemba-speaking 
tribes (Lala, Namwanga, Mambwe, Ushi, Lamba, Bisa, Lunda, etc.).
How salient are tribal divisions when compared with the broader linguistic divides? 
Baylies & Szeftel have argued that the Second Republic (1972-1991) witnessed an 
increased focus on local issues, which meant that tribal divisions became more
‘JO Aimportant, while the salience of the language groups declined. Similarly, Posner 
found that the one-party state of the Second Republic tended to emphasise tribal 
boundaries, whereas language group cleavages dominated political competition under 
the multi-party regimes of the First and Third Republics. This is however only 
partially convincing as tribe has continued to play an important role throughout the 
Third Republic (1991-today). According to interview evidence, President Levy 
Mwanawasa’s practise of appointing members of his ‘family tree’ -  that is, members of 
the small Lamba and Lenje tribes -  has heightened tribal divisions since 2001. 
Moreover, and related to the problem of the ‘family tree’, the mounting strength of both 
UPND and PF reflects perceptions of marginalisation among the Tonga and Bemba 
tribes who feel that they have been neglected vis-a-vis some of the smaller Tonga- and 
Bemba-speaking groupings. While language group cleavages arguably remain the main 
axis of political competition, tribal divisions within these larger groupings are also 
enduringly relevant, especially as far as the country’s largest tribes are concerned.
282 CSO 1973: 28, CSO 2003: Instructions manual, Appendix 7.
283 As mentioned before, and in contrast to claims by Posner (2005), Zambia’s language clusters are not 
ethnic groups in that membership is determined by the predominant language that an individual uses for 
his daily communication rather than by descent. This means that one can be classified a Bemba-speaker 
without being a member of one of the Bemba-speaking tribes. Nevertheless, those belonging to one o f the 
Bemba-speaking tribes represent the overwhelming majority o f the Bemba language group.
284 Baylies & Szeftel 1984.
285 Posner 2005.
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Table 9: Tribal groups in Zambia and their population share, 1969-2000 (in percent)286
Tribal group 1969 2000
Bemba 18,3 18,1
Tonga 10,5 12,7
Ngoni 6,3 4,0
Lozi 5,5 5,6
Nsenga 5,1 5,5
Chewa 4,8 7,2
Tumbuka 3,8 4,2
Lala 3,1 3,2
Kaonde 2,9 3,0
Luvale 2,4 2,1
Lunda (North-West) 2,3 2,5
Ushi 2,2 2,4
Lamba 2,2 2,2
Bisa 2,0 1,8
Lenje 1,9 1,7
Namwanga 1,6 2,7
Mambwe 1,6 2,3
Mbunda 1,5 1,4
Other 21,9 17,3
Total 100,0 99,9
A third, albeit less salient source of social cleavage has been class. Many of the most 
astute country specialists have argued that class is more or less peripheral to Zambian 
politics. During the 1970s, Molteno observed that
‘in Zambia, neither leaders nor followers have perceived class membership as a variable
relevant to political behaviour’.287
More recently, Posner argued that ‘class identities are not sufficiently deeply felt for 
them to play a role’.288 While acknowledging ‘objectively identifiable’ class differences 
in urban Zambia, he claims that these have not been paralleled by the emergence of 
class consciousness and therefore continue to be outweighed by tribal and linguistic 
cleavages. Even though it is plausible to assume that tribe and especially language are 
still more important determinants of Zambian politics, class as a potential source of 
political action should not too easily be dismissed. As early as in 1935, the first strike 
by mineworkers on the Copperbelt displayed an undeniable consciousness of common 
interest and the capability to organise concerted resistance within the urban 
environment. After independence, political competition mainly played out along 
linguistic and tribal lines but class issues always simmered below the surface. The rise
286 CSO 1973: 28; CSO 2003: 51.
287 Molteno 1974: 80.
288 Posner 2005: 86p.
289 Roberts 1976: 20lp.
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of the UPP during the early 1970s, for example, reflected not only grievances among 
Bemba-speakers but also considerable support among workers on the Copperbelt who 
were frustrated by the lack of social progress since independence.290 During the 
economic crisis of the 1980s, the leading role of the trade unions and recurrent urban 
riots on the Copperbelt suggest a considerable degree of class consciousness -a  
phenomenon that can hardly be dismissed as peripheral given the central role of the 
Copperbelt in Zambian politics. In recent years, the importance of class issues seems to 
have increased rather than decreased. Most importantly, the rise of Michael Sata’s PF 
since 2001 does not only reflect Bemba grievances but also articulates class-based urban 
discontent -  a strategy that has won the opposition party many votes and seats not only 
on the Copperbelt but also in Lusaka.291 On the whole, class does matter in Zambian 
politics, albeit often interrelated with tribal and linguistic divisions.
How about other potential social cleavages such as province or religion? Province is 
indeed an interesting contender. As mentioned above, Zambia has a total of nine 
provinces, including Copperbelt, Luapula, Northern, Eastern, Central, Lusaka, 
Southern, North-Western and Western Provinces (see map 2) .292 Identities based on 
these provincial divisions seem on several occasions to have driven political action in 
post-colonial Zambia. During the First Republic, for example, leaders from Luapula 
Province organised under the banner of ‘We Luapulans’ complaining that they had been 
neglected when compared with leaders from Northern Province.293 During the Second 
Republic, UNIP tried to minimise inter-group conflict by trying to ensure equal 
provincial representation on its Central Committee (CC).294 And even during the Third 
Republic, complaints about favouritism are occasionally framed in provincial terms.295 
Yet, there is reason to argue that provincial identities ultimately reflected linguistic and 
tribal divisions. The conflict between leaders from Luapula and Northern Provinces, for 
instance, largely mirrored divisions between Bemba-speaking tribal groupings in 
Luapula Province (Ushi, Lunda, Ng’umbo) and the Bemba tribe in Northern Province. 
Similarly, UNIP’s attempt to balance provincial representation was first and foremost a 
way to balance appointments between the country’s major language groups. Moreover,
290 Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 125pp.
291 Larmer & Fraser 2007; Gould 2007.
292 Lusaka Province was carved out of Central Province in 1978.
293 Baylies 1984.
294 Tordoff 1980a: 17p.
295 ‘Rupiah is the worst chief tribalist -  Sata’, The Post, 13 October 2009.
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people in the urban Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces organise based on either 
linguistic, tribal or class cleavages rather than on a cohesive provincial identity.
Religion, finally, has never been a relevant source of social cleavage in Zambia. In 
2000, about 87% of the population were Christian (65% Protestants and 22% 
Catholics), 1% were Muslim or Hindu, 5% adhered to other faiths, and 5% were
• 296atheist. Even though this religious profile is not dissimilar to that of Uganda, religion 
has never been a significant factor in Zambian politics. This is not to deny that the 
Christian churches have at times played an influential role in politics.297 But unlike in 
Uganda, divisions between Protestants and Catholics or between Christians and 
Muslims have never structured the country’s political or economic playing field.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that colonial rule in what is now Uganda and Zambia 
produced high levels of social fragmentation. In Uganda, the main sources of social 
cleavage are tribe, region and -  albeit to a declining extent -  religion. In Zambia, the 
most salient social dividing lines include language, tribe and -  albeit to a lesser extent -  
class. While the legacy of high social fragmentation represented an important challenge 
for post-colonial governments in both countries, social divisions in Uganda were clearly 
more pronounced than in Zambia. This became most evident in the absence of a united 
nationalist movement and the dominance of tribally- and religiously-based political 
parties. Zambia’s nationalist movement was also characterised by serious divisions but 
nonetheless more broad-based in character. This was not least due to the urbanised 
Copperbelt that played an important integrating role.
In the following chapters, I will show that Uganda’s post-colonial leaders have been 
less successful in overcoming social divisions than their counterparts in Zambia. 
Uganda’s leaders have repeatedly failed to effectively accommodate tribal, regional and 
religious cleavages -  a failure that has become a key driver behind recurrent civil war 
since 1962 (chapters 4 and 5). In Zambia, by contrast, post-independence leaders have 
managed to effectively contain linguistic, tribal and class divisions, which explains the 
country’s enduring peace and stability since 1964 (chapters 6 and 7).
296 CSO 2003.
297 Hinfelaar 2008.
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4 From Obote to Amin and back -  
exclusionary elite bargains and recurrent civil war 
in post-independence Uganda
As shown in chapter 3, colonial rule left Uganda with extremely high levels of social 
fragmentation, evident in the absence of a united nationalist movement and the 
dominance of tribally- and religiously-based political parties. As a consequence, the 
country’s post-independence leaders faced the difficult challenge of forging an inclusive 
elite bargain from a narrow and sectarian power base. In this chapter, I will argue that 
the Obote I, Amin, Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Obote II 
administrations have all, albeit to different degrees, failed to meet this difficult 
challenge -  a failure that can be directly related to the various insurgencies that have 
ravaged the country between 1962 and 1986.
To develop my argument, I will first provide information on the eight different civil 
wars that took place in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 (section 4.1). In a second and 
third step, I will show that the Obote I, Amin, UNLF and Obote II elite bargains were 
mostly exclusionary in nature (section 4.2) and then go on to argue that the observed 
lack of power-sharing between competing groups can be causally related to the 
recurrent outbreak of civil war (section 4.3). The chapter ends with brief thoughts on 
competing explanations (section 4.4).
4.1 Conflict levels between 1962 and 1986
Uganda between 1962 and 1986, unfortunately for the Ugandan people, offers almost 
unequalled opportunities for the study of political violence, including two successful 
military coups, more than a dozen coup attempts, state-directed killings, and eight cases 
of civil war (one even with international involvement).298
The first Obote regime (1962-1971) was relatively peaceful by Ugandan standards. As 
part of the UPC-KY alliance, Obote became Prime Minister, while the Buganda King,
298 As mentioned in chapter 2, information on the number of war-related deaths and ‘effective resistance’ 
is generally scarce and contested. While some doubts remain, my review of the secondary literature and 
newspaper articles in the Lexis Nexis News database suggests that all eight insurgencies match my 
definition of civil war.
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Mutesa II, was made President. The first signs of instability were the Rwenzururu 
movement299 and the army mutiny of January 1964, which was however put down 
without bloodshed. Only two years later, Uganda experienced its first civil war, which 
opposed government troops to the Buganda Kingdom and became known as the ‘Battle 
of Mengo’.300 After the violent subordination of the Mengo, Obote became President 
and introduced a unitary Constitution (1967). The country seemed to return to relative 
stability, albeit interrupted by the violence surrounding the imposition of a one-party 
state in December 1969.301 In January 1971, Idi Amin ousted President Obote in the 
country’s first successful military coup.
The reign of Idi Amin was extremely violent by every standard, with anywhere from 
12.000 to 300.000 deaths between 1971 and 1979.302 Beyond repeated waves of state- 
directed killings and at least a dozen known military coup attempts,303 the Amin 
administration witnessed two incidents of civil war. The first was the failed insurgency 
of September 1972 when an exile group of 1300 people -  mainly belonging to Obote’s 
forces but supported by Yoweri Museveni’s Front of Salvation (FRONASA) -  crossed 
into Uganda in order to topple Amin.304 The second civil war was the anti-Amin 
rebellion in 1978-79 that ultimately led to the downfall of the regime.305 The conflict 
involved a total of 28 groups from both within and outside Uganda, which were 
organised under the umbrella of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). This 
successful insurgency had however a very strong international component in that it was 
Nyerere’s Tanzania that -  provoked by Amin’s invasion of the Kagera Salient on 30 
October 1978 -  led the Ugandan groups to military victory.
The Amin regime was followed by the intermezzo of the Uganda National Liberation 
Front (UNLF) that witnessed the coming and going of three different Presidents
299 In the early 1900s, the Rwenzururu Kingdom of the Bakonzo people had been arbitrarily subjected to 
the Toro Kingdom. After demands for their own district had been refused by the colonial government, the 
Bakonzo launched a low-intensity guerrilla struggle against the British, which they continued throughout 
all the independent governments following decolonisation. It is only in 1982 that the Rwenzururu 
leadership finally signed an armistice with the Obote II government (see Kasfir 1976: 130pp.; Prunier 
2004: 367p.).
300 Government estimates put the number o f deaths at 40, whereas the Baganda cited a figure between 
400-4000 (Kasozi 1994: 86). Eyewitness evidence from palace occupants to the Human Rights 
Commission (GOU 1994a) tends to support the larger figure.
301 ACR 1969/1970: B212.
302 Estimates range from 12.000-30.000 (Jorgenson 1981: 315), 80.000-90.000 (ACR 1977/1978: B444), 
150.000 or more (Kyemba 1977: 115) to 50.000-300.000 (Kasozi 1994: 104).
303 ARC 1974/1975: B310; ACR 1976/1977: B378; ACR 1978/1979: B425.
304 The rebellion claimed the lives of about 500 people (ACR 1972/1973: B276; Museveni 1997: 70).
305 Avirgan & Honey 1982.
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between April 1979 and December 1980. The UNLF came to an end with the 
controversial elections of December 1980 that brought back to power Milton Obote. 
The latter ruled until July 1985 when he was toppled in a military coup led by Bazillo 
and Tito Okello. The period between 1979 and 1986 was again characterized by 
extreme levels of political violence. Most of the latter occurred in the context of five 
different civil wars. Two civil wars occurred in West Nile, including insurgencies by the 
Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and the Former Uganda National Army 
(FUNA). The remaining three civil wars took place in Buganda, the epicentre of violent 
conflict under Obote II. The two smaller insurgencies involved the Uganda Freedom 
Movement (UFM) on the one hand, and the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda 
(FEDEMO) on the other. The by far most sustained and ultimately successful 
insurgency in Buganda was however Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army 
(NRA), which launched a guerrilla war in the Luwero Triangle on 6 February 1981 and 
captured power on 26 January 1986.The total extent of death and destruction caused by 
the five anti-UNLF/ Obote II civil wars is difficult to estimate. Most sources indicate 
that a few hundred thousand people died -  the bulk of them during the NRA war.
How can one explain the outbreak of civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986? In 
what follows, I will show that that the Obote I, Amin, UNLF and Obote II governments 
all failed to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation by forging an 
inclusive elite bargain -  a failure that can be directly related to recurrent civil war.
4.2 The post-independence elite bargains (1962-1986)
4.2.1 The Obote I elite bargain (1962-1971):
The incomplete quest for national integration
At independence, Obote seemed to have a clear ‘plan for nationhood’, promising ‘to use 
government machinery and funds without favour to either tribe or race, religion or 
sex’. In line with such promises, the Obote I administration did indeed witness 
sustained -  albeit incomplete -  attempts for political and economic power-sharing 
between the country’s ethno-regional groups. Yet, the quest for national integration 
remained incomplete due to the absence of military and territorial power-sharing.
306 Estimates range from 300.000 (Mutibwa 1992: 159) to 500.000 (Kasozi 1994: 145pp.).
307 Obote 1962.
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POLITICAL POWER-SHARING
The distribution of government positions under Obote I was on average carefully 
balanced between Uganda’s ethno-regional groups. In absolute terms, all four groups 
received a remarkably similar share of government appointments between 1962 and 
1970 (see figure 7a). This was true not only for ministers and deputies but also for the 
more consequential positions in the ‘inner core’ of political power. In terms of 
population share, the Baganda and Northerners were slightly overrepresented, while 
Easterners and Westerners were moderately underrepresented (see figure 7b).
Figure 7: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1962-1970308
Figure 7a: Absolute Distribution, 1962-1970 average
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308 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.
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This balanced picture based on average values is however somewhat deceiving. As 
shown in figure 7c, the Baganda were initially seriously overrepresented, whereas 
Northerners, Easterners and Westerners remained underrepresented. This situation 
reflected not only the dominant position of the Buganda Kingdom at independence but 
also the constraints of the UPC-KY alliance, which obliged Obote to appoint a large 
number of KY ministers. Accordingly, in 1962, the Baganda -  at the time representing 
16.3% of the population -  controlled 33.3% of all ministers (5 out of 15 portfolios), 
46.2% of deputy ministers and 28.6% of the ‘inner core’, including the powerful 
ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs. The early dominance of the Baganda was 
reinforced by the elevation to the presidency and Head of State of Kabaka Mutesa II on 
4 October 1963. This reflected an unwritten pact between Obote and the Kabaka that -  
as part of the reward for supporting Obote to become Prime Minister at independence -  
Mutesa II would become President.309
Table 10: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, Index of Representation, 1962- 
1970 (in percent)310 _________ ________________________________________
Tribe Population
(1959)
1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
Baganda 16,3 36,0 27,8 17,1 17,2 18,3
Iteso 8,1 7,0 7,8 10,1 6,1 10,0
Banyankole 8,1 12,1 13,3 11,9 10,4 10,0
Basoga 7,8 9,5 10,6 8,2 1,9 1,7
Bakiga 7,1 2,2 2,2 6,4 1,9 1,7
Banyarwanda 5,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Langi 5,6 9,2 10,0 8,6 11,1 10,0
Bagisu 5,1 2,6 2,8 1,9 1,9 1,7
Acholi 4,4 2,6 2,2 4,1 4,9 3,3
Lugbara 3,7 0,0 0,0 3,7 3,0 3,3
Batoro 3,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 11,6 11,7
Banyoro 2,9 2,6 2,8 4,1 5,6 5,0
Karamajong 2,0 0,0 2,8 1,9 1,9 1,7
Alur 1,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,0 3,3
Bagwere 1,7 2,2 2,2 4,1 0,0 0,0
Bakonzo 1,7 0,0 2,8 1,9 3,0 3,3
Japadhola 1,6 0,0 0,0 1,9 5,6 5,0
Banyole 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Madi 1,2 2,2 7,8 6,0 5,6 5,0
Others 10,3 9,5 2,8 6,0 5,6 5,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
The initial prominence of the Baganda heightened long-standing fears of Buganda 
dominance in other parts of the country. Trying to correct the imbalances, Obote -  
himself a Langi from the North -  soon managed to lure more and more MPs of the
309 Mudoola 1993: 94; Mutibwa 2008: 65pp.
310 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.
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Democratic Party (DP) into crossing the floor to the UPC.311 Similarly, some MPs from 
the ‘progressive’ KY faction decided to look beyond their tribal identities and changed 
sides to the ruling party.312 As a result, the alliance with KY soon became dispensable 
for the UPC and was formally ended in August 1964. Significantly, Obote used the end 
of the alliance to quickly reduce the prominence of the Baganda in government (see 
figure 7c). Although the Baganda still received a proportional share of government 
appointments, the significant decline in influence was a clear threat to Baganda 
monarchists who were not willing to settle for less than a dominant place in the nation's 
politics. Even more importantly, the Baganda ministers in Obote’s post-coalition 
government were precisely those that had previously crossed the floor to UPC. As these 
ministers were little more than traitors in the eyes of the Baganda monarchists, the 
Buganda Kingdom at Mengo -  the key player in Ugandan politics for the past decades -  
found itself fully excluded from political power by the mid-1960s. To make matters 
worse, the position of the Mengo was further damaged by the Tost counties’ referendum 
held in November 1964. Despite the fierce resistance of the Kabaka, there was 
overwhelming support for the return of two of the three counties to Bunyoro. While the 
transfer struck a severe symbolic blow to the pride of the Baganda, it also ‘reduced the 
number of patronage posts available for distribution by the Mengo hierarchy’.314 In 
political economy terms, the issue was also over who would ‘control the economic 
surplus in Buganda’.
As the Baganda share in Obote’s government declined, that of the other ethno-regional 
groups increased (see figure 7c). If one disaggregates this broader picture to the level of 
tribal groups, we see that of all twenty tribes with more than 1% of the population, only 
the Banyarwanda316 and Banyole did not have representation in government between 
1962 and 1970 (see table 10). Among Westerners, the Banyankole, Batoro, Banyoro 
and Bakonzo were all well represented, with only the Bakiga lagging somewhat behind. 
Among Easterners, all groups (Iteso, Basoga, Bagwere, Japadhola) except the Bagisu
311 Jorgensen 1981: 220. Among those who crossed the floor was the DP Secretary General Basil 
Bataringaya.
312 Mutibwa 2008: 76p. These included, among others, Joshua Luyimbazi-Zake and William W. Kalema.
313 Ibid.; various interviews.
314 Jorgenson 1981: 220.
315 Mamdani 1976: 243.
316 The Banyarwanda at the time comprised three groups, including nationals, migrants and refugees 
(Mamdani 2001: 161pp.). Their non-representation in the public sector was due to two reasons. While 
nationals did not constitute an active political force, non-nationals were subjected to open discrimination 
by the Obote I government.
98
received proportional representation. Among Northerners, often reputed to have 
acquired a disproportionate share under Obote, only the Langi and Madi were 
overrepresented (albeit not dramatically), while the Acholi, Lugbara, Karamajong and 
Alur had more or less proportional representation.
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Figure 8: Ethno-regional distribution of permanent secretaries in Uganda, 1970317
Figure 8a: Absolute Distribution Figure 8b: D istribution relative to  popu la tion  share
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A look at the distribution of civil service appointments reveals a similar picture. 
Between 1959 and 1967, no tribe with more than 1% of the population was totally
• • l i  ounrepresented in the civil service. As in the case of government appointments, none 
of the Northern groups were ever significantly over-represented (except the Acholi in 
1965), while the Baganda were over-represented by a factor fluctuating between two 
and three times their population share. In terms of permanent secretary appointments, 
the Baganda were also overrepresented, while the other groups -  especially Easterners 
and Westerners -  were underrepresented (see figure 8).
The quest for national integration was also mirrored in the ruling party. In the early 
years of independence, UPC suffered from a weak organisational base, with Obote -  in 
sharp contrast to Kaunda in Zambia -  lacking the necessary means to exercise sufficient 
control over the party. From its creation in 1960, the UPC had been little more than a 
loose confederation of ‘locally powerful political notables’ that had no centralised
317 Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; ‘The beast o f tribalism4, The 
Independent, 25 January -  7 February 2008.
318 Kasfir 1976: 182p.
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^ 1Qhierarchy and only limited support at the grassroots. This loose coalition was even 
further strained when DP and KY MPs joined the ruling party in mid-1964 (see above). 
As a consequence, factional conflicts within UPC started to escalate from 1964-65, with 
a ‘centre faction’ (led by Obote) opposing a ‘conservation faction’ (led by the UPC 
Secretary General Grace Ibingira). This split
‘soon polarised over ideology and ethnicity, for Obote’s faction assumed the mantle o f a 
nationalistic and socialist movement championing the interests of the so-called 
‘disadvantaged’ of the north and east, while Ibingira’s faction became identified with the 
conservative wing of the party which also served as an advocate for the position and 
interests of the Bantu’.320
After the 1966 crisis, the Obote faction had clear control of the party. This can be seen 
when looking at the composition of the UPC Party Cabinet (the highest party organ), 
which included three Northerners (1 Langi, 1 Acholi, 1 Madi), two Easterners (1 
Musoga, 1 Mugisu), one Westerner (1 Mutoro) and one Muganda during the second half 
of the 1960s.321 Nevertheless, the UPC’s structure was overhauled in 1968 in order to 
eliminate tribalism and strengthen its organisational base.322 The new party structure 
preserved a dual hierarchy of conference and executive at three levels (the parish, 
parliamentary constituency, and national), while deliberately weakening the district 
party organisation that had in the past facilitated tribal strife. Also, Obote introduced an 
innovative electoral scheme whereby parliamentary candidates had to fight elections not 
only in a ‘basic’ constituency in their home region but also in ‘national’ constituencies 
in each of the other three regions.323 The rationale was to force candidates to look 
beyond tribal boundaries and focus on national rather than local issues.
Finally, the Obote I administration also made efforts to accommodate religious 
divisions. The main challenge was to appease the Catholics who were in the majority 
(34.5% against 28.2% Protestants in 1959) and perceived themselves as victims of the 
Protestant establishment (see chapter 3). Obote -  himself Protestant -  succeeded in co­
opting such Catholic notables as Felix Onama, Cuthbert Obwangor and Mathias Ngobi 
who ‘appear to have been the unofficial interpreters’ between the government and the 
Catholic Church’.324 While the government remained dominated by Protestants, 
Catholics received a proportional share of government appointments between 1962 and 
1970, especially in the ‘inner core’ of political power (see figures 9a and 9b). Similarly,
319 Jorgenson 1981: 221pp.
320 Mutibwa 1992: 33.
321 Own data compiled based on UPC 2008.
322 Kasfir 1976: 205pp.
323 For details see Willets 1975: 286pp.
324 Mudoola 1993: 35.
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the Muslims were well-integrated into Obote’s elite bargain. Led by Prince Badru 
Kakungulu (the Kabaka’s uncle), they rallied behind the UPC-KY alliance and were -  
in relation to their small numbers (5.6% in 1959) and political marginality upon 
independence -  adequately represented in government. The position of Muslims within 
the ruling coalition was enhanced in July 1965 when Ali Kisekka, Abu Mayanya and 
Issa Ssebunya -  three prominent Muslims -  joined UPC.
Figure 9: Religious composition of government in Uganda, 1962-1970325
Figure 9a: Absolute d istribution, 1962-1970 average
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From the mid-1960s, attempts to overcome religious divisions were however 
undermined by mounting tribal conflict, which may be taken as evidence that tribal 
cleavages outweighed religious divisions. On the one hand, the election of the first 
Anglican Archbishop in 1966 divided the Church of Uganda into two competing 
factions opposing the non-Muganda Bishop Eric Sabiiti to the Muganda Bishop of 
Namirembe, Dunstan Nsubuga.326 After Sabiiti emerged winner, the new ‘UPC 
archbishop’ went on to legitimise Obote’s action against the Buganda Kingdom in 1966 
-  a step that led to the alienation of the Namirembe faction and earned Obote enduring 
hostility in parts of the Anglican Church until the coup in 1971. On the other hand, the 
establishment of the National Association for the Advancement of Moslems (NAAM) in 
August 1965 divided the Muslim community.327 Officially created to promote unity 
among Muslims, the real intention was to rival Prince Badru Kakungulu’s Uganda
325 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.
326 Mudoola 1993: 43pp.
327 Mudoola 1993: 51pp.; Mutibwa 2008: 124.
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Moslem Community (UMC), especially in Buganda. As a consequence Muslim support 
was now divided along tribal lines. While the NAAM faction was deeply integrated into 
Obote’s elite bargain, the UMC and its detained leader was severely alienated.
ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING
Attempts for economic power-sharing were initially hampered by the fact that Uganda 
had little control over its own economy, which limited the scope for patronage 
distribution outside party and government. As a consequence, the Obote I 
administration used the late 1960s to increase its stake in the economy. Key in this 
respect was the ‘Commanding Heights Strategy’ whereby the parastatal sector was 
greatly expanded and ‘Africanised’.328 This involved not only the creation of new 
parastatals and the reorganisation of existing ones but also comprehensive 
nationalisation measures in May 1970 when the government announced the 60% 
nationalisation of 80 major firms. Significantly, the dramatic expansion of the parastatal 
sector provided Obote with an enlarged material basis for his elite bargain, i.e. a 
substantially increased reservoir for patronage distribution.
Interestingly, the bulk of this growing ‘economic cake’ seems to have gone to the 
Baganda. Figures 10a and 10b detail the distribution of key appointments in 27 
parastatal companies as of 1970, including data on key parastatals such as the Uganda 
Development Corporation, the Coffee Marketing Board, the Lint Marketing Board, the 
National Trading Corporation, the National Insurance Corporation and the Bank of 
Uganda. In absolute terms, the Baganda received about 40% of all appointments against 
20% each for the other three ethno-regional groups.329 In terms of population share, the 
Baganda were seriously overrepresented, while Easterners, Northerners and Westerners 
were underrepresented. A similar picture emerges from my own data on the Coffee 
Marketing Board -  arguably the key parastatal along with the Uganda Development 
Corporation. Here, the 1969 Board of Directors included three Baganda, three 
Westerners (1 Munyankole, 1 Munyoro, 1 Mukonzo), two Easterners (1 Musoga, 1 
Mugisu) and one Northerner (1 Lugbara) .330 All this taken together refutes claims by
328 Jorgenson 1981: 231pp.
329 At the level of tribal groups, the Baganda, Iteso, Acholi, Batoro and Banyoro were overrepresented, 
while the rest was underrepresented.
330 Own data compiled based on CMB 1973.
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I
Jorgenson that Obote tried to stifle the Baganda economically. While it may be true 
that the government used the newly created economic infrastructures to prevent 
excessive Baganda domination,332 the above data and interview evidence indicate that 
the Baganda continued to play a prominent role in the economic sector.
Figure 10: Ethno-regional distribution of key appointments in 27 parastatal companies in 
Uganda, 1970333
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Figure 10b: Distribution relative to  population share
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MILITARY POWER-SHARING
Attempts for political and economic power-sharing were contradicted by the persistence 
of a Northern-dominated army. After independence, UPC had not responded to the 
soldiers’ demands for swift Afficanisation and improved conditions of service -  a 
situation that fuelled discontent and culminated in the 1964 mutiny.334 In contrast to 
their counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania, the Ugandan government reacted very 
leniently to the munity. It not only continued to expand the size of the army but also 
granted the mutineers major concessions, including ‘phenomenal’ pay rises and 
accelerated Afficanisation. Predictably, in line with colonial imbalances, rapid 
Afficanisation led to an army dominated by Northerners -  a trend that was reinforced by
331 Jorgenson 1981: 246p.
332 To give an example, the cooperative unions -  mostly in the hands of Baganda farmers -  were deprived 
of their independence and subjected to government control (Kasozi 1994: 93).
333 Compiled based and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; ‘Where was Tribalism 
in Uganda?’, The Standard (Tanzania), 12 February 1971.
334 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 48pp.
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the repeated purging of Baganda officers.335 Omara-Otunnu has argued that Obote had 
little choice but to retain a Northern-dominated army:
‘The position of the UPC was precarious, and its position in government was to begin with 
based only on a coalition. In the army the majority of the troops came from the north, the 
Prime Minister’s own regional power base These two factors combined to make it 
imprudent for Obote to take harsh measures in reaction to the mutiny’.336
Yet, it is important to ask whether the army -  that had so far been largely absent from
the political stage -  was really so crucial to Obote’s survival, especially in early 1964
when Obote was still in a rather strong position. The army was still small at the time
and could have easily been disbanded, especially if Obote had -  like Nyerere in
Tanzania -  relied on British military support. Also, even though the creation of a
tribally balanced army was certainly difficult in the short run given the historical
imbalances, the extremely rapid promotions after the mutiny suggest that there was
considerable leeway. And even during the late 1960s, Obote could have exploited the
massive Israeli military presence in the country to change the character of the army.337 It
seems therefore more plausible to argue that Obote simply ignored the possibility of
rebuilding the army as a politically neutral and tribally representative organisation.
Instead, he chose to continue the military’s colonial legacy and strengthen the army as
his main power bastion. This choice had important repercussions in that the military
was henceforth used as the key battleground for politicians to play out their struggles.
Figure 11: Ethno-regional distribution of appointments in the army and military police 
command in Uganda, 1966 & 1969338
Figure 11a: Absolute distribution
Buganda Eastern
(Southern)
I  A rm y c o m m a n d  (1966) □  M ilitary  po lice  c o m m a n d  (1969)
Figure l i b :  D istribution relative to  popula tion  share
250  +
150  4
3  100
B uganda E as te rn  N o rth e rn  W e s te rn
(S o u thern )
I A rm y c o m m a n d  (1966) E3 M ilitary  p o lice  c o m m a n d  (1969)
335 Kasozi 1994: 74, Mudoola 1993: 96.
336 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 64.
337 Interview, Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga.
338 Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 80.
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The persistence of a Northern bias in the security sector is illustrated in figures 11a and 
lib . Northerners dominated both the army and military police command, while the 
other three ethno-regional groups -  especially the Baganda and Westerners -  were 
clearly marginalised. In the officer corps, the bulk of the positions was held by the 
Acholi, Langi and the Iteso (see table 11). The military police command, by contrast, 
was clearly dominated by the West Nile tribes, including the Lugbara, Alur, Madi and 
Kakwa. The Northern bias was even more pronounced at the level of the ‘rank and file’. 
In 1969, 61% of the soldiers were from the North against 22% Easterners, 12% 
Westerners and 5% Baganda.339
Table 11: Tribal distribution of appointments in the army and military police command in
Uganda, 1966 & 1969 in percent)340
Tribe Population (1959) Army command (1966) Military police command 
(1969)
Baganda 16,3 9,4 0,0
Iteso 8,1 14,0 5,6
Banyankole 8,1 4,1 5,6
Basoga 7,8 5,8 2,8
Bakiga 7,1 1,2 2,8
Banyarwanda 5,9 0,6 2,8
Langi 5,6 13,5 8,3
Bagisu 5,1 3,5 0,0
Acholi 4,4 15,2 13,9
Lugbara 3,7 8,8 25,0
Batoro 3,2 1,2 0,0
Banyoro 2,9 1,2 0,0
Karamajong 2,0 0,0 2,8
Alur 1,9 5,3 13,9
Bagwere 1,7 1,8 0,0
Bakonzo 1,7 0,0 0,0
Japadhola 1,6 0,0 0,0
Banyole 1,4 0,0 0,0
Madi 1,2 4,7 5,6
Others 10,3 9,9 11,1
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
The coexistence of a strong Acholi-Langi axis on the one hand, and a strong West Nile 
faction on the other soon created jealousies, which translated into tensions between 
Obote and the Army Commander Idi Amin, a Kakwa from West Nile.341 Amin tried to 
bolster his position by mainly recruiting among Sudanic-speakers from West Nile. This 
became evident not only in the Military Police (see above) -  his main stronghold -  but 
also in the army as a whole where there was a marked increase of 74% in Sudanic- 
speakers between 1968 and 1969 and a striking stagnation in Nilo-Hamitic speakers
339 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 82.
340 Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 80.
341 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 78pp.
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(Obote’s language group). Obote struck back by shifting resources and competences to 
the Special Forces and the General Service Unit (GSU) -  rival organisations that were 
stuffed with his own Langi tribesmen'342
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING
At independence, Uganda inherited a fairly autonomous and well-developed system of 
local government.343 Under colonial rule, the district was established as the central unit 
of local administration. While the centre retained control through the powerful 
overseeing presence of District Commissioners (DCs), the districts were ruled through 
directly elected councils, which were empowered to raise their own revenue through 
local taxation, recruit their own staff and deliver a broad range of social services (e.g. 
roads, water, education and health). The 1962 Independence Constitution cemented 
high, albeit varying degrees of territorial power-sharing.344 As mentioned in chapter 3, 
Buganda was granted full federal status and therefore enjoyed considerable local 
autonomy, which was structured around the institution of the Kabaka, a Parliament with 
directly elected representatives and a local administration organised in ministries and 
headed by political ministers. The other kingdoms (Toro, Ankole, Bunyoro and Busoga) 
were given semi-federal status whereby their rulers, political institutions and 
administrations became part of local government. The non-kingdom areas came to be 
divided into nine unitary districts, which continued to be governed through directly 
elected councils and retained their pre-independence competences. Altogether, the post­
independence system of local government provided the local leadership of the various 
tribal groups with a wide range of opportunities for political participation and 
employment, especially in Buganda.
Territorial power-sharing was however increasingly undermined from 1963 when the 
Ministry of Regional Administrations was given more powers over local government.345 
Accordingly, the Councils were not only made more financially dependent but also 
gradually lost control over local appointments. This trend was greatly reinforced by the 
abrogation of the Independence Constitution in 1966 -  the main guarantee for territorial 
power-sharing. The ensuing 1967 Republican Constitution strengthened the centre at the
342 Hansen 1977: 88. Kasozi (1994: 89) claims that 75% of Special Force member were Langi.
343 Sathyamurthy 1982; Golooba-Mutebi 1999.
344 Barongo 1989: 73p.
345 Sathyamurthy 1982; Golooba-Mutebi 1999.
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expense of the periphery. Most importantly, all kingdoms were abolished and replaced 
by now 18 unitary districts that suffered from seriously curtailed local autonomy. First, 
local councils were stripped of most service delivery functions, which meant that ‘local 
budgets and thus local political arenas’ diminished steadily.346 Second, the reach of the 
centre was greatly increased, evident not only in the growing powers of the DCs but 
also in the President’s Office control over local appointments. As local government 
appointments effectively became party appointments, chiefs and other local staff were 
replaced by UPC supporters. Altogether, territorial power-sharing had been more or less 
abrogated by the late 1960s. The change was most dramatic in Buganda that was 
divided into four districts and deprived of its entire local hierarchy.
THE END OF OBOTE I
In contrast to current descriptions of Obote as a notorious ‘tribalist’347, his first 
administration displayed clear signs of an inclusive nation-building project. This 
became evident in serious attempts for political and economic power-sharing. However, 
the quest for an inclusive elite bargain remained incomplete. First, Obote failed to 
achieve lasting accommodation with the Buganda Kingdom. Even though the Baganda 
were by no means fully excluded from political and economic power, the Buganda 
monarchists at Mengo were alienated by their loss of influence at the central state level, 
the abrogation of the post-independence provisions for territorial power-sharing, and the 
uncompromising desecration of the Kabaka’s symbols. Second, Obote’s attempts to 
achieve national integration were undermined by the unresolved legacy of a Northern- 
dominated army, which had gained a high political profile and increasingly escaped his 
control. This ultimately paved the way to the 1971 military coup. In late 1970, Obote 
tried to contain the escalating factional struggles in the army by demoting the Army 
Commander Idi Amin and his closest West Nile associates.349 But it turned out that 
Obote had unleashed a genie after the mutiny in 1964 that he now found impossible to 
put back in the bottle. The Amin faction proved strong enough to counterstrike and 
ousted Obote on 25 January 1971. In doing so, Amin received the silent support of other
346 Kasfir 1976: 251.
347 Museveni 2000: 118. For a more nuanced appraisal of Obote see Anguria 2006.
348 Kasfir 1976: 212p. After the 1966 crisis, the Kabaka’s palace in Kampala was turned into an army 
barracks, while the Buganda Parliament became an office building for the Ministry of Defence. The 
deposed Kabaka himself was treated with outright disrespect when Obote first refused to offer the exiled 
monarch a pension (in contrast to other deposed kings) and later even rejected the demand to bring his 
body back for burial at home.
349 For details see Omara-Otunnu 1987: 89pp.
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alienated social forces, including Baganda monarchists, the Anglican Namirembe 
faction and Prince Badru Kakungulu’s UMC.
4.2.2 The Amin elite bargain (1971-1979):
The era of undisguised exclusion
Amin seized power with a very narrow support base. While the downfall of Obote was 
greeted with jubilation among many Baganda, there was considerable apprehension in 
the rest of the country. Against this backdrop, Amin initially tried to present himself as 
the ‘man of peace’ who was mainly concerned with reconciliation, national unity and 
prosperity. Measures of goodwill included the abolition of the one-party state and the 
release of political prisoners.350 Most importantly, Amin brought back the body of Sir 
Edward Mutesa II from London for burial in Uganda -  a step that earned him popularity 
among many Baganda and bolstered his fragile leadership.351 Nevertheless, it soon 
became obvious that Amin’s drive for reconciliation was little more than a masquerade. 
As all political institutions (including Parliament) were suspended, Uganda was 
henceforth ruled by decree. Moreover, the regime came to be characterised by 
extremely low levels of power-sharing, evident in a striking ethno-religious bias in 
favour of a ‘Nubian-Kakwa’ core group and Muslims in general.
MILITARY POWER-SHARING
True power under Amin lay with the army. Even though the military government 
initially announced that the army as a whole was to be made more tribally 
representative, the reality was always different. After the coup, the size of the military 
was almost doubled from 6700 men in 1970 to 11.409 by the end of 1971.352 As large 
parts of the army were exchanged, the new ‘rank and file’ came to exhibit a pronounced 
ethno-religious bias. While about 4000 were former Sudanese or Zairian rebels and 
most of the rest from West Nile, the proportion of Muslims reached an estimated 40%. 
By 1977, the situation was scarcely different. Of about 15.000 serving soldiers, an 
estimated 4000-5000 were from West Nile, while 3000 were Southern Sudanese.353 This
350 Kasozi 1994: 105pp.; Ravenhill 1974: 231.
351 Mutibwa 1992: 86.
352 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 107p.
353 ACR 1977/1978: B442.
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estimate is supported by data on recruitment in 1978 when 68% of all recruits came 
from West Nile district, of which 36.3% were Kakwa and 21% Lugbara.354
These imbalances at the ‘rank and file’ level were mirrored in the officer corps. 
Significantly, no less than 13 of 22 officers promoted shortly after the coup were from
“I C C
West Nile, while another 4 were immigrants from Zaire and Sudan. These imbalances 
even worsened from late 1972 when Amin decided to strengthen his hold on the army 
by ensuring that key positions were in the hands of close affiliates. From now on, it was 
especially the Kakwa (his own group) and Nubians356, and Muslims generally who got 
the strategic posts. This came largely at the expense of other West Nile officers (Alur, 
Madi and Lugbara), many of whom were removed or even killed from late 1971. 
While the Amin regime always continued to have its base in West Nile with still 
substantial contingents of Alur, Madi and especially Lugbara officers, the dominance of 
the ‘Nubian-Kakwa’ core group became more and more entrenched. By 1977, 32% of 
the 22 key army officers were Kakwa, 9% Nubian, 18% Sudanese, 27% were from 
other West Nile tribes and only 14% were from outside West Nile (see table 12).358 
Maybe even more strikingly, 17 of the 22 key officers -  that is, 77.3% -  were Muslims 
(5.6% of the population in 1959).
Table 12: Tribal distri button of the top army command in Uganda, 1977 (in percent)359
Tribe Population
(1959)
1977
(total distribution)
1977
(distribution relative 
to population share)
Kakwa 0,8 31,8 3877,3
Nubian 0,1 9,1 8990,9
Sudanese 0,4 18,2 4445,5
Other West Nilers 7,2 27,3 278,8
Others 91,5 13,6 -85,1
Total 100,0 100,0 0,0
354 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 134p.
355 Jorgenson 1981: 269p.
356 The Nubians originally came from Southern Sudan where they were recruited by Emin Pasha in the 
19th century and later incorporated into the British colonial forces. Nubians have settled in all parts of 
Uganda but constitute only about 0.1% of the population. The firm link between all Nubians is their 
Islamic faith (of the Sunni sect) and their language ‘Lunubi’, which is based on Arabic. When adopting 
‘Nubi’ practises, everybody can become a Nubian: Some Nubians are Baganda, while others are Basoga, 
Banyoro, Acholi, Langi or Kakwa (see ACR 1973/1974: B295; 21; Hansen 1977: 109).
357 For details see Hansen 1977: 113pp.
358 Omara-Otunnu (1987: 134) reports that in 1977 no less than 54% of the entire officer corps were 
Sudanic-speakers (Lugbara, Madi, Kakwa -  7% of the population) against 26% Bantu-speakers (66% of 
the population), 12% Luo-speakers (14.5% of the population) and 7% Nilo-Hamitic-speakers (12.5% of 
the population).
359 Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; ACR 1977/1978: B442.
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The army’s ethno-religious bias became also evident in the Defence Council, which was 
originally meant to deal only with military matters but soon became the country’s 
paramount decision-making organ, relegating the Cabinet to a secondary role. The 
Council presumably included most military officers at the Lieutenant Colonel rank and 
above, plus commanding officers of key military units.361 Even though membership was 
never fully disclosed, it was clearly monopolised by Amin’s ethno-religious cronies. By 
1977, the Council’s top hierarchy comprised President Idi Amin (a Muslim Kakwa), 
Vice-President Adrisi (a Muslim Lugbara and Amin’s uncle), the Chief of Staff Maj- 
Gen Lumago (a Christian Kakwa and Amin’s cousin), the Chief of Operations Col. 
Maliyamungu (a Christian Kakwa and Amin’s cousin) and the Commander of the 
Marines Col Taban (a Kakwa and Amin’s nephew).362
Beyond the regular army, Amin’s various secret service organisations -  responsible for 
most of the state-directed terror -  were also firmly in the hands of the Kakwa-Nubian 
core group. The notorious State Research Department, the largest secret service with 
2000 agents, was formally headed by Francis Itabuka from Busoga but effectively 
commanded by Farouk Minawa, a Nubian. The two other key agencies were also 
controlled by Nubians. While Ali Towili headed the Public Safety Unity, Hussein 
Marella was in charge of the Military Police.
POLITICAL POWER-SHARING
The extent of political power-sharing was similarly limited. Between 1971 and 1979, 
Northerners were on average heavily overrepresented in terms of government 
appointments (see figures 12a and 12b). Westerners, by contrast were grossly 
underrepresented, while Southerners and Easterners received a more a less proportional 
share. Significantly, the ‘Northern bias’ in government increased over time from 15% 
overrepresentation in 1973 to 237.4% in 1979 (see figure 12c). At the same time, the 
Eastern share in government declined dramatically, whereas that of Southerners 
remained at fairly constant levels.
360 ACR 1973/1974: B292.
361 Jorgenson 1981: 282.
362 ACR 1977/1978: B434.
363 Kyemba 1977: 11 lp.; ACR 1976/1977: B374.
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Figure 12: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1971-1979364
Figure 12a: Absolute d istribution, 1971-1979 average
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Figure 12c: Index of R epresentation, D istribution relative to  population share, 1971-1979
200
ISO
100
50
0
-50
-100
197 3  1975
•  B uganda  (S o u th e rn ) —  — E a ste rn   N o rth e rn
1977  
•  W e s te rn
If one disaggregates this broader ethno-regional picture to the level of tribal groups, we 
see that the overwhelming majority of Northern ministers belonged to Amin’s West 
Nile-Nubian-Sudanese axis, especially after 1975 (see table 13). Accounting for about 
8% of the population, the latter provided 47.6% and 61.9% of all ministers in 1977 and 
1979. Their share in the ‘inner core’ of political power was even higher, with 75% in 
1977 and 78.2% in 1979. All other tribes -  except the Baganda and to a lesser extent the 
Iteso, Basoga and Bakiga -  were fully marginalized by the late 1970s.
364 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 
283. Note that data on deputy ministers under Amin are not available.
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Table 13: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, Index of Representation, 1971- 
1979 (in percent)365________________________________________________________
Tribe Population
(1959)
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979
Baganda 16,3 19,4 15,5 17,4 19,6 18,3
Iteso 8,1 8,3 9,9 4,2 4,8 2,4
Banyankole 8,1 0,0 0,0 2,1 2,4 2,4
Basoga 7,8 11,1 12,7 4,2 2,4 4,8
Bakiga 7,1 2,8 9,9 4,2 4,8 2,4
Banyarwanda 5,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Langi 5,6 2,8 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,0
Bagisu 5,1 8,3 9,9 7,6 0,0 0,0
Acholi 4,4 5,6 5,6 2,1 0,0 0,0
Lugbara 3,7 8,3 2,8 11,8 13,4 12,7
Batoro 3,2 2,8 5,6 0,0 0,0 0,0
Banyoro 2,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Karamajong 2,0 2,8 2,8 2,1 2,4 0,0
Alur 1,9 8,3 0,0 2,1 2,4 2,4
Bagwere 1,7 2,8 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,0
Bakonzo 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Japadhola 1,6 8,3 9,9 7,6 0,0 0,0
Banyole 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Madi 1,2 0,0 0,0 15,3 17,3 10,3
Kakwa 0,8 8,3 9,9 7,6 8,6 15,9
Sudanese 0,4 0,0 0,0 2,1 11,0 18,3
Nubian 0,1 0,0 0,0 7,6 8,6 10,3
Others 9,0 0,0 0,0 2,1 2,4 0,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
The religious bias of the Amin governments was even more extreme. On average, 
Muslims were hugely overrepresented in Cabinet between 1971 and 1979 (see figures 
13a and 13b). Protestants were moderately overrepresented, while Catholics and other 
religions were marginalised. Over time, Muslim overrepresentation grew from 98.4% in 
1971 to a staggering 1246.4% in 1979 (see figure 13c). In the ‘inner core’, Muslims 
held 87.5% and 88.9% of all appointments in 1977 and 1979. Protestants were initially 
extremely prominently represented in government but then found themselves fully 
marginalised by the late 1970s. The disproportionate recruitment of Muslims reflected a 
deliberate attempt to ‘muslimise’ the overwhelmingly Christian country, which became 
also evident in the increasingly aggressive treatment of the Christian churches. This 
began as early as in 1972 when Amin broke with Israel and cultivated friends in the 
Arab world (especially Libya and Saudi Arabia) -  a step that culminated in Uganda’s 
adherence to the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1974. Islam becoming the 
religion of the establishment, Christian missionaries were on several occasions expelled 
from the country, while 27 Christian organisations were banned in 1977. Furthermore, a
365 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 
283.
366 Kasozi 1994: 108p.
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number of high ranking Christians were murdered, most notably Benedicto Kiwanuka 
in late 1972 and the Anglican Archbishop Luwum in early 1977. The latter incident -  
that received worldwide condemnation -  was followed by the killing of thousands of 
Christians and disastrously sharpened the distinction between Islam and Christianity.367
Figure 13: Religious composition of government in Uganda, 1971-1979368
Figure 13a: Absolute Distribution, 1971-1979 average
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Figure 13c: Index of Representation, Distribution relative to  population  share
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On the whole, political power was distributed in an extremely biased manner. It is 
however important to recognise that the Cabinet was generally of little importance 
under Amin. Ruling through the gun, Amin abandoned ‘any pretence at Cabinet rule’
367 ACR 1976/1977: B392.
368 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 
283.
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from 1972. The ministers -  who had all been made military cadets liable to military 
discipline -  were mostly ineffective and demoralised. According to Amin’s former 
minister Kyemba, ministers
‘were reduced to little more than ciphers. We were forbidden to discuss anything of 
significance, because such subjects were classed as security matters. Since nearly half the 
country’s budget was devoted to the armed forces, we could not discuss the budget 
seriously’.371
From the late 1970s, the cabinet was further undermined by the existence of a ‘veranda 
cabinet’ made of elders of the Kakwa clan who were based in Kampala and controlled a
•inn
substantial reservoir of patronage.
ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING
Patterns of exclusion became equally visible in the economic sector. Giving in to 
growing demands by Baganda bureaucrats and traders for more rapid Afficanisation of 
trade, Amin launched the infamous ‘economic war’ in late 1972 whereby 50.000 Asians 
were expelled from the country.373 As the latter owned about half of the country’s 
wealth, the expulsion opened the way for the state to take control of Asian assets. The 
Government took over the biggest companies (e.g. the Madhvani Industrial Group), 
while the remainder of small and medium-sized businesses were redistributed. This 
move was politically shrewd in that it helped Amin to regain popularity in a country 
weary of Asian economic domination. More importantly, it for the first time placed the 
whole of the economy in Ugandan hands,374 substantially increased the available 
reservoir of patronage and thereby enlarged the material basis of Amin’s elite
'1HC
bargain. If handled properly, the ‘economic war’ could have therefore been used to 
create a more secure economic and social basis for the regime. In practice, however, the 
distribution of spoils was again heavily skewed in favour of three overlapping groups,
'inf.namely the Nubians, the military and Baganda Muslims. Significantly, applicants
369 ACR 1972/1973: B271pp.
370 While many ministers fled the country (e.g. W. Kibedi, E. Rugumayo, E. Wakhweya and H. Kyemba), 
at least six were killed in office or after being dismissed (Jorgenson 1981: 282).
371 Kyemba 1977: 101.
372 ACR 1977/1978: B434.
373 For details see Jorgenson 1981: 285pp.
374 Amin declared that ‘if  they do not remember us for any other good thing, they will at least remember 
us for having given Uganda her economic independence’ (cited after Mutibwa 1992: 97). My own 
interviews in Uganda suggest that Amin is indeed still remembered for having placed the economy into 
Ugandan hands.
375 The spoils of the economic war consisted of 5655 firms, factories, ranches and agricultural estates, as 
well as homes, cars and household goods (Jorgenson 1981: 288.). In response to the state takeover of 
firms, public sector employment grew from 134.000 to 202.000 between 1971 and 1977.
376 ACR 1973/1974: B303p.; Kyemba 1977: 63p.; Mutibwa 2008: 64p.
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often feigned adherence to Islam in the hope of being taken for Nubians -  the most 
favoured of all groups.
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING
The regime’s ethno-religious bias was also mirrored at the local level. After Amin took 
over, the move towards political centralisation was carried significantly further than 
before.377 Local councils were abolished along with numerous civil service posts, 
ostensibly to fight corruption and reduce the costs of local administration. In 1972-73, 
the country witnessed an extensive re-organisation of local government. First, the four 
regions were replaced by nine (later ten) provinces. The newly appointed provincial 
governors -  who wielded considerable power -  were all high-ranking military officers
'1 * 7 0
and almost all Muslim West Nilers. Second, the number of districts was increased to 
satisfy the desire of small tribal groups for more autonomy -  a strategy that won the 
military government considerable support among the beneficiary groups. The districts 
were ruled directly by centrally appointed DCs who were mostly military men and 
enjoyed immensely enlarged powers, including control over local expenditure. Army 
officers were deployed across the country to select thousands of chiefs at village, parish
1 7 Qand sub-county and county levels. While the local chiefs were drawn from both the 
military and civilian spheres, they came by and large from West Nile, and were mostly 
Muslims.
THE END OF THE AMIN REGIME
By the mid-1970s, Amin had established a highly exclusionary elite bargain, which was 
based on the Nubian-Kakwa core group on the one hand, and on Muslim support on the 
other. Despite high levels of state repression throughout the 1970s, this extreme 
minority regime was ultimately impossible to sustain and overthrown by the UNLA in 
1978-79.
377 Golooba-Mutebi 1999; Sathyamurthy 1982: 28pp.
378 ACR 1973/197: B292; ACR 1977/1978: B447.
379 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 124p.
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4.2.3 From the UNLF to Obote II and the Okellos (1979-1986):
The elusive quest for an inclusive elite bargain380
THE UNLF ELITE BARGAINS
When the UNLF took power in 1979, it was made up of a broad spectrum of competing 
political forces, which were divided along both tribal and ideological lines:
• The (Baganda) monarchists, including conservatives like Prof. Yusuf Lule, 
Andrew Kayiira, Sam Sebgereka and Grace Ibingira.
• The DP centrists, led by the veteran politician Godfrey Binaisa.
• The (Marxist) radicals, divided into two wings. One wing was led by Museveni, 
while a more orthodox Marxist wing comprised the so-called ‘Gang of Four’.
• The UPC/pro-Obote forces, led by Paulo Muwanga and Brig. David Oyite-Ojok. 
Significantly, only Museveni and the pro-Obote forces had substantial support in the
'1Q*\
‘hotchpotch’ UNLA -  the real locus of power along with the Tanzanian army.
The initial conflicts were between those who favoured Obote’s return, and those 
opposed to the exiled former President. In this context, the radicals lined up with the DP 
centrists and Baganda monarchists to gain the majority in the UNLF, thereby excluding 
the pro-Obote forces. This anti-Obote coalition had chosen the Muganda Prof. Lule -  
perceived as relatively neutral -  as President. However, Lule turned out to be a heavy- 
handed President who quickly alienated all major political forces.383 Most 
problematically, Lule heightened divisions by his unbalanced appointment policies. 
Even though the President initially respected the UNLF balance of power by including 
key representatives of all political factions in Cabinet, this could hardly disguise the fact 
that his government was heavily dominated by the old ‘Mengo clique’ of conservative 
elements in Buganda (see figure 14 and table 14). Accordingly, Baganda ministers -  
mostly in person of monarchists such as Sam Sebgereka, Andrew Kayiira or Arnold 
Bisase -  held 35% of ministerial appointments and even 50% of the ‘inner core’.384 A 
major blunder was also the manner in which the Lule regime distributed the businesses
380 Given the short-lived nature of the various regimes between 1979 and 1986,1 will not systematically 
distinguish between the different forms of power-sharing but rather discuss them in an integrated manner.
381 ACR 1979/80: B347p.
382 ACR 1979/80: B361p.; Jorgenson 1981: 335p.
383 Interview, Yona Kanyomozi.
384 Note, however, that one of the key ministers from Buganda, the Minister of Internal Affairs Paulo 
Muwanga, had been a staunch UPC supporter since the 1960s and was now a leading figure in the ‘pro- 
Obote’ camp.
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of Amin’s supporters who had fled the country for fear of reprisals: Lule’s closest 
associates, especially from among his fellow Baganda, were taking a lion’s share of the
385assets. Suspicions of a revival of Kiganda power were further heightened by the 
President’s failure to cultivate a national image, evident in the fact that he ended his 
swearing-in speech in Luganda language telling his fellow tribesmen that ‘Now it is our 
turn’.386
Figure 14: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1979-1985387
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The imbalances were greatly reinforced by Lule’s cabinet reshuffle on 7 June 1979.388 
Among other changes, the President demoted both Muwanga and Museveni from key 
ministries, while replacing them with conservative Baganda. This alienated the 
militarily powerful pro-Obote and pro-Museveni forces and dealt a severe blow to the 
UNLF balance of power. Furthermore, Lule introduced a proposal on army recruitment 
that foresaw a quota system where the number of recruits from each tribal group should 
be proportionate to its population share.389 While this proposal may have been well 
meant with the view to overcoming the legacy of a tribally biased army, it was 
perceived as entailing a high intake of Baganda and further alienated the pro-Museveni 
and pro-Obote factions. Museveni, for instance, bitterly complained about the fact the 
Lule wrote him an official letter requiring him to disband the FRONASA forces he had
385 Tindigarukayo 1988: 609p.; Gertzel 1980: 479.
386 Avirgan & Honey 1992: 153.
387 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 
338p.
388 ACR 1979/80: 354p.
389 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 146p.
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just recruited.390 In the end, the inability to accommodate the major UNLA factions 
became the key driving force behind Lule’s downfall on 20 June 1979.
Table 14: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, Index of Representation, 1979- 
1985 (in percent)391 ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Tribe Population
(1959)
Lule
(1979)
Binaisa
(1980)
Military
Commission
(1980)
Obote II 
(1981)
Obote II 
(1983)
Obote II 
(1985)
Baganda 16,3 42,5 40,1 18,8 17,1 17,1 17,1
Iteso 8,1 5,0 10,9 11,2 13,1 13,1 13,1
Banyankole 8,1 16,3 12,7 16,6 11,3 11,3 11,3
Basoga 7,8 11,3 14,7 12,5 7,8 7,8 7,8
Bakiga 7,1 2,5 1,8 2,7 2,4 2,4 2,4
Banyarwanda 5,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,8 1,8 1,8
Langi 5,6 0,0 1,8 9,8 10,8 10,8 10,8
Bagisu 5,1 8,8 1,8 1,4 2,4 2,4 2,4
Acholi 4,4 13,8 10,9 17,5 9,0 9,0 9,0
Lugbara 3,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,9 2,9 2,9
Batoro 3,2 0,0 1,8 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,8
Banyoro 2,9 0,0 0,0 1,4 2,9 2,9 2,9
Karamajong 2,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 2,9 2,9 2,9
Alur 1,9 0,0 1,8 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,8
Bagwere 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Bakonzo 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,8 1,8 1,8
Japadhola 1,6 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,8
Banyole 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Madi 1,2 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,2 1,2 1,2
Others 10,3 0,0 1,8 1,4 7,3 7,3 7,3
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Lule was replaced by another Muganda, Godfrey Binaisa -  a choice that was largely 
meant to make sure that the ousting of Lule could not be construed as an anti-Baganda 
move.392 Binaisa initially sought to restore the UNLF balance of power. As Muwanga 
and Museveni were reinstated to their key ministries, his government came to contain 
key representatives of all major political factions. Nevertheless, it remained biased with 
view to ethno-regional cleavages, still privileging the Baganda at the expense of the 
other groups (see figure 14 and table 14). Binaisa’s fragile elite bargain was further 
undermined when the pro-Obote forces manipulated the President to remove Museveni 
from the powerful Ministry of Defence.394 The temporary alliance between Binaisa and
390 Museveni 1997: 110.
391 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 
338p.
392 Museveni 1997: 112p.
393 Significantly, all Baganda ministers (except Arnold Bisase) were now of either DP centrist (Jack 
Sentengo) or radical orientation (Bidandi Ssali) -  a situation that alienated the Baganda monarchists from 
the centre.
394 See Avirgan & Honey 1982: 21 Op.
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the pro-Obote group was rooted in a shared fear of Museveni and his FRONAS A forces 
-  a fear that was not unfounded as Museveni had used his position to enlist a 
disproportional number of recruits from his tribal base in Ankole, and from closely 
related Kigezi (see figures 15a and 15b). But Binaisa soon realised that the pro-Obote 
forces were only using him and desperately sought to undermine their growing power 
base -  first by unsuccessfully trying to remove Muwanga from cabinet and then by 
bluntly sacking the powerful Army Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok on 10 May 1980. Faced 
with this challenge, the UNLF Military Commission assumed powers on 13 May 1980.
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Figure 15: Tribal distribution of military recruitment in Uganda, November 1979395
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The military government, headed by Muwanga, marked the return to power of the pro- 
Obote forces, evident in cabinet where Northerners -  i.e. the Langi-Acholi axis -  
regained considerable influence, mostly at the expense of the Baganda (see figure 14 
and table 14). The Military Commission itself consisted of six members, including 
Muwanga (the Chaiman), Oyite-Ojok, Okello, Omaria, Museveni and Maruru. It 
remained divided between the two political factions that were left in the UNLF power 
struggle -  the pro-Obote forces on the one hand, and Museveni on the other. The real 
rulers in the Military Commission were however Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok, while 
Museveni was little more than a ‘figurehead’:
‘Numerically, we were in a minority on the Commission because I was the only active anti-
Obote member. Paulo Muwanga, Oyite Ojok and William Omaria were pro-Obote. The
395 Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 150p.
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other two, Tito Okello and Col Zed Maruru, while not necessarily pro-Obote, were not 
actively against him either. So I was left alone to hold the line against Obote’.396
The controversial parliamentary elections of December 1980 sealed the victory of the 
pro-Obote forces. Irrespective of whether the elections were rigged,397 the pro-Obote 
forces now not only controlled military power but also held a comfortable parliamentary 
majority. The UPC gained 74 parliamentary seats (plus 22 nominated MPs) against 51 
for Ssemogerere’s DP and only 1 for Museveni’s Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) 
whereby Milton Obote -  who had returned from his Tanzanian exile on 27 May 1980 -  
became once again President.
THE OBOTE II ELITE BARGAIN
Upon his return to power, Obote had promised a government of national unity in order 
to contain the unresolved divisions. This promise was however at best partially fulfilled, 
not least since all ministers were UPC members. As under Obote I, Northerners were 
overrepresented in government, especially the old Langi-Acholi axis (see figure 16 and 
table 14). Westerners were mostly underrepresented (except the Banyankole), whereas 
Easterners and the Baganda received largely proportional representation. The 
prominence of the Baganda, especially in the ‘inner core’ of political power, is however 
deceiving. As UPC had been denied even a single parliamentary seat throughout the 
whole of Buganda during the 1980s elections, Obote used his right of nomination to 
ensure Baganda representation. The nominees were however long-standing members of 
UPC and therefore lacked constituents in Buganda. Most prominently, the key Muganda 
in government, Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paulo Muwanga, was widely 
considered to be a Northerner (see above). Against this background, the Baganda 
monarchists were again fully excluded from political power.
Beyond government, there seems to have been more Northern favouritism than under 
Obote I. The scant available evidence suggests that Northerners -  in particular the Langi 
and Acholi -  clearly dominated both the civil service and the parastatal sector between
396 Museveni 1997: 115.
397 While most observers identify abundant evidence for rigging (e.g. Mutibwa 1992: 138pp.; Kasozi 
1994: 136pp.), the Commonwealth Observer’s Report came to the following conclusion: ‘Despite the 
imperfections and deficiencies to which we have drawn attention, and subject to the concern expressed on 
the question of nominations and unopposed returns, we believe this has been a valid electoral exercise 
which should broadly reflect the freely expressed choice of the people of Uganda’ (cited after ACR 
1980/81: B370).
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1981 and 1986. More consequential was however the persistence of a Northern- 
dominated army, suggesting that Obote had learned little from the past. While detailed 
figures are not available, Obote himself estimated that in 1985 the rank-and-file 
comprised 60% Acholi, 20% Langi and 20% other tribal groups.399 This picture was 
mirrored in the officer corps, which was heavily dominated by the Acholi, Langi and 
Itesot.400 Admittedly, there was a certain path-dependency in these imbalances in that 
the Acholi and Langi had already dominated the anti-Amin struggle along with 
Museveni’s FRONASA forces and were now the only ones left when the latter followed 
Museveni into the bush after the 1980 elections. While this made the creation of a 
balanced army difficult in the short-term, the government made only limited efforts to 
correct the imbalances.401 Instead, Obote seemed to regard the UNLA as his own army 
that would ultimately keep him in power.402
Figure 16: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1981-1985403
Figure 16a: A bsolute d istribution, 1981-1985 average
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In the end, the persistence of a politically partisan and tribally biased army gave again 
rise to factional struggles. When the respected Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok (a Langi) died 
in a plane accident in 1983, Obote chose to replace him with Lt.-Col. Smith Opon Acak
398 Mutibwa 1992: 211; Ginywera-Pinchwa 1989: 52.
399 Cited after ACR 1985/86: B478.
400 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 158pp.; various interviews.
401 According to Obote’s son, the President tried to create a more balanced army around a number of non- 
Northem army officers who had been recruited from the political party wing and were extremely loyal to 
Obote (Interview, Jimmy Akena) -  a claim that was confirmed in other interviews. However, this 
alienated the ‘old guard’, especially the Acholi faction, and thereby contributed to the 1985 coup.
402 This became evident during the 1980 election campaign when Obote challenged the DP leader Paul 
Ssemogerere to show him ‘his generals’ (Mutibwa 1992: 150).
403 Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU various years.
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(another Langi) -  a decision that alienated more senior Acholi officers.404 As the army 
became riddled by tensions between Langi and Acholi elements, the President was 
increasingly opposed by an Acholi faction led by Prime Minister Otema Alimadi, Army 
Commander Tito Okello and Brig. Bazillio Okello. The Acholi’s perception that Obote 
was trying to eliminate them ultimately led to the military coup of the two Okellos on 
27 July 1985.
THE OKELLOS
Once in power, the new government led by Tito Okello as Head of State and Bazillio 
Okello as Chief of Defence Forces proclaimed their intention to form a government of 
national unity.405 As a consequence, all rebel groups -  with the exception of Museveni’s 
NRA -  signed a peace agreement and gained representation on the Military Council 
depending on their military strength. The NRA’s refusal to join the government of unity 
was overcome by the conclusion of the Nairobi peace accord on 17 December 1985. 
The latter amounted to a power-sharing agreement between all fighting forces who 
agreed on a fairly inclusive composition of the Military Council: UNLA (7), NRA (7), 
FEDEMO (2), UMF (1), FUNA (1) and UNRF (1). Also, it provided for the creation of 
a nationally representative army. Yet, the power-sharing agreement soon collapsed and 
Museveni’s NRA captured power.
4.3 Exclusionary elite bargains and civil war onset
‘If you are head of a family, and you treat one or two of your children better than the others, 
chances are that you are going to have a rebellion in your house. A country is just like 
family’.406
I argue that recurrent civil war onset in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 can be traced 
back to the persistence of mostly exclusionary elite bargains. The main thrust of this 
argument was widely confirmed during my interviews in Uganda. When asked about 
the key drivers of Uganda’s civil wars since 1962, the overwhelming majority of my 
interviewees made immediate and prominent reference to problems that are more or less 
explicitly linked to my notion of an exclusionary elite bargain. Accordingly, the
404 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 160p. To Obote’s credit, it would have been equally contentious to give the 
number two army appointment -  after the Army Commander Tito Okello -  to another Acholi.
405 Ibid.; Mutibwa 1992: 172p.
406 Interview, Ben Wacha.
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repeated insurgencies were said to be due to ‘domination by ethno-regional groups’; 
‘tribal divisions’, ‘ethnic grievances’, ‘ethnicity as underlying cause of all conflicts’, ‘a 
sense of injustices felt by communities’, ‘imbalances in the distribution of jobs and 
resources’, ‘politics rooted in tribal differences’, ‘an unequal sharing of the national 
cake’, ‘the North-South divide’, ‘structural injustices interpreted in ethnic terms’ and 
‘the absence of a national ethos’.407
In what follows, I will briefly discuss each of the eight civil wars that ravaged the 
country between 1962 and 1986 and show that they can all be causally related to the 
persistence of largely exclusionary elite bargains.
THE BATTLE OF MENGO
As discussed above, the Obote I regime was characterised by attempts for political 
power-sharing. The only exception was the political marginalisation of the Baganda 
monarchists after the end of the UPC-KY alliance in 1964, most evident in their 
sidelining in government and the painful loss of the ‘lost counties’. As a result, the 
Buganda government at Mengo felt seriously disadvantaged -  a situation that paved the 
way to the ‘Battle of Mengo’ in 1966.
In reaction to the break-up of the UPC-KY alliance, the Baganda monarchists did not 
immediately seek open confrontation with the Obote government but instead sought to 
exploit the UPC’s weak organisational base. Aware of the factional divisions within the 
ruling party, the Mengo decided to disband KY and instructed its members to join the 
UPC in early 1965. Trying to fight the UPC ‘from within’, the Baganda monarchists 
entered into an (informal) alliance with Ibingira’s ‘conservatives’. The emergence of a 
strong ‘conservative’ faction within UPC constituted a very real threat to Obote’s hold 
on power, especially when his rivals shifted the attack to the national level.408 On 4 
February 1966, during Obote’s absence from Kampala, the Ibingira faction successfully 
introduced a motion in Parliament calling for the suspension of Idi Amin and an 
investigation into the alleged receipt of gold and ivory from Congolese rebels by Amin, 
Obote, Onama, and Nekyon -  the four key figures in the ruling coalition and all from 
the North.
407 Various interviews.
408 Jorgenson 1981: 229.
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At the same time, the opponents were using the factionalised army as a battleground to 
play out their struggles. While the ‘conservatives’ turned to the Army Commander 
Opolot who had married the daughter of a minister in the Buganda government und was 
therefore considered the Kabaka’s man, Obote relied on the support of Idi Amin who 
was then Opolot’s deputy.409 In mid-1965, Obote consolidated his power over the army 
by taking direct control over the Ministry of Defence. The Kabaka -  as President still 
titular Commander-in-Chief -  and Opolot reacted by recruiting a secret army and 
shifting officers and units loyal to Obote to the periphery.410 This was later admitted by 
the Kabaka himself.411
Obote struck back on 22 February 1966 by arresting the core of the conservative faction 
and taking over all powers of government. The same day, he appointed Amin as Army 
and Air Force Chief of Staff, while demoting Opolot to the powerless position of Chief 
of Defence Staff. The army now fully placed in his hands, Obote abrogated the 1962 
Independence Constitution -  the key expression of territorial power-sharing. Confronted 
with the total exclusion from both political and military power and the ‘untimely 
dismantling of federalism’412, the Buganda Parliament ordered central government to 
withdraw from Buganda soil on 24 May 1966. Faced with this open secessionist threat, 
the army -  led by none other than Idi Amin himself -  invaded and captured the 
Kabaka’s palace after brief but fierce fighting. Altogether, the 1966 ‘Battle of Mengo’ 
clearly resulted from Obote’s failure to ensure a lasting integration of the Baganda 
monarchists into his elite bargain.
THE ANTI-AMIN INSURGENCIES (1972, 1978-79)
Idi Amin’s elite bargain was exclusionary by every standard (see section 4.2.2). This 
extreme degree of ethno-religious exclusion arguably became the key driver behind the 
two anti-Amin insurgencies in 1972 and 1978-79.
The failed 1972 insurgency, to begin with, originated precisely among those tribal 
groups that had suffered the by far most pronounced exclusion in the early days of the
409 Mutibwa 1992: 36.
410 For details see Omara-Otunnu 1987: 74. The Kabaka allegedly even tested the idea of ousting Obote in 
a military coup with a number of Western embassies (ACR 1980/81: B353).
411 Mutesa 1967: 186.
412 Interview, John Ken Lukyamuzi.
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regime, namely the Acholi and Langi. Significantly, the post-coup reorganisation of 
government and the armed forces came largely at the expense of these two groups who 
had held key government positions under Obote I and composed about one third of his 
army. Unsure about their loyalty, Amin began to systematically purge Langi and Acholi 
from all positions of influence, most notably in the army. These violent purges occurred 
in four waves between January 1971 and September 1972.413 While thousands of Langi 
and Acholi were secretly eliminated, others managed to escape to Tanzania where they 
joined Obote who had gone into exile after the 1971 coup. This heightened Amin’s 
sense of insecurity, motivated further purges against the Acholi and Langi and 
ultimately caused still more of them to flee to Tanzania. Beyond the extreme case of the 
Acholi and Langi, it was especially Westerners -  in particular the Banyankole 
(Museveni’s group) -  who suffered from exclusion during the early years of Amin’s 
rule. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the failed 1972 insurgency was 
mainly driven by Obote’s Acholi-Langi fighting force and supported by Yoweri 
Museveni’s FRONASA. Even though one could argue that Obote would have tried to 
regain power at one point or another, it were first and foremost Amin’s exclusionary 
policies within the military that provided the former President with a sufficient reservoir 
of potential guerrilla fighters.
A similar argument can be made in relation to the 1978-79 insurgency. As Amin’s elite 
bargain grew more and more exclusionary during the 1970s, a total of 28 Ugandan 
opposition groups emerged both within and outside the country and began to coordinate 
their efforts to remove the regime. Given that Amin’s ‘minority regime’ excluded large 
parts of Ugandan society, the various groups came from almost every tribal and 
ideological background.414 It is however no coincidence that the only two rebel 
movements with significant military muscle -  Obote’s Kikoosi Maluum and Museveni’s 
FRONASA forces from Ankole-Kigezi -  hailed from the two areas that arguably 
suffered from the most serious marginalisation. This was especially the case for Obote’s 
Langi-Acholi constituency that experienced enduringly high levels of exclusion and 
repression throughout the 1970s.415 Similarly, Westerners, especially the Banyankole, 
continued to be systematically denied access to positions of state power. Easterners, by 
contrast, were treated with relative favour as both the Busoga and Iteso were -  at least
413 ACR 1971/1972: B229; ACR 1972/1973: B277p.; ACR 1976-1977: B376pp.; Kyemba 1977: 44p.
414 For a list of all Ugandan resistance groups and their leaders see ACR 1978/1979: B445p.
4,5 ACR 1972/73: B277p.; ACR 1976/1977: B374.
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until the late 1970s -  comparatively well-represented in the circles of both military and 
political power. Buganda, finally, was home to many commercial elites that benefited 
from the Africanisation of trade.416 Prominent among the latter were Baganda Muslims. 
Here, Amin benefitted from his alliance with Prince Badru Kakungulu who helped him 
gain the support of many Baganda, including non-Muslims 417 Even when Kakungulu 
became too powerful and was sidelined, the UMSC -  led by Baganda Muslims -  
remained the foundation for the Amin-Baganda alliance and turned out to be an 
important bedrock for the survival of the regime in all matters that were not military. In 
the words of Mutibwa,
‘the Buganda Factor, in the form of the Baganda Muslim community, was something to
reckon with in the survival of Amin’s regime for the long period it lasted’.418
The hour of the UN LA came in mid-1978 when Amin’s narrow but powerful base 
among the Nubian-Kakwa core group started to disintegrate.419 Increasingly concerned 
about Amin’s excesses, the influential Nubian community in Bombo asked Vice- 
President Adrisi to push for a civilian Administrator-General. As a consequence, 
fighting broke out between Amin and Adrisi and caused a split within the innermost 
circles of the regime. As a result, a mutiny began within one of Amin’s most loyal units, 
the Malire Mechanized Regiment. Even though Amin managed to quell the mutiny, he 
was now in serious trouble. Trying to cover up for his disintegrating power base, 
Amin’s army invaded Tanzania and occupied the Kagera Salient. Supported by several 
thousand of Tanzanian soldiers, the UNLA used this occasion to invade their own 
country and overthrew the Amin regime in April 1979.
THE ANTI-UNLF/OBOTEII INSURGENCIES (1980-1986)
The collapse of the UNLF elite bargain and Obote’s return to power produced three 
main ‘losers’, including (1) West Nilers; (2) the Baganda; and (3) Museveni with his 
followers from Ankole-Kigezi. Significantly, all three of these groups reacted to their 
marginalisation by launching armed insurgencies against the government. In this sense, 
the five different civil wars that ravaged Uganda during the first half of the 1980s were
416 According to Jorgenson (1981: 314), ‘members of the African elite voted with their feet to remain in 
Uganda, indicating that the calculus of violence and enrichment was such that the opportunities for wealth 
outweighed the risks of death and disappearance’.
417 Mutibwa 2008: 159pp.
418 Ibid.: 167.
4,9 ACR 1978/1979: B424pp.
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all closely related to the failure of the post-Amin governments to establish a truly 
inclusive elite bargain.
The West Nile insurgencies
Those that had lost out from the moment the UNLF took power were West Nilers who 
had monopolised state power under Amin and were now systematically purged from all 
positions of influence. This became most visible in the case of the Amin’s army, which 
was regarded as a West Nile institution and therefore ousted and driven into Sudan.420 
In the aftermath of the war, the UNLF -  allegedly a broad-based coalition inclusive of 
all social groups -  made no attempt to reach out to West Nile leaders. In the UNLA -  
dominated by pro-Obote forces that had suffered most at the hands of Amin’s soldiers -  
the total exclusion of West Nilers was almost to be expected. But their marginalisation 
became also apparent under Lule and Binaisa who appointed only a single minister from 
West Nile (see section 4.2.3). The Obote II government included a few West Nilers who 
had however little constituency in their home areas in that they had been returned 
uncontested due to absence of voter registration in large parts of West Nile before the 
1980 elections.421 The exclusion from the new elite bargain was worsened by the 
UNLA’s general attitude of stigmatisation and revenge. As a consequence, both 
former UA soldiers and West Nile civilians were subjected to indiscriminate violent 
attacks by UNLA soldiers. Throughout the early 1980s, the West Nile territory was at 
times almost empty with 60.000 refugees in Zaire and 350.000 in Sudan.423
Feelings of political and military marginalisation coupled with UNLA violence 
provided a fertile breeding ground for rebellion. Accordingly, the remnants of Amin’s 
defeated army launched a series of attacks on UNLA targets in West Nile in October 
1980, before splitting into two factions.424 One faction came to be known as the Uganda 
National Rescue Front (UNRF), headed by Moses Ali and mainly composed of 
members of the Lugbara, Aringa and Madi communities. Ex-combatants rationalize the 
UNRF insurgency in the following terms:
‘The problem in Uganda is the culture o f pushing out a whole army and replacing it with a 
new one. Then you have people who are so well trained. Then you start harassing the
420 Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 5pp.
421 Bwengye 1985: 250pp.
422 For details see Avirgan & Honey 1982: 225p.
423 Kasozi 1994: 178p.
424 Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 5pp.
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former soldiers. What do you expect? Why should the whole of West Nile be forced to feel 
guilty for Amin’s sins? Human beings were pegged to the ground alive, left dying, rotting.
So could we just sit and not fight the government of the day? People had to fight against 
such injustices’.425
The UNRF remained in Uganda, scoring a number of victories between 1980 and 1982. 
Less active was a second faction called the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) that 
was essentially composed of the Nubian-Kakwa core of Amin’s defeated army. The 
FUNA -  whose leadership remained unclear -  retreated into the Sudan and the DRC, 
launching occasional ambushes against the UNLA. Both rebel groups lost momentum 
due to internal divisions but continued to attack government forces until the 1985 coup.
The Baganda insurgencies
The second group that had lost out from the UNLF intermezzo were the Baganda who 
had initially enjoyed a prominent position. With Lule and Binaisa, there had been two 
Baganda Presidents and both of them had provided their tribesmen with a 
disproportionate share of appointments (see section 4.2.3). Lule had been especially 
popular as witnessed by the wild rejoicings upon his inauguration and the mammoth 
demonstrations after his removal.426 By the time the period of the UNLF came to an 
end, the Baganda were not only again excluded from political and military power but 
also saw their arch-enemy Obote being returned to the Presidency. As a result, they 
were far more disaffected than any other tribe in the country.
This feeling of betrayal and marginalisation translated into the insurgencies that sprung 
up in Buganda from early 1981. Accordingly, a group of Baganda monarchists -  who 
had been sidelined with the ousting of Lule -  founded the Uganda Freedom Movement 
(UFM) and were later, after the removal of Binaisa, joined by a number of Baganda DP 
centrists.427 Headed by Andrew Kayiira, the UFM launched two abortive coups attempts 
in early 1981. From 1982, following the failed attack on the Lubiri Barracks in 
Kampala and the destruction of UFM training camps by government forces, the UFM 
lost momentum but continued to exist until 1985. A second rebel group was George 
Nkwanga’s Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMO), which emerged 
from 1982-83 and was also exclusively based among the Baganda. While some sources
425 Cited after ibid.
426 Mutibwa 2008: 175pp.
427 Various interviews; Kasozi 1994: 166pp.
428 ‘Guerrillas Launch Attack on Kampala Barracks, Deaths Reported’, The Associated Press, 23 
February 1982.
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indicate that FEDEMO was no more than the successor of UFM429, the two groups were 
later separately recognised under the 1985 Nairobi power-sharing agreement (see 
below). UFM and FEDEMO were both clearly motivated by the perception that the 
Baganda were excluded from access to state power. Francis Bwengye, for instance, who 
initially joined UFM and later played a key role in FEDEMO, vehemently criticised the 
tribally biased composition of the Obote II government and identified this as a major 
impediment for peace and reconciliation.430
TheNRA insurgency431
The third major social force that had been progressively deprived of influence under the 
UNLF was Museveni and his followers from Ankole-Kigezi. Originally a key figure in 
the UNLF, Museveni had been demoted by both Lule and Binaisa, sidelined in the 
Military Commission and forced to contest multi-party elections he knew he could not 
win with his only recently created UPM (see section 4.2.3). Afterwards, he faced the 
prospect of a government led by his arch-rival Obote from whom he could not expect 
anything.
Museveni has portrayed himself as a principled nationalist who had to fight against a 
system of ‘petit bourgeois’ politicians and military officers who maintained power by 
manipulating sectarian cleavages of religion and ethnicity.432 The narrative of Museveni 
as a nationalist who had a programme around which he built considerable unity and 
adherence to his fight cannot be entirely dismissed.433 Interestingly, however, he reveals 
that when the UNLF was destroyed and multi-party elections were announced in late 
May 1980,
‘[i]t was from that point that some of us knew that we would eventually have to resort to 
arms yet again to fight the system, and from then on, we decided to make our position very 
clear’.434
The point in time Museveni refers to -  the coup by the Military Commission he had 
little control over and the announcing of multi-party elections he knew he could not win
429 ‘Reported Statements by Opponents of the Former Obote Government in Uganda’, BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 6 August 1985.
430 Bwengye 1985: 259p.
431 For a more extensive discussion of the NRA civil war see Museveni 1997; Amaza 1998; Kasfir 2005.
432 Museveni 1997.
433 On the role of nationalist and Marxist ideology in Museveni’s struggle see Museveni 1997; Amaza 
1998; Kasfir 2005. Note, however, that Museveni’s nationalist agenda is at least partially contradicted by 
the anti-Northem undertone of the NRA insurgency (see below) and the tribal bias in his post-1986 
government (see chapter 5).
434 Museveni 1997: 116.
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-  is exactly when his own political marginalisation had been sealed. It therefore seems 
more plausible to argue that the NRA insurgency was mainly motivated by the 
progressive sidelining of Museveni and his followers within the UNLF. This is 
implicitly confirmed by Kirunda-Kivejinja, Museveni’s long-standing comrade, who 
locates the beginning of the NRA war in Binaisa’s fateful decision to oust Museveni 
from the Ministry of Defence:
‘The fall of the UNLF and subsequent events that hinged on the gun as the arbiter of 
political debate has roots in this decision taken in the Ministry o f Defence. It is safe to say 
that the country would have been spared this ordeal if this reshuffle had not taken place. 
History could have been different’. 4
Even after Obote regained power, the formation of a more inclusive government might
have prevented the NRA war. Insiders like Francis Bwengye suggest that ‘[h]ad Obote
formed a government of national unity, Museveni would never have gone to the
bush’.436
Was Museveni fighting his personal exclusion or on behalf of his tribe, the Banyankole? 
Significantly, and this is often overlooked, Museveni could hardly claim to be fighting 
on behalf of the Banyankole as a whole. On the contrary, the Banyankole were 
prominently represented under the UNLF and especially -  Ankole being a traditional 
UPC stronghold -  under Obote II (see section 4.2.3). Key to understanding this apparent 
contradiction are the ‘politics of Ankole’ with the uneasy relationship between the two 
main sub-groups -  Bairu farmers (the majority) and Bahima cattle owners (the 
minority). Historically, the UPC in Ankole was dominated by Protestant Bairu.437 Even 
though the Bahima -  Museveni’s group -  were also Protestant, they realised that they 
were being edged out of positions of social significance and therefore voted for the 
Catholic DP. This in turn became a serious threat for the Protestant Bairu in the UPC 
who now faced the combined vote of the Protestant Bahima, the Catholic Bairu and the 
Catholic Banyarwanda. Significantly, the UPC was actively playing on these divisions 
by labelling FRONASA as ‘anti-Bairu’438 and denying some Bahima -  along with the 
Banyarwanda and Catholic Bairu -  the right to vote during the 1980 elections. Also, all 
Banyankole ministers under Obote II were Protestant Bairu thereby accentuating both 
the inner-Ankole divisions and the alienation of the Bahima.439 Altogether, Museveni 
had only the core support of the small Bahima community and some followers in nearby
435 Kirunda-Kivejinja 1995: 251.
436 ‘The clash of two warlords’, The Monitor, 13 July 2005.
437 Kasozi 1994: 186p.
438 Museveni 1997: 98p.
439 Interview, Yona Kanyomozi.
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Kigezi -  a situation that made it impossible to begin the insurgency in Western Uganda. 
This is precisely why the NRA chose to launch their guerrilla war in Buganda where the 
opportunity to mobilise popular support was greatest due to the almost unreserved 
resentment for the pro-Obote forces. In the words of the former NRA guerrilla Jim 
Muhwezi:
‘Buganda was very strongly opposed to Obote (...). 99% of them did not like Obote. So it 
was the best place to operate from (...). They [the Baganda] were so annoyed, they needed 
someone to organise them into a rebellion’.440
While the NRA guerrillas were initially perceived as ‘outsiders’, the merger with 
another Baganda rebel group, namely Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF), soon 
helped to boost their support among the Baganda.441 As a consequence, the NRA 
became a ‘Bantu alliance’, which was mostly headed by Bahima commanders and 
otherwise composed of Baganda foot soldiers. The NRA’s anti-tribalist rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the bush war had a strongly ‘anti-Northem’ (and especially anti- 
Acholi) undertone, which reflected the rebels shared hatred for the pro-Obote forces 
who hailed mostly -  even though by no means exclusively -  from Northern Uganda. 
This is even confirmed by otherwise laudatory NRA insiders.442 Museveni’s true 
motivations were revealed in the often-cited interview with the Drum magazine in 
October 1985:
‘The problem in Uganda is that the leadership has mainly been from the north. The 
southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a peripheral role all these years since 
independence in 1962’.443
The Obote II regime did extremely little to accommodate the NRA rebellion. Instead, 
the situation was considerably worsened by the eviction of the Banyarwanda. In 1982, a 
total of 75.000 Banyarwanda -  most of them Ugandan citizens -  were evicted from 
Ankole and had to move into refugee camps, along with twelve thousand Bahima and 
Bakiga.444 The main reason for this violent persecution was that the Catholic 
Banyarwanda -  who had long been considered a threat to the Protestant Bairu 
establishment along with the Bahima and Catholic Bairu (see above) -  had now become 
identified with the NRM. They suffered at the hands of the party rather than the army 
and subsequently joined the NRA insurgency en masse whereby a quarter of its forces
440 Interview, Maj.-Gen. Jim Muhwezi.
441 Kasfir 2005: 283p.
442 See Amaza 1998: 62.
443 Cited after Nabudere 2003: 34.
^K asozi 1994: 186pp.
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came to be of Rwandese origin.445 Moreover, Obote failed to consider a political 
resolution of the conflict. Instead, his UNLA launched a series of large-scale military 
campaigns against the insurgents and often directed their anger and frustration against 
Baganda peasants. Faced with unabated rebellion, it was especially Obote himself who 
displayed a stubborn unwillingness to engage in talks with his arch-rival Museveni. In 
early 1985, the NRM reportedly sent emissaries to various government officials to 
negotiate for peace but Obote declined hoping to win an outright victory. 446 This 
uncompromising attitude contributed to internal regime divisions and ultimately led to 
the 1985 coup.
THE FAILURE OF THE NAIROBI PEACE ACCORD (1985)
Why did the 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord -  a seemingly inclusive power-sharing 
agreement -not bring about lasting peace? First, there were once again divisions over 
the distribution of access to positions of state power. On the one hand, there were 
complaints about Acholi dominance in appointments to government, the army and the 
parastatals.447 On the other hand, a key stumbling block was the unresolved scramble 
for the Ministry of Defence with both the UNLA and NRA knowing that whoever 
controls the military ultimately holds political power.448 Second, the agreement 
threatened vested military interests by providing for the establishment of a national 
army that would initially number only 8.480.449 As a consequence, many of the 15.000 
UNLA soldiers knew that they would soon be demobilised. Facing a bleak future for 
employment, they reacted by engaging in looting and murder. The NRA finally used 
these enduring human rights violations as a pretext to take full control of Kampala in 
late January 1986 and thereby satisfied their own ambitions for power.
4.4 Competing explanations
What are other factors that account for recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 
1986? As discussed in chapter 1, standard explanations focusing on natural resource 
availabilities, economic performance, income inequality, ethnic fractionalisation and
443 Ngoga 1998: 98.
446 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 162.
447 Barongo 1989: 83
448 Omara-Otunnu 1987: 168.
449 Tindigarukayo 1988: 620.
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formal regime type are of little use when trying to understand the seemingly never- 
ending cycle of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in post-colonial Uganda.
Moreover, events between 1962 and 1986 confirm my initial contention that in some 
cases horizontal inequalities at the elite level alone are sufficient to cause violent 
conflict. This is by no means to deny that Uganda has a long history of socioeconomic 
horizontal inequalities at the mass level that goes back to the colonial period when the 
British favoured the southern parts of the country (see chapter 3). As a consequence, the 
Baganda had privileged access to water, health services, education, employment and 
income throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, whereas the other groups -  especially 
in the North -  lagged behind.450 Significantly, however, these severe mass-level 
horizontal inequalities can hardly explain the various civil wars between 1962 and 1986. 
Some insurgencies originated among tribal groups that were clearly privileged in 
socioeconomic terms but excluded at the elite level. The 1966 ‘Battle of Mengo’, for 
example, did not reflect the grievances of the broader population in Buganda (who was 
in fact better off in socioeconomic terms than the rest of the country) but those of the 
marginalised Mengo elite. Similar arguments can be made for the anti-Obote II 
insurgencies in Buganda during the early 1980s (NRA, UFM, FEDEMO). Other civil 
wars originated among tribal groups that were -  when compared with the groups in 
power -  in a similar position at the mass level but discriminated against at the elite 
level. This is true not only for the anti-Amin rebellions but also for the West Nile 
insurgencies of the early 1980s (FUNA, UNRF). In all of the above cases, the excluded 
leadership was -  despite the absence of relative deprivation at the mass level -  able to 
recruit followers and mobilise violence against the government.
In the end, there is really only one crucial competing explanatory factor to explain 
recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986, namely violent repression. As it 
has already become evident in section 4.3, all eight civil wars were caused not only by 
the exclusion of certain tribal groups from the ruling coalition but also by concurrent 
state violence against the excluded groupings. The 1966 ‘Battle of Mengo’, to begin 
with, was caused not only by the progressive marginalisation of the Baganda 
monarchists but also by the army’s attack on the Kabaka’s palace. The anti-Amin 
rebellions were caused not only by the extremely exclusionary nature of the regime but
450 For details on socioeconomic horizontal inequalities at the mass level in Uganda see Matovu & 
Stewart 2001: 270pp.; Klugman et al. 1999.
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also by repeated waves of state-directed terror, especially against the Acholi and Langi 
but also -  as time went on -  against most other groups. In the words of Museveni and 
many of my interviewees, Ugandans were jointly taking up arms against Amin ‘because 
he was a killer’.451 Similarly, the FUNA and UNRF' rebellions in West Nile in the early 
1980s went back not only to the total exclusion of West Nilers from the post-Amin elite 
bargain but also to enduring UNLA violence against the local population. To quote the 
former commander of UNRF, Maj.-Gen. Bamuze:
‘In 1979,1 went into exile (...). We were asking, now what is our future? How can we go 
back to Uganda? We had to fight because the government was fighting our people in the 
country’.452
The three anti-Obote II insurgencies in Central Region, finally, did not only reflect the 
political sidelining of both Baganda monarchists and Museveni’s followers from the 
West but also harsh state violence against the Baganda peasantry and Banyarwanda 
refugees.
What was more important as a trigger of civil war -  exclusion or repression? The 
answer varies from insurgency to insurgency. The ‘Battle of Mengo’ mainly reflected 
the escalating power struggle between the government and the Baganda monarchists. As 
the latter were openly seeking confrontation with the government to redress their 
marginalisation, the army’s attack on the palace merely forestalled an already inevitable 
conflict. In the UFM and NRA cases, the exclusion aspect was also clearly predominant 
with state violence against the Baganda peasantry and Banyarwanda refugees only 
fuelling the ongoing rebellions. The anti-Amin rebellions and the West Nile 
insurgencies, by contrast, were maybe more triggered by excessive state repression and 
the imperatives of physical survival. If the Acholi and Langi under Amin and West 
Nilers under UNLF had only been excluded, the insurgencies might not have occurred 
in the short-term. In the long run, however, outright exclusion is likely to have caused 
violent conflict anyway. Moreover, one could argue that violent state repression is 
largely endogenous to the existence of exclusionary elite bargains. This becomes most 
evident when looking at Amin’s extreme minority regime. In order to maintain the 
latter, violent repression against the excluded majority was almost inevitable. So even if 
the UNLA was fighting indiscriminate killings as the most visible aspect of Amin’s 
regime, it was in the end fighting Amin’s exclusionary elite bargain that was causing the 
violence in the first place.
451 Museveni 1997: 33; various interviews.
452 Cited after Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 6.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 
goes back to the persistence of mostly exclusionary elite bargains, evident in enduringly 
low levels of political, economic, military and territorial power-sharing under the Obote 
I, Amin, UNLF and Obote II governments. This continued failure to fully accommodate 
the colonial legacy of extremely high ethno-regional fragmentation became the key 
driver behind the eight civil wars that ravaged the country during its first two and a half 
decades of independence. At the same time, this chapter has shown that the seemingly 
never-ending cycles of civil war in Uganda were not only caused by tribal 
marginalisation but also by concurrent violent repression against the excluded 
groupings. Altogether, the story of Uganda’s post-independence instability is a story of 
exclusion and repression along tribal lines.
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5 Fundamental change or just another change of guard? 
Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni’s Uganda
‘No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard: it is a 
fundamental change in the politics of our country. In Africa, we have seen so many changes 
that change, as such, is nothing short of mere turmoil. We have had one group getting rid of 
another one, only for it to turn out to be worse than the group it displaced. Please do not 
count us in that group of people (.. .)’.453
In the last chapter, I have argued that recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 
1986 can be traced back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. In this chapter, 
I will ask how the country’s elite bargain evolved after Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) took power in January 1986. To what extent has the NRM brought 
about the promised fundamental change by sharing access to positions of state power 
more equitably between the country’s major tribal groups? And how has this affected 
Uganda’s peace and stability?
To find answers to these questions, I will start by discussing the observed levels of 
violent conflict in post-1986 Uganda (section 5.1). In a second and third step, I will 
establish the inclusiveness of the NRM elite bargain (section 5.2) and then analyse its 
impact on peace and stability (section 5.3). I conclude with brief thoughts on competing 
explanations (section 5.4).
5.1 Conflict levels between 1986 and 2008
Museveni was sworn in as President on 26 January 1986 and has ruled the country ever 
since. Between 1986 and 1996, his NRM held power on the basis of a ‘no-party 
democracy’ (see below) -  a transitional political arrangement that was constitutionalised 
in 1995. In 1996 and 2001, the President and his ‘Movement’ scored clear victories in 
two rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections. To be able to stay in power, 
Museveni had the presidential term limit removed in 2005, while giving in to demands 
to reinstitute multi-party politics. In 2006, he and his party won the first multi-party 
elections since 1980 by a large margin, losing only in the North and in parts of the
453 Yoweri Museveni, 1986 inauguration speech reproduced in ‘Museveni 24 years later: Ours is not a 
mere change of guard; it is a fundamental change’, The Monitor, 29 January 2010.
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East.454 The Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) emerged as the largest opposition 
party, followed by UPC, DP, CP and the Justice Forum (JEEMA).
The official rhetoric of reconciliation notwithstanding, the NRM’s track record in re­
building national unity is mixed at best. Significantly, the Museveni government has 
faced at least seven civil wars since 1986 -  more than any other government in post­
colonial Uganda.455 The main theatre of civil war has been ‘Acholiland’ in the North 
where the 1986 uprising by the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) was soon 
followed by Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and Joseph Kony’s Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). While the UPDA and HSM insurgencies ended in 1988, the 
LRA war dragged on until 2006 making it one of the longest wars in post-colonial 
Africa. Outside Acholiland, the Teso area in the East witnessed the rebellion by Peter 
Otai’s Uganda People’s Army (UPA), which lasted from 1987 to 1992. Moreover, the 
government faced two insurgencies in West Nile. While the first one was launched by 
the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) (1995-1997), the second was a revival of the 
Uganda National Rescue Front (labelled UNRF II) that went back to the bush between 
1998 and 2002. Finally, there was also one civil war in Western Uganda, namely the 
rebellion by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (1996-2002). There are few reliable 
estimates on civil war-related deaths under Museveni.456 It is certain that most casualties 
occurred during the LRA war, followed by the HSM, ADF, UPDA and UPA 
insurgencies, while the West Nile wars were clearly less conflict intensive. Altogether, 
it is roughly estimated that total war-related deaths amount to a staggering 500.000.457
Over time, the scope and intensity of civil war have diminished. While the violence 
peaked during the anti-NRM insurgencies of the late 1980s, the more recent rebellions 
have never developed the same momentum with lower levels of mobilisation, casualties
454 See Kiiza et al. 2008.
455 While it is true that the NRM government has also lasted far longer than any o f its predecessors, civil 
war in post-1986 Uganda has often been downplayed in a rather cynical manner, not only within the inner 
circles of the NRM but also by outside observers. Reinikka & Collier (2001), for instance, herald Uganda 
as ‘the main model of successful postconflict recovery in Africa’ where both peace and economic growth 
have been restored. The civil wars in the North are mentioned ‘en passant’ but dismissed as peripheral.
456 Information on war-related deaths and ‘effective resistance’ is again scarce and contested. Such 
difficulties notwithstanding, my review of newspaper articles in the Lexis Nexis News database suggests 
that all seven insurgencies match my definition of civil war. This sets them apart from many other post- 
1986 splinter rebel groups. The Uganda Amnesty Commission counted a total of 28 rebel groups for the 
period between 1986 and 2009 (‘23,500 Denounce Rebellion’, The New Vision, 1 October 2009).
57 Lomo & Hovil (2004b: 4) reported ‘hundreds of thousands of deaths’, thousands of abductions (mostly 
children) and 1.4 million displaced people. More recently, the Project Ploughshares (2009) estimated that 
500.000 have been killed, 20.000 abducted and 2 million displaced.
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and civilian displacement. By the early 2000s, five out of the seven insurgencies 
(UPDA, HSM, UPA, WNBF, UNRF II) had been formally brought to an end. The ADF 
has been more or less inactive since 2003, while the LRA has not operated in Uganda 
since the start of peace negotiations in 2006. Yet, the unity of the country remains 
fragile. This has become evident in threats of Northern secession458, rumours about the 
emergence of new rebel groups459 and the highly publicised ‘Buganda riots’460 of 
September 2009.
What explains the persistence of civil war in Museveni’s Uganda? And how can one 
make sense of the more recent decline in violent conflict? In what follows, I will argue 
that the Northern insurgencies can be traced back to the existence of an exclusionary 
elite bargain, evident in the lack of political, military and economic power-sharing. At 
the same time, territorial power has been shared more equitably as a result of the 
NRM’s comprehensive decentralisation policy since the mid-1990s, which has eased 
conflict over imbalances at the centre and thereby contributed to a decline in violence.
5.2 The NRM elite bargain (1986-2008)
When NRM took power, it found itself in a difficult position. First, the country’s 
political and economic structures had been almost entirely destroyed by the violent 
excesses of previous regimes, leaving the NRM with very little to build upon. Second, 
the former guerrilla force had only a very limited political base in that its leadership 
exhibited a marked tribal bias in favour of the western and southern parts of the country 
(see chapter 4). As a consequence, the NRM urgently needed a formula that would 
convince people in all parts of Uganda that it was not just another ‘change of guard’ but 
interested in ‘fundamental change’. The answer to this problem was a political system 
that was based on an inclusive ‘Movement’ rather than traditional political parties.461 
This notion of ‘no-party politics’ was rooted in Museveni’s interpretation of Uganda’s 
post-colonial history as a spiral of violence caused by communally based political 
parties 462 The NRM’s alternative was ‘Movement’ democracy where political party 
activity was banned and elections were held strictly between individual candidates.
458 ‘North MPs Threaten to Secede Over Marginalisation’, The New Vision, 30 April 2009.
459 ‘Mao Confirms New Rebel Group’, The New Vision, 29 June 2009.
460 ‘500 Suspects Held, 14 Dead in City Riot’, The Monitor, 13 September 2009.
461 See Kasfir 2000; Oloka-Onyango 2000; Carbone 2008.
462 Museveni 1997.
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A key component of ‘Movement’ democracy was the promise to establish a broad- 
based government. The notion of broadbasedness was never clearly defined and 
therefore somewhat ambiguous in meaning. On the one hand, there was a political 
understanding of the concept whereby key figures of the old political parties were to be 
co-opted into the ‘Movement’. On the other hand, and more importantly, the concept 
was clearly linked to the NRM’s declared intention to eliminate all forms of ethnic, 
regional and religious sectarianism.463 In the end, the essence of broad-based 
government was to offer the leaders of all groups access to positions of power and 
influence in order to extend the NRM’s reach into Ugandan society. Current and former 
NRM insiders describe this approach ‘as a way of healing the wounds of the past’464, as 
an all-encompassing ideology to ‘bring everybody on board and build unity’465.
Yet, as I shall demonstrate below, the NRM’s approach of broad-based government was 
at best partially implemented. At the central state level, the distribution of political, 
military and economic power has been heavily biased in favour of Southern and 
Western Uganda. Territorial power, by contrast, has been shared more equitably, 
evident in the substantial decentralisation policy from the mid-1990s.
POLITICAL POWER-SHARING
‘The balancing act was always there. I was Prime Minister and I had to form a government 
balancing groups very consciously. I had to do it. Whenever a minister had to form a 
committee, he would bring the names to the Prime Minister to do what we call the 
‘balancing act’. And this ‘balancing act’ was ethnic, religious, regional, and gender’.466
As evident in the above quote, members of the NRM tend to maintain that their 
government has always been broad-based in nature. Such rhetoric is however in striking 
contrast to the actual composition of government since 1986.
In terms of political broadbasedness, the NRM did make an initial effort to offer 
positions to well-known leaders of the old political parties. Accordingly, the first NRM 
Cabinet did not only include NRM leaders but also well-known representatives of the 
DP, the UPC or the CP, even in more important positions. However, this approach had
463 See NRM Ten-Point Political Programme, reproduced in Amaza 1998: 242pp.
464 Interview, Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere.
465 Interview, Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu.
466 Interview, Kintu Musoke.
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clear limits. First, there was never a veritable ‘coalition government’ meant to achieve a 
settlement with the old parties as political organisations. Instead the focus was solely on 
co-opting individuals who were ‘extrapolated from their political communities’, not 
least to weaken the old political parties.467 Second, it was always questionable how 
much power the co-opted ministers actually enjoyed, not least since their deputies were 
often trusted figures in the NRM’s ‘inner circles’.468 Third, political broadbasedness 
began to fade as early as during the late 1980s when some of the co-opted opposition 
politicians were dismissed or even imprisoned over political disagreements with the 
government.469 By mid-1995, the government had lost all its appearance as an inclusive 
coalition, evident in the resignation of Paul Ssemogerere (DP) and the dismissal of all 
ministers who had expressed themselves in favour of a return to a multiparty system.470
In terms of ethno-regional cleavages, the NRM was never broad-based to begin with. 
Despite the introduction of an Anti-Sectarian Law in 1988, the composition of 
government between 1986 and 2008 has on average been heavily skewed in favour of 
Southerners and Westerners, especially as far as the more consequential positions in the 
‘inner core’ are concerned (see figures 17a and 17b). As shown in figure 17c, this bias 
has remained a fairly constant phenomenon since NRM took power. This refutes the 
often-heard claim that the Museveni government was initially broad-based but then 
became exclusionary over time 471
Unsurprisingly, the main beneficiaries of this favouritism have been groups from 
Western Uganda, Museveni’s home. Between 1986 and 2008, the Westerners’ 
overrepresentation increased from 38.8% to 60.5% (see figure 17c), reflecting rises in 
the share of ministers (31.3% to 46.7%) and the ‘inner core’ (54.5% to 61.5%). This 
means that the West has become more and more visible in government since 1986, in 
particular in the key positions. The bulk of the latter have gone to the Banyankole -  
especially to Museveni’s Bahima subgroup -  who have always been grossly 
overrepresented (see table 15). The second most influential Western tribe in Museveni’s
467 Jimmy Akena recalls that a few prominent UPC leaders were singled out and co-opted, while UPC 
cadres at lower levels were persecuted, arrested or even killed. In the end, broad-based politics were 
therefore ‘more o f a ruse in undermining the old political parties’ (Interview, Jimmy Akena).
468 Kasfir 2000: 67.
469 Examples include Francis Bwengye (DP -  Minister of Commerce), Dawid Lwanga (FEDEMO -  
Minister of Environmental Protection) and Andrew Kayiira (UFM -  Minister of Energy) (Omara-Otunnu 
1992:449).
470 ACR 1994/1996: B444.
471 Various interviews; Green 2006: 380; Rubogoya 2007: 72; Carbone 2008: 24.
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governments has been the Bakiga. The Banyoro, Batoro and Banyarwanda have been 
less prominently represented, while the Bakonzo have had no representation.
Figure 17: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1986-2008,472
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The second largest share of government appointments has gone to the Baganda who 
were, at least initially, amply rewarded for their support during the NRA war. 
Accordingly, Baganda ministers have been extremely prominent in the NRM 
governments since 1986 (see figure 17 and table 15). This is especially true for the 
‘inner core’ of political power. More recently, however, the Baganda share in 
government has suffered a serious decline. Between 2000 and 2008, the Baganda
472 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU Various Years.
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overrepresentation fell from 101% to 38.2% (see figure 17c). Moreover, some of the 
Baganda ministers who retain prominent portfolios have fallen out with the Mengo and 
are therefore no longer considered as ‘true’ representatives of the Buganda Kingdom.473 
Altogether, there is a growing feeling of marginalisation among many Baganda, not 
least with respect to the increasingly blatant dominance of Westerners. A prominent 
opposition MP, himself a Muganda, describes the widespread unease in the following 
terms:
‘The feeling is that they include you, they make you Vice-President or Prime Minister, but 
you only do what you have been told. And you can always be shuttled out. People can trace 
ministers from the West who have been in the government from the beginning to the end.
But you cannot say that for anybody from Buganda’.474
While the Westem-Buganda alliance still remains the bedrock of Museveni’s regime, it 
has clearly become more fragile over time.
Easterners and Northerners, by contrast, have always been underrepresented in 
government. This is maybe somewhat less the case for Easterners whose 
underrepresentation has remained fairly constant since 1986 but who have at least 
received a minimum share in the ‘inner core’. Over time, there have always been a few 
influential Easterners in the upper NRM ranks, mostly -  but not exclusively -  from 
Bantu-speaking Busoga (see table 15). Yet, most tribal groups from the East have on 
average been underrepresented, especially the Itesot -  the second largest group -  but 
also the Bagwere, Japadhola, Banyole and Sarnia. This situation has been criticised even 
within NRM. In December 2007, Capt. Mike Mukula, NRM Vice-Chairman for Eastern 
Uganda, openly challenged President Museveni on the grounds that the Western bias in 
appointments was making the mobilisers’ work in the East difficult.475
473 The most prominent example would be the current Prime Minister, Apolo Nsibambi, who had fallen 
out with the Kabaka by the time he was appointed to government and is therefore said to lack a social 
base in Buganda.
474 Interview, John Baptist Kawanga.
475 ‘Govt Struggles to End Sectarianism Debate’, The Weekly Observer, 14 February 2008.
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Table 15: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, 1986-2008,476
Tribe Population
(2002)
Position 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Baganda 17,7
'Inner Core' 36,4 36,4 46,2 46,2 46,2 27,3 27,3 50,0 45,5 45,5 36,4 30,8
Ministers 37,5 36,4 40,0 39,3 39,3 24,0 25,0 31,0 30,8 26,9 25,0 26,7
Deputies 23,5 17,6 21,4 25,0 28,6 29,0 27,6 32,4 22,7 20,0 22,2 20,5
Banyankole 10,0
'Inner Core' 9,1 9,1 23,1 30,8 30,8 36,4 36,4 16,7 18,2 18,2 27,3 30,8
Ministers 9,4 9,1 14,3 21,4 21,4 28,0 29,2 27,6 19,2 19,2 25,0 23,3
Deputies 35,3 41,2 19,0 15,0 14,3 12,9 13,8 2,9 18,2 13,3 11,1 22,7
Basoga 8,9
'Inner Core' 9,1 9,1 7,7 7,7 7,7 9,1 9,1 8,3 9,1 0,0 9,1 0,0
Ministers 6,3 6,1 5,7 7,1 7,1 12,0 8,3 10,3 3,8 3,8 4,2 10,0
Deputies 11,8 11,8 7,1 10,0 9,5 6,5 6,9 0,0 6,8 4,4 6,7 6,8
Bakiga 7,2
'Inner Core' 18,2 18,2 7,7 0,0 0,0 9,1 9,1 8,3 9,1 18,2 27,3 23,1
Ministers 9,4 9,1 8,6 3,6 3,6 4,0 4,2 6,9 11,5 11,5 16,7 10,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Iteso 6,7
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 7,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 5,7 7,1 7,1 8,0 8,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,3
Deputies 0,0 0,0 7,1 0,0 0,0 6,5 3,4 5,9 6,8 8,9 8,9 4,5
Langi 6,4
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 7,7 7,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 2,9 3,6 3,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,3
Deputies 0,0 0,0 4,8 0,0 0,0 6,5 6,9 2,9 4,5 4,4 4,4 0,0
Acholi 4,9
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 7,7
Ministers 3,1 3,0 2,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,3
Deputies 5,9 5,9 7,1 20,0 19,0 6,5 6,9 5,9 4,5 4,4 4,4 0,0
Bagisu 4,8
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,1 9,1 0,0 0,0
Ministers 6,3 6,1 2,9 3,6 3,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 7,7 7,7 4,2 3,3
Deputies 5,9 5,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,2 3,4 5,9 4,5 4,4 2,2 4,5
Lugbara 4,4
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 2,9 3,6 3,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,8 3,8 4,2 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 2,4 5,0 4,8 3,2 3,4 2,9 2,3 2,2 2,2 0,0
Banya-
rwanda
3,3
'Inner Core' 9,1 9,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,9 2,3 6,7 6,7 2,3
476 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU Various Years.
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Banyoro 2,9
'Inner Core' 9,1 9,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,1 9,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 5,7 3,6 3,6 4,0 4,2 3,4 3,8 7,7 8,3 6,7
Deputies 0,0 0,0 7,1 0,0 0,0 6,5 6,9 8,8 9,1 8,9 6,7 4,5
Batoro 2,6
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,1 9,1 8,3 9,1 9,1 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 2,9 3,6 3,6 4,0 4,2 6,9 3,8 3,8 0,0 3,3
Deputies 5,9 5,9 4,8 5,0 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 4,4 4,4 2,3
Bakonzo 2,6
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Alur 2,3
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,2 3,4 2,9 2,3 2,2 2,2 4,5
Bagwere 1,8
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,3
Deputies 5,9 5,9 2,4 5,0 4,8 3,2 3,4 2,9 0,0 2,2 2,2 2,3
Japadhola 1,5
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 0,0 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,3
Banyole 1,5
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Madi 1,3
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 8,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 2,9 0,0 0,0 8,0 8,3 6,9 7,7 7,7 8,3 0,0
Deputies 5,9 5,9 4,8 5,0 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,3
Samia 1,2
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 3,1 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,9 0,0 0,0 2,2 4,5
Karamajong 1,1
'Inner Core' 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ministers 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Deputies 0,0 0,0 2,4 5,0 4,8 3,2 3,4 5,9 4,5 4,4 4,4 4,5
Others 6,9
'Inner Core' 9,1 9,1 7,7 7,7 7,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 7,7
Ministers 3,1 3,0 2,9 3,6 3,6 8,0 8,3 3,4 7,7 7,7 4,2 3,3
Deputies 0,0 0,0 4,8 5,0 4,8 3,2 3,4 2,9 2,3 2,2 2,2 6,8
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The position of the North has been even more marginal (see figure 17). While 
Northerners received a more or less proportional share of deputy ministers (the least 
influential positions), they were seriously and consistently underrepresented in terms of 
ministerial appointments. Even more problematically, they were almost entirely 
excluded from the ‘inner core’ of political power. Significantly, the marginalisation in 
government has affected all key tribal groups in Northern Uganda, including the 
Lugbara in the North-West, the Acholi and Langi in the North and the Karamajong in 
the North-East (see table 15). In the case of the Acholi and Langi, the dominant groups 
under Obote, it is even hard to think of any key figure that has remained in government 
for a substantial period of time. Accordingly, Northerners typically complain that all the 
‘juicy ministries’ are monopolised by Southerners and Westerners.477
Furthermore, interview evidence suggests that the position of the few ministerial
A *7 0
appointees from the North has been undermined by two forms of ‘window dressing’. 
First, there seems to be a tendency to disempower ministers from the North by 
appointing ‘Westerners’ as deputy ministers or permanent secretaries in the same 
ministry who then wield ‘real’ power -  a claim that is largely backed by my own data. 
Second, many of the appointees are said to lack a substantial constituency in the North 
and are therefore not regarded as ‘true’ representatives of their groups.479 In the context 
of the unabated distrust for Museveni and the NRM in the North, the situation has 
gotten to a point where most ministers from the North lose popular support once they 
are appointed to government.480 People like Felix Okot Ogong, one of the few NRM 
ministers from the North who was actually perceived as representing Northern interests, 
were soon dropped from government.
The tribal bias in government is mirrored in the ruling party. During the days of ‘no­
party democracy’, the NRM functioned through the structures of the Ugandan state.481 
After the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 2006, it had to organise itself as a 
political party. The key organ of the ruling party is now the NRM Central Executive 
Committee (CEC). While the latter is commonly said to wield little influence, it is
477 Interview, Kitara McMot.
478 Various interviews.
479 A prominent example is Cosmas Adyebo from Lango who was Prime Minister in the early 1990s.
480 The most-often cited example would be Daniel Omara-Atubo from Lango, a former member of UPC,
who used to be very popular but lost support after his appointment to the Ministry of Lands where he was 
perceived as propagating the NRM’s unpopular policies.
81 Carbone 2008.
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heavily dominated by Westerners (mostly Banyankole) and Baganda (see figure 18 and 
table 16 below). The only Northerner on the CEC is Moses Ali, a Madi from West Nile.
Figure 18: Ethno-regional distribution of the NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC) 
in Uganda, 2008482
Figure 18a: A bsolu te D istribution Figure 18b: D istribution relative to  popula tion  share
W este rn
40%
N orthern
B uganda
(S o u th e rn )
W este rnN o rth e rn
In the civil service, finally, the Museveni government tried to downsize and rationalise 
the bloated structures it had inherited from previous governments.483 During the first 
half of the 1990s, the size of the civil service was cut from about 200.000 to 150.000 
but then slowly crept back up reaching about 250.000 in 2007 (see figure 23 below). 
Civil servants from the northern and eastern parts of the country were allegedly the 
firsts to suffer from retrenchment after the NRM took power.484 The overall tribal 
composition of the civil service is difficult to establish. My data for permanent 
secretaries in 1991 and 2007 again show a strong bias in favour of the Baganda and 
Westerners (mostly Banyankole) -  a bias that has become worse over time (see figure 
19 and table 16 below). Also, there is evidence that the North is marginalised even at 
the lower levels of the civil service. In a recent parliamentary debate, Felix Okot Ogong, 
NRM MP from Dokolo County Lira, complained:
‘I have clear records here that even in our administrative service in this government the 
North is not treated equally. When you look at the PS level, we have only one. At the under 
secretaries' level, from West Nile to Teso we have only one, that is Olon Atipo. When you 
go to principle assistant secretaries, we have only one but they have the majority. Many of 
these have stayed in the same posts for long without promotion (...). There were seven 
positions that were advertised for under secretaries. Six were filled and none of them came
482 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; NRM 2008.
483 Mwenda & Tangri 2005: 456pp.
484 Interview, Cecilia Ogwal.
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from the North, and the person that was not promoted was from the North. I went to the 
principal assistant secretaries and 18 officers were promoted but none from the North. 
Members of Parliament, these are the people who plan for government. They are the people 
who plan for the entire country. When part of the country is not integrated within the 
planning, then that is a sign of doom to our people’.485
Figure 19: Ethno-regional distribution of permanent secretaries in Uganda, 1991 & 
2007486
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MILITARY POWER-SHARING
In the army, arguably still the locus of real power in Uganda, tribal imbalances are even 
more pronounced. This is maybe less the case at the level of the rank-and-file where the 
NRM made efforts for tribal balancing. Accordingly, the government introduced a quota 
system whereby each district is required to send a specific number of recruits to the
487army. Moreover, many of the defeated armies were absorbed into the NRA (later 
renamed Uganda People’s Defence Forces -  UPDF), including the UNLA, FEDEMO,
400
UNRF, UPDA and UPA. It is difficult to say to what extent these measures have been 
successful. Insiders suggest however that the composition of the rank-and-file is now 
relatively balanced.489
485 GOU 2009a: col. 3.11.
486 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU 1991,2008a.
487 Muhereza & Omurangi Otim 1998: 199.
488 Mudoola 1991: 239; ‘Uganda to incorporate former rebel forces’. Xinhua News Service, 10 November 
1988.
489 Interview, Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu.
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Figure 20: Ethno-regional composition of the army command in Uganda, 2007490
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The UPDF officer corps, by contrast, remains heavily biased in favour of Westerners. 
Complaints about the ‘entrenchment of Bahima/Banyankole/Banyarwanda hegemony’ 
surfaced in the late 1980s.491 By the mid-1990s, discontent within the army was rising 
due to the fact that Westerners -  and in particular the Bahima -  were not only still 
monopolising the army command but also benefitting from rapid promotions, largely at 
the expense of Baganda officers.492 This situation has not changed until today.493 Since 
1986, no less than five out of six Army Commanders were from Ankole (Elly Tumwine, 
Salim Saleh, Mugisha Muntu, James Kazini and Aronda Naykairima), and all but one 
(Muntu) were from the Bahima subgroup. Saleh is even Museveni’s brother, while 
Kazini is a distant cousin to Museveni’s wife. The only non-Munyankole Army 
Commander was Jeje Odongo, an Itesot, who is reported to have yielded very little real 
influence.494 Moreover, all officers appointed to the rank of full general since 1986 are 
Bahima -  Museveni, Tumwine, Tinyefuza, Nyakirima and Saleh.495
The heavy Western bias is mirrored in the current distribution of the 23 UPDF Top 
Command positions (see figures 20a and 20b). Here, Westerners account for 61% of all
490 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU 2008b.
491 ACR 1987/1988: B446p.
492 ACR 1994-1996: B448; Muhereza & Omurangi Otim 1998: 199.
493 A good case in point is Museveni’s own son, Lt.-Col. Kainerugaba Muhoozi, who has benefited from 
extremely rapid promotion, whereas many Baganda officers who joined the army with him are still 
secondary lieutenants or cadets.
494 Various interviews.
495 ‘Does Museveni favour Bahima kinsmen?, ‘The Independent ’, 22 February -  6 March 2008.
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positions, including 44% Banyankole (mostly Bahima) (see table 16). They also 
monopolise the top seven strategic positions.496 The Baganda are also overrepresented, 
while Easterners and Northerners are again seriously underrepresented. The ethno- 
regional bias in the UPDF officer corps becomes less pronounced when analysing the 
current distribution of the top five army ranks (see figures 20a and 20b).497 
Interestingly, the data show that Northerners -  especially the Acholi (see table 16) -  are 
by now more prominently represented within the top five army ranks. While many of 
them are former rebels who were allowed to retain their ranks but wield little 
influence498, at least a few appear to occupy relatively influential positions.499 Insiders 
agree however that it is especially at the level of the junior ranks that attempts are made 
to reach out to other regions.500 The ambitions of young cadets from other parts of the 
country are then typically frustrated by denying them adequate training and promotion.
Altogether, the Banyankole-Bahima dominance in the army remains firmly entrenched. 
Interestingly, the paramount role of the ‘historicals’ from Western Uganda is even 
enshrined in the 2005 UPDF Act that explicitly mentions 20 such historicals and grants 
them a lifelong right to sit on the top two military bodies, namely the High Command 
and the Defence Forces Council.501 This clearly shows that the UPDF is still first and 
foremost Museveni’s army, a partisan organisation that owes allegiance not to the state 
but rather to the President and what he considers ‘his’ people. The latter are not only 
defined by their tribal background but also by political loyalty to the President. Even 
though these two criteria coincide in most cases, independent-minded officers from the 
West who support a professional army tend to be sidelined. A prominent example 
would be the former Army Commander Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu, himself a 
Munyankole but from the Bairu subgroup.
496 These include the Commander of Defence Forces (CDF), the Deputy Commander of Defence Forces 
(DCDF), the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS), the Commander Land Forces (CLF), the Commander Air 
Forces (CAF), the Chief of Staff Land Forces (COS-LF) and the Chief o f Staff Air Forces (COS-AF).
497 General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier and Colonel.
498 Examples include the two former LRA commanders Brig. Kolo and Brig. Banya.
499 Relatively influential Northerners include the Chief Political Commissar (CPC), Francis Okello, and 
two of the current division commanders, Lucky Kidega and Charles Otema Owany (all Acholi).
500 Various interviews.
501 GOU 2005.
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Table 16: Tribal distribution of key positions in the ruling party, the civil service and the
,502
Tribe Population
(2002)
NRMNEC
(2008)
Permanent
Secretaries
(1991)
Permanent
Secretaries
(2007)
Top UPDF 
command 
(2007)
T opfi\e 
UPDF ranks 
(2007)
Baganda 17,7 28,6 26,3 33,3 26,1 28,0
Banyankole 10,0 19,0 21,1 33,3 43,5 28,0
Basoga 8,9 9,5 0,0 4,8 0,0 1,3
Bakiga 7,2 9,5 5,3 4,8 8,7 6,7
Iteso 6,7 4,8 7,9 0,0 4,3 4,0
Langi 6,4 0,0 10,5 4,8 0,0 0,0
Acholi 4,9 0,0 2,6 4,8 8,7 13,3
Bagisu 4,8 0,0 2,6 4,8 0,0 0,0
Lugbara 4,4 0,0 2,6 0,0 0,0 1,3
Banyarwanda 3,3 0,0 2,6 4,8 0,0 0,0
Banyoro 2,9 9,5 2,6 0,0 4,3 2,7
Batoro 2,6 0,0 7,9 4,8 4,3 2,7
Bakonzo 2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ahir 2,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3
Bagwere 1,8 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Japadhola 1,5 0,0 5,3 0,0 0,0 2,7
Banyole 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Madi 1,3 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,7
Sarnia 1,2 4,8 2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0
Karamajong 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,0
Others 6,9 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Beyond the regular army, Museveni’s Uganda has witnessed the proliferation of formal 
and informal security organisations.503 Out of about 30 different security outfits, some 
are statutory, including, among others, the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), 
the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) or the External Security Organisation (ESO). 
Many others are of non-statutory nature. Carved out of the army, the police or the 
statutory intelligence services, they typically operate independently of their mother 
organisations and report directly to the President. Examples include the Presidential 
Guard Brigade (PGB), the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT), the Civic Defence 
Unit (CDU), the Popular Intelligence Network (PIN), the Black Mamba Squad or the 
Kalangala Action Plan. These armed units are an important source of jobs that the 
President hands out to his supporters. Observers agree that ‘most of these informal 
security outfits are stuffed with the president’s villagemates, relatives, and tribesmen as 
these are deemed to be most loyal’.504 Instructive in this respect is the example of the 
PGB, which is widely considered as Museveni’s personal militia in charge of the army.
502 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU 2008b.
503 ‘Museveni’s many security organs: A ticking time bomb’, The Independent, 6-12 December 2009.
504 Ibid.
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It has some 10.000 personnel, mostly Banyankole (Bahima), and is very privileged in 
terms of resources and equipment, including control over the Mechanised Brigade in 
Masaka.
ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING
The Ugandan economy has undergone comprehensive liberalisation since 1986, most 
notably in the parastatal sector that had been a source of patronage under previous 
regimes. Before the launch of privatisation in 1992, there were more than 140 
parastatals, most of which were majority-owned by the government.505 To date, 89 
public enterprises have been divested, while another 33 companies were liquidated. 
Ironically, this process of structural economic reform seems to have created more rather 
than fewer opportunities for patronage deployment -  opportunities that have again 
mostly been to the benefit of Westerners and Southerners.
Figure 21: Ethno-regional distribution of employment in key semi-autonomous agencies in 
Uganda, 1996-2008506
Figure 21a: Uganda Revenue Authority, 
Distribution relative to population share, 2008
B uganda
(S o u th ern )
•  T otal e m p lo y m e n t ■ C o m m iss io n e rs  O  Board o f D irec to rs
Figure 21b: Uganda Coffee Development Authority 
Distribution relative to population share, 1996-2005 
average
B u g a n d a
(S o u thern )
I
N o rth e rn  W este rn
I B oard o f  D irec to rs
First, the opening of the economy created a need for institutions to regulate the 
liberalized sectors.507 Accordingly, the government began to establish specialised 
statutory bodies to carry out the newly emerging economic and administrative tasks.
505 GOU 2008c.
506 Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; ‘Uganda: Baganda Hold Most Jobs in 
Revenue Body’, The New Vision, 29 January 2008; UCDA Various Years.
507 See Mwenda & Tangri 2005: 456pp.; Mwenda 2007: 30p.
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The early 1990s saw the creation of semi-autonomous agencies such as the Uganda 
Revenue Authority (URA), the Uganda Investment Authority (ULA) or the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA), soon followed by ‘development authorities’ for cotton, 
coffee, tea and tobacco, which replaced the old marketing boards. Moreover, the task of 
liberalising the telecommunications, power-generation, and broadcasting industries was 
assigned to new regulatory bodies. By 2003, the country had 95 semi-autonomous 
agencies that commanded huge budgets and provided nearly 50.000 people with well- 
paid employment. All available evidence indicates that the NRM government has used 
these agencies to ‘reward its political and ethnic clients from the south-western part of 
the country with jobs’.508 Such tribally-based recruitment has repeatedly raised concerns 
in both the press and parliament. Most recently, a Northern MP presented Parliament 
with a list, which details the ethno-regional distribution of jobs in a total of 87 
remaining parastatals, semi-autonomous agencies and commissions.509 The document 
showed a very marked bias against the eastern and northern parts of the country. Such 
claims are supported by my own data for two of the country’s key authorities. As shown 
in figures 21a and 21b, Easterners and Northerners are grossly underrepresented in both 
the URA and the Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA).
Second, the privatisation process itself was used for patronage deployment. Of the 89 
privatised companies, 46 were sold to Ugandan investors, while the rest was acquired 
by foreign buyers.510 The process was however from the beginning undermined by 
irregularities. Critics typically deplore the non-transparent manner of the exercise, the 
favouring of foreign buyers at the expense of indigenous investors and the undervalued 
selling of state assets to supporters within the innermost circle of the NRM.511 Most 
stories of cronyism and corruption concerned the President’s relatives who were 
accused of overly benefitting from privatisation. The undisputed protagonists in this 
respect were Salim Saleh (Museveni’s brother) and Sam Kutesa (Museveni’s in-law) 
who were both heavily involved in the scandals surrounding the divestitures of various 
companies.512 A highly dubious role in all this was played by the Minister of State for 
Privatisation, Matthew Rukikaire, whose family had long been closely associated with 
Museveni and his wife. Despite public criticism, Saleh and Kutesa were publicly
508 Okuku 2002: 38.
509 GOU 2009b: col. 7.17.
5,0 GOU 2008c.
511 Various interviews.
512 For details see Tangri & Mwenda 2001: 118pp.
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defended by the President and never faced criminal charges -  a situation that was hardly 
surprising given that the heads of anti-corruption agencies were themselves mostly loyal 
supporters from Museveni’s home region. All this shows that privatisation has by no 
means put an end to the corruption and favouritism that hitherto characterised the 
bloated parastatal sector. While the flagship assets were mainly distributed among 
Westerners, some of the smaller assets were awarded to political supporters in all parts 
of the country. This can be interpreted as a form of rent-sharing meant to appease the
local leadership.
On the whole, the process of economic reform has created new avenues of rent 
deployment that have mainly benefitted the President’s ethno-regional core 
constituency. This limited extent of economic power-sharing may be partially offset by 
the fact that the downsizing of the state has generally increased economic opportunities 
outside the state. The recent growth of the non-state economy has ‘created the 
opportunity for people to look elsewhere than government’, which was not possible 
before.514 As economic opportunities have spread, even those without close connections 
to the Museveni regime may benefit. Given the fact that educational and economic 
opportunities have always been concentrated in the south-western parts of the country, it 
is however doubtful whether the peripheral areas in the North and East will really 
benefit from these changes, at least in the short- and medium term.
Interestingly, ethno-regional imbalances at the centre involve an increasingly visible 
element of ‘family rule’ whereby the President’s own relatives are prominently 
represented in the country’s political, military and economic structures (see table 17). In 
this context, marriage within narrow tribal confines seems to play an important role in 
securing a loyal ‘inner core’ and guaranteeing regime survival.515 Museveni’s wife is 
also a Muhima, while all his children are married to Bahima. Most high-ranking 
military officers have married strategically to gain access to the ‘inner circles’ of the 
regime. NRM heavyweights like Sam Kutesa or Maj.-Gen. Jim Muhwezi may disagree 
here and there with the President but nonetheless remain closely connected through 
marriage. These family connections provide the regime with a unique character and give 
rise to a degree of unity that should not be underestimated.
513 Examples include the Acholi Inn (Col. Otema Awany -  Acholi), the Lira Hotel (Sam Engola -  Langi), 
the Soroti Hotel (Mike Mukula -  Itesot) or the Mount Moroto Hotel (Cornelius Kodet -  Karamajong).
514 Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango.
515 Interview, Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga.
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Table 17: Museveni’s family tree516
NAME DEGREE O F KINSHIP POSITION IN 2 0 0 9
Gen. Salim Saleh (Caleb M useveni's younger Presidential A dvisor on D efence (formerly M oS for
xn
Ui—<
Akandwanaho) brother Micro-Finance and army commander)
Janet Kataha M useveni M useveni's wife M oS for Karamoja Affairs and Member o f  Parliament
fc Maj. Bright Rwamirama M useveni's cousin M oS for Agriculture and Member o f  Parliament
OCu, Maj. Gen. Jim M uhwezi M useveni's in-law Merriber o f  Parliament (formerly M inister o f  Health)
Sam Kutesa M useveni's in-law M inister o f  Foreign Affairs
M oses Byaruhanga M useveni's in-law Presidential A ssistan t on Political Affairs
|
Lt. Col. M uhoozi 
Keinerugaba
M useveni's son Commander o f  Special Forces under the Presidential 
Guard Brigade
<HI-* Maj. Sabiiti M agyenyi M useveni's cousin Overall commander o f  the elite Presidential Guard 
Brigade
* CoL Kate era Cousin o f  M useveni's wife Second commander the Gulu-based 4th Division
Edwin Karugire M useveni's son-in-law Real estate agent who handles many government 
contracts
oZo
Geoffrey Kamuntu M useveni's son-in-law Owns a procurement firm that does oil-related 
consultancy work
u
w Hannington Karuhanga Cousin o f  M useveni's 
wife
Chairman o f  a leading coffee exporting company  
(UGACOF) and a director in Stanbic Bank
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING
At the national level, the NRM has largely replicated the tribal favouritism of earlier 
regimes. In this sense, it has been little more than just another ‘change of guard’. At the 
local level, by contrast, there are indeed signs of far-reaching change. Here, the NRM 
government adopted a decentralisation policy, which gives local authorities substantial 
political, administrative and fiscal powers and is therefore considered as ‘one of the 
most far-reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world’.
In 1987, the NRM introduced political decentralisation by spreading its system of 
‘Resistance Councils’ (RCs), with their origins in the bush war period, throughout the 
entire country. Accordingly, the existing RC system was converted into a pyramidal, 
five-tier structure of Local Councils (LCs), linked through complex political and
C  I  Q
administrative arrangements (see figure 22). In rural areas, the highest tier is the 
district (LCV), followed by counties (LCIV), sub-counties (LCIII), parishes (LCII) and 
villages (LI), whereas urban areas are divided into the city of Kampala (LCV), 
municipalities (LCIV), towns (LCIII), wards (LCII) and zones (LCI). Significantly, LCs 
were given decision-making functions on all matters except security, national planning, 
immigration, foreign affairs, and national projects. Most executive decisions are taken at
516 Compiled based on ‘Family rule in Uganda’, The Independent, 11 March 2009.
517 Francis & James 2003: 325.
518 See Steffensen et al. 2004; Ahmad et al. 2006; Ssewankambo et al. 2008.
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the level of the districts and municipalities.519 Districts, municipalities, sub-counties and 
towns are headed by an elected executive (the chairperson) and a Local Government 
Council, composed of directly elected councillors.520 At the district level, the central 
government is represented through the Resident District Commissioner (RDC).
Figure 22: Local government and administrative units in Uganda, 2006 521
District Councils
No. in the country: 79
Average popn: 307,025
Average size (krrr): 2,430
City Councils
No. in the country: 1
Average popn: (Day) 2.5 m
(Night) 1.2 m
County Councils
No. in the county: 151
Average popn: 148,34
Average sas (km*): 1,298
Municipal Councils
No. in the country: 13 
Average popn: 59,000
City Division Councils
No. in the country 5
Sub County Councils
No. n  the country 857
Average popn: 27,000
Average size (km*): 216
Town Councils
No inthe country: 92 
Average popn 19.000
Municipality Division Councils
No. m the country 34
;  '
Parish/Ward
No. in the country . 5,478
Average popn: 4.290
Average size (tarf): 37.5
Vlllages/Celis/Zones
No. in the country: 46.065
Average popn: 500
Average size (ten2): 4.4
Administrative decentralisation followed the political decentralisation process apace. 
The devolution of responsibility for a large number of key public services, including 
primary education and health services, required substantial administrative capacity at 
the local level. Most importantly, local governments were delegated to administer 
service delivery under the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) -  a share that reached up to 70% 
in the early 2000s.522 As a consequence, the number of local civil servants expanded 
considerably (see figure 23). Most of the administrative and technical staff is 
concentrated at the LCV and LCIII level. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and
519 The lower-level decision-making authorities are the sub-counties, towns and divisions, while parishes 
and wards are considered as administrative units supporting their upper structures.
520 In rural areas, chairpersons and councillors are elected at the district, sub-county, and village levels, 
while in urban areas, they are elected at the city, municipality, town, division, and cell levels. At the 
remaining levels, the chairpersons are selected by electoral colleges consisting of lower-level councillors. 
Operations are conducted through five-member executive committees selected by the chairperson, and 
endorsed by the Council.
521 Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 137. Note that the boxes refer to institutions with status as LGs, whereas the 
oval figures refer to the level of institutions with only administrative status.
522 Ahmad et al. 2006: 8.
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the town clerk are the heads of public service and chief accounting officers for the 
district and city, leading an elaborate administrative system with several sector 
departments. To support local government administration, several statutory bodies have 
been created, including, among other, the District Service Commission in charge of 
recruitment and firing of local civil servants, the District Land Board in charge of land 
issues and the Tender Board in charge of procurement.
Figure 23: Size of the civil service in Uganda, 1993-2007523
Figure 23a: Size o f civil service, 1993-2007
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Political and administrative devolution would be incomplete without fiscal 
decentralisation -  the backbone of any decentralised system. The extent of fiscal 
decentralisation in Uganda is high by regional and even interregional standards, with the 
local governments’ share of total government expenditure rising from 25.2% in 1999 to 
35.2% in 2005.524 Correspondingly, the size of local revenue almost quintupled between 
1998 and 2006 (see figure 24a) whereby locally available revenue as percentage of total 
government revenue increased from 19.8% to 31.1% (see figure 24b). On the downside, 
and as almost everywhere in the developing world, fiscal decentralisation has been 
rather modest with respect to local revenue-generation. Even though local authorities 
are constitutionally empowered to raise revenue through local taxation, the latter’s share 
in total local revenue has fallen from about 15% in 1998 to only some 5% in 2006 (see
523 Compiled and calculated based on Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 141.
524 IMF 2009.
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figure 24a).525 This already narrow tax base has been further undermined by the recent 
abolishment of the Graduated Income Tax (GT), which had previously accounted for 
more than two thirds of local tax revenue.526 As a consequence, local governments are 
highly reliant on grants from central government that now contribute more than 90% of 
local revenue. Moreover, almost 90% of these grants are of conditional nature (see table 
18), i.e. they are earmarked by the centre for the provision of specific services. The 
local governments’ scope in allocating local revenue is thus limited.
Figure 24: Local revenue in Uganda, 1998-2006527
Figure 24a: Com position of local revenue, 
1998-2006 (in billion U ganda shillings)
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Figure 24b: Total local revenue as p ercen tage  o f to tal 
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Interestingly, the process of decentralisation has been accompanied by an increase in the 
number of local government units. While the country had 22 districts when the NRM 
took power in 1986, the number has since then literally exploded to no less than 94 in
C 'l O
2009 -  a development that is increasingly criticised for its economic non-viability not
only in the public529 but also in the higher ranks of the NRM.530
525 Ahmad et al. (2006: lip .)  report that the share o f locally generated revenue amounted to as much as 
80% in the early stages of the decentralisation process.
526 Steffensen et al. 2004.; Muhumuza 2008: 68p. Note that the GT grew out o f the colonial hut tax and, 
after independence, was imposed by law on every male person of the apparent age of 18 and every mature 
female with an income (Cammack et al. 2007: 32pp.). Historically, GT revenues went to central 
government but, with the introduction of decentralisation under the NRM, it was decided that the GT 
would be collected by local governments.
527 Compiled based on IMF 2009.
528 ‘Govt Names Fourteen New Districts’, The New Vision, 19 May 2009. For further details see Green 
2008.
529 ‘Too Many Districts Burden to Government’, The New Vision, 4 December 2008; ‘Can The Country 
Afford 200 Districts?’, The New Vision, 23 October 2009.
530 ‘Otafiire Shuns Creation of New Districts’, The New Vision, 30 March 2009.
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Table 18: Grants rom centra government in Uganda, 1995-20071in billion UGX)531
Year 1995/96 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02
Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Total %
Conditional grants 77,2 65,5 170,6 76,0 220,9 77,0 320,2 82,3 418,8 83,4 533,2 87,3
Unconditional grants 40,6 34,5 54,3 24,0 64,4 23,0 66,8 17,2 79,1 15,8 73,8 12,1
Equalisation grants 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 0,5 4,0 0,8 3,9 0,6
Total 117,8 100,0 224,9 100,0 285,2 100,0 389,0 100,0 502,0 100,0 610,9 100,0
Year 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Total % Total % Total % Total % Total %
Conditional grants 576,0 87,7 639,8 88,0 714,4 88,7 741,8 85,8 767,0 88,8
Unconditional grants 76,9 11,7 83,6 11,5 87,5 10,9 119,7 13,8 93,3 10,8
Equalisation grants 4,2 0,6 3,3 0,5 3,5 0,4 3,5 0,4 3,5 0,4
Total 657,1 100,0 726,7 100,0 805,5 100,0 864,9 100,0 863,8 100,0
What are the main drivers behind decentralisation? The government has argued that 
decentralisation favours popular participation, accountability and improved service 
delivery:
‘In sum, decentralisation is a democratic reform, which seeks to transfer political, 
administrative, financial, and planning authority from the centre to local government 
councils. It seeks to promote popular participation, empower local people to make own 
decisions, and enhance accountability and responsibility. It also aims at introducing 
efficiency and effectiveness in the generation and management of resources and in the 
delivery of services’.532
Yet, there is strong reason to argue that the practice of decentralisation has been driven
C ' i ' l
by political objectives rather than administrative efficiency or popular participation. 
More specifically, decentralisation has been used to build political support in all parts of 
the country by ‘buying off local leadership through access to political influence, paid 
employment and government resources.534 The number of included elites at the local 
level is considerable. Mwenda & Tangri estimated that more than 400.000 local
• o  ccouncillors were receiving government salaries or sitting allowances in 2003 -  a
number that has surely grown ever since. Combined with the almost 200.000 civil 
servants employed in the local administration (see figure 23), there are well-above
531 Compiled and calculated based on Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 137.
532 GOU 1994b.
533 For critical reflections on whether decentralisation has advanced popular participation and service 
delivery see Golooba-Mutebi 2005; Steiner 2007; Morris 2009.
534 Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain data on whether local employment and decentralised budgets 
have been distributed equitably between competing tribal groups. Yet, anecdotal interview evidence 
suggests that there is no tribal bias in the distribution of the spoils of decentralisation (various interviews). 
This is supported by the fact that 45 out of 80 districts in 2007 were located in the less populated North- 
East (23 in Northern Province, 22 in Eastern Province), while the more populated South-West had ‘only’ 
35 districts (19 in Western Province, 16 in Central Province) (Uganda Districts Information Handbook 
2007). This can be interpreted as an attempt to build support among the local leadership of the otherwise 
marginalised North-East.
535 Mwenda & Tangri 2005: 457.
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500.000 local elites across the country who have benefitted from decentralisation. 
Critics argue that such ‘co-optation strategy’ is considered less expensive than 
delivering adequate services to the people.536
Significantly, and this is key to effective territorial power-sharing, the available 
evidence suggests that these jobs are overwhelmingly filled with locals, i.e. local 
councillors and civil servants in Gulu district are typically Acholi, while those in Jinja 
District are mostly Busoga, etc. A recent study by Therkildsen & Tidemand, for 
instance, found that staff in local government is mostly recruited locally (typically from 
the same tribal group or even sub-group in the district), not least since ‘sons and
537daughters of the soil’ are considered ‘more understanding’ of community problems. 
Wherever this is no longer the case, locals have tended to protect ‘their’ share of 
territorial power. This has become evident in Bunyoro where the ‘indigenous’ people 
vehemently complained that Bakiga settlers had taken over important positions in local 
government. In line with the political rationale of decentralisation, President Museveni 
reacted by publicly proposing to ‘ring-fence’ local leadership positions in the whole of 
Bunyoro region for the indigenous people, except in urban areas.
The recent proliferation of new districts has to be situated in the context of the return to 
multi-party politics from 2006. Faced with a dwindling political base in the country, the 
NRM has used district creation to undermine opposition and win broad electoral 
support. This strategy, which has been largely successful,539 is succinctly summarised 
by an opposition MP:
‘Everywhere the President sees opposition, he creates a district’.540 
At the same time, local leaders have sought to exploit the logic of decentralisation and 
actively mobilised for their own autonomous district where they would get a surer piece 
of the ‘national cake’. Tribal differences are often used to justify the creation of new 
districts:541
‘Whenever you hear of a new district, there is some ethnicity involved (...). In fact, each 
group thinks that if  you get district, you get services closer to you and get attached. Because
536 Interview, Peter Walubiri.
537 Therkildsen & Tidemand 2007: 71. See also Francis & James 2003.
538 ‘Museveni’s letter: Guidance on Banyoro Bafuuriki question’, The Daily Monitor, 31 July 2009.
539 See Green 2010.
540 Interview, Hussein Kyanjo.
541 Evidence on the influence of ethnicity on district creation remains however ambiguous. While Saito 
(2003) concludes that the splitting created more ethnic homogeneity in each district, Green (2010) finds 
no evidence that ethnicity has played a primary role in the creation of new districts over the past two 
decades.
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then you can get a job in the district, you can get a cow (...). That is what people are 
pressing for because at the centre they do not see themselves. When you get a new district, 
you get a new MP, you get a woman MP coming from your area, you go to the dining 
table’.542
Altogether, decentralisation has brought about a degree of territorial autonomy that is 
unusual by historical standards. While the process is increasingly inefficient in 
economic terms, inclusive elite politics at the local level have helped the NRM to ’buy’ 
support throughout the territory. In this context, the described limits to fiscal 
decentralisation are no contradiction since the emphasis on grants has allowed the centre 
to retain sufficient control over the ‘politics of patronage’. Nevertheless, a number of 
recent changes indicate that the degree of territorial power-sharing is becoming more 
constrained. First, the already mentioned abolition of the GT in 2005 has seriously 
constrained the operations of local authorities, which depended on it for general 
administration.543 This means that local governments are often no longer able to pay 
salaries to full-time district leaders, sitting and transport allowances to councillors as 
well as pensions to their retired employees. Second, and closely related to the problem 
of inadequate funds, the central government had to take over the salaries of top local 
government political leaders, while also re-centralising the power to recruit and control 
key local civil servants (including the CAOs and town clerks). Third, political control 
over district procurement -  a key site of rent-seeking544 -  was removed from the local 
leaders and transferred to centrally controlled civil servants.
5.3 The NRM elite bargain and civil war onset
‘The people from Western Uganda took it as their turn to lead Uganda and therefore fell 
into the same trappings as the first governments: Recruit your tribespeople to the army, fill 
all the public service positions with your people and disempower the rest of society. And of 
course this leads only to one response: Fight back! Just fight back!’.545
How has the combination of exclusion at the centre and inclusion in local government 
affected the country’s peace and stability since 1986? In what follows, I will argue that 
the ethno-regional bias at the centre was a key driving force behind the various anti- 
NRM insurgencies. Since the mid-1990s, however, violent conflict over imbalances at 
the centre has been eased by the accelerating process of decentralisation, which has
542 Interview, John Baptist Kawanga.
543 Cammack et al. 2007: 32pp.; Muhumuza 2008: 71pp.
544 For details see Muhumuza 2008: 74.
545 Interview, Salaamu Musumba.
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provided the local leadership in all parts of the country with access to employment and 
resources and thereby integrated them into the elite bargain.
THE ACHOLI REBELLIONS
In Northern Uganda, Museveni was widely perceived as ‘a man of Southern Uganda’ 
who had removed ‘their own government’ whereby the NRM victory came to be 
interpreted as one of the South over the North.546 The feeling of defeat and 
disempowerment was particularly pronounced in Acholiland -  the locus of the most 
violent and sustained anti-NRM rebellions. Here, the loss of state power had dramatic 
dimensions. In July 1985, for the first time in Ugandan history, both political and 
military supreme positions were held by Acholi (see chapter 4). Only six months later, 
the NRM had set aside the power-sharing provisions of the Nairobi Peace Accord -  
causing a long-standing sense of betrayal -  and ousted the Acholi from all positions of 
real power. As the NRM failed to mobilise the North politically by incorporating its 
leaders into its ranks (see section 5.2), it looked like a ‘Southern government, as 
regionally exclusive as the previous regimes’.547 Even more consequentially, the loss of 
military power -  the ‘traditional’ domain of Acholi influence -  was perceived as 
particularly humiliating, not least since it was now in the hands of the Banyankole. This 
is well-explained by the current RDC of Gulu District, Walter Ochora, who is himself 
an Acholi and a former participant in the UPDA insurgency:
‘The Acholi (...) think they are very strong, they are very fit because they eat millet. And 
other tribes like the Banyankole, they call them opoko. Opoko is a goat (...). So they say the 
Banyankole are lazy, they cannot do anything as far as the army is concerned (...). When 
Museveni overthrows the government, the people cannot contemplate how a weak tribe 
could displace them from the army. When they hear Aronda, the CDF, is a Munyankole, 
when they hear the Chief of Staff is a Muturo, when they hear this, they remember those 
past days of glory when they used to command. And therefore what is now their alternative 
since the army has been hijacked from them?’548
It is in this overall context that the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) 
launched the first Acholi rebellion in August 1986. Often described as the ‘war of the 
generals’, the insurgency was led by a section of the Okellos’ ousted army officers who 
had fled north after the NRA victory. According to its political wing, the principal goal 
of the UPDA was
546 Various interviews.
547 Mahmood Mamdani, cited after Branch 2005: 12.
548 Interview, Walter Ochora.
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‘to vindicate the right of the people from all parts o f the country to participate in
« 549government .
Behind this lay the generals’ determination to fight in order to negotiate for readmission 
into the military and receive an equitable share in national government, which they 
perceived to be heavily dominated by Westerners.550 Feelings of marginalisation were 
coupled with the excessive atrocities that the NRA committed in Acholiland. Ironically, 
these atrocities began in early 1986 when the scattered former UNLA (and future 
UPDA) leaders were in a very weak position and had little or no political legitimacy 
among the broader Acholi population.551 Wrongly assuming that the Acholi population 
was the mass base for a still-existent Northern military force, the NRA expected deep 
popular resistance and behaved as if occupying enemy territory -  thereby undertaking, 
in the words of Adam Branch, ‘a counter-insurgency without the insurgency’. This 
entailed massive anti-civilian violence, including a veritable ‘witch-hunt’ for former 
UNLA soldiers.552 Finally, the Acholi were also alienated by an unprecedented looting 
of their wealth by Karamajong cattle-rustlers in 1986-87, which the NRA soldiers did 
not prevent or even colluded in.553 Altogether, feelings of political and military 
exclusion, the experience of NRA violence and the loss of cattle provided a fertile 
breeding ground for the UPDA civil war. The latter was brought to an end through the 
Gulu Peace Accord on 17 March 1988, which guaranteed 2000 UPDA officers and 
soldiers reintegration into the NRA.554 While this satisfied the immediate concerns of 
some rebels, others had either left before or now refused to surrender. This was not least 
due to the fact that the peace deal did not address the wider issues of exclusion and 
human rights violations.
A parallel insurgency had broken out in late 1986 when Alice Auma -  a young Acholi 
woman who claimed she was a medium for the holy spirit ‘Lakwena’ -  started to raise 
an army, which she called Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). According to Heike Behrend, 
the HSM was not only fighting against an ‘external enemy’ represented by the NRM but
549 Cited after Omara-Otunnu 1992: 456.
550 Nabudere 2003: 45; Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 5.
551 Branch 2005: 9pp.
552 ACR 1987/88: B443pp. Many claim that the worst atrocities were committed by FEDEMO, which had 
been incorporated into the NRA in early 1986 and was subsequently deployed to the North, allegedly to 
give them a chance to seek revenge for UNLA violence against the Baganda during the NRA war. 
Nabudere (2003: 42p.), by contrast, argues that it was the NRA who committed the atrocities and then 
blamed them on FEDEMO.
553 Gersony 1997: 31. The cattle population in Gulu and Kitgum was reduced from 285.000 in 1985 to 
about 5.000 in 1997, less than 2% of the earlier number.
554 See Lamwaka 1998: 152pp.
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also against ‘internal enemies’ in the form of impure soldiers and witches.555 The 
motivations underlying the war against the ‘external enemy’ concerned not only the 
marginalisation of the Acholi in the public sector but also the escalating NRA atrocities. 
The political agenda of the HSM became evident in Lakwena’s announcement that the 
movement was fighting to depose the Museveni government and unite all people in 
Uganda.556 More specifically, the link between Museveni’s exclusionary elite bargain 
and the HSM war becomes evident in the following poem of one unnamed Holy Spirit 
soldier:
‘Now as time come for him [Museveni] in power (...), only the Westerns [sic] having good 
posts in all gov’t depts. Pailarmany [sic] bodies (...) This gov’t has undergone the System 
of tribialism [sic] (...) But now, only the westerns [sic], have good progress in education 
(...) Is this really national progress?’557
But unlike the UPDA, the HSM had also a very strong spiritual dimension focusing on
the internal conditions in Acholiland. Here, the Acholi soldiers returning from the
‘Luwero triangle’ were considered as impure -  death in war being interpreted in terms
of witchcraft (kiroga) -  and identified as the cause of all evil. The rebellion was
therefore also an attempt to redeem soldiers who had become ‘internal strangers’ in
Acholiland, which explains the prominence of rituals to purify soldiers of evil and
witchcraft. Unsurprisingly, the message of both political empowerment and spiritual
redemption from violence found widespread echo not only among the Acholi, but also
in other areas experiencing insecurity and exclusion. Accordingly, the HSM marched
from Kitgum to Soroti, Kumi, Mable and Tororo and found willing recruits among the
Langi, Teso and Japadhola. It was only when the HSM reached Busoga -  a Bantu area
relatively well-integrated into the NRM elite bargain -  that the rebels were defeated in
late October 1987.
The third and most sustained Acholi insurgency, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA), started in June 1987 as a splinter of the UPDA.558 The LRA shares many 
of the HSM’s rituals and beliefs, including the idea that Acholiland requires spiritual 
cleansing. Kony allegedly sees himself as a messenger of God and strives for a 
government based on the Ten Commandments. At the same time, the LRA has become 
notorious for its extremely brutal violence against the Acholi population, including 
abductions, mutilations and indiscriminate mass killings. This has made it relatively
555 Behrend 1999.
556 Allen 1991: 395.
557 Cited after Behrend 1999: 163pp.
558 Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 141p.; Kayunga 2000: 114p.
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easy to dismiss Kony as a religious fanatic or mere lunatic. Such position is typically 
taken by NRM politicians in Kampala559 or NRM representatives in the North who 
consider Kony a madman ‘who believes he talks with God twice every day without 
airtime’.560 Similar assessments can be found in the press561 and in the academic 
literature where some scholars place the LRA entirely outside politics.
Nevertheless, the ‘Kony as maniac’ hypothesis is a too easy dismissal of one of the 
longest civil wars in postcolonial Africa. Instead, there is -  albeit scattered -  evidence 
that the LRA insurgency involves a political agenda that speaks to the marginalisation 
of the Acholi people. Interviews with former LRA combatants, for example, suggest 
that Kony claimed to be fighting to overthrow the government and justified this in terms 
of specific Acholi grievances such as the ‘overstayed rule of the Banyankole’ or land 
issues.563 Similar grievances are also expressed in a number of LRA manifestos.564 A 
political agenda became also evident after the failed 1994 peace talks when the LRA 
launched an information campaign in the villages, explaining to civilians how the NRM 
government had sabotaged the peace talks.565 Similarly, the rebels announced a 
ceasefire for the 1996 elections, encouraging the population to support Museveni’s 
opponent, Paul Ssemogerere. The most important manifestation of the LRA’s political 
agenda occurred however in the context of the recent Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008). 
During the negotiations, the LRA delegation made broad political demands, including 
the establishment of an independent commission to oversee the reconstruction of 
northern and eastern Uganda, a referendum on federalism within two years, 
compensation of cattle stolen during the war, land reform, and the creation of a new 
national army reflective of Uganda’s tribal diversity.566 Later, it demanded that 
Northerners and Easterners be assured 35% representation in military, government and
c/:n
ambassadorial posts -  claims that are obviously related to patterns of ethno-regional 
exclusion at the centre.
559 Interview, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda.
560 Interview, Walter Ochora.
561 ‘The deadly cult of Joseph Kony’, The Independent (UK), 8 November 2008.
562 See Gersony 1997: 103; Chabal & Daloz 1999: 86; Van Acker 2004: 348.
563 Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 16. Note however that the evidence is inconclusive as other interviews with ex­
combatants did not reveal any political agenda.
564 Finnstrom 2008: 122pp.
565 Branch 2005: 18p.
566 ICG 2007: 5.
567 ICG 2008: 2.
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But does this really prove that the LRA insurgency was caused by the marginalisation 
of the Acholi? The answer remains heavily contested -  even among those Acholi 
leaders who were closely involved in the peace talks. Norbert Mao, one of the most 
eloquent spokespersons of the Acholi cause, remains convinced that the LRA does have 
a political agenda, which is however poorly articulated and deliberately denied by the 
national and international media:
‘The fact that you cannot articulate an agenda does not mean that you do not have one. And 
I think this has been the problem with the LRA. The LRA has been extremely inarticulate.
And for me who spent at one time one full week in the LRA camp talking to the rebels and 
talking to Joseph Kony, I can tell you very plainly that the Joseph Kony phenomenon was 
just a symptom of deep-seated resentment of Museveni’s assumption o f power (...). In fact,
Joseph Kony has been speaking out. Only that there is a narrative, which was accepted by 
the media and the Western World, that this is a madman. And even when Joseph Kony tries 
to articulate the causes of his grievances, it is just pushed by the wayside (...). I never saw 
any religious zealotry for all the one week that I spent there. I never saw any religious 
rituals. Most of this is an invention of the Western media, it is propaganda’.568
Others find the LRA’s political demands irreconcilable with its brutality against Acholi
civilians.569 Again others have vehemently questioned the authenticity of the LRA’s
political demands. A key issue in this context is the role played by the Lord’s
Resistance Movement (LRM), the political arm of the LRA that is organised by
members of the Acholi diaspora. Significantly, the LRA delegation during the Juba
Peace Talks was dominated by diaspora Acholi, which has led to accusations that the
LRM does not actually represent the rebels on the ground but has rather
opportunistically imposed its own political agenda from the outside:
‘The issue of political agenda started emerging recently (...). You will not get anything 
coming from the LRA leadership in Uganda (...). But now when the peace talks started, 
opportunists also came in, hurriedly developed the so-called political agenda and the peace 
talks became a political process (...). Actually, at the beginning I was there [in Juba]. These 
people [the diaspora Acholi] could not discuss anything with the government. They were 
not informed on what was on the ground. I talked with them twice. They knew nothing 
about facts on the ground to enable them talk convincingly in the negotiation’.570
This assessment is shared by many Northern leaders who feel that the Acholi diaspora 
has ‘hi-jacked’ the Juba Peace Talks to impose far-reaching political demands.
On the whole, however, elements of political opportunism, religious zealotry and 
unjustifiable brutality do not necessarily disqualify the LRA from having a political 
agenda. The Kony insurgency clearly originated in a political context of ethno-regional 
exclusion and still speaks to deeply felt Acholi grievances. It therefore remains -  just 
like the UPDA and the HSM -  a product of the unresolved marginalisation of the North.
568 Interview, Norbert Mao.
569 ICG 2004; Interview, Richard Todwong. For a critical assessment o f this argument see Branch 2005: 
7p.
5 0 Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya.
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The NRM has been unwilling to tackle this underlying root cause and thereby -  
somewhat ironically -  given some credence to a brutal and wretched war. This explains 
why Acholi leaders are often so ambivalent when talking about the Kony phenomenon:
‘Have you seen the pictures of the Northern leaders when they meet Kony? You just look at 
the body language, the way they look at the guy. They do not look at the guy as if he is 
maniac (...). Kony is a loony, there is no doubt, but he is speaking to deeply felt Northern 
grievances (...). Northern leaders are very ambivalent about it, you hardly find anybody 
condemning him. At the same time, they will tell you that Kony is a real bastard. Where is 
the disconnect?’571
The LRA has been inactive in Uganda since the start of peace negotiations in 2006.572 
While the latter were never concluded due to Kony’s failure to sign the agreement573, 
the LRA has since then been driven into the DRC where it is bringing havoc on the 
local population.574
THE TESO REBELLION575
In Teso, the only major non-Bantu area in the East, the rise to power of Museveni’s 
NRM led to a considerable loss of influence. Under Obote II, the Iteso had enjoyed 
privileged access to positions of state power. This could be seen in government where 
Peter Otai, Col. Omaria and Stephen Ariko held important positions. The key Iteso 
strongholds under Obote II were however the security services, including the police, 
prison and military staff. Most importantly, Obote had introduced a paramilitary police, 
the so-called Special Forces, where 5000 out of 8000 recruits originated from Teso. The 
latter were led by Col. Omaria and played an instrumental role under Obote II, not least 
in trying to defeat Museveni’s guerrillas. After Obote’s fall, the Iteso lost much of their 
former influence. As the NRM began to reorganise the public sector, it not only 
summarily dismissed large parts of the security forces but also sacked the entire Special 
Forces. This resulted in huge unemployment among the Iteso and gave rise to strong 
perceptions of marginalisation and neglect.
To make matters worse, exclusion was combined with a deteriorating security situation, 
which was caused by two factors. First, the NRM decided to disband local militias that 
had been set up under Obote in order to defend Teso against cattle rustlers from
571 Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango.
572 On the peace negotiations see ICG 2007,2008.
573 ‘Kony fails to sign peace deal’, The Monitor, 29 November 2009.
574 This suggests that the LRA has over time developed an economic agenda that is -  a least partially -  
independent o f the political situation in Uganda.
575 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Buckley-Zistel (2008), the only comprehensive academic 
treatment of the Teso insurgency.
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neighbouring Karamoja. As a consequence, a series of raids in 1986-87 destroyed the 
cattle stocks of the Iteso with estimated losses being as high as 500.000 (or 93%), which 
was not only dramatic in economic terms given the social and cultural significance of 
the cattle. The government did little to stop the Karamajong warriors. This was 
commonly interpreted as a deliberate policy of intimidation aimed at punishing the Iteso 
for their support of Obote and depriving them of their main source of livelihood. 
Second, the NRA engaged in serious human rights abuses against the local population. 
While former political and military leaders -  especially ex-members of the Special 
Forces -  were often arrested and harassed, villagers also suffered from mistreatment by 
NRA soldiers. The most prominent incident occurred in 1989 when 55 Iteso prisoners in 
NRA custody were suffocated in a railway wagon in Mukura.
As in Acholiland, the combination of political and military marginalisation, 
Karamajong cattle rustling and NRA violence ultimately motivated disgruntled former 
Iteso officials -  mostly from the disbanded Special forces -  to take up arms against the 
Museveni government in 1987. The ensuing Uganda People’s Army (UPA) insurgency 
was led by Peter Otai, Obote’s former minister, and pursued military action against the 
government until 1992. The UPA civil war was concluded not via a formal peace accord 
but through the efforts of the NRM-sponsored Teso Commission (1990-2000), which 
was composed of respected Iteso and sought advice from a broad range of stakeholders. 
Among the Commission’s major outcomes were the reduction of army presence in 
Teso, the recruitment and training of local defence units and the reinstatement of former 
security personnel. Moreover, former rebel leaders were co-opted into national (e.g. 
Omax Omeda) and local government (e.g. Hitler Echweru), which had a significant 
impact on the termination of the UPA rebellion and helped to improve Iteso 
representation in the NRM elite bargain, at least until the late 1990s (see section 5.2).
THE WEST NILE REBELLIONS
In 1986, the situation in West Nile was different from Acholiland and Teso. This was 
mainly due to the fact that Museveni’ NRA and Moses Ali’s UNRF had signed a 
‘declaration of unity’ in 1985.577 It was agreed that if the NRA won the anti-Obote II 
war, Ali would become Vice-President, and vice-versa. After the war, UNRF was
576 ‘20 years after, still too many apologies for Mukura deaths’, The Independent, 28 July 2009.
577 Nabudere 2003: 34.
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rapidly integrated into the NRA and its leaders were actively working to build support 
for the NRM regime among their own people. As a consequence, the NRA met no 
resistance when it reached West Nile in late March 1986.578 Also, the NRA initially 
maintained high levels of discipline thereby defusing fears of human rights abuses. All 
this explains the relative peace in West Nile during the early years of NRM rule.
From the late 1980s, however, it became clear that the power-sharing pact between 
Museveni and Moses Ali was at best partially honoured. This can be seen when looking 
at the composition of government (see section 5.2). Moses Ali himself never became 
Vice-President but was first made a minister and then -  after his temporary arrest in the 
early 1990s (see below) -  enjoyed enduring political influence as Deputy Prime 
Minister between 1996 and 2006. Accordingly, the Madi, Ali’s group, are the only West 
Nile tribe that has been relatively prominently represented in the NRM government 
since 1986. Others, especially the Lugbara as the biggest West Nile group, have been 
confined to rather marginal positions, especially during the mid-1990s. The half-hearted 
incorporation of West Nilers into the NRM regime became even more evident in the 
army. First, not all of the ex-Amin soldiers had been absorbed into the NRA after 1986. 
While most FUNA combatants remained in exile in north-eastern Zaire, some ex-UNRF 
were deemed unqualified for NRA service.579 Those who were absorbed into the NRA 
often complained that the initial agreement between Museveni and Ali had not been 
adequately honoured. In the words of a former UNRF II combatant:
‘The agreement was that UNRF combatants were to retain their ranks. But people were 
demoted instead (...). Many UNRF deserted the army, others retrenched, others retired. The 
whole process of integration was not done. All these things demonstrated lack of 
government commitment to the agreement, that the government was insincere to the whole 
agreement (...)’.580
The retrenchment mostly occurred in the early 1990s when the overall size of the NRA 
was reduced from 100.000 to 50.000. As educational qualification was a criterion in 
demobilisation, Muslims from northern Arua tended to be disproportionately affected.
To make matters worse, feelings of marginalisation combined with mounting insecurity 
in West Nile from the late 1980s, evident in the constant harassment of UNRF members
C O j
who were assaulted, imprisoned or even killed. Among those arrested in the early 
1990s was not only Moses Ali but also other prominent West Nile leaders such as Rajab
578 Gersony 1997: 84.
579 Ibid.: 87.
580 Cited after Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 11.
581 Ibid.: 12.
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Rembe, Maj. Alidiga or Maj. Noah Talib. Also, the NRA allegedly attempted to 
assassinate Maj. Gen. Bamuze -  the future leader of UNRF II.582 This undermined the 
initial confidence in NRA discipline and caused fears that West Nile was bound to 
suffer another round of bloody revenge.
Eventually, the familiar pattern of exclusion and violent repression led to the formation 
of two rebel groups in West Nile. In 1995, Juma Oris -  formerly a minister under Amin 
and then a member of FUNA -  launched the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) that was 
mainly based among those ex-Amin soldiers who had not been integrated into the NRA. 
The WNBF insurgency capitalised on the widespread feeling of political and economic 
neglect.583 Former combatants complain about a generalised lack of employment in the 
area, especially in the army that was perceived to be monopolised by the ‘Banyankole 
or Baganda’.584 The rebellion was at times accompanied by high levels of violence585 
but ultimately lost momentum due to acts of violence against local communities. It was 
put to an end in 1997 through a combination of military defeat, a government amnesty 
and the skilful mediation of the UPDF officer Maj.-Gen. Katumba Wamala.586 The 
second West Nile insurgency, the revival of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 
II), was launched in 1998. According to its leader, Maj. Gen. Bamuze, the insurgency 
was an immediate reaction to the perceived breach of the agreement between Museveni 
and Moses Ali, the repeated harassment of former UNRF soldiers and the overall 
feeling of political and economic neglect.587 Significantly, it was mainly based among 
the marginalised and repressed Lugbara-Aringa communities, and especially among 
those Muslim soldiers who had been retrenched in the early 1990s. The link between 
UNRF II and Museveni’s exclusionary elite bargain became also evident in subsequent 
negotiations over a peace deal where the rebel leaders specifically asked for positions in 
government, the parastatals, the foreign service and the army.588 Some of these demands 
were fulfilled in the December 2002 peace agreement, which granted the rebels 10 
positions in government, allowed former UNRF commanders to retain their military
C O Q
ranks and provided for the re-integration or resettlements of UNRF combatants.
582
583
Ibid.
Ibid.: 14p.
584 Cited after ibid.
585 ‘2,000 Ugandans killed in fight near border with Sudan’, Xinhua News Service, 17 March 1997.
586 Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 18pp.
587 Ibid.: 11pp.
588 ‘Bamuze’s rebels now want to be ministers’, The Monitor, 29 April 2002; ‘UNRF II rebels face 
government with huge demands’, The New Vision, 23 October 2002.
89 ‘Rebels reap 10 govt posts’, The New Vision, 27 December 2002.
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THE REBELLION IN WESTERN UGANDA
The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are a case apart in that most of their fighters came 
from Buganda and operated in Western Uganda, the two main pillars of the NRM’s 
support base. As a result, the link with Museveni’s exclusionary elite bargain was less 
straightforward than in the case of the Northern insurgencies, yet not entirely absent.
The ADF war has been described as ‘rebellion without a cause’, not least since the 
rebels lacked a coherent political agenda.590 This is however misleading since ADF 
brought together a number of small and extremely disparate anti-NRM elements, which 
all had their specific political grievances.591 The first group was a radical Muslim 
movement known as Tabliq that turned political in 1989 when the Ugandan Supreme 
Court ruled in favour of one of the rival factions within the Muslim community.592 
Interpreting this as state interference in Muslim affairs, the Tabliq henceforth 
considered the constitution of an Islamic state as the only way to protect Muslim 
interests in Uganda. In 1991, hundreds of Tabliq activists were jailed after they 
occupied by force the Kampala Central Mosque. After their release from prison in 1993, 
a radical Tabliq group soon re-appeared under the name of Uganda Muslim Freedom 
Fighters. Two other Buganda-based splinter rebel groups emerged in 1995. The Uganda 
Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) had its base among Baganda Muslims and vowed to 
fight alleged violence and discrimination against the Muslim community. The Allied 
Democratic Movement (ADM) was created by Baganda ultra-monarchists. While the 
NRM was firmly rooted in Buganda, a small monarchist faction was unhappy that 
Museveni had restored the Buganda Kingdom only in a diminished, non-political form 
(see below) and therefore decided to take up arms against the government. A final rebel 
group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), was a revival of the 
old Rwenzururu movement in Western Uganda, which had fought for the restoration of 
the Bakonzo Kingdom since the 1950s (see chapter 4). Significantly, the Bakonzo were 
not only alienated by the NRM’s refusal to restore their Kingdom593 but also by the fact
590 Hovil & Werker 2005: 14.
591 If not marked otherwise, this paragraph draws heavily on Prunier 2004: 367pp.
592 Kayunga 2000: 115pp. The Tabliq, set up in India in the 1920s, had initially been a revivalist Muslim 
sect that started to spread worldwide from the 1950s and eventually reached Uganda.
593 The Bakonzo Kingdom was finally restored as a cultural institution on 19 October 2009. See ‘Rise of 
Rwenzururu kingdom’, The Sunday Vision, 17 October 2009.
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that they were the only major tribal group in Western Uganda who were excluded from 
access to positions of state power (see section 5.2).594
From the mid-1990s, the four rebel groups came together to form the ADF, aided and 
abetted by the Sudanese government (see section 5.4 below).595 The incorporation of 
NALU was of key importance for two reasons. First, it provided the rebels with a good 
peasant grounding in local realities, which was also important in terms of future 
recruitment. Second, the Rwenzori mountains were not only strategically ideal for 
rebellion but also offered the advantage of the DRC as nearby refuge. The ADF went 
into action in late 1996. The heterogeneity of the involved groups explains the absence 
of a coherent political agenda. Whereas the ADM elements claimed to be fighting ‘to 
re-introduce multi-party politics’ and ‘stop Museveni’s nepotism giving all the juicy 
jobs to Westerners’, the Tabliq and NALU components sought to establish an Islamic 
State and an autonomous Bakonzo Kingdom. From late 1997, the ADF was 
progressively undermined by its own violence against the civilian population596 and 
soon shifted to urban terrorism.597 As mentioned above, the ADF has been more or less
CQO
inactive since 2003 even though a formal peace agreement is yet to be concluded.
THE RECENT DECLINE IN VIOLENT CONFLICT
‘It is now perceived as if  we can now recruit our people from home. The centre is less 
important, the periphery can decide on its own’.599
One puzzle remains. Why has the persistence of ethno-regional exclusion in Museveni’s 
Uganda not caused more violent conflict? How come the scope and intensity of violence 
have even declined since the late 1990s?
I argue that tensions over the tribal bias at the centre have been eased by the process of 
decentralisation. As the LC system was spread throughout the country and divided into 
an ever-growing number of districts, hundreds of thousands of local leaders -  including
594 Note that Crispus Kiyonga, a key minister in Museveni’s government since 1986 and often thought to 
be a Mukonzo, is in fact from the tiny Banyabindi tribe. As such, he was long the 'headmaster' of those 
opposed to the restoration of the Omusingaship and therefore strongly opposed by most Bakonzo.
595 Prunier 2004: 373pp.
596 Hovil & Werker 2005.
597 ‘ADF rebellion: Guerrilla to urban terrorism’, The New Vision, 21 May 2007.
598 ‘ADF Rebels Want Peace Talks’, The New Vision, 18 November 2008.
599 Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya.
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former rebels -  from all tribal backgrounds have been able to obtain access to paid 
employment, political influence and government resources (see section 5.2). Since jobs 
and resources are no longer exclusively controlled at the central state level, the value of 
holding national power has declined -  a powerful disincentive for rebellion.
The LC system as a locus of territorial autonomy has only developed over time, 
especially in the conflict-ridden North. Here, the spread of the LC system was initially 
fairly uneven and often subject to heavy interference from the centre. A good case in 
point is Acholiland in the late 1980s and early 1990s where Council members or civil 
servants suspected of rebel collaboration were often dismissed or even arrested.600 As 
the RCs became mere tools of the central state, there was little scope for the 
development of independent Acholi leadership. This situation seems to have changed 
over time as Acholi leaders are now in a position to use the LC system to develop local 
constituencies and mobilise opposition against the national government. The best 
example in this regard is Norbert Mao who resigned from Parliament in 2006 and then -  
successfully -  ran for the position of Gulu LCV Chairman. Afterwards, he declared that 
he had been
‘tired of being a commentator in Kampala: in local government, you are in charge. In fact I
wish I had gone there earlier’.601
The increased political space for independent Acholi leadership at the local level has 
reduced the need to reverse the persistent ethno-regional bias at the centre. Even though 
the latter is still vehemently criticized by Acholi leaders, lucrative alternatives in local 
government arguably undermine support for existing or future rebellion.
The relationship between decentralisation and peace can also be observed in West Nile. 
Here, most of the UNRF II combatants were drawn from Aringa county, which was 
formerly part of Arua District but later elevated to District status and named Yumbe 
District. Interestingly, the fact that Aringa county initially lacked District status was a 
specific focus for grievances, as evident in the following complaint by a former UNRF 
II member:
‘[MJarginalization was a major cause of the war. When we were under Arua, central
government funds were not making it to Yumbe’.602
600 Branch 2005: 16.
601 Cited after Green 2008: 432.
602 Cited after Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 13.
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This issue was resolved with the creation of Yumbe District in 2000 -  in the midst of 
the UNRF II rebellion. It seems safe to argue that the jobs and resources that 
accompanied the new district facilitated the rapid conclusion of the conflict.
All this is not to claim that the relationship between decentralisation and conflict 
avoidance is straightforward. While the NRM’s manipulation of local government has 
helped to buy support and stability in the short- and medium term, it may not be 
sustainable in the long run. As the ‘patronage empire’ at the local level continues to 
grow, Museveni’s ‘politics of survival’ are likely to become increasingly unviable and 
unstable. This is especially the case since district creation has already bred a number of 
local-level tribal conflicts.603 Prominent examples include not only the above-cited 
quarrels in Bunyoro but also similar conflicts in Buliisa, Tororo or Pallisa districts.
Another important source of conflict surrounding the decentralisation process is that the 
Baganda have always demanded more far-reaching autonomy in the form of a federal 
system of government (Federo).604 To many Baganda, this is a lot more important than 
influence at the level of the central state.605 In 1993, the NRM government did restore 
the Buganda Kingdom, albeit only as a purely cultural institution, which remains 
constrained by the centre’s control over its finances.606 Moreover, it has only offered a 
more limited ‘regional tier system’, which the Mengo has repeatedly rejected as 
insufficient. In recent years, tensions over frustrated demands for federal autonomy 
have built up and contributed -  along with other factors -  to the outbreak of violence 
during the September 2009 ‘Buganda riots’. Tellingly, the Mengo publicly reiterated its
f.f\n
‘federo demands’ at the height of the crisis.
5.4 Competing explanations
Which other factors account for the persistence of civil war in Museveni’s Uganda? 
First, the above discussion has shown that two of the anti-NRM insurgencies in the 
North, namely the HSM and the LRA, were also motivated by an important spiritual 
agenda. Second, and in contrast to my findings in chapter 4, there is reason to argue that
603 ‘Museveni districts breeding tribal wars’, The Independent, 30 June 2009. See also Green 2008; 
Morris 2009.
604 See Mutibwa 2008.
605 Interview, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi.
606 Carbone 2008; Mutibwa 2008.
607 ‘Mengo lists federo demands’, The New Vision, 18 September 2009.
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the post-1986 insurgencies were not only due to enduring exclusion at the level of elites 
but also facilitated by concurrent socioeconomic inter-group inequalities at the level of 
the masses. Even though the gaps have narrowed over time, the basic pattern of unequal 
access to economic opportunities and social services has remained in place since 
Museveni took over in 1986, with Northern Region consistently ranked bottom. This 
can be seen when analysing recent trends in poverty incidence (see figure 25) and other
/ n o
social indicators. As a consequence, tribal groups from the North and parts of the 
East were now clearly disadvantaged at both the elite and mass levels. This situation 
made it easier for Northern and Eastern rebel leaders to find willing recruits. At the 
same time, however, it is important to recognise that the great majority of foot soldiers 
in the post-1986 insurgencies were former members of the security services (see section 
5.3) rather than impoverished Acholi, Lugbara or Iteso peasants.
Figure 25: Incidence of poverty in Uganda, 1992-2006609
C en tra l E aste rn N o rth e rn W e s te rn N ational
■  1 9 9 2 /9 3  ■  2 0 0 2 /0 3  □  2 0 0 5 /0 6
Third, all anti-Museveni insurgencies -  except maybe the ADF -  were also due to 
violent repression against the excluded tribal groups. Accordingly, the three civil wars 
in Acholiland were caused not only by the political and military disempowerment of the 
Acholi but also by excessive NRA violence against both former UNLA soldiers and the 
civilian population. This is especially true for the UPDA insurgency that was launched 
when exclusion had not yet fully taken root and was therefore mainly a ‘defensive war’,
608 UBOS 2006a; UNDP 2007.
609 Compiled based on UBOS 2006a.
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a ‘war of survival’ and a ‘conflict about self-preservation’.610 In the words of a local 
grassroots activist:
‘When they [NRA] took over, they started killing, started looting our properties very badly 
(...). I saw how people were tied (...) and slaughtered, ten people were killed and buried in 
one grave, in the North here (.. .).That is why people went to the bush’.611
Similarly, the insurgencies in West Nile and Teso did not only reflect the exclusion of 
former security service personnel from access to jobs and resources but also their 
violent persecution and harassment by NRA soldiers. To quote Omax Omega, a former 
UPA leader:
‘The truth about the insurgency is very clear. We were forced to go into the bush (...). For 
when the arrests of prominent politicians started, when they started prosecuting former 
Special Forces and police understandably people ran away. We were not organised that we 
wanted to fight government -  people just run to the bush for fear of being harassed. Then, 
after some time, we saw the thing continued, and we thought that the only way to handle 
this situation was to group ourselves (...). So the only way we thought we had was to take 
up arms and defend ourselves’.612
Finally, four out of the seven anti-Museveni insurgencies -  namely the LRA, WNBF, 
UNRF II and ADF -  also involved important regional spillover effects in that they were 
part of a ‘proxy war between Uganda and Sudan’.613 While the Sudanese government 
provided Ugandan rebel groups with financial and military aid, the NRM government 
did in turn back John Garang’s Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). As for the 
Kony war, Sudan made contact with the LRA from 1992-93 and has since provided it 
with weapons and training facilities614 -  a situation that leads NRM politicians to 
describe Kony as a mere ‘surrogate of the Khartoum administration’615. Similarly, the 
Sudanese provided both the WNBF and the UNRF II with considerable military and 
logistical support.616 Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the three rebel 
groups were strongly rooted in local realities and therefore first and foremost a product 
of the Acholis’ and West Nilers’ feeling of exclusion and persecution in the Ugandan 
polity. The case of the ADF may be different in that the role of Sudan in setting up the
f.\n
insurgency was extremely instrumental. Even though the four ADF components were 
also anchored in perceptions of exclusion and neglect, they were rather small splinter
610 Various interviews.
611 Interview, Margaret Odong.
612 Cited after Buckley Zistel 2008: 102.
613 Pranier 2004.
6.4 Ibid: 366; ICG 2004: 24p.
6.5 Interview, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda.
616 Gersony 1997: 88; Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 13; Prunier 2004: 376.
617 Prunier 2004: 373pp. Note that the ADF is also believed to have received funding from a number o f  
other external sources, including Mobutu’s Zaire, A1 Qaeda and other radical Islamists (Hovil & Werker 
2005: 13).
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groups in areas that were otherwise deeply integrated into the NRM elite bargain. It 
seems therefore doubtful that ADF would have emerged without the decisive support of 
Sudan.
5.5 Conclusion
‘But where is Museveni's heart? Where does he yearn to go, and if nowhere, why destroy 
the only country that he knows? Can't he see that this sectarian thing he is nurturing is not 
only dangerous but unsustainable? Does one need to be soothsayer to see that he is leading 
Uganda to a terrible genocide, with only one community [the Bahima] eligible for State 
House scholarships, lucrative jobs, land allocation, control of security organisations and the 
country's finances in 20 years?’618
Almost 24 years after it took power, the NRM is still to deliver much of the 
‘fundamental change’ it once promised. Despite flamboyant promises of broad-based 
government, the ethno-regional bias at the centre not only remains unaddressed but even 
seems to be getting worse over time. Ironically, one could say that the greatest offender 
of the anti-sectarian law has been the government itself. This unwillingness to forge a 
more inclusive elite bargain -  together with socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, 
violent state repression and regional spillover effects -  has undoubtedly been a key 
driver behind the seven civil wars that have ravaged the country since 1986. Some of 
these tensions have been eased by the comprehensive decentralisation policy from the 
mid-1990s, which has created a huge ‘patronage empire’ at the local level and thereby 
bought the support of the local leadership. Territorial power-sharing in its current form 
does however hardly amount to ‘fundamental change’ in that it has already become a 
source of tribally coloured local-level conflict.
What are the prospects for future peace and stability? My own interviews in Uganda 
suggest that the gloomy predictions by Bety Kamya as cited above are shared by a 
surprising number of people. Many fear that the country may be sitting on a ‘time 
bomb’ and predict genocidal violence against members of Museveni’s tribal core 
constituency if the imbalances are not redressed.619 Such predictions may be somewhat 
exaggerated and motivated by the opposition’s attempt to discredit the NRM 
government. Nevertheless, the recent ‘Buganda riots’, which indeed involved sporadic
618 Bety Kamya, ‘Where is Museveni's Heart?’, The Monitor, 28 January 2008.
619 Various interviews.
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violence against people believed to be Banyankole620, show that such predictions may 
be not entirely unfounded. It can therefore not be excluded that anger over the potential 
misconduct of the 2011 elections or the unexpected death of the President will escalate 
into a ‘Kenya-like’ scenario.
To avoid future conflict and violence, the NRM will need to move beyond its anti­
sectarian rhetoric and finally start to bridge the North-South divide that has become 
strikingly entrenched, not least psychologically. While new insurgencies in the North 
are currently considered to be rather unlikely, Northerners continue to perceive the 
‘Southern government’ with unabated distrust and speak of ‘two political countries 
divided by the Nile’.621 Similarly, people in the southern parts of the country
‘cannot imagine that the Northerners can come back and rule. They see themselves as being 
an endangered species. If you allow the people in the North to go back to power, then they 
are finished’.622
Significantly, Northerners seem to be particularly distrustful of the President himself -  a 
situation that goes back to his decision to set aside the power-sharing provisions under 
the Nairobi Peace Accord (1985) and his reported derogatory talk about 
‘Northerners’. A fresh start for national unity may therefore require an unspent 
political leadership after the 2011 elections.
More generally, the country will need a new political framework that not only tackles 
the long-standing socioeconomic inequalities but also gives more substance to the 
notion of broadbasedness. This could involve a new national dialogue on the ethno- 
regional question and the place of the different communities in Uganda. The much- 
talked about introduction of a federal order is by no means a ‘magic bullet’ since 
distributional conflicts over jobs and resources would not disappear. But it may provide 
a stronger institutional framework for the accommodation of social cleavages and 
thereby become an important step towards the overdue ‘fundamental change’.
620 ‘More Deaths in Kampala Riots’, The New Vision, 11 September 2009. According to eyewitnesses, 
people were dragged out of cars at road blocks in several parts of the city for looking like Banyankole, 
and beaten up.
621 Interview, James Atoh.
622 Interview, Sam Njuba.
623 Museveni allegedly said he would put the Acholi in a bottle like grasshoppers so that they can eat 
themselves (Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 11) -  a statement that was mentioned in many of my interviews with 
Northern leaders.
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6 ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ -  The UNIP elite bargain and 
the foundations of Zambia’s lasting peace
In the preceding two chapters, I have shown that civil war in Uganda can be traced back 
to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. In the next two chapters, I will contrast 
Uganda’s story of recurrent exclusion with the Zambian experience of enduring 
inclusion and show that the persistence of inclusive elite bargains has helped to 
accommodate the spectre of ethno-regional violence. I will start by discussing the elite 
bargain of the First and Second Republic (1964-1991), which has laid the solid 
foundations of the country’s lasting peace and stability.
In line with the structure of the two previous chapters, I start my discussion by 
describing the observed level of violent conflict during the First and Second Republic 
(section 6.1) and then move on to establish the inclusiveness of the UNIP elite bargain 
(section 6.2). In a third step, I analyse the relationship between UNIP’s inclusive elite 
bargain and the country’s peace and stability between 1964 and 1991 (section 6.3). The 
chapter ends with brief thoughts on competing explanations (section 6.4).
6.1 Conflict levels between 1964 and 1991
As shown in chapter 3, there was considerable potential for conflict when UNIP led 
Zambia to independence in October 1964. To begin with, the ruling party faced 
opposition not only from Nkumbula’s ANC in the South but also from the traditional 
government in Barotseland, which had only recently displayed overt secessionist 
aspirations. Moreover, as an indigenous economic class with control of capital or skills 
was virtually non-existent, access to the offices and resources of the post-colonial state 
was of key importance and almost inevitably bound to lead to bitter struggles among the 
leaders of the country’s major social groups.
Yet, Zambia has remained an ‘oasis of peace and tranquillity’624 in an otherwise highly 
unstable region. Under the multi-party regime of the First Republic (1964-1972), 
President Kaunda ruled the country on a comfortable majority, albeit challenged by the 
enduring strength of the ANC in Southern Province and the emergence of the Lozi-
624 Interview, Marc Chona.
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based United Party (UP) in Western Province.625 In 1968, UNIP won the general 
elections but had to accept defeat to the ANC not only in the southern but also -  after 
the ban of UP -  in the western parts of the country. An even more significant challenge 
to UNIP emerged in 1971 when the Bemba-based United Progressive Party (UPP) 
challenged its authority in the North, the ruling party’s stronghold during the nationalist 
struggle. As UNIP found itself on the verge of becoming a regional party, it introduced 
a one-party state in December 1972. Intense factional struggles notwithstanding, there 
were only a few isolated incidents of violence during the First Republic, most notably a 
clash between UNIP and UP supporters on the Copperbelt in 1968 that resulted in six 
deaths. Moreover, there was considerable state repression against all opposition parties, 
especially before and after the imposition of the one-party regime.
During the Second Republic (1972-1991), UNIP ‘won’ the general elections in 1973, 
1978, 1983 and 1988, with considerable support for President Kaunda even at the height 
of economic crisis and no signs of large-scale violent conflict. This is not to deny that 
the country witnessed several incidents of low-level political violence throughout the 
course of the Second Republic. From the mid-1970s, for example, Adamson Mushala 
and his followers tried to launch an armed rebellion in North-Western Province -  the 
only attempted insurgency in the history of post-colonial Zambia.627 Even though the 
Mushala rebellion temporarily destabilised parts of the province, it failed to gain 
momentum and never came close to qualifying as a full-blown civil war. This means 
that war-related casualties were in the dozens rather than in the hundreds, violence was
C*\ o
far from sustained and the weaker party was never able to mount effective resistance. 
Other forms of political violence were similarly unsuccessful and short-lived. Three 
military coup attempts in 1980, 1988 and 1990 were either uncovered in the planning 
phase or put down within a matter of a few hours. More serious and sustained was a 
series of violent (and on several occasions deadly) urban riots throughout the 1980s that 
originated in the context of extreme economic decline, growing urban poverty and the 
confrontation between the government and the trade unions. In the light of the mounting
625 Tordoff & Molteno 1974a.
626 Tordoff 1980a; Gertzel et al. 1984.
627 For details on this largely unknown episode in Zambian history see Larmer & Macola 2007.
628 Given the extremely limited available information on the Mushala rebellion, the exact number of 
conflict-related deaths was impossible to establish. Nonetheless, interview evidence as well as 
information published in Wele (1987), Larmer & Macola (2007) and the Africa Contemporary Record 
(Various Years) makes it safe to assume that the attempted rebellion never came close to qualifying as a 
civil war.
629 ACR 1989/1990: B674; Phiri 2002.
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protest, UNIP’s fortunes changed in the early 1990s with growing pressure for the 
reintroduction of multipartyism and a humiliating electoral defeat to the trade union-led 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991. Nevertheless, Zambia always 
remained light-years away from the civil wars experienced by many of its neighbouring 
countries. Instead, the country managed a transition to multi-party rule that is still 
widely regarded as one of the most peaceful in the history of the African continent.
How can one explain Zambia’s remarkable peace and stability? While there is an 
abundant literature on war and breakdown in the neighbouring countries, civil war 
avoidance in Zambia seems to be have been taken for granted. The only exception in 
this regard is the work by Peter Burnell who has made an attempt to grapple with 
‘Zambian exceptionalism’.630 Burnell stresses the need for ‘dynamic explanation’ and 
identifies a number of factors that explain conflict avoidance in Zambia at different 
moments in time (see section 6.4). Yet, he only briefly and superficially touches upon 
what is arguably the key driving force behind ‘Zambian exceptionalism’, namely its 
inclusive elite bargain.
6.2 The UNIP elite bargain
After independence, UNIP made a sustained attempt to forge an inclusive elite bargain 
in order to complete national unity. ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ being the overarching 
motto, the government relied on a practice called ‘tribal balancing’ whereby access to 
positions of state power was to be distributed equitably among competing groups. This 
practise was maintained throughout the First and Second Republic and implemented at 
all levels of the public sector, which became evident in high degrees of political, 
economic and military power-sharing.
6.2.1 The elite bargain of the First Republic (1964-1972)
The First Republic witnessed the birth of an inclusive nation-building project meant to 
cultivate a ‘sense of oneness’631 and make the motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ a 
reality. In the field of education, for example, secondary schools were created in every 
district, of which many were established as ‘national’ boarding schools. Selection for
630 Burnell 2005.
631 Interview, Njekwa Anamela.
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the latter was nationally based, which means that there was a deliberate attempt to bring 
together pupils from all provinces of the country and make them grow up in a ‘national’ 
environment. The historian B. Phiri, one of Zambia’s foremost academics, recalls that
‘through this system you found yourself for five years in a boarding school in a region other 
than where you originate from. So by the time you finish these five years, you had grown 
up in an environment different from your own. And therefore you cultivated friendships 
(...). So by the time you are going to college, you had already known people from other 
provinces (...). So at the end of the day, people became closer as Zambians. People began to 
see themselves as Zambians ( ,..)’.632
In a similar vein, civil servants were deliberately transferred across the country and
typically served outside their home areas. The same was true for political leaders in
party and government (for details see below) and even trained soldiers who were
purposefully posted outside their home provinces to ensure the national integration of
the armed forces. These measures taken together promoted multilingualism and
lasting inter-cultural contact -  especially in form of inter-marriages -  and thereby
helped to lower tribal sentiment. At the same time, the ruling party tried to consolidate
national unity by ensuring an inclusive inter-group distribution of access to positions of
state power.
POLITICAL POWER-SHARING
The UNIP governments during the First Republic were on average carefully balanced 
between the country’s five main language groups. In absolute terms, government was 
dominated by Bemba-speakers, followed by the Nyanja, Tonga, Barotse and North- 
Western groups (see figure 26a). This distribution closely matched the groups’ 
population share, with none of the groups being seriously underrepresented and only the 
relatively small group of Barotse-speakers (8.6% of the population) being clearly over­
represented (see figure 26b). Significantly, this proportional balance was achieved not 
only for ministers and deputies but also for the more consequential positions in the 
‘inner core’ of political power. Moreover, UNIP made sure that the government was 
also inclusive in racial terms by appointing a few individuals of white or coloured 
background to influential positions.
632 Interview, Prof. Bizeck J. Phiri.
633 Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke.
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Figure 26: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 1964-1972634
Figure 26a: A bsolute d istribution , 1964-1972 average
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However, it took a while to establish this overall balance. Initially, Bemba- and Nyanja- 
speakers -  the two largest groups -  were underrepresented, while the Tonga- and 
especially Barotse-speaking groups were overrepresented (see figure 26c). The 
prominence of Tonga-speakers was clearly meant to increase UNIP’s appeal in the 
southern parts of the country, the core constituency of the opposition ANC. Lozi 
domination was due to the fact that when Kaunda constituted his first Cabinet in 1964, 
Lozi leaders had used the ultimate threat of withdrawal from the party to insist on being 
given what they considered adequate ministerial representation.635 The President could 
not afford to ignore such a threat, which might have precipitated the secession of
634 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, GOZ Various Years a.
635 Molteno 1974: 66.
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Barotseland. At the same time, Lozi overrepresentation angered Bemba-speakers. S. 
Wina, one of the key Lozi ministers at the time, recalls that S. Kapwepwe -  the leader 
of the Bemba-speaking bloc -  repeatedly complained about Lozi dominance in Cabinet 
arguing that appointments had to be properly balanced.
The initial imbalances in government were mirrored in UNEP’s Central Committee 
(CC), the key organ of the ruling party. In the early post-colonial days, all major 
factions were represented on the UNIP CC, including S. Kapwepwe (Bemba), R. 
Kamanga (Nyanja), S. Wina (Lozi) and M. Chona (Tonga). Nevertheless, Nyanja- and 
especially Barotse-speakers were overrepresented, while the Bemba-speaking faction 
was again underrepresented (see table 19). This led to growing disaffection among 
Bemba-speakers who felt neglected relative to their major contribution to the freedom
f / i n
struggle. The perception of relative neglect culminated in the upheavals surrounding 
the August 1967 UNIP elections.638 While members of the UNIP CC had previously run 
for office on a balanced team ticket, now for the first time seven out of the eleven posts 
were contested, not least to demonstrate that the principles of political democracy could
/ 'O Q
work. Bemba-speaking leaders used this occasion to join up with the weak Tonga­
speaking faction to unseat leading Lozi- and Nyanja-speaking leaders (see table 19). As 
a result, the Bemba-Tonga alliance won all but one of the contested seats and the top 
four UNIP CC positions were now held by two Bemba and two Tonga.
Table 19: Linguistic composition of the UNIP Central Committee (CC) in Zambia, 1964- 
1969 (in percent)640________________________________________________________
Language Group Population (1969) 1964 1967 1969
Bemba 38,8 28,6 45,5 41,7
Nyanja 21,7 28,6 9,1 16,7
Tonga 15,2 14,3 27,3 25,0
North-Western 10,6 0,0 0,0 8,3
Barotse 9,2 21,4 18,2 8,3
Other 4,5 7,1 0,0 0,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
The imbalances on the UNEP CC alienated Nyanja- and Barotse-speakers. As a result, a 
‘Unity in the East’ movement sprung up, which reflected the fear that the declining
636 Interview, Sikota Wina.
637 Pettman 1974: 233; Molteno 1974: 66.
638 For details on the 1967 crisis see Rotberg 1967.
639 Rasmussen 1969: 422; Tordoff & Molteno 1974a: 24.
640 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973; Rotberg 1967; ‘KK scraps top UNIP 
committee’, Times o f Zambia, 26 August 1969.
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influence of Nyanja-speaking leaders would negatively affect the group’s development 
share.641 Disaffection in Barotseland was even more deep-seated. Even though the 
Barotse-speakers were clearly over-represented, UNIP’s support in the West had always 
remained fragile due to the deep divisions in the Lozi ruling class. Significantly, most 
Lozi ministers were ‘nationalists’ and therefore in sharp conflict with the Lozi 
‘traditionalists’ who maintained considerable ‘say’ in Western Province.642 The 
‘traditionalists’ were further alienated by the progressive dismantlement of the formal 
structures of the Barotse national government between 1965 and 1970 -  a policy that 
was implemented by the Lozi ‘nationalist’ faction and earned them bitter resentment in 
the province. This resentment was reinforced by the visible loss of Lozi influence at the 
centre, evident not only in the Lozi defeat during the 1967 party elections but also in the 
previous dismissal for alleged financial impropriety of two Lozi ministers -  one of them 
Nalumino Mundia who was widely recognised as a vocal spokesman for traditional 
Barotse interests. Lozi discontent ultimately gave momentum to the UP, which had been 
created in 1966 and was soon taken over by Mundia. The UP -  that openly played on 
anti-Bemba sentiment643 -  was banned after a clash with UNIP on the Copperbelt in 
August 1968.644 This proved however ineffective as the UP continued its activities 
under the umbrella of the ANC and won most of the seats in Western Province during 
the 1968 general elections.
To make matters worse, UNIP’s sustained efforts to win over the ANC-dominated 
South proved futile.645 Even though Tonga-speakers were well-represented in party and 
government, the ANC won -  to the great disappointment of UNIP646 -  the 1968 general 
elections in Southern Province, albeit with a considerably smaller margin. The reason 
why UNIP’s strategy of careful political cultivation failed is difficult to explain. 
Molteno stresses that ANC had operated in the Southern Province for ten years before 
UNIP broke away whereby ‘socialisation’ may explain why the swing to UNIP was so 
small in 1968.647 Maybe more importantly, many of the Tonga-speaking leaders within
641 Molteno 1974: 73.
642 Gertzel 1984b: 206pp.
643 Dresang 1974: 1610.
644 Tordoff & Scott 1974: 136p.
645 Rasmussen 1969: 41Op.
646 Kaunda himself was furious, evident in his often-cited ‘it pays to belong to UNIP’ speech: ‘I cannot 
see how I can continue to pay a police officer or a civil servant who works for Nkumbula (...). How dare 
they bite the hand that feeds them? They must learn that it pays to belong to UNIP. Those who want to 
form a civil service of the opposition must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry Nkumbula’ (cited 
after Phiri 2006: 141).
647 Molteno 1974: 71p.
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UNIP -  in particular M. Chona and E. Mudenda -  had long been described as ‘mere 
tools of the Bemba regime’ and therefore lacked a substantial power base in their home
In the light of these divisions, UNIP intensified its quest for unity from the late 1960s. 
Immediately after the 1967 party elections, Kaunda had appointed four national trustees 
to the UNIP CC from areas which would have otherwise been underrepresented as a 
result of the elections. This had however little effect since ‘the split within UNIP went 
too deep to be healed by what had become a familiar balancing device (...)’.649 As a 
consequence, the President soon opted for structural change. In 1969, he disbanded the 
UNIP CC and replaced it with a more balanced Interim Executive Committee (see table 
19). Moreover, a new party Constitution (1970) was adopted, which did not formally 
embody a proposal for strict equality of provincial representation in the UNIP CC but 
emphasised the ‘need to get candidates from all parts of the country’ and provided that 
each province should henceforth have 600 delegates at national conferences.
At the same time, the President became even more anxious to project a government with 
a national image. Accordingly, the distribution of government positions between 
language groups became remarkably balanced from the late 1960s (see figure 26c). As 
the imbalances of the early post-colonial years were being redressed, the President took 
care to improve the position of the North-Western group and addressed Luapulan 
concerns about marginalisation within the Bemba-speaking group.650 Moreover, he used 
his nominating powers (five possible nominees from outside Parliament) to appoint 
people from Western and Southern Province where UNIP had lost the 1968 elections -  
a strategy that ensured that both Barotse- and Tonga-speakers continued to have largely 
proportional representation. The nomination of J. B. Siyomunji (Lozi) as Provincial 
Cabinet minister for Western Province in 1969 was of particular significance as it 
reflected a deliberate strategy to win back support among Barotse-speakers by seeking 
closer links with the Lozi ‘traditionalists’.651
648 Macola 2008: 36pp.
649 Tordoff & Scott 1974: 114pp.
650 Baylies 1984: 163pp. From the mid-1960s, leaders from Luapula Province -  hitherto part of the 
Bemba-speaking bloc -  had started to complain about political marginalisation. A UNIP stronghold 
during the nationalist struggle, the Province was not represented in Cabinet or the UNIP CC until the late 
1960s. The ensuing complaints about political neglect were especially directed against Northern Province 
politicians (also Bemba-speakers) who were accused of insulting Luapulans and taking over Luapula 
National Assembly seats.
651 Gertzel 1984b: 216.
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Efforts for political power-sharing could also be observed in the civil service. The 
latter’s size increased dramatically from 22.561 in 1964 to 51.491 in 1969.652 Along 
with this expansion went a rapid ‘Zambianisation’ of the administration. In 1964, only 
6.3% of all permanent secretaries were Zambian -  a share that rose to 86.4% in 1968 
and 100% in 1972 (see table 20). These top civil service appointments once again 
reflected a balance between the country’s major language groups. Insiders confirm that 
this was a deliberate policy meant to ensure that all groups would feel that they have a 
substantial stake in the administrative running of the country. Moreover, the scant 
available evidence indicates that this balance at the level of permanent secretaries was 
mirrored at the lower levels of the civil service.654
Table 20: Linguistic distribution of permanent secretaries in Zambia, 1968-1972 (in 
percent)655______________________________________________________________
Language Group Population (1969) 1964 1968 1972
Bemba 38,8 0,0 31,8 28,0
Nyanja 21,7 0,0 22,7 36,0
Tonga 15,2 0,0 9,1 12,0
North-Western 10,6 0,0 4,5 4,0
Barotse 9,2 6,3 18,2 20,0
Other 4,5 93,8 13,6 0,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING
Attempts for economic power-sharing were initially hampered by the fact that Zambia 
had very little control over its own economy -  a situation that limited the scope for 
patronage distribution. As a consequence, the UNIP government engaged in far- 
reaching economic reform meant to gain control over the economy and thereby increase 
the material basis of the elite bargain. In April 1968, Kaunda announced the 
‘Mulungushi economic reforms’ whereby the government took a 51% controlling share 
in twenty-six large industrial and commercial firms and used its power to restrict certain 
economic opportunities, especially retail trading, to Zambian citizens.656 The Industrial 
Development Corporation (INDECO) was given vast new responsibilities and thus 
became -  almost overnight -  an industrial corporate giant. In August 1969, the 
government took a 51% ownership of the two copper-mining giants (Anglo American
652 Tordoff & Molteno 1974b: 269.
653 Interview, Vernon Mwaanga.
654 Dresang 1974: 1612.
655 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, GOZ Various Years b.
656 Johns 1980: 106pp.
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Corporation and Roan Selection Trust), which were placed under the Mining 
Development Corporation (MINDECO). INDECO and MINDECO were made 
subsidiaries of a huge conglomerate, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation 
(ZIMCO).
The political economy dimension of the nationalisation measures was all too obvious in
f .c n
that the reforms extended patronage opportunities into the productive sectors. As the 
number of jobs in the parastatal sector expanded substantially658, Kaunda could -  faced 
with mounting discontent -  now distribute patronage outside state and party jobs.659 
Interviewees typically claim that there was a very deliberate attempt to share these 
rewards equitably between the country’s language groups.660 While detailed information 
on the distribution of key parastatal appointments during the First Republic is not 
available, my own data for the Second Republic corroborate such claims (see below).
MILITARY POWER-SHARING
The UNIP government also made attempts to promote military power-sharing. 
Interestingly, the nationalist movement had established very close contacts with African 
officers in the colonial army, the Northern Rhodesian Regiment. S. Wina, a key member 
of the liberation struggle, recalls that senior African officers in the army and police 
would even secretly inform the ‘freedom fighters’ whenever the colonial government 
planned a crackdown on the nationalists.661 As a consequence, there was little distrust 
between civilian and military leaders when Zambia reached independence in 1964. At 
the same time, however, the 1964 military coup attempt in Tanzania just a few months 
before Zambia’s independence had sent a timely warning to the UNIP leadership that 
harmonious civil-military relations could not be taken for granted. Trying to avoid the 
Tanzanian experience, UNIP set out to put the Zambian army under tight civilian 
control.
657 Burdette 1988: 85pp.
658 Szeftel 1982: 6.
659 As more than 80% of the Zambian economy was now in the hands of the parastatals, there were little 
economic opportunities left outside the state. Former dissidents point out that this allowed UNIP to 
effectively marginalise political opponents who were denied access to jobs and resources (Interview, 
Tentani Mwanza).
660 Various interviews.
661 Interview, Sikota Wina.
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At independence, the Northern Rhodesian Regiment was renamed the Zambian Defence 
Forces (ZDF) that came to consist of three pillars, including the Zambia Army (ZA), the 
Zambia Air Force (ZAF) and the Zambia National Service (ZNS). Whereas the UNIP 
government inherited an army of only 2.900 soldiers from Northern Rhodesia, the size 
of the ZDF was rapidly expanded from 4.400 in 1968 to 16.200 in 1986.662 This 
dramatic growth was closely related to regional threats to national security, including 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia (1965), 
liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia as well as South Africa’s 
recurrent destabilisation attempts.
Recruitment into the Zambian army was based not only on merit but also on the 
principle of ‘tribal balancing’. Accordingly, the ruling party abolished all racial and 
tribal discrimination in recruitment to the ZDF, not least since it recognized that tribal 
imbalances had played a major role in military interventions across Sub-Saharan 
Africa.664 At the level of the rank-and-file, a newly introduced quota system prescribed 
that army units were to be composed of soldiers from all provinces and districts -  a 
system that ensured that all tribal groups had a stake in the army.665 Similarly, the 
officer-corps was deliberately drawn from all parts of the country (see below). 
Interestingly, insiders claim that national integration within the army was facilitated by 
the fact that the first Army Commander, Gen. Chinkuli, was from the small Lenje tribe 
rather than from one of the bigger groups -  a situation that helped to avoid patterns of 
tribal dominance:
‘If we had started with someone from a big tribe like the Bemba, maybe the tribal disease
would have grown. But we started with a brilliant young man from a small tribe’.666
The national outlook of the military was further enhanced by the creation of the ZNS as 
a third pillar of the army. The ZNS emerged from the UNIP Youth Wing that had 
established Youth Production Camps in all districts after independence and was also 
mandated to provide youths with military training.667 In 1971, the ZNS was formally 
established and involved all Zambians between 18 and 35 who -  upon graduation -  
became members of a reserve army, the so-called Home Guard. The ZNS proved useful
662 IISS Various Years.
663 Agyeman-Duah 1992: 145p.
664 Haantobolo 2008: 136p.
665 Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke.
666 Interview, Peter Matoka.
667 Haantobolo 2008: 146pp.
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in different ways. First, it combined military training with training in food production 
and thereby bridged the gap between the broader population and army personnel in a 
productive way. Second, the government’s policy of dispersing ZNS camps throughout 
the territory anchored the military in every comer of the country and contributed to the 
emergence of a nationwide sense of belonging.
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING
The extent of territorial power-sharing, by contrast, was more limited. At independence, 
UNIP had little control over the provincial and district administration that had enjoyed 
considerable discretionary power under colonial rule. As a consequence, the 
government decided to break up the pre-existing structures and transferred most of their 
functions to newly established central government departments at the provincial level. 
This was followed by the 1965 Local Government Act, which abolished the Native 
Authorities -  seen as symbols of colonial oppression -  and replaced them with 67 new 
and democratically elected local governments (24 urban authorities, 43 rural 
councils).669 While the latter were formally given wide-ranging functions, the primary 
aim of local government reform was clearly to institute political control by the centre. 
Accordingly, an Under-Minister was appointed to each of the eight provinces and 
became the political and administrative head of the region. Similarly, at the district 
level, the highest civil servant, the District Secretary, was replaced by the partisan UNIP 
Regional Secretary. The result of these reforms was not only a centralisation of political 
power but also a significant politicisation of local government structures.
These trends were reinforced by the 1968 decentralisation policy, which was -  
somewhat paradoxically -  essentially an attempt to contain the sectional conflict 
surrounding the 1967 party elections. Anxious to strengthen national unity, President 
Kaunda stressed the need to
‘decentralize in centralism. I define this decentralization in centralism as a measure 
whereby through the Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most o f your 
Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and 
Government machinery at the centre in the interest of unity. In short, you decentralise to 
avoid regionalism (.. .)’.671
668 Chikulo 1981,2009.
669 The chiefs who previously headed the Native Authorities were not abolished like their counterparts in 
Tanzania. Even though they lost most of their power, they remained important as a link to the political 
legitimacy of the pre-colonial past (Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 173p.).
670 Saasa 2002: 115p.
671 Cited after Tordoff 1980b: 205.
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At the provincial level, the most significant aspect of decentralisation was the posting of 
a full Cabinet minister as the political head, supported by a Minister of State and a 
permanent secretary.672 At the district level, a District Governor was made the politico- 
administrative head of each of the 53 districts. Yet, besides the transfer of a few senior 
politicians to the provincial and local level, most of the administrative and technical 
staff remained concentrated at the centre and local departments had little ‘say’ in policy­
making. Moreover, local governments -  especially rural councils -  were in practice not 
entrusted with any major functions (except bridge and road maintenance) and therefore 
remained on the sidelines of the central government’s activity. The rather marginal 
position of local governments during the First Republic is underlined by the limited 
extent of fiscal decentralisation (see figures 27a and 27b). Even though local revenue 
increased in absolute terms between 1964 and 1970 (mostly due to more borrowing), its 
percentage of total government revenue stagnated at rather low levels. In line with this 
situation, the ‘Simmance review’ of local government in 1971-72 concluded that the 
decentralised system of government was not working because executive authority 
remained heavily concentrated at the centre.674
Figure 27: Local revenue in Zambia, 1964-1970675
Figure 27a: C om position o f local revenue , 
1964-1970 (in million Kwacha)
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Figure 27b: Total local rev en u e  as percen tag e  of to ta l 
ce n tra l g ov ern m en t revenue , 1964-1970
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672 Chikulo 1981: 60pp.
673 Grass-roots participation remained minimal since the established network o f development committees 
(Village Productivity Committee, Ward Development Committee; District Development Committee and 
Provincial Development Committee) were turned into partisan instruments of control dominated by ruling 
party cadres.
Cited after Mukwena 2001: 7.
675 Compiled and calculated based on GOZ Various Years c.
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THE SLIDE TO ONE-PARTY RULE
Despite of high levels of power-sharing at the centre, it ultimately proved difficult to 
keep the broad-based coalition together. From the early 1970s, it was again the Bemba- 
speakers who felt neglected. Bemba neglect was more perceived than real as Bemba- 
speaking leaders remained well-represented in government, party and administration. 
Nonetheless, they were offended by the dissolution of the UNIP CC and the 
reappointment of three leaders defeated in 1967 -  a move that was perceived as 
depriving them of a victory won in open elections. As a consequence, S. Kapwepwe, the 
charismatic leader of the Bemba-speaking bloc, resigned as Vice-President in protesting
(inf.
the ‘victimisation’ of his fellow tribesmen. Bemba disgruntlement came to a head in 
August 1971 after Kaunda suspended four Bemba-speaking ministers, including 
Kapwepwe’s lieutenant J. Chimba. Convinced that the balance of power within UNIP 
had swung away from them, Kapwepwe and his supporters created the UPP and 
managed to win one of the by-elections in late 1971.677 Faced with this challenge, the 
government banned UPP in February 1972 and detained Kapwepwe and other key 
figures.
Even though the UPP was Bemba-dominated, its emergence was more than an 
expression of Bemba grievances.678 Another source of disagreement was ideological 
difference about the role of the ruling party and intra-party democracy. While younger, 
more educated leaders stressed the importance of unity and control from above, the 
older, more populist ‘freedom fighters’ emphasised the need for mass participation and 
popular control. As the populist faction now felt marginalised in favour of more 
educated Zambians and decided to regroup under the umbrella of the UPP, the latter 
was at least as much an expression of common roots in militant nationalist politics as in 
shared Bemba parentage. More broadly, the UPP attracted all those who were frustrated 
by their lack of progress or promotion since independence, especially in the urban 
society of the Copperbelt where expectations were especially difficult to fulfil.679 UPP 
was therefore a heterogeneous coalition of workers, trade unionists, small businessmen 
and party militants, many of them Bemba but not all of them.
676 ACR 1969/1970: B231p.
677 Kapwepwe himself won the seat for Mufulira West on the Copperbelt.
678 Gertzel et al. 1984: 14p.; Scott 1978: 327.
679 Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 125pp.
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Altogether, UNIP found itself on the verge of becoming a regional party in the early 
1970s. While the ANC continued to control both Southern and Western Provinces, the 
great popularity of Kapwepwe’s UPP challenged its authority in the Northern parts of 
the country -  UNIP’s stronghold during the days of the nationalist struggle. 
Significantly, UNIP seemed too weak in organisational terms to allow the unchecked 
interplay between factions, not least because Kapwepwe had taken with him many of 
UNIP’s most efficient and outspoken leaders and thereby weakened the ruling party’s
/tqa
mobilisation capacity. The introduction of the one-party state in December 1972 was 
therefore seen as the only way to preserve UNIP’s authority and contain the 
increasingly destabilising factional struggles.
6.2.2 The elite bargain of the Second Republic (1972-1991)
At the beginning of the Second Republic, UNIP found itself in a difficult position. The 
banned opposition parties were still well-entrenched and support for the ruling party 
was probably lowest since independence. The main challenge was therefore to establish 
a broader support base that would embrace both former opposition stalwarts and key 
interests groups. This required however a better ‘institutional balance between 
participation and control’ as increased participation after independence had heightened 
factional struggles.681
To increase control, the new Constitution provided for a centralisation of political 
power. Above all, it increased the powers of the President who now acted at his 
discretion on a wide range of issues, including foreign affairs, and was accorded 
extensive nominating powers. Moreover, the Constitution introduced a division 
between party and government with the former being supreme. Overall policy direction 
was assigned to the UNIP CC, while administrative decision-making was delegated to 
the Cabinet. Executive power also expanded in Parliament with primary elections 
organised among Party officials before a general election and the UNIP CC taking the 
final decision on Parliamentary candidates. Finally, a ‘leadership code’ was introduced 
to control the assets held by all public leaders.
680 Gertzel et al. 1984: 14p.
681 Ibid.: 4.
682 ACR 1972/1973: B302.
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Significantly, however, the centralisation of power was combined with the sustained 
attempt to establish the broadest possible basis of support for the regime. To widen 
support, the ‘Chona Commission’ (1972) had not only recommended that UNIP should 
be open to anyone but also argued in favour of institutional representation in 
Parliament. This was clearly an attempt to appeal to civil servants, trade unionists, 
businessmen and students -  groups who, mainly because of the dominance of local 
party organisers, had been sidelined during the First Republic and therefore flirted with 
the UPP opposition. Even though the idea of formal institutional representation was not 
adopted, in practise
‘the one party State saw an enormous increase in the influence of senior civil servants, trade
union leaders, parastatal managing directors, business and the small professional elites’.684
UNIP’s alliance with the Zambian ‘middle class’ helped to win back support of major 
interests groups but alienated local party officials who were frustrated that the expected 
economic rewards under the one-party state did not materialise. As a result, both party 
membership and activism declined considerably throughout the Second Republic 
leaving the ruling party as an ‘amorphous body’685 largely unable to effectively 
implement and communicate government policies.
UNIP also tried hard to (re)build stable support in the former opposition areas. The first 
‘settlement’ was reached with the ANC. While Nkumbula had initially refused the 
‘invitation’ to join UNIP, he soon decided that he could not leave his followers out in 
the political cold and approached Kaunda with a view to reconciliation. The latter 
was publicly celebrated in Choma, Southern Province, on 17 June 1973 when 
Nkumbula called ANC members to join UNIP. The reconciliation with the ‘Lozi 
faction’ of the former ANC was less formalised and did not start until 1974 when the 
former UP leader N. Mundia was released from prison and ‘allowed’ to win a
c. on
parliamentary seat in a by-election. The relationship with the former UPP faction was 
most uneasy. Even though Kapwepwe and 34 other UPP detainees were released in 
December 1972, UNIP remained highly suspicious of former UPP supporters. As 
Kaunda feared infiltration by former UPP men, the latter were not allowed to join as 
UNIP members except by applying to the UNIP CC -  a provision which effectively
683 Scott 1980: 148p.
684 Ibid.
685 Ibid.: 158.
686 ACR 1973/1974: B326p.
687 Gertzel 1984b: 218pp.
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blocked UPP entry.688 Nevertheless, UNIP sought accommodation with the former UPP 
top leadership by making them financial overtures and using the mediation of UNIP
z t o q
Bemba leaders. After prolonged negotiations, Kapwepwe and four of his senior aides 
were readmitted into UNIP on 9 September 1977 for the ‘sake of complete unity’.690
To bolster this new unity, Kaunda further intensified efforts to project a national 
outlook of the regime’s leadership. Significantly, the practise of ‘tribal balancing’ was 
maintained throughout the Second Republic, with the President repeatedly emphasising 
the usefulness of this approach with view to preserving peace and stability.691
POLITICAL POWER-SHARING
Government appointments during the Second Republic remained on average carefully 
balanced between the country’s main language groups (see figures 28a and 28b). This 
was again true not only for ministers and deputy ministers but also for the more 
consequential positions in the ‘inner core’ of political power. In terms of my ‘Index of 
Representation’, the Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and North-Western groups were almost 
perfectly represented, while only the small Barotse-speaking bloc was 
overrepresented.692 If we analyse the composition of government beyond average 
values, we see that proportional representation was a fairly constant phenomenon 
between 1974 and 1990 (see figure 28c). Interestingly, government appointments 
continued to be used strategically to anchor the one-party state in former opposition 
areas. Instructive in this respect was an informal agreement that the Prime Minister 
would always be either a Tonga or a Lozi.693 Accordingly, three out of the six Prime 
Ministers during the Second Republic were Tonga-speakers (M. Chona, E. Mudenda 
and K. Musokotwane), while the remaining three were from the Barotse-speaking bloc 
(D. M. Lisulo, N. Mundia and M. Masheke). The appointment of N. Mundia -  the 
former dissident who had been returned to Cabinet in 1976 -  as Prime Minister in 
February 1981 was of particular significance and finally restored solid links between 
Western Province and the centre.
688 ACR 1973/1974: B327p.
689 Larmer 2008: 112p.
690 ACR 1977/1978: 467.
691 ACR 1981/1982: B836.
692 This refutes claims that Barotse-speakers remained outside the ‘fusion of Zambian elites’ (Englebert 
2005).
693 Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 186p.
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Figure 28: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 1974-1990694
Figure 28a: A bsolute D istribution, 1974-1990 average
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Figure 28c: Index of R epresen tation , D istribution relative to  popu la tion  share, 1974-1990
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If one disaggregates this broader picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that some 
of the larger tribes were on average slightly underrepresented, including the Tonga, 
Nsenga, Tumbuka, and Ngoni (see table 21). The reverse was true for some of the 
smaller groups, in particular the Lunda and Lenje. On the whole, however, it is striking 
that none of the country’s 19 tribal groups with more than 1% of the population were 
entirely excluded from government between 1974 and 1990. Moreover, only four of 
these 19 groups (Namwanga, Lamba, Luvale and Mbunda) never had a minister in the 
‘inner core’ of political power. Finally, even the smaller groups subsumed under ‘Other’ 
were prominently represented.
694 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 1988 
are missing.
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Table 21: Tribal composition of government in Zambia, Index of Representation, 1974-
1990 (in percent)695_______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Tribe Population
(2000)
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1990
Bemba 18,1 24,4 17,3 16,2 15,5 15,2 15,0 11,8 11,8
Tonga 12,7 14,4 13,9 11,4 4,6 4,4 5,8 6,1 4,3
Chewa 7,2 7,0 7,8 11,3 10,8 9,6 9,1 9,6 12,8
Lozi 5,6 8,3 8,6 12,5 16,6 19,5 15,9 16,7 9,3
Nsenga 5,5 2,8 3,0 3,8 1,4 0,0 1,5 1,6 9,1
Tumbuka 4,2 4,4 4,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,5 1,6 2,0
Ngoni 4,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,1 5,5 3,8 0,0 1,0
Lala 3,2 4,4 1,3 1,2 4,6 4,4 2,9 4,6 2,0
Kaonde 3,0 2,8 4,8 3,8 3,1 3,0 2,9 0,0 5,4
Namwanga 2,7 2,8 3,5 5,1 1,7 3,0 1,4 1,4 1,7
Lunda (N/W) 2,5 5,8 5,6 3,8 3,1 3,0 2,9 3,0 0,0
Ushi 2,4 0,0 1,3 1,2 0,0 0,0 1,5 5,6 6,4
Mambwe 2,3 4,4 0,0 3,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Lamba 2,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,3 2,9 1,4 2,9 3,3
Luvale 2,1 1,4 3,0 4,9 3,1 4,4 2,9 3,0 1,0
Bisa 1,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,7 4,1 3,8 4,0 5,4
Lenje 1,7 2,8 1,8 3,8 1,7 1,5 5,3 5,6 6,1
Lunda 1,4 1,4 8,6 1,2 1,7 3,0 10,6 7,2 6,4
Mbunda 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0
Other 15,9 13,0 15,2 16,2 16,9 16,6 12,0 15,2 11,0
Total 99,9 100,0 99,9 100,1 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
The quest for political power-sharing became also evident in the UNIP Central 
Committee (CC) -  the key decision making body during the Second Republic.696 
Accordingly, the UNIP CC was broadly reflective of the country’s main language 
groups between 1973 and 1988 (see figures 29a and 29b). While Bemba- and Nyanja- 
speakers were very slightly underrepresented, the smaller groups were moderately 
overrepresented.
The UNDP CC was generally known as Kaunda’s ‘sacred cow’ representing many of the 
nationalist leaders of the independence struggle (the ‘old guard’) who were still 
influential behind the scenes and had to be included. Moreover, former opposition 
stalwarts were brought on board to foster accommodation. A key appointment in this 
respect was that of Edward Liso -  Nkumbula’s lieutenant -  who was unanimously voted 
to UNIP’s CC in December 1973697 and remained one of Southern Province’s key 
leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In a similar vein, N. Mundia and other key 
Lozi-speaking politicians were integrated into the UNIP CC from the late 1970s to 
restore support in Western Province. The attempt to use the highest party organ for
695 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a.
696 Tordoff 1980a: 17p.
697 ACR 1975/1976: B383.
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purposes of national integration became also visible in the appointments of both Illuete 
Yeta IV (the Litunga) and Chitimukulu Mutale Chitapankwa (Bemba Paramount Chief) 
in 1983 -  a move intended to weld the influential traditional rulers more firmly into the
/Q O
political structures.
Figure 29: Linguistic composition of the UNIP Central Committee (CC) in Zambia, 1973- 
19886"
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Figure 29a: A bsolu te D istribution, 1973-1988 average
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‘Tribal balancing’ also continued to be practised in the civil service. The latter’s size 
grew from 51.491 in 1969 to 126.260 in 1977700 and still numbered around 90.000 in 
the late 1980s.701 In general the need to accommodate ‘the fluctuating pressures of 
strategic provincial and other interests’ remained a constant concern.702 The result was a 
fairly proportional distribution of senior civil service appointments between the 
country’s major language groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see figures 30a and 
30b). Even though some groups were at times slightly better or worse off, the overall 
picture was of balancing the claimants.
698 ACR 1983/1984: B870; Interview, Dr. Patrick Manda.
699 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; UNIP Various Years.
700 Szeftel 1982: 6.
701 ACR 1987/1988: B828.
702 Dresang & Young 1980: 86p.
197
Figure 30: Linguistic distribution of permanent secretaries in Zambia, 1976-1985703
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ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING
In terms of economic power-sharing, the picture was similarly balanced. By the late 
1970s, the size of the parastatal sector had grown to 128.350704 and provided the 
Zambian government with a huge reservoir of well-paid employment. My data indicate 
that these rewards were distributed in a remarkably equitable manner. As shown in 
figures 31a and 31b, all language groups -  with the exception of the North-Western 
group -  received proportional shares of appointments to the boards of directors and the 
senior management of the country’s three major parastatals (ZIMCO, INDECO and the 
mining parastatals). At the same time, individuals of white or Asian background 
continued to hold prominent positions throughout the Second Republic (subsumed 
under ‘Other’). Parastatal positions were generally more lucrative than positions in the 
civil service and often used to co-opt influential opposition figures. In the context of the 
mounting conflict with the trade unions (see below), President Kaunda appointed four 
key Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) leaders (F. Chiluba, C. Sampa, N. 
Zimba and H. Bweupe) to the ZIMCO board in 1983.705 One year later, T. Walamba, 
the influential Vice-Chairman of Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ), accepted a 
position on the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) board of directors.
703
704
Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; GOZ Various Years b. 
Szeftel 1982: 6.
705 ACR 1983/1984: B872.
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Figure 31: Linguistic distribution of parastatal appointments in Zambia, 1974-1990 
average706
Figure 31a: A bsolute d istribution
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MILITARY POWER-SHARING
In the military sector, the inclusive recruitment and promotion policies that had been 
introduced after independence facilitated the emergence of an officer corps with a 
national outlook. While detailed information on the composition of the entire officer 
corps is not available, a close look at all Zambian Army Commanders during the 
Second Republic shows that all of the country’s five major language groups have over 
time enjoyed substantial representation at the very top of the military hierarchy (see 
table 22).
To further promote the integration of the military into the elite bargain, the Second 
Republic witnessed a progressive ‘politicisation’ of the army and a ‘militarisation’ of 
politics. On the one hand, UNIP organs commonly referred to as ‘Works Committees’ 
were introduced in the barracks and appointments to key army positions were generally 
given to those believed to be loyal to the ruling party. Moreover, all ranks had to 
participate in political education seminars where party policy was explained and loyalty 
to the one-party state was promoted.707 On the other hand, high-ranking army leaders 
were offered lucrative positions at all levels of government. This began as early as 1973 
when Kaunda nominated the three heads of the armed services to Parliament and
706 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; ZIMCO Various Years; INDECO 
Various Years; MINDECO Various Years; ZCCM Various Years.
707 ACR 1975/1976: B384.
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appointed all three of them as Ministers of State. Such a strategy of inclusion was 
maintained throughout the 1970s and 1980s with many current or former army officers 
being appointed to Cabinet, the UNIP CC or as District Governors. Prominent ministers 
with military background included, among others, Maj.-Gen. Chinkuli, Gen. Masheke, 
Lt.-Gen. Mibenge, Brig.-Gen. Haimbe and Lt.-Gen. Lungu. As more and more army 
officers were serving in high-ranking civilian positions, people started wondering 
whether the President was slowly turning over the country to soldiers.709
Table 22: Linguistic distribution of army commanders in Zambia, 1976-1991710
Unified command structure (1976)
Zambia National Defence Force
Gen. G  K. Chinkuli (Tonga)
Lt.-Gen. P. D. Zuze (Nyanja)
Lt.-Gen. B. N. Mibenge (Bemba)
De-unified command structure (1980)
Air Force Army National Service
Maj.-Gen. C. Kabwe (Bemba) Gen. M. N. Masheke (Barotse) Brig.-Gen. C. J. Nyirenda (Nyanja)
Lt. Gen. A. Lungu (Nyanja) Lt.-Gen. C. S. Tembo (Nyanja) Brig.-Gen. F. S. Mulenga (Berriba)
Maj.-Gen. Sinibule (Bemba) Lt.-Gen. G  M. Kalenge (North-Western) Maj.-Gen. T. Fara (Nyanja)
Lt.-Gen. Simutowe (Bemba) Lt.-Gen. F. G  Sibamba (Barotse)
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING
While the Second Republic exhibited high levels of political, economic and military 
power-sharing, territorial power-sharing was more limited. As during the First Republic, 
executive authority remained concentrated at the centre, the provinces were granted 
only a small share in the central government’s expenditure, and most rural councils
* 711operated within a context of ‘central control and local impotence’. Furthermore, the 
politicisation of local government structures reached a new dimension in 1976 when 
provincial members of the UNIP CC (MCCs) took over as political heads of the 
provinces.
The fusion of party and local government was formalised with the 1980 Local 
Administration Act, which abolished the distinction between party, central and local 
government and established a single administrative agency in each district -  the District
708 ACR 1973/1974: B333.
709 ACR 1988/1989: B758.
710 Own data compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke; Interview, Geofroy
Haantolobo.
7,1 Tordoff 1980b: 206.
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Council.712 The latter was headed by a centrally appointed District Governor and 
became responsible for the totality of party, central and local government activity in the 
district. The 1980 Act not only devolved further executive powers to the district level 
but also provided the Councils with more scope to raise their own revenue. Yet, despite 
this formal increase in autonomy, most District Councils remained undermined by the 
de facto absence of any significant sources of local revenue. Moreover, the planned 
integration of party and government proved difficult to achieve since the districts lacked 
integrated budgets.713 On the one hand, central government departments continued to 
depend on their ministerial headquarters for funds, making it difficult for the District 
Councils to control their activities. On the other hand, UNIP itself made the integration 
unattainable by continuing to control its district party accounts from Lusaka. In the end, 
the main objective of the 1980 reforms was again to increase political control over the 
local councils rather than to achieve genuine decentralisation.
Figure 32: Posting of Provincial Ministers and MCCs in Zambia, 1974-1988 average714
P o s te d  o u ts id e  'h o m e ' p ro v in ce P o s te d  in side  'h o m e ' p ro v in c e
■  Provincial MCCs D  Provincial M in is te rs
Interestingly, the Second Republic witnessed a special form of ‘tribal balancing’ 
whereby the great majority of both Provincial Ministers and Provincial MCCs were 
deliberately posted outside their ‘home’ areas’ (see figure 32). The few exceptions to 
this pattern all belonged to the Bemba, Tonga or Lozi tribes.715 This is unlikely to be a
Chikulo 1985: 74pp.
7,3 Mukwena 2001: 8p.
714 Own data compiled and calculated based on GOZ Various Years a; UNIP Various Years.
715 Similarly, very few of the 55 District Governors in 1977 served in their ‘home’ district and at least 
three-quarters o f them served also outside their province of origin (Tordoff 1980b: 198).
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coincidence. Instead, it can be interpreted as another attempt to build support in former 
opposition areas
THE DECLINE OF THE UNIP ELITE BARGAIN
Altogether, UNIP managed to forge an increasingly stable elite bargain where access to 
positions of political, economic and military power was distributed in a remarkably 
equitable manner. From the late 1970s, however, the escalating economic crisis put a 
severe drain on UNIP’s patronage machine, caused serious legitimacy problems for the 
ruling party and ultimately led to political realignments.
Figure 33: The representation of Copperbelt Province in Zam bia’s government, 1964- 
1990716
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The Achilles’ heel of the UNIP elite bargain was clearly the failure to effectively 
accommodate class cleavages, evident in the insufficient incorporation of the 
Copperbelt. This problem went back to the breakaway of UPP in the early 1970s that 
had taken with it UNIP’s most outspoken leaders and destroyed much of the ruling 
party’s support in what had been its stronghold since the nationalist struggle. Even 
though UNIP had survived and officially attempted to ‘reconcile’ with former UPP 
supporters, the party on the Copperbelt remained deeply affected by suspicion and
716 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 1988 are 
missing. Note that figure 33 considers how many ministers and deputies were elected in Copperbelt 
constituencies rather than how many members of government were o f Copperbelt descent.
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accusation.717 As a consequence, the Copperbelt failed to retrieve its old prominence in 
both the ruling party and government. While Copperbelt MPs had provided a significant 
proportion of both party and government cadres during the First Republic, the 1973 
general elections removed virtually the whole generation of Copperbelt nationalist
*71 o
politicians from leadership. As the new MPs had strong local connections rather than 
links with the centre, the urban population on the Copperbelt was left without 
recognisable leadership of national stature. The declining representation of Copperbelt 
society in government during the Second Republic is shown in figure 33.
UNIP’s inability to exercise control over the Copperbelt could initially be compensated 
for by providing stable consumer prices to urban consumers, especially subsidised
7 1 0maize -  the nation’s staple food. In the context of rapid urbanisation and economic 
decline, it became however increasingly costly to ‘buy off urban consumers. As 
subsidies were reduced and economic hardship increased, the unions began to fill the 
political void on the Copperbelt. During the 1970s, the government had gained 
considerable influence over organised labour by placing party faithful into the 
leadership of the ZCTU and making the latter a branch of UNIP.720 Despite signs of 
accommodation, union leaders could hardly ignore the grievances of their members and 
remained critical of government, especially from the late 1970s when rapid economic 
downturn resulted in growing urban unemployment, spiralling prices and declining real
771 * *wages. The result was an increase in industrial action and mounting tensions between 
government and the trade unions that became more and more powerful with a 
membership of 367.000 in 1980 (double that of UNIP).722 The confrontation escalated 
in 1980 over the reorganisation of local government in mine townships and eventually 
culminated in a series of strikes, the suspension of 17 union leaders from UNIP and the
77^detaining of some, including the influential ZCTU leader F. Chiluba.
The govemment-union power struggle was temporarily defused with the release of the 
detained union leaders in November 1981 and their appointment to key parastatal 
positions in 1983/84 (see above). Nevertheless, union mobilisation soon resurfaced in
17 Larmer 2008: 108.
18 Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 135pp.
19 Johns 1980: 114p.; Bates & Collier 1995: 122pp.
20 Burdette 1988: 128p.
21 Larmer 2006a: 167pp.
22 Gertzel 1984a: 92p.
23 Ibid.; Larmer 2006a: 169pp.
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the light of the unabated economic crisis and controversial structural adjustment 
policies.724 In late 1986, the removal of price control led to the doubling of the price of 
‘breakfast’ mealie meal (food eaten by most urban Zambians) and sparked violent riots 
on the Copperbelt. These ‘food riots’ revealed the weakness of the one-party state and 
marked the starting point of efforts to reintroduce multipartyism and remove UNIP from 
power. Significantly, UNIP was no longer able to effectively co-opt the union 
leadership. Whereas Chiluba is believed to have turned down overtures to join UNIP’s 
leadership in the late 1980s, others accepted high-level appointments but were 
subsequently considered as ‘sell-outs’ among union members and eventually removed 
from the leadership. Ultimately, the unions became the main driver behind the 
opposition’s rise to power in 1991 with the fledgling MMD structures being built 
around the local branches of ZCTU’s member unions.
The unions received support from other ‘middle class’ elements who were disillusioned 
by combined effects of one-party dominance and economic crisis. Paradoxically, the 
unions’ key allies were businessmen who mobilised opposition against the regime’s 
socialist economic policies that favoured state enterprises at the expense of the private 
sector.725 Opposition first became apparent in 1977 when a business community- 
dominated Parliamentary Select Committee criticised the inefficient party and 
government structures and made recommendations on resolving the economic crisis. At 
the turn of the decade, the outspoken businessmen E. Chipimo not only publicly 
recommended a return to multi-party politics but also participated -  along with other 
businessmen -  in the October 1980 coup plot. Afterwards, business leaders, organised 
in the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), remained 
a centre of opposition to the regime and provided campaign funds to the union-led 
democratisation movement. Beyond this ‘class compromise between business and 
labour’ , the opposition movement also included churchmen, academics and 
intellectuals. Finally, the broad-based coalition over time also attracted more and more 
one-time UNIP leaders who had been purged or defected from the ruling party’s ‘inner 
core’.
724 Larmer 2006b: 297pp.
725 Bartlett 2000: 434pp.; Simutanyi 1996: 830pp.
726 Bartlett 2000: 444.
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Altogether, UNIP came to face an opposition movement that was very similar to itself— 
an inclusive coalition that drew together various organised interests and representatives 
from all parts of the country. The emergence of broad-based opposition centred on the 
trade unions was only the logical consequence of an elite bargain that was non-sectarian 
in nature but had only shallow control over the urban areas, especially the Copperbelt. 
Using both popular discontent and the fall of the communist bloc in 1989 as ‘windows 
of opportunity’, MMD proved strong enough to develop national appeal and swept to 
victory in the 1991 elections.
6.3 UNIP9s inclusive elite bargain and civil war avoidance
I argue that civil war avoidance in Zambia during the First and Second Republic can be 
traced back to the continued existence of an inclusive elite bargain. Without UNIP’s 
sustained attempt to accommodate the dominant social cleavages by means of ‘tribal 
balancing’, the at times hefty factional struggles between the country’s major groups 
would have undoubtedly -  as they did in many other African countries -  escalated into 
open violence and war.
When asked about the main drivers of Zambia’s enduring peace and stability since 
1964, the overwhelming majority of my interviewees made immediate and prominent 
reference to UNIP’s motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ and Kaunda’s practise of 
‘tribal balancing’. To give an example, H. Mwale, a long-standing minister under 
Kaunda, explained Zambia’s peace in the following terms:
‘When we got independence, we had the motto of One Zambia One Nation. Under this One 
Zambia, One Nation we organised all the 73 tribes in Zambia to be one (...). That’s why 
the country has been stable (...) Us, as the old freedom fighters, we created Zambia as one 
country and one people’.727
Similarly, Gen. M. Masheke, Prime Minister during the 1980s, maintained:
‘Tribal balancing has helped to prevent violent conflict. There is nothing more frustrating 
for a group of people in a country than knowing that they are not taken care o f because of 
their tribal background. That was taken care of (...). They were made part and parcel of 
Zambia (...). You can have ministers from one tribe only and they can be efficient in terms 
of doing their work. But they will be inefficient in the fact that they will not be accepted in 
other areas’.728
Interestingly, such assessments were widely shared not only among UNDP stalwarts but 
also among former opposition politicians, civil society representatives and academics.
727 Interview, Haswell Mwale.
728 Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke.
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But how can one further substantiate the link between Zambia’s inclusive elite bargain 
and civil war avoidance? In the Ugandan case, the challenge was to understand whether 
the given degree of tribal exclusion can plausibly explain events that did occur (i.e. 
recurrent instances of civil war). This could be done by investigating the specific 
historical contexts of the observed insurgencies and the underlying motivations of their 
protagonists. In the Zambian case, things are more complicated. Here, the challenge is 
to understand whether the given degree of tribal inclusion can explain an event that 
never occurred (i.e. the absence of civil war). This is obviously more difficult (and 
speculative) since there are simply no successful insurgencies to investigate and no 
protagonists to interview. The only solution to this problem is counter/actual reasoning 
-  a method for evaluating claims of causation by exploring what might have happened 
had the causal event not occurred.729 This means that I have to reason what might have 
happened if there had been no inclusive elite bargains in Zambia between 1964 and 
1991.1 suggest that this can best be done by looking at distinct moments o f crisis in the 
history of the First and Second Republic.
A first moment of crisis occurred in the wake of independence when UNIP faced the 
still looming secessionist threat from Barotseland. The ruling party responded to this 
threat by playing on the deep-seated divisions between Lozi ‘traditionalists’ and Lozi 
‘nationalists’. As detailed in chapter 3, the traditional Barotse leadership favoured 
independence to preserve its autonomy and privilege, whereas young educated Lozi 
such as Sikota and Arthur Wina played a key role in the nationalist movement and saw 
no economic future for an independent Barotse state. The Kaunda government skilfully 
managed to drive a wedge between these two factions by giving in to the Lozi 
‘nationalist’ faction’s claims for an extremely generous allocation of government and 
party positions (see section 6.2). Admittedly, this did by no means appease the 
‘traditionalists’ since most of the appointed Barotse-speakers were from within the inner 
circles of the ‘nationalist’ faction. This partly explains the emergence of the UP from 
the mid-1960s despite Lozi overrepresentation in party and government. Nevertheless, 
Kaunda’s move arguably accommodated the ‘nationalists’ and thereby prevented the 
emergence of a strong and united secessionist movement in Barotseland. If the President 
had rejected the nationalists’ demands for a prominent share of key appointments, the
729 While Edwar Carr (1961: 97) dismissed counterfactual history as a ‘parlour game’ played by the 
‘losers’ in history, others have argued for careful counterfactual thinking (e.g Hawthorn 1993; Ferguson 
2000). For some case studies comparing the possible against the actual see Tuchman 1984; Parker 1993; 
Zartman 2005b.
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‘nationalist’ faction might have joined forces with the traditional Barotse government. It 
seems plausible to suggest that such a united secessionist movement would have -  if 
faced with persistent exclusion -  ultimately resorted to violent means.
A second moment of crisis occurred after the 1967 UNIP CC elections when the victory 
of the Bemba-speaking bloc and the ensuing imbalances in party and government 
produced widespread fears of Bemba domination throughout much of the country. This 
was arguably the most serious political crisis in Zambia’s post-colonial history and 
threatened to tear apart the still fragile unity of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’. Kaunda 
himself was deeply shocked by the extent of tribal divisions and used his address to the 
UNIP Party Council after the divisive 1967 party elections to proclaim:
‘We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial 
lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership.
I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a 
state of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, colour and religion, which is the 
negation of all that we stand for in this party and government (...). It is very easy to shout 
‘ONE ZAMBIA, ONE NATION’ but very difficult to think and act in that way honestly 
and sincerely. As we discuss this matter here, I don’t want to hide from you all that there 
are very few fields in the life of this nation which have not been adversely affected. How 
difficult it is to build, but how easy to destroy’.730
These intense tribal tensions were however defused by the subsequent appointment of a
more balanced Interim Executive Committee and reinforced attempts to increase the
national outlook of government and administration. If the controversial 1967 UNIP CC
had not been dissolved, this would almost certainly have caused lasting alienation
among the Nyanja- and Barotse-speaking factions and might ultimately have led to the
emergence of violent conflict. Instead, the UNIP government always sought to placate
the grievances of the disaffected groups, evident in the continued efforts to win (back)
support among Tonga- and Barotse-speakers throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The deliberate appointment of Lozi ‘traditionalists’ may have been of particular
significance in this context as it facilitated a rapprochement with the traditional Barotse
government and thereby further mitigated the threat of secessionist violence.
A third moment of crisis occurred after the imposition of the one-party state in 1972-73, 
which involved the banning of all opposition parties -  most notably of UPP -  and 
therefore caused considerable frustration and disaffection. If the introduction of one- 
party rule had been accompanied by systematic discrimination against the core 
constituencies of the banned opposition parties, the likely outcome would have been
730 Cited after Rotberg 1967: 33.
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violent conflict. This was however never the case. While the one-party state was 
undoubtedly autocratic in nature and did not hesitate to victimise those individuals who 
challenged its authority (see below), there is no evidence that groups as a whole were 
ever discriminated against. This pattern can be illustrated by looking at the example of 
UPP. As discussed above, many known or suspected UPP members were actively 
prevented from re-joining politics or even imprisoned throughout much of the 1970s. 
Yet, the Bemba -  both as a tribe and language group -  always continued to have 
remarkably proportional representation at all levels of the public sector (see section 6.2). 
Significantly, this prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances that are 
arguably especially conducive to violent mobilisation. In the end, the extremely 
inclusive elite bargain of the Second Republic helped to systematically accommodate 
sectional cleavages and thereby achieved more unity than critics typically concede, 
especially when taking into account the severe economic and regional crises that faced 
the country at the time.
A fourth moment of crisis occurred in 1976 when A. Mushala launched the only attempt 
of armed insurrection against the Zambian post-colonial state. Initially a member of 
UNIP, Mushala joined the UP in the late 1960s and then became -  after the UP was 
banned -  ANC Provincial President in North-Western Province. Unlike the top ANC 
leadership, Mushala and a few followers boycotted the negotiations over the one-party 
state and -  after having received limited training and support in South Africa -  
ultimately launched a guerrilla war in North-Western Province in 1976. Typically 
characterised as mere ‘bandits’ or ‘South African puppets’ by members of the ruling 
party,732 the rebels claimed to be fighting the one-party state and the marginalisation of 
North-Western Province. Even though the low-level rebellion dragged on until late 
1982 when Mushala was killed, it failed to gain substantial support. The main reason for 
this failure was arguably that the mainstream of the North-Western leadership was fully 
integrated in the country’s elite bargain throughout the Second Republic. As shown 
above, this was not only true for the North-Western group as a whole but also for all 
three tribes in the Province, including the Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. Of particular 
interest in this context is the position of the Lunda leadership -  Mushala and most of his 
followers were Lunda -  who were extremely prominently represented not only in 
government (see above) but also in other parts of the public sector. If the Lunda
731 Larmer & Macola 2007.
732 Interview, Marc Chona.
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leadership had been marginalised, the insurgency might have been more successful. But 
as this was far from the case, Mushala remained a relatively isolated figure who proved 
unable to mobilise significant support.
A final period (rather than moment) of crisis occurred during much of the 1980s when 
Zambia was hit by extreme economic decline and mounting social unrest. If the 
worsening economic crisis had -  as it happened in other African countries -  been 
accompanied by a biased distribution of the dwindling ‘national cake’, this might have 
caused a ‘tribalisation’ of political competition, which might ultimately have turned 
violent. But this was never the case. Instead, there is evidence for what one might label 
an ‘inclusive sharing of losses’. V. Mwaanga, a former Minister under Kaunda, recalls 
that
‘even at the time when resources were very extremely limited, an attempt was made to 
equitably share jobs and resources among the various competing interests (...). It was not 
always easy but at least an attempt was made’.733
Similarly, Reverend F. Sakala, one of the country’s most outspoken clerics, remembers:
‘When we suffered we suffered together. There wasn’t a privileged section of Zambian 
society which enjoyed immunity when the economy went down. We all suffered’.734
On the whole, the persistence of an inclusive elite bargain even in times of economic 
crisis prevented the country’s disintegration into violent group conflict. At the same 
time, however, UNIP’s inclusive handling of economic decline could not prevent 
generalised discontent across sectarian lines and thereby produced -  somewhat 
ironically -  a broad-based opposition movement that proved strong enough to displace 
it from power.
6.4 Competing explanations
As shown in chapter 1, most standard explanations of civil war are of limited use when 
trying to understand civil war avoidance in Zambia. Also, events between 1964 and 
1991 tend to support my expectation that patterns of war and peace are mainly driven by 
inter-group inequalities at the level of elites rather than by inter-group inequalities at the 
level of the masses. Interestingly, post-independence Zambia was initially characterised 
by considerable socioeconomic inequalities. While the urban areas on the Copperbelt 
were much better off, socioeconomic development lagged behind in the rural areas
733 Interview, Vernon Mwaanga.
734 Interview, Reverend Foston Sakala.
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throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Even though comprehensive data is not 
available, the scant available evidence indicates that Western, North-Western and 
Luapula Provinces were particularly disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms -  a situation 
that gave rise to pronounced feelings of marginalisation. In Western Province, 
widespread resentment was mainly due to a lack of tangible development progress and 
the government’s decision in 1966 to prohibit any further labour migration to South 
Africa through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA).735 The 
closure of the latter -  that had for many years been a major source of income -  meant 
rising unemployment in a region where there were few alternative opportunities. Similar
n'if.
socioeconomic grievances existed in North-Western and Luapula Provinces. All this 
means that the absence of civil war under Kaunda can hardly be related to a lack of 
socioeconomic inter-group inequalities at the level of the masses. Instead, it was 
arguably Kaunda’s practise of ‘tribal balancing’ at the level of elites that prevented 
existing socioeconomic disparities from escalating into violent conflict.
The key importance of ‘tribal balancing’ notwithstanding, Zambia’s peace and stability 
between 1964 and 1991 was also due to a number of other factors. First, regime type 
seems to have mattered, albeit in a different form than commonly suggested. Advocates 
of the ‘anocracy favours civil war’ argument suggest that repression under the autocratic 
one-party regime contributed to the stability of the Second Republic.737 Indeed, the one- 
party state entailed considerable repression against those who were suspected of
H 'l Q
opposmg the official doctrine of ‘one party participatory democracy’. Yet, even 
critics of the one-party state concede that repression was always relatively ‘mild’ when 
compared with other countries and can therefore not explain the absence of violent
7?Qconflict. More consequential was the fact that one-party rule limited political 
competition and thereby helped to contain the destabilising factional struggles of the 
First Republic. As discussed above, ‘tribal balancing’ alone could not prevent the 
emergence of tribally-based opposition parties that threatened to unravel the ruling 
coalition. This was because the post-independence context of multi-party competition -  
and more specifically the option of defection into the opposition -  favoured political
735 Gertzel 1984b.
736 Baylies 1984; Larmer & Macola 2007.
737 Burnell 2005: 118p.
738 For details see Phiri 2006: 162pp.; Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 7.
739 Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.
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fragmentation and made stable elite accommodation inherently difficult to achieve.740 
The introduction of the one-party state put an end to ‘the crisis of fragmentation’741 and 
thereby stabilised political competition over the distribution of spoils. All this is not to 
claim that one-party rule was a direct cause of Zambia’s peace, not least since the latter 
also prevailed under the multi-party arrangements of the First and Third Republic. But it 
did help to stabilise and further entrench Zambia’s inclusive elite bargain.
Second, there is what one might label the ‘Kaunda factor’. Although bom among the 
Bemba in Northern Province, Kaunda’s Nyasaland (now Malawi) parentage and his 
strong anti-tribal stance led him to be regarded as the only one capable of playing
ha*}politics ‘above tribe’. In the words of Aka Lewanika:
‘Kaunda was chosen as a unifier, as one who is above tribe (...). The leaders of the Bemba 
could accept Kaunda because he grew up as a Bemba. The others could accept him because 
basically he was not Bemba’.743
Kaunda’s role as a mediator ‘above tribe’ was crucial in maintaining the fragile post­
independence elite bargain, especially since his own Bemba background enabled him to 
stand up to Bemba demands without producing an escalation of conflict. If, for 
example, a Lozi President had disbanded the UNIP CC in 1969 and thereby revised the 
electoral victory of the Bemba-speaking bloc, this would almost certainly have caused 
violent conflict. The undue dependency on Kaunda as a mediator became evident in 
early February 1968 when the President -  shocked by the extent of tribal divisions -  
stepped down for one night. Many commentators agree that there is little doubt that the 
Zambian political system would have disintegrated into open violence if Kaunda had 
not agreed to stay.744 This speculation is underlined by N. Tembo, the Minister of State 
for North-Western Province at the time, who described the implications of Kaunda’s 
resignation in the following terms:
‘I left that Hall with one theme in mind -  the Republic is finished (...). My family was left 
behind in the Solwezi provincial capital of North-Western Province. My first thought, 
following the shock of Ken’s resignation, was the security of my family who were more 
than six hundred and forty kilometres away from this confusion (...). I was therefore going 
to drive all night to Solwezi, pick up my family, pack a few essential belongings and drive
740 The dilemma of ‘tribal balancing’ in the context of multi-party politics was that it turned out to be a 
‘zero-sum game’: Once the centre responded to allegations of (real or perceived) neglect by one group, it 
would almost inevitably take away from other groups and therefore provoke new concerns of (relative) 
deprivation. In this ‘vicious’ circle, the central government tended to oscillate between competing group 
demands and ultimately suffered from a steadily shrinking power base.
741 Interview, Sikota Wina.
742 Phiri 2006: 148.
743 Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.
744 Tordoff & Scott 1974: 151. In the wake o f the 1967-68 crisis, Kaunda strategically used his position as 
‘pacifier above tribe’ to consolidate his own position vis-a-vis political opponents (Interview, 
Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika).
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back to Lusaka, and then to Lundazi in the Eastern Province, which is my home. I was 
going to leave them in the safety of the villagers and return to Lusaka with my shot gun and 
join in the street fighting’.745
Third, there was the ‘regional factor’. Significantly, post-colonial Zambia found itself in 
a context of extreme regional instability, including liberation wars in many of its 
neighbouring countries (Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique) as well as 
recurrent destabilisation attempts from apartheid South Africa. The liberation struggle 
in Southern Rhodesia had the most dramatic impact on Zambia. Accused of harbouring 
liberation fighters, the country was on several occasions subject to Rhodesian air raids 
in 1978/79, which were destructive both in terms of loss of life and property, but also 
psychologically.746 Moreover, the presence of thousands of war refugees on Zambian 
territory threatened to embroil the country in its neighbour’s affairs.747 Interestingly, 
however, and in sharp contrast to the situation in Uganda, these regional spill-over 
effects proved to be an integrating force. Rather than causing internal conflict, the 
presence of an external threat strengthened UNIP’s domestic authority and ultimately 
helped to unify the country. This was however only made possible by the existence of 
an inclusive elite bargain, which meant that neighbouring countries had few 
opportunities to destabilise Zambia by playing on feelings of marginalisation. A case in 
point is the South Africa-sponsored Mushala insurgency, which failed to gain ground in 
the North-West due to the absence of cohesive group grievances. In the end, the 
inclusive elite bargain helped to insulate Zambia from the potentially destabilising 
regional spillover effects.
Finally, there was the ‘urban factor’. As detailed in chapter 3, the growth of the mining 
industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930s led to rapid urbanisation whereby Zambia 
exhibited above African average levels of urbanisation upon independence (see figure 
34). Afterwards, the share of the urban population rose from about 20% in the mid- 
1960s to about 40% in the late 1970s, making Zambia the second most urbanised 
country in Africa at the time. The urban contact that followed -  especially in form of 
intertribal marriages -  blurred language- and tribe-related cleavages and, over time, 
helped to create a sense of ‘Zambia-ness’ , which made inter-group conflict less 
likely. Nevertheless, the hefty factional struggles throughout the 1960s and 1970s
745 Cited after Phiri 2006: 146.
746 ACR 1978/1979: B450.
747 Burnell 2005: 116p.
748 Interview, Mbita Chitala.
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showed that language and tribe as sources of social cleavage remained salient even in an 
increasingly urbanised society. In this sense, ‘tribal balancing’ was arguably without 
alternative with a view to securing peace and stability.
Figure 34: Urbanisation in Zambia749
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Zambia’s peace and stability during the First and 
Second Republic goes back to the existence of an inclusive elite bargain, which 
manifested itself in high degrees of political, economic and military power-sharing. In 
sharp contrast to the situation in Uganda, competing linguistic and tribal groups enjoyed 
remarkably proportional access to positions of state power. This helped to accommodate 
the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation, prevented the emergence of cohesive 
group grievances and thereby laid the foundations for Zambia’s lasting peace.
While the UNIP elite bargain is key to understanding civil war avoidance between 1964 
and 1991, national integration was also facilitated by a number of other factors. These 
include the presence of President Kaunda as a credible ‘mediator above tribe’, the 
existence of an external threat in the form of regional instability, high levels of 
urbanisation, and one-party rule during the Second Republic.
749 World Bank 2009.
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7 Between cracks and continuity -  Zambia’s elite bargain 
and the lasting peace of the Third Republic
In the last chapter, I have argued that civil war avoidance during Zambia’s First and 
Second Republic can be traced back to UNIP’s inclusive elite bargain. In this chapter, I 
will ask how the country’s elite bargain evolved after the reintroduction of multi-party 
politics in 1991. To what extent has the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
followed UNIP’s tradition of sharing access to positions of state power equitably 
between the country’s major linguistic and tribal groups? And how has this affected 
Zambia’s peace and stability?
To find answers to these questions, I will start by assessing the observed levels of 
violent conflict during the Third Republic (section 7.1). In a second and third step, I will 
establish the inclusiveness of the MMD elite bargain (section 7.2) and then analyse its 
impact on peace and stability between 1991 and 2008 (section 7.3). The chapter again 
ends with brief thoughts on competing explanations (section 7.4).
7.1 Conflict levels between 1991 and 2008
Chiluba and his MMD won a large majority in the 1991 elections, losing only in Eastern 
Province that remained a UNIP stronghold.750 In 1996, MMD -  benefiting from 
UNIP’s electoral boycott -  even managed to win a majority throughout the entire 
country.751 The situation changed in 2001 when the new MMD candidate L. 
Mwanawasa -  hampered by Chiluba’s controversial but ultimately unsuccessful bid for 
a ‘third term’ -  won the presidency by a very narrow margin and even failed to gain a 
majority in Parliament.752 While MMD retained control of the North (Copperbelt, 
Northern, Luapula, and -  to a lesser extent -  Central Provinces), the three main 
opposition parties dominated in the rest of country, including UNIP in the East, the 
Forum For Democracy and Development (FDD) in Lusaka and the United Party for 
National Development (UPND) in Southern, Western and North-Western Provinces. 
MMD’s position was however strengthened in the 2006 poll where Mwanawasa won
750 Baylies & Szeftel 1992.
751 Baylies & Szeftel 1997.
752 Burnell 2002, 2003.
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the presidency by a larger margin and recaptured a solid parliamentary majority. 
While an electoral alliance between UPND, UNIP and FDD showed a disappointing 
performance except in Southern Province, the Patriotic Front (PF) emerged as the 
leading opposition party sweeping Lusaka and the Copperbelt and garnering substantial 
support in Luapula and Northern provinces. Mwanawasa’s second term was abruptly 
ended by his death in July 2008. He was replaced by Vice-President R. Banda who won 
the presidential poll in October 2008.754
Throughout the Third Republic, there were again hardly any signs of political violence. 
One of the few exceptions was another military coup attempt in October 1997 when 
Captain Lungu (alias Captain ‘Solo’) and his comrades managed to gain control of 
Radio Zambia claiming they had taken over on behalf of the National Redemption 
Council, the alleged political wing of the defence force.755 Yet, as the coup attempt was 
organised by relatively junior army officers who enjoyed little support in the higher 
ranks, it was immediately crushed by loyalist forces. Another minor exception were 
urban riots following the 2006 elections. As PF leader and presidential candidate M. 
Sata claimed the vote had been rigged, Lusaka and the Copperbelt -the opposition 
strongholds -  witnessed urban violence for two consecutive days.756 The protests ended 
however quickly when Sata himself asked his supporters to stop the violence. On the 
whole, Zambia remained light-years away from experiencing civil war.
How can one explain this enduring peace and stability? In what follows I will show that 
MMD largely followed UNIP’s practise of forging an inclusive elite bargain, some 
cracks in the ruling political coalition notwithstanding. This has arguably remained a 
key driver behind civil war avoidance between 1991 and 2008.
7.2 The MMD elite bargain (1991-2008)
The Third Republic did by no means revolutionise Zambia’s political culture. A first 
element of continuity was centralised political power. While MMD had campaigned for
753 Gould 2007; Larmer & Fraser 2007.
754 Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010. Note that I limit my analysis to the Chiluba and Mwanawasa 
administrations and do not cover events since Rupiah Banda took over as President in October 2008. This 
is due to the fact that my fieldwork ended in mid-October 2008, two weeks before the Presidential by- 
elections.
755 Phiri 2002: 12.
756 ‘Zambia vote count sparks violence’, BBC News, 1 October 2006.
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a parliamentary system of government, it left the presidential system largely unchanged. 
Power continued to be concentrated in the presidency and Parliament remained rather 
weak with all legislation still originating within the executive.757 The second element of 
continuity was the predominance of one political party. The size of MMD’s victory in 
1991 and the weakness of UNIP as the only serious opposition party made the re- 
introduction of multi-party politics more formal than real.758 As a consequence, MMD 
reproduced rather than replaced UNIP. Even though opposition parties gained strength 
under Mwanawasa (especially during the 2001 elections), MMD always remained the 
only political party with considerable political support in all parts of the country.759 
Continuities between MMD and the former ruling party were also evident in the 
substantial presence of former UNIP cadres in the MMD ranks760 -  a pattern that can be 
observed until today. The current President R. Banda, for example, was once a minister 
under Kaunda and left UNIP to join the MMD only in the course of Mwanawasa’s first 
term.
The third -  often overlooked- element of continuity was the enduring attempt to forge 
an inclusive elite bargain. Significantly, both Chiluba and Mwanawasa continued to 
make a UNIP-style attempt to accommodate linguistic and tribal cleavages by forming a 
‘maximum coalition’761, evident in high degrees of political, economic and military 
power-sharing.
POLITICAL POWER-SHARING 
Officially, the Chiluba government rejected the convention of ‘tribal balancing’ arguing
Hff)that such an approach would be undemocratic and economically harmful. But does 
this really mean that ‘tribal balancing’ was fully abandoned? Many scholars seem to 
think so and report a growing ‘Bemba bias’ in appointments, typically related to the fact
757 Burnell 2001: 104p.
758 Baylies & Szeftel 1992: 89.
759 As discussed above, MMD did not win the majority o f votes in some Provinces during both the 2001 
and 2006 elections. Yet, MMD always managed to win a considerable amount of votes even in areas 
where the opposition prevailed (see Burnell 2001, Larmer & Fraser 2007). This makes it different from 
regionally-based opposition parties like UPND or PF and explains why the ruling party has so far 
managed to remain in power.
760 According to Baylies & Szeftel (1992: 83), ‘[n]o fewer than 20 MMD candidates in the 1991 elections 
were former or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 had been cabinet ministers or central committee members. 
Another six had been UNIP regional secretaries or district governors and four were former army officers’.
761 Van Donge 1995:214.
762 Chikulo 1996: 33.
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that Chiluba himself is a Bemba-speaking Lunda from Luapula Province.763 Among 
Zambians, there is an often-heard perception of Bemba domination under Chiluba, 
which Rueben Lifuka, Director of Transparency International Zambia, summarised in 
the following terms:
‘More Bemba had access to positions of power; all key positions went to the Bemba. This 
was disruptive in the sense that it alienated other tribes who felt that they were not taken on 
board’.764
Similarly, another civil society activist recalled that ‘Chiluba bembanised the country, 
which created a lot of resentment’.765
Table 23: Linguistic distribution of the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) in 
Zambia, 2001-2008 (in percent)766__________________________ _________________
Language Group Population 2001 2008
Berriba 41,7 50,0 42,1
Nyanja 23,8 12,0 14,0
Tonga 13,9 16,0 21,1
North-Western 7,7 12,0 12,3
Barotse 6,9 9,0 8,8
Other 6,0 1,0 1,8
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
Such accusations of a generalised ‘Bemba bias’ under Chiluba are however unjustified. 
This is not to deny that MMD was initially indeed dominated by the Bemba-speaking 
group. At the National Convention in February 1991, Chiluba captured the party 
presidency, while leaders from Western (A. Wina) and North-Western Provinces (H. 
Mulemba) lost out.767 At the same time, elections for the MMD National Executive 
Committee (NEC) produced a clear bias in favour of Bemba-speakers who held 18 out 
of 28 (or 64%) of all positions -  a situation that produced open complaints about 
‘tribalism’.768 Especially pronounced was the underrepresentation of Nyanja-speakers 
from Eastern Province who were perceived to represent the only remaining UNIP 
stronghold. Over time, however, the ‘Bemba bias’ within the higher ranks of the party 
has eased (see table 23). Even though Nyanja-speakers remain underrepresented, the 
MMD party leadership now reflects a broadly national outlook.
763 Chikulo 2000: 171; Osei-Hwedie 1998: 235p.; Burnell 2001: 99.
764 Interview, Rueben Lifuka.
765 Interview, Mulima Kufekisa-Akapelwa.
766 Compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; Hulterstrom 2004: 103; MMD 2008.
767 Bartlett 2000: 433.
768 Ibid.
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Figure 35: Linguistic distribution of permanent secretaries in Zambia, 1992-2008769
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A national outlook was also retained in the civil service where permanent secretary 
appointments continued to be distributed more or less proportionally among the 
country’s major language groups, the more recent overrepresentation of Tonga-speakers 
notwithstanding (see figures 35a and 35b). This contradicts earlier claims by Mphaisha 
that all senior civil servants were fired and replaced by Chiluba’s financiers and 
supporters, mostly from his Bemba-speaking group.770 Interestingly, the MMD 
government struggled hard to avoid cuts in the size of the civil service. Accordingly, the 
politically most demanding component of a Public Sector Reform Programme -  to cut 
civil service personnel by 25% within three years -  was never implemented.771 This 
means that an important bastion of Zambia’s elite bargain remained largely untouched, 
suggesting that the MMD government, like its predecessor, lacked autonomy from 
powerful vested interests in the bureaucracy.
769 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years b, d.
770 Mphaisha 1996: 81.
771 Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 63.
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Figure 36: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 1992-1998772
Figure 36a: A bsolute d istribution , 1992-1998 average
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Most importantly, my data show that ‘tribal balancing’ was also informally retained in 
government, albeit to a lesser extent than under Kaunda. hi absolute terms, Chiluba’s 
governments were on average dominated by Bemba-speakers (see figure 36a). In terms 
of population share, however, the Bemba-speaking group was only very marginally 
overrepresented (see figure 36b). All other language groups received relatively 
proportional representation, even though some of them were at times slightly better or 
worse off (see figure 36c). The only exception was the Nyanja-speaking group that was 
underrepresented from the beginning -  a situation that initially reflected the fact that 
UNIP had won all parliamentary seats in Eastern Province during the 1991 elections. 
Nonetheless, Chiluba subsequently used his right of appointment (eight MPs from
772 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 2000 are 
missing.
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outside Parliament) to bring Nyanja-speakers on board. The key appointment in this 
respect was clearly that of Brig.-Gen. G. Miyanda who first served as the powerful 
Minister without Portfolio (3rd in the hierarchy) and later became Vice-President (2nd in 
the hierarchy). After the 1996 elections, Miyanda was replaced by Gen. Chr. Tembo -  
another Nyanja-speaker from the Tumbuka tribe. Even though Nyanja-speakers 
remained underrepresented, they were -  in sharp contrast to the Acholi in Museveni’s 
Uganda -  continuously represented in the ‘inner core’ of political power. Last but not 
least, Chiluba also maintained the tradition of racial inclusiveness in government by 
appointing a significant number of ministers of White or Asian background.773
Table 24: Tribal composition of government in Zambia, Index of Representation, 1992-
2008 (in percent)774
Tribe Population
(2000)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Bemba 18,1 12,8 9,5 15,8 16,2 16,6 18,2 2,3 5,3
Tonga 12,7 7,4 8,7 8,9 17,5 1,9 7,4 6,7 6,6
Chewa 7,2 0,0 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,0 2,4 8,1 7,1
Lozi 5,6 5,1 6,4 8,7 8,2 11,6 7,4 9,0 7,2
Nsenga 5,5 3,9 4,9 6,0 2,1 1,5 0,0 3,2 4,5
Tumbuka 4,2 5,2 3,5 5,8 5,3 1,5 2,5 2,3 0,9
Ngoni 4,0 5,0 1,6 0,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,3 2,7
Lala 3,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,8 8,3 8,3 2,3 6,2
Kaonde 3,0 5,2 5,7 2,2 0,0 4,9 2,5 4,6 8,4
Namwanga 2,7 1,1 4,9 2,9 5,3 1,0 0,0 1,4 1,3
Lunda (N/W) 2,5 1,1 2,1 2,2 2,9 2,9 3,3 3,2 6,2
Ushi 2,4 6,0 3,3 2,3 2,4 2,5 0,8 1,9 1,8
Mambwe 2,3 6,0 4,9 0,0 0,8 2,9 3,3 2,3 2,2
Lamba 2,2 1,3 4,6 4,5 4,5 9,2 6,6 8,6 8,8
Luvale 2,1 0,0 0,8 0,8 1,6 1,0 0,8 6,7 3,6
Bisa 1,8 3,9 1,3 2,2 4,9 1,5 1,7 1,9 0,0
Lenje 1,7 6,0 6,6 2,3 2,9 9,7 10,0 8,8 9,6
Lunda 1,4 7,8 8,2 8,8 6,2 8,7 6,6 5,3 5,3
Mbunda 1,4 1,1 1,3 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 1,3
Other 15,9 21,1 20,7 23,6 17,3 13,5 18,2 12,5 11,1
Total 99,9 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
In terms of tribal cleavages, some of the larger groups were clearly underrepresented in 
Chiluba’s governments, including the Chewa, the Tonga and -  interestingly -  even the 
Bemba (see table 24). The reverse was true for some of the smaller groups, in particular 
the Bemba-speaking Lunda from Luapula Province, the President’s own group. Yet, 
none of the country’s 19 largest tribes were fully excluded from government between 
1992 and 1998. Moreover, even many of the numerous smaller tribes with less than 1% 
of the population (subsumed under ‘Other’) were prominently represented.
773 Examples included, among others, S. Zukas, G. Scott, D. Patel and S. Desai.
774 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a.
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The broad-based nature of the Chiluba regime limited the prospects of political 
mobilisation based on linguistic or tribal cleavages. This is not to deny that MMD was 
affected by factional struggles, which resulted in the departure of more than half of the 
original MMD cabinet ministers and the emergence of 35 opposition parties until the
n nc
mid-1990s. Political fragmentation became more serious towards the end of 
Chiluba’s second term, especially in 2000 and 2001 when the President unsuccessfully 
tried to extend his second term of office into a third term.776 Most of these parties were 
however off-shoots of the ruling party and typically rooted in personal ambitions rather 
than in cohesive group grievances. One exception was the Lozi-based National Party 
(NP), which was created in 1993 to protest the alleged marginalisation of Barotse-
7 7 7speaking leaders in party and government. However, the NP failed to gain lasting 
ground, not least since Chiluba improved the representation of Barotse-speakers from 
the mid-1990s (see figure 36c). A second exception was the creation of the United Party 
for National Development (UPND) in late 1998. UPND -  led by A. Mazoka (a Tonga) -  
was commonly seen as an ‘anti-Bemba formation’ that expressed latent feelings of 
neglect among the North-Western-, Barotse- and especially Tonga-speaking groups.778 
Interestingly, this neglect was clearly more perceived than real since all of these three 
groups were rather well represented in party and government (see above). The 
perception of neglect allowed UPND to establish itself as the main opposition party by 
winning a number of by-elections in the late 1990s. According to political insiders, the 
widespread fear of Bemba domination ultimately forced Chiluba to pick a non-Bemba 
as his successor.779 In this sense, L. Mwanawasa -  a Tonga-speaking Lenje from 
Central Province -  was regarded as a suitable candidate to defuse anti-Bemba 
sentiment.780
775 Baylies & Szeftel 1997: 115.
776 Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 29pp. For details on the ‘third term debate’ see Phiri 2006: 202pp.
777 Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 188p; Bartlett 2000: 441p.
778 Since the early 1990s, feelings of marginalisation had been especially pronounced among leaders from 
the Tonga tribe in Southern Province (Ihonvbere 1995: 9pp.). Such feelings of neglect culminated in the 
rise of UPND and earned the party a ‘Tonga’ label. Phiri (2006: 219) reports that UPND’s ‘tribal tag’ was 
confirmed by the activities of the Tonga Traditional Association, which openly urged all Tonga and Lozi 
to vote for Mazoka in the 2001 elections. Interestingly, the UPDN leadership did little to distance itself 
from such ‘tribal’ campaigning. Nevertheless, the ‘Tonga label’ was not entirely justified since the UPND 
leadership was, at least initially, fairly national in character (Hulterstrom 2004: 102).
779 Interview, Njekwa Anamela.
780 Note that Mwanawasa’s father is a Lenje from Central Province (Tonga-speakers), while his mother is 
a Lamba from Copperbelt Province (Bemba-speakers). This made him a suitable candidate to bridge the 
divide between two of the country’s key language groups.
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After Mwanawasa took over as President in 2001, the need for a tribally balanced 
government continued to be recognised. Accordingly, Mike Mulongoti -  formerly 
Minister of Information and one of the President’s closest confidants -  argued that
‘[i]t would be naive for any political leadership to ignore the sensitivity to the issue o f tribal 
balancing. If you are building a nation, everybody must think they are part and parcel and 
you must carry them along deliberately’.781
In line with such statements, there were indeed signs that that Mwanawasa sought to 
forge another ‘maximum coalition’. After the 2001 elections, this was a difficult 
undertaking since the ruling party had almost no MPs outside its strongholds in the 
northern and central parts of the country. As a consequence, the President chose to co­
opt several prominent opposition MPs and appointed them as ministers or deputy 
ministers.782 This not only helped MMD to regain a parliamentary majority but was also 
meant to create support in the opposition areas. Moreover, the President used his 
appointment prerogatives to nominate prominent individuals from opposition areas as 
ministers. This conciliatory attitude towards opposition areas ensured that the Barotse 
and North-Western language groups were prominently represented (see figure 37c). 
Nyanja-speakers, by contrast, were initially almost entirely excluded, which gave rise to 
mounting complaints about marginalisation.784 To rebuild support in the East, the 
President appointed R. Banda, a Chewa, who successfully campaigned for MMD before 
the 2006 elections and was subsequently made Vice-President. The re-emergence of 
MMD as a ‘national’ party during the 2006 elections facilitated the establishment of a 
more balanced government during Mwanawasa’s second term (see figure 37c). 
Altogether, the Mwanawasa governments on average retained a broadly national 
outlook (see figures 37a and 37b).
Signs of continuity notwithstanding, the MMD elite bargain came to suffer from a 
number of serious cracks. First, efforts for ‘tribal balancing’ under Mwanawasa were at 
least partially contradicted by the existence of the so-called ‘family tree’. The latter 
consisted of the President’s Lamba and especially Lenje relatives who were appointed 
to key positions not only in government but also in the administration and the Foreign
781 Interview, Mike Mulongoti. See also ‘Cabinet Size - Mulongoti Versus Everyone?’, Zambian 
Economist, 11 December 2007.
782 Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 31pp. The co-opted MPs included members of FDD (3), HP (2) and 
UNIP (2).
783 Examples included the Minister of Agriculture M. Sikatana (Lozi), the Minister of Information N. 
Zimba (Tumbuka) and the Minister of Works & Supply L. Sondashi (Kaonde).
784 Interview, Haswell Mwale.
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Service. Key members of the ‘family tree’ in government included -  among others -  
the former Minster of Home Affairs L. Mapushi, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Lt.-Gen. R. Shikapwasha, the former Deputy Minister of Finance J. Shakafuswa (all 
Lenje) and the former Minister of Defence G. Mpombo (Lamba). While the importance 
of the family should not be exaggerated, its existence is underlined by the considerable 
overrepresentation of the Lenje and Lamba tribes between 2002 and 2008 (see table 24).
Figure 37: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 2002-2008786
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Second, there was a progressive fall-out between the President’s faction and the Bemba- 
speaking bloc. While Mwanawasa and his MMD had received massive support in the
785 Various interviews; ‘Mwanawasa hacks at State House ‘family tree’, Times o f  Zambia, 17 June 2004.
786 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 2000 are 
missing.
Bemba-speaking areas during the 2001 elections, Bemba-speaking leaders soon
7 8 7complained about the appointment of opposition politicians and the growing 
influence of the ‘family tree’. Moreover, Bemba-speakers were alienated by 
Mwanawasa’s decisive anti-corruption stance that not only targeted the former President
7 8 8Chiluba but also some of his close associates, many of them Bemba. As Chiluba and 
influential Bemba politicians like the former ZCCM chairman F. Kaunda were taken to 
court, this was perceived as selective justice targeted at the Bemba. This favoured the 
rise of Michael Sata and his PF who had broken away from MMD in 2001 but retained 
close contact with the Chiluba group within MMD, openly claiming that the Anti-
78Q
Corruption Task Force had specifically targeted Bemba politicians. The fallout 
between Mwanawasa’s MMD and the Bemba-speaking bloc became apparent during 
the 2006 elections when most of the Bemba-speaking North voted for Sata (except the 
Namwanga/ Mambwe areas). At the same time, Bemba representation in government 
declined for the Bemba-speaking group as a whole (see figure 37) and, even more so, 
for the Bemba tribe (see table 24). By 2006, the latter did not have even a single senior 
minister in Cabinet. Most political insiders, including the PF Vice-President G. Scott 
himself790, agree that the current strength of PF is first and foremost a ‘response to 
Mwanawasa’s fallout with the Bemba’.791
Third, MMD has also failed to rebuild support in the South. After the death of UPND 
leader Mazoka before the 2006 elections, the party’s Tonga leadership insisted that his 
successor had to be a Tonga whereby the young H. Hichilema became party President,
7 0 7at the expense of two influential Lozi politicians. This greatly reinforced popular 
perceptions of UPND as a ‘Tonga party’, provoked a mass exodus of non-Tonga party 
members and affected UPND’s electoral performance in Western and North-Western 
Province, which returned into the MMD camp. Yet, UPND retained control over 
Southern Province and became entrenched as a regional party. On the whole, the Tonga
787 Over time, many key positions were distributed to individuals who had originally not been part of 
Chiluba’s MMD. Prominent examples include the former Minister o f Finance N. Magande, the former 
Minister of Defence G. Mpombo (both former UPND), the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lt.-Gen. R. 
Shikapwasha (former HP), or current President R. Banda (former UNIP) -  none of whom is a Bemba- 
speaker. At the same time, influential party stalwarts like the MMD National Secretary K. Kalumba -  a 
Bemba-speaking Tabwa -  were not even included in Cabinet during Mwanawasa’s second term.
788 On Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption drive see Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 67pp.; van Donge 2009.
789 Larmer & Fraser 2007: 63 lp.
790 Interview, Guy Scott.
791 Interview, Mbita Chitala.
792 Interview, Sakwiba Sikota. Note that S. Sikota himself was one of the two Lozi politicians who were 
sidelined after Mazoka’s death.
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as a tribe have largely remained outside the ruling coalition. While Tonga-speakers have 
on average been overrepresented in government (see figure 37), the bulk of these 
appointments has gone to Mwanawasa’s small Lenje group (see table 24). And even 
those few Tonga that have been appointed typically lack a political support base in 
Southern Province. The best example in this respect is the former Minister of Finance,
N. Magande, who -  after losing the elections on a MMD ticket -  was nominated by the
7(n
President but is commonly said to have no constituency among the Tonga.
Figure 38: The representation of Copperbelt Province in Zam bia’s government, 1992- 
2008794
15 0
100
50
E
SI
-SO
-100
1 9 9 2 19 9 4 19 9 6 19 9 8 2002 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8
■ Index  o f  R e p re se n ta tio n  “  “  'In n e rC o re ' *  M in is te rs  •  D e p u tie s
Finally, MMD also lost political control over the urban areas, especially over the 
Copperbelt. Initially, the Copperbelt had been the ruling party’s major stronghold, 
evident in the prominent position of Copperbelt politicians in government during the 
early 1990s (see figure 38). Moreover, the powerful trade unions initially viewed 
Chiluba as one of ‘theirs’ and did little to oppose formerly controversial policies.795 
Over time, however, the importance of Copperbelt politicians within MMD declined 
dramatically, while the unions were ‘paralysed’ by their initial symbiosis with MMD
793 Interview, Dr. Webby S. Kalikiti.
794 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 2000 are 
missing. Note that figure 38 considers how many ministers and deputies were elected in Copperbelt 
constituencies rather than how many members of government were of Copperbelt descent.
795 Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the 1980s, even the drastic cuts in maize subsidies in 1992 
caused no major reaction among the trade unions (Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 65p.). G. Scott, a former 
minister under Chiluba and current Vice-President o f PF, explains: ‘Low meali meal prices were part o f 
Kaunda’s social contract. Once you had a new party in power, there was no longer a social contract. We 
never promised cheap meali meal’ (Interview, Guy Scott).
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and the combined effects of economic and political liberalisation. MMD’s increasing 
failure to accommodate class cleavages in urban areas created a political void, which 
was skilfully filled by Sata’s PF. Accordingly, PF does not only express Bemba 
grievances but also mobilises along class lines by articulating urban discontent -  a 
strategy that won the party many votes and seats not only on the Copperbelt but also in 
Lusaka.797
Altogether, political competition during the Third Republic has brought about a 
constellation, which is strikingly similar to that of the First Republic. In both periods, 
the ruling parties started out with largely ‘national’ appeal that was especially strong 
among Bemba-speakers in the North. The main opposition parties -  ANC and UP 
during the First Republic and NP and UPND during the Third Republic -  had their 
organisational and electoral strength among the Lozi- and Tonga-speaking groups of 
Western and Southern provinces. Over time, both ruling parties lost ground in the 
‘Bembaphone’ North, especially in urban areas of the Copperbelt, where strong 
opposition parties emerged (UPP and PF).
ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING 
In the economic sector, Zambia has undergone comprehensive liberalisation since the
7QQreturn to multi-party politics in 1991. A key aspect of economic reform during the 
1990s was the privatisation of the country’s bloated parastatal sector, which had been a 
key bastion of UNIP’s elite bargain during the First and Second Republic (see chapter 
6). In 1992, a comprehensive privatisation programme was introduced but initially 
failed to deliver results, not least due to fierce resistance by ZIMCO, the powerful 
holding company.799 After the dissolution of ZIMCO in July 1995, the process gathered 
momentum whereby 262 companies out of a total working portfolio of 285 had been 
privatised by 2006, most of them in the late second half of the 1990s.800 Of particular 
significance was the extremely controversial privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM) between 1992 and 2000 -  Zambia's largest commercial
796 Political and economic liberalisation culminated in declining union membership, splits in the 
movement and organisational decay. For details see Rakner 2003; Larmer 2005.
797 Larmer & Fraser 2007; Gould 2007. The 2008 presidential elections confirmed that Sata’s PF draws 
support from both Bemba-speakers and the urban poor (see Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010).
798 For details see Rakner 2003: 67pp.
799 For details on privatisation in Zambia see Craig 2000, 2002; Rakner 2003.
800 ZPA 2006a.
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enterprise, which not only generated most of the country's foreign exchange earnings
on 1
but was also of enormous strategic and symbolic importance.
The rapid -  many say precipitous -  privatisation of the parastatal sector reduced the 
scope for patronage distribution outside party and government and resulted in the layoff 
of thousands of former parastatal employees. Yet, it soon became apparent that 
privatisation -  and the liberalisation of the economy more generally -  opened new
QA^
avenues for rent-seeking and increased rather than decreased the scale of corruption. 
Accordingly, office holders in politics and administration used the often intransparent 
privatisation process to acquire public assets cheaply, especially small-scale companies, 
and enrich themselves. In many cases, the cheaply acquired companies were simply 
stripped off their assets rather than recapitalized or fully relocated to other countries in
O A I
the Southern African region -  a process that resulted in an enormous loss of wealth. 
Listing a number of examples where MMD politicians had bought buildings and other 
assets at undervalued prices, one independent newspaper commented:
‘Where then have they suddenly found the money to become full-fledged capitalists? There 
is something fishy somewhere and the situation is looking bad. To paraphrase the lyrics of 
one famous song: How long shall they plunder our economy while we stand aside and 
look?’804
Who benefitted from this looting of state assets? There is no doubt that the main 
beneficiaries were Chiluba, his relatives and his closest friends, some of whom were
OAf
later targeted during Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption drive and taken to court. D. Patel, 
at the time Minister for Commerce, Trade and Industry and therefore responsible for the 
privatisation programme, recalls that Chiluba repeatedly pressured him to ‘sell
QA/J
properties to his cronies’. Beyond nepotism, there were also claims that privatisation 
generally benefitted the Bemba-speaking group, the sale of state farms to R. Penza and 
E. Kasonde (two former Ministers of Finance from the Bemba tribe) being prominent 
examples. Such accusations of ‘tribalism’ can however not be confirmed. Taking into 
account all companies sold to political leaders, Zambian individuals and Zambian 
corporate bodies, there is no evidence for a generalised ‘Bemba bias’ in the distribution 
of privatised assets (see figures 39a and 39b). While Bemba-speakers did indeed receive
801 For details on the privatisation of ZCCM see Craig 2001; Larmer 2005.
802 Chikulo 2000: 165pp.; Szeftel 2000: 217pp. See also van Donge 2009.
803 Interview, Rueben Lifuka.
804 Cited after Szeftel 2000: 219.
805 See van Donge 2009.
806 Interview, Dipak Patel.
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the largest share of privatised companies, they were even slightly underrepresented in 
terms of their population share. The only clearly discernible bias was in favour of 
Zambians of Asian background who acquired a highly disproportional share of the 
privatised companies. This confirms public perceptions that privatisation really 
benefitted foreign investors and ‘non-Zambian’ citizens.
Altogether, the example of privatisation shows that -  unlike in Museveni’s Uganda (see 
chapter 5) -  the spoils of economic reform were not monopolised by members of 
specific ethnic groups. The same can be said for the distribution of key appointments in 
the remaining parastatal companies. While comprehensive data are not available, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that important positions in key parastatal companies such 
as the Bank of Zambia or the Zambia Revenue Authority were distributed relatively
equitably between the country’s major groupings throughout the Third Republic. 80 7
Figure 39: Linguistic distribution of privatised companies in Zambia, 1992-2006 average808
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MILITARY POWER-SHARING
In the army, the end of the one-party state meant that the civilian and military spheres 
had to be de-linked. In general, the MMD government held the view that the military
807 Interview, Wilfrid Mwamba.
808 Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; ZPA 2006b. In the case of companies sold to 
political leaders and Zambian individuals, I have established the language group affiliation o f the 
purchaser. In the case of companies sold to Zambian corporate bodies, I have established the language 
group affiliation of the buying company’s director/chairman.
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should be politically neutral and therefore moved to professionalise the ZDF.809 As a 
result, party structures and political education in the army were abolished and alleged 
UNIP loyalists were retrenched. Yet, the Chiluba government did not fully abandon 
UNIP’s strategy of promoting civil-military integration by appointing former military 
personnel into high political office. Accordingly, two out of three Vice-Presidents were 
of military background, including Brig. Miyanda and Lt.-Gen. Tembo. Even under 
Mwanawasa former military officers like Lt.-Gen. Shikapwasha (Minister of Home 
Affairs) or Brig.-Gen. Chituwo (Minister of Health) occupied key cabinet positions, 
while many others were given lucrative posts as ambassadors. This indicates that 
careers still do not end with retirement from the army.
Table 25: Linguistic distribution of army commanders in Zambia, 1991-2QQ8810
Lt. —Gen. R. Shikapwasha (Tonga) Gen. N. M. Simbeye (Bemba) Lt.-Gen. W. G  Funjika (North-Western)
Lt.-Gen. S. Kayumba (North-Western) Lt.-Gen. S. L. Mumbi (Nyanja) Maj.-Gen. M. Mbao (Nyanja)
Lt.-Gen. Ch. Singogo (Bemba) Lt.-Gen. G  R. Musengule (Bemba)
Lt. Gen. S. Mapala (Nyanja) Lt.-Gen. I. Chisuzi (Tonga) Maj.-Gen. R. Chisheta (Bemba)
More importantly, MMD deliberately retained UNIP’s tradition of inclusive recruitment 
and appointment policies. According to Mbita Chitala, member of the Defence Council 
under Chiluba, ‘tribal balancing’ was continued at all levels of the armed forces to
Oil
ensure ‘that the whole country is represented’. Similarly, G. Mpombo, Minister of 
Defence under Mwanawasa, used the 2007 debate on the military budget to emphasise 
the enduringly national character of the Zambian army and re-affirmed that no district 
was disadvantaged in terms of recruitment.812 Such claims are confirmed when 
analysing the composition of the officer corps during the Third Republic. While 
comprehensive information is again not available, my data suggest that the top 
command positions in the army are still distributed fairly equitably among the country’s 
major language groups (see table 25).
Moreover, ‘new’ forms of patronage help ‘buy off the top army leadership and ensure 
that the army remains part of the MMD elite bargain. Under Chiluba, the military 
leadership was known to be heavily implicated in the proliferating corruption scandals, 
which involved considerable material benefits. Such allegations have now been
809 Phiri 2002: 12; Haantobolo 2008: 203p.
810 Own data compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke; Interview, Geofroy 
Haantolobo.
811 Interview, Mbita Chitala.
8,2 GOZ 2007.
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confirmed by the fact that several of Chiluba’s high-ranking army officers were 
prosecuted and convicted in civil courts after Mwanawasa took over in 2001, including,
among others, Lt.-Gen Funjika, Lt.-Gen. Kayumba, Lt.-Gen. Singogo and Lt.-Gen.
01-1
Musengule. More recently, the MMD government has managed to keep the army 
busy by sending large numbers of military officers to participate in lucrative peace­
keeping missions. By now, the country is involved in a total of nine peace-keeping 
missions worldwide whereby the number of Zambian observers has grown from 8 in 
1994 to 108 in 2008.814 This has left behind a rather small number of officers who can 
be more easily monitored.
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING
While the Third Republic continued to exhibit relatively high levels of political, 
economic and military power-sharing, territorial power-sharing was more limited. After 
the transition to multi-party rule, the 1991 Local Government Act revoked the UNIP- 
engineered fusion of party and government and provided the now 72 local authorities (4 
City Councils, 12 Municipal Councils, 56 District Councils) with wide-ranging 
functions, including responsibility for the provision of services such as water supply,
QIC
sewerage, health, feeder and district roads, education and housing. Yet, the formally 
empowered local government structures have remained largely dysfunctional for a 
number of reasons.
Administratively, the local councils still coexist with deconcentrated sector ministries, 
which report to parent ministries of the central government in Lusaka through
R1provincial officials. The latter have far more power than local government elected 
councillors and therefore continue to dominate decision-making at the local level. This 
can be illustrated at the example of the District Development Coordination Committees 
(DDCCs) that were created in 1993 as forums for planning and implementation of 
development activities, as well as for community participation. Yet, as the majority of 
the DDCC members are civil servants representing deconcentrated central government
813 ‘Colonel arrested for theft of ZAF Funds’, The Post', ‘Former military commander arrested in Zambia’ 
Saturday Star, 10 March 2004; 7 April 2003; ‘Zambia ex-airforce commander arrested for corruption’, 
Agence France Presse, 30 December 2006; ‘Former army commander jailed for corruption’, Times o f  
Zambia, 3 March 2009.
814IISS Various Years.
815 See Saasa 2002: 118pp.; Chikulo 2009: 101pp.
816 Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 47; Chikulo 2009: 104.
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departments, there is no coordinating mechanism for integrated planning and 
management under the direct control of the council. Also, the effectiveness of district 
councils is severely undermined by a lack of competent staff.
Figure 40: Local revenue in Zambia, 1994-2005817
Figure 40a: C om position o f local r e v e n u e , 
1994-2005 (in billion Kwacha)
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The financial situation of the local councils is even worse. While formally given 
considerable powers to raise their own revenues, few councils are able to take advantage 
of this provision due to their limited resource base. As shown in figure 40a, local 
revenue has more than tripled between 1994 and 2005 and is mainly composed of local 
taxes and diverse administrative fees (subsumed under ‘other’). Yet, real local revenue 
has declined, not least since local governments have been deprived of many former 
powers to mobilise resources since the mid-1990s (e.g. motor vehicle licensing, beer
a t  o
surtax, rent from council housing, exemptions from property rates, etc.). Moreover, 
district councils receive only small and erratic shares of their declining revenues from 
central government (see figure 40a), and even these meagre transfers often come late. 
The extremely limited extent of fiscal decentralisation is illustrated by the fact that local 
revenue represents only a marginal share of central government revenue -  a share that 
has fallen from 4.8% in 1994 to only 1.2% in 2005 (see figure 40b).819 The lack of 
adequate financial resources despite the imposition of new responsibilities has had a
817 Compiled and calculated based on Saasa et al. 1999; IMF 2009. Data for the years 1998-2000 are not 
available. In general, information on local government accounts is still not included in the national budget 
and therefore remains inadequate (World Bank 2003: 43).
818 Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 47; Hampwaye 2008: 350p.
819 This share is negligible when compared with fiscal decentralisation in Museveni’s Uganda (see chapter
5).
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£ 9 0very negative impact on the councils’ capacity to deliver essential social services. By 
now, many local authorities have accumulated huge debt burdens and face enduring 
financial crisis.
Altogether, local autonomy has remained minimal throughout the Third Republic. In the 
words of Erdmann & Simutanyi, this is ‘partly the result of sheer incompetence and 
disregard for local government, and partly a deliberate policy to weaken local autonomy 
while strengthening central control; not for development but for maintaining political 
power’.821 The unabated ‘centralism’ of the MMD administration became apparent in 
2000 when President Chiluba installed ‘district administrators’ (DAs) as political 
appointees that were only responsible to himself and ensured centralised control over 
the districts. While many district councils can hardly perform their functions, the DAs 
have been fmically well-equipped for patronage purposes. To give an example, the 
Constituency Development Funds -  originally intended for local authorities -  have been 
placed under the control of the DAs. After 2001, President Mwanawasa withstood 
pressures to abolish the DAs. This means that Kaunda’s old idea of ‘decentralisation in 
centralism’ is still firmly entrenched:
‘What has passed for decentralisation in Zambia is not creating centres of power at the local 
level but sending delegates to different comers o f the country. So you would have an 
authority in a district made up of people appointed from Lusaka, and accountable to 
Lusaka, and afraid of Lusaka, and representing Lusaka, but being projected to manifest 
decentralisation. So it is a decentralisation without a devolution of power’.822
Interestingly, the Zambian government has on several occasions recognised the poor 
state of local government and even introduced a National Decentralisation Policy, which 
was formally launched in August 2004.823 Yet, to the great frustration of the involved 
donor organisations , this policy had still not reached the stage of implementation in 
late 2008. It remains to be seen whether the government’s ‘Decentralisation 
Implementation Plan 2009-2013’ will provide new impetus in this respect.825 As long as 
this is not the case, local government is only of limited interest for competing groups 
whereby the inclusive distribution of access to central state power remains of great 
importance.826
820 For case studies see Saasa et al 1999; Hampwaye 2008.
821 Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 49.
822 Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.
823 GOZ 2002.
824 Interview, Birgit Pickel.
825 GOZ 2009.
826 Interview, Prof. Jotham Momba.
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7.3 MMD’s inclusive elite bargain and civil war avoidance
In the previous section, I have shown that the Chiluba and Mwanawasa regimes 
continued to ensure a relatively inclusive distribution of access to positions of political, 
economic and military power, the re-emergence of some familiar cracks in the Zambian 
elite bargain notwithstanding. In what follows, I will argue that the persistence of an 
inclusive elite bargain under MMD has remained a key driver behind civil war 
avoidance during the Third Republic, even though the overall importance of ‘tribal 
balancing’ may have declined. The enduring importance of inclusive inter-group access 
to central state power can again be illustrated by looking at distinct moments of crisis 
between 1991 and 2008.
A first moment of crisis occurred during and after the transition to multi-party politics 
in 1991. Both protagonists and observers generally agree that this transition was 
peaceful mainly because the MMD was an extremely broad-based movement whose
o*)n
leadership cultivated a national image through the trade unions. If MMD had come to 
be dominated by one language group or even a single tribe, this would almost certainly 
have caused alienation and conflict. This can be shown by the example of the Barotse- 
speaking group. The latter had originally played an important role within MMD, evident 
in the prominence of Lozi-speaking leaders such as A. Wina or A. Lewanika. After 
Chiluba captured power, Barotse-speaking leaders were however sidelined in party and 
government (see above) -  a situation that culminated not only in the creation of the 
Lozi-based NP but also in renewed claims for the restoration of regional autonomy 
under the Barotseland Agreement.828 In mid-1993, representatives of the Barotse Royal 
Establishment even made open secessionist demands, which were vehemently rejected 
by the Chiluba government.829 Two years later, secessionist demands in Barotseland 
resurfaced over the passage in parliament of a bill that withdrew the power to allocate
827 Various interviews.
828 Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 188p. Officially attacking the government over corruption, A. Lewanika’s 
resignation in 1992 also reflected the Lozi’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which their demands were 
handled by the MMD government. A. Wina was dismissed as Minister of Education in 1993.
829 ‘Zambia's second-biggest province seeks secession’, Agence France Presse, 22 July 1993; ‘Zambia: 
Government warns against secession’, IPS-Inter Press Service, 20 July 1993. When rumours spread that 
the Litunga was about to be arrested over the secessionist demands, the traditional war drum was sounded 
in Barotseland and up to 2500 men congregated at the Litunga’s palace to offer him protection. Realising 
how sensitive the situation was, the MMD government decided to back down (Sichone & Simutanyi 
1996: 188p.).
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land from traditional rulers and transferred it to the President. Tellingly, protests in 
Western Province eased with the improved representation of Barotse-speakers in party 
and government from the mid-1990s. While secessionist talk did not entirely disappear,
o - i  1
especially in the context of the Namibian Lozi Caprivi rebel movement , it had clearly 
lost momentum by the late 1990s.832
A second moment of crisis occurred in the context of the controversies surrounding the 
‘third term’ debate, which caused considerable conflict within the ruling party and 
ultimately resulted in its loss of a parliamentary majority during the 2001 elections. As 
discussed above, tribal sentiments were of minor importance during the ‘third term’ 
debate, evident in the fact that even some of Chiluba’s tribesmen resigned in order to 
protest against the President’s bid for constitutional changes. Nevertheless, there is 
reason to argue that the broader debate over Chiluba’s succession did involve tribal 
connotations in that there was a widespread perception of Bemba dominance, which 
found expression in the growing strength of UPND. If the President had picked a 
Bemba-speaker as his successor in this kind of a situation, the succession crisis might 
have led to lasting alienation in other parts of the country. Instead, the choice of 
Mwanawasa -  a Tonga-speaker who subsequently tried to rebuild MMD support in the 
non-Bemba-speaking areas -  can be considered a shrewd example of ‘tribal balancing’, 
which prevented the consolidation of cohesive grievances along language group lines.
A final moment of crisis occurred after Mwanawasa’s unexpected death in mid-2008. 
While the country remained remarkably stable even during this uncertain succession 
period, the ruling party came to be characterised by intense factional struggles, which 
proceeded along both personal and tribal lines. According to political insiders, there 
were three main contending groups within MMD at the time. One group was led by 
K. Kalumba, the MMD National Secretary, who not only enjoyed strong support among 
the lower party cadres but also maintained close links with the Chiluba faction. A
830 ‘Zambia-politics: Western Region threatens to secede’, IPS-Inter Press Service, 6 November 1995.
831 ‘Govt advised to take Lozi secession call seriously’, The Post, 19 November 1998; ‘Barotses threaten 
secession’, The New African, March 1999.
832 ‘Zambian MPs condemn idea of Barotseland’s breakaway’, Xinhua News Agency, 18 November 1998; 
‘Mbikusita-Lewanika’s politics rather ridiculous’, Times o f Zambia, 18 November 1998; ‘Barotse 
secessionists’ dilemma’, Africa News, 17 February 1999; ‘I don’t believe in secession of Barotseland -  
Aka’, Africa News, 30 October 2002.
833 Interview, Emily Sikazwe.
834 Various interviews.
835 Kalumba himself served as a Minister under Chiluba and later faced corruption charges in court 
(‘Court Wants Katele, Others' Charges Specified’, Times o f Zambia, 13 October 2004).
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second group included influential members of the ‘family tree’ who supported the 
candidature of N. Magande, the Minister of Finance, but had limited support within the 
party. A third faction grouped around R. Banda, the Vice-President, who was however 
commonly regarded as an ‘outsider’ within the party. The choice of Kalumba as the 
MMD presidential candidate would have angered the non-Bemba, whereas a ‘family 
tree’ candidate might have further alienated the Bemba bloc. As a consequence, the 
former UNIPist and party outsider Banda was elected as MMD candidate and 
subsequently replaced Mwanawasa. This can be interpreted as another shrewd choice of 
‘tribal balancing’. On the one hand, the election of Banda ended the relative 
underrepresentation of the Nyanja-speaking group within MMD. On the other hand, 
Banda is said -  through Kalumba as his ‘kingmaker’ -  to enjoy close connections with 
the Chiluba faction, which may help to reintegrate the Bemba-speaking bloc (albeit at
O'* c.
the expense of Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption drive).
Altogether, there is reason to argue that the inclusive inter-group distribution of access 
to positions of state power remains important to preserve Zambia’s peace and stability. 
This view was widely shared by the great majority of my interviewees. D. Patel, for 
example, explained:
‘It is not possible to govern this country if  you don’t deal with balancing. The day you 
remove balancing, the country will disintegrate into civil war’.837
Similarly, the political veteran V. Mwaanga considered ‘tribal balancing’ to be without
alternative even more than 40 years after independence and labelled the absence thereof
0^0
as ‘a recipe for violent conflict’. Admittedly, such statements may be somewhat 
exaggerated. Nation-building policies under Kaunda’s motto of ‘One Zambia, One 
Nation’ have undoubtedly left deep traces in the political culture of a country where
O -J Q
open tribal campaigning is now widely considered a ‘no-go’. As tribal sentiment is 
less pronounced today than in the post-independence period, the exclusion of certain 
groups from access to positions of state power is less likely -  after decade-long efforts 
to promote national unity -  to become an immediate trigger of violent conflict.
836 Evidence of this is that corruption charges against Chiluba were suddenly dropped after years of 
investigation (‘Chiluba Acquitted’, Times o f Zambia, 18 August 2009).
837 Interview, Dipak Patel.
838 Interview, Vemon Mwaanga.
839 Burnell 2005: 122; various interviews. The best example to illustrate the dangers of tribal campaigning 
in Zambia would be UPND. As the party leadership openly insisted that Mazoka’s successor had to be a 
Tonga, the party now finds it impossible to wash off the ‘Tonga label’, which in turn makes it difficult for 
UPND to establish itself outside ‘Tongaland’.
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While ‘tribal balancing’ may therefore have become less important over time, it seems 
equally exaggerated to claim that national unity is by now so firmly entrenched that it 
can no longer be reversed. One of my interviewees, for instance, vehemently argued that
‘[n]o politician can ever divide Zambians. It is too late, One Zambia, One Nation has 
succeeded (...). It is a good thing that Kaunda overstayed in politics because this gave him 
enough time to forge a nation’.840
Such assessments are however contradicted by the recent ‘re-tribalisation’ of political 
competition, which is at least reminiscent of developments during the First Republic. 
Linguistic and tribal cleavages clearly continue to matter for voter alignment and even 
more so for party affiliation841, not least evident in the enduring strength of PF and 
UPND. The enduring salience of sectarian cleavages becomes also evident in
Q A f )  Ocontemporary political debates or the recent proliferation of tribal associations. Dr. 
Neo Simutanyi, one of the country’s foremost intellectuals, describes the phenomenon 
in the following terms:
‘Tribe is a taboo subject in public but is actually canvassed privately. When like-minded 
people meet, they look around the table, make sure they are all from the same place and 
then ask: Now, how do we deal with those Bemba?’844
Against this background, it should be kept in mind that the political culture of ‘One 
Zambia, One Nation’ is a result of deliberate political action and can be undone if such 
an approach is no longer deemed necessary.
7.4 Competing explanations
Which other factors account for the enduring peace and stability of Zambia’s Third 
Republic? Beyond inclusive elite politics, there is reason to believe that the decline of 
socioeconomic inter-group inequalities at the level of the masses has also facilitated 
civil war avoidance. As detailed in section 6.4, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities 
were initially quite pronounced in post-independence Zambia. More recently, however, 
these inequalities have diminished. While the urban areas in Lusaka and on the 
Copperbelt are still better off, the rural provinces now exhibit strikingly similar trends 
in poverty incidence (see figure 41) and other social indicators.845 Combined with the
840 Interview, Reverend Foston Sakala.
841 See Erdmann 2007.
842 ‘GBM’s tribal remarks slammed’, Times o f Zambia, 23 September 2009; ‘NEC member accuses Levy 
of open tribalism’, The Post, 2 April 2008; ‘Tribal politics will divide Zambia, warns Mangani’, The Post, 
15 January 2008; ‘It’s time to try Tongas for presidency -  Shalya’, The Post, 24 September 2007; ‘Lozi 
tribalists must be opposed’, The Post, 18 June 2007.
843 Interview, Mbita Chitala.
844 Interview, Dr. Neo Simutanyi.
845 For details see CSO 2006.
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persistence of ‘tribal balancing’ at the level of elites, declining socioeconomic 
disparities between provinces have arguably helped to further entrench the country’s 
peace and stability.
Figure 41: Incidence of poverty in Zambia, 1991-2006846
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Finally, there is the urban factor. Even though urbanisation rates have declined since the 
early 1980s and are now even below Sub-Saharan African average (see section 6.4), the 
influence of urban areas -  especially those in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt -  on the rest 
of the country is immense.847 Most importantly, the process of urbanisation has blurred 
linguistic and tribal cleavages. First, urban migration has reduced language barriers in 
that there are Bemba-speakers on the Copperbelt who do not come from one of the 
Bemba-speaking tribes in Northern and Luapula Provinces, just as there are Nyanja- 
speakers in Lusaka who do not come from the Nyanja-speaking tribes in Eastern 
Province. Second, urbanisation has resulted in high levels of inter-tribal marriages 
whose off-springs are considered ‘proper’ Zambians. Posner calculates that about 46% 
of all married Zambians in urban districts and 32% of those living in rural areas haves
o A o
spouses from different tribes. This striking figure is supported by anecdotal evidence 
from my own fieldwork. Accordingly, the great majority of my interviewees 
emphasised that they were themselves married to someone from a different tribe, while
846 Compiled based on ibid.
847 ?hiri 2006: 199.
848 losner 2005: 92. Not that these calculations are based on the 1990 census. Current levels o f inter-tribal 
mairiages were not available but are likely to be even higher.
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most of their children also have spouses from a tribe other than their own. In the words 
of Patricia Palale, Public Sector Management Specialist at the World Bank,
‘[y]ou cannot really say I am fully Bemba or Tonga. There are very few whose parents are 
from the same village or from the same tribe. Most of us are a mixture o f regions, a mixture 
of tribes’.849
Many of those who I interviewed argued that high levels of urbanisation and inter-tribal 
marriages make inter-group violence impossible. As many Zambians owe allegiance to 
several language groups or tribes, collective action based on linguistic or tribal identities 
is said to be ‘almost unthinkable’.850 This is convincing, albeit only partially. First, I 
have shown that language and tribe remain salient social cleavages even in times of high 
urbanisation, evident in the enduring strength of PF and UPND. Second, a brief glance 
at other African countries suggests that urbanisation alone is not sufficient to prevent 
civil war. In 2009, countries that were more urbanised than Zambia included, among 
others, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, Central African Republic,
Of 1
Nigeria and Somalia -  countries that have all experienced recurrent civil war. 
Moreover, the case of Kenya underlines that even high levels of inter-tribal marriages 
do not guarantee the absence of inter-tribal political violence.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Zambia’s enduring peace and stability during the 
Third Republic is mainly due to the persistence of an inclusive elite bargain. After the 
transition to multi-party politics in 1991, both the Chiluba and Mwanawasa 
governments have made a continued attempt to form a ‘maximum coalition’, evident in 
the largely inclusive distribution of access to positions of political, economic and 
military power between the country’s major language groups. This has again helped to 
prevent the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby cemented Zambia’s 
lasting peace. At the same time, the decline of socioeconomic inter-group inequalities as 
well as high levels of urbanisation have made violent conflict even less likely.
849 Interview, Patricia Palale.
850 Interview, Marc Chona.
851 World Bank 2009. At the same time, other peaceful countries such as Tanzania or Malawi exhibit 
significantly lower rates of urbanisation than Zambia.
852 ‘Kenya violence takes toll on intertribal marriages’, Deseret News (Kenya), 27 January 2008.
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While Zambia’s peace and stability seems solidly entrenched, it should not be taken for 
granted. Signs of continuity notwithstanding, the Mwanawasa elite bargain came to 
exhibit a number of serious cracks, which were strikingly similar to those of the First 
Republic. On the one hand, the Mwanawasa administration witnessed a certain ’re- 
tribalisation’ of political competition, evident in the strength of PF in the Bemba- 
speaking North and UPND in the Tonga-speaking South. On the other hand, the ruling 
party has lost ground in the urban centres where Sata’s PF has emerged as a serious 
contender. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that a PF victory in the upcoming 
2011 general elections might further polarise Zambia along both tribal and class lines. 
This underlines that the political culture of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ should not be 
taken for granted.
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8 Conclusion
‘It is not a matter of having an equal number of each ethnic group, region, class, gender, 
etc. represented, or following the ‘proportionality principle’ (...). The real solution concerns 
the question of which candidates are to be (...) selected (...), and to what post? More often 
than not, it is personalities without political clout in the ethnic group or region who are 
hand-picked and factored into the equation. Or should he have clout, he is not given any 
post near power. In these circumstances the equation does not balance. The problem of 
power is not arithmetic: it is often algebraic, geometric -  a matter of calculus’.85
This PhD thesis started from the puzzle of striking differences in civil war occurrence 
across Sub-Saharan Africa, exemplified by the two countries of Uganda and Zambia. 
While Uganda has been among the most conflict-intensive countries on the African 
continent with 15 cases of civil war since independence in 1962, Zambia has been 
characterised by enduring peace and stability with no instance of civil war since the end 
of colonial rule in 1964. In order to explain this extreme variation in the two countries’ 
vulnerability to civil war, I first reviewed the five most influential theoretical 
approaches in the civil war literature. I found that while most of these approaches fall 
short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need for elite power- 
sharing offer a promising starting point. Against this backdrop, I went on to develop a 
theoretical approach that focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I expected that a 
country’s propensity for conflict or peace is determined by the inclusiveness of the ‘ elite 
bargain’, which I defined as the distribution of access to positions of state power 
(political, military, economic and territorial) between contending social groups. This led 
me to hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, whereas 
exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.
This initial hypothesis was largely confirmed by the empirical findings from my two 
case studies. In Uganda, recurrent civil war can be traced back to the persistence of 
exclusionary elite bargains under all post-colonial governments, which have -  albeit to 
different degrees -  produced enduring antagonism between the country’s major tribal 
groups and thereby become a key driving force behind the various insurgencies since 
1962. Obote’s initial failure to fully accommodate the colonial legacy of high social 
fragmentation was replicated not only by the Amin, UNLF and Obote II regimes but 
also by the Museveni government that is still to deliver the promised ‘fundamental 
change’. By contrast, Zambia has been able to contain the spectre of civil war between
853 Sithole 1994: 162.
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its major linguistic and tribal groups by forging and maintaining an inclusive elite 
bargain. The foundations of Zambia’s lasting peace and stability were laid by Kaunda’s 
practise of ‘tribal balancing’ and further entrenched by subsequent post-colonial 
governments who have all exhibited a tendency to form another ‘maximum coalition’. 
Altogether, post-colonial differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia 
reflect first and foremost distinct differences in the inclusiveness of elite politics.
In this concluding chapter, I will first refine my argument by drawing ten main lessons 
from my research (section 8.1). In a second step, I will discuss three avenues for future 
research (section 8.2).
8.1 Refining the argument
Which overarching lessons can be drawn from my research? While my hypothesis of a 
link between a country’s vulnerability to civil war and the inclusiveness of its elite 
bargain is generally confirmed, it can be further refined and complemented by 
competing explanatory factors. In what follows, I will therefore first detail five lessons 
on the impact of the elite bargain. I argue that Uganda and Zambia’s varying 
vulnerability to civil war reflects differences in the (1) relative trend; (2) depth; (3) 
scope; (4) authenticity; and (5) perception of the elite bargain. Afterwards, I will go on 
to outline five lessons on competing -  yet complementary -  explanations. I argue that 
varying propensities for peace or conflict also depend on (1) violent state repression; (2) 
socioeconomic inter-group inequalities; (3) political leadership; (4) levels of 
urbanisation; and (5) regional spillover effects.
THE IMPACT OF THE ELITE BARGAIN RECONSIDERED
(1) Relative changes in the elite bargain
First, and maybe most importantly, the Uganda-Zambia comparison provides strong 
evidence that civil war onset is especially likely in the wake of important relative 
changes in the elite bargain, i.e. if a group has recently experienced a relative loss o f 
power. Significantly, this is also confirmed by recent quantitative research where
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‘downgraded power status’ is found to have a significant impact on why ethnic groups 
rebel.854
The importance of relative power losses as a determinant of civil war becomes 
strikingly evident when looking at the history of violent conflict in Uganda. The 
Baganda, to begin with, had assumed a dominant position under colonial rule and were 
therefore reluctant to accept a relative decline in influence under Obote I -  a situation 
that culminated in the 1966 ‘Battle of Mengo’. Similarly, the Acholi and Langi had 
occupied many key positions under Obote I but were then purged from all positions of 
influence under Amin, which explains their prominent role in the anti-Amin rebellions. 
Relative losses of power are also key to understanding the various anti-UNLF/Obote II 
insurgencies. The FUNA and UNRF insurgencies reflected the extreme loss of power 
by West Nilers who had monopolised power under Idi Amin but were then fully 
excluded from the UNLF elite bargain. Baganda monarchists had been influential 
during the early days of UNLF, especially under Lule, but were then progressively 
marginalised by the pro-Obote forces, which provided a fertile breeding ground for 
UFM and FEDEMO. In a similar vein, the NRA insurgency clearly originated in the 
fact that Museveni and his FRONASA forces had initially occupied key positions in the 
post-Amin coalition but were then systematically sidelined by Obote loyalists. A final 
example for the link between relative losses of power and civil war onset are the anti- 
Museveni insurgencies since 1986. The insurgencies in Acholiland seem closely related 
to the fact that the Acholi had held political and military power after the 1985 military 
coup by the Okellos but found themselves marginalised once the NRM took over. A 
similar argument can be made for the UPA rebellion by the Itesot who had been 
prominently represented in the ‘inner circles’ of the Obote II regime but were sidelined 
with the regime change of 1986. Groups that have always had little more than a 
marginal role, by contrast, have not been motivated to fight to regain something they 
never had. This is especially true for the Karamojong in the North-East who have 
always been on the periphery of the colonial and post-colonial state.855
In Zambia, some groups have also suffered from relative losses of power, which have -  
in line with the overall thrust of the argument -  at times caused hefty factional 
struggles. Bemba-speakers, for instance, had played a leading role during the
854 Cederman et al. 2010b: 108.
855 Mirzeler & Young 2000.
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independence struggle but were then somewhat underrepresented in party and 
government during the early post-colonial days -  a situation that culminated in the 
upheavals surrounding the 1967 party elections. Similarly, Barotse-speakers found their 
influence declining by the late 1960s and reacted by setting up the Lozi-based UP. More 
recently, Bemba-speakers were prominently represented under Chiluba but lost 
influence after Mwanawasa became President, which became a key driver behind the 
rise of Michael Sata’s PF. On the whole, however, relative changes in the inter-group 
distribution of access to positions of state power were less frequent and extreme. Unlike 
in Uganda, there was never a situation where one group monopolised state power and 
was then abruptly chased from all positions of influence. Instead, the downgraded 
groups always retained a considerable stake in the ruling coalition. This has arguably 
helped to prevent the typically strong emotions surrounding the sudden loss of power 
and prestige and explains why the mentioned factional struggles did not escalate into 
open violent conflict.
(2) The depth of the elite bargain
Second, it has become clear that a country’s propensity for peace or conflict depends on 
the depth of the elite bargain, i.e. the extent to which the ‘inner core' o f state power is 
shared between competing social groups. This confirms my initial suspicion that it is 
not enough -  as it is often done -  to analyse the overall distribution of appointments but 
instead to focus on what are arguably the positions of real power and influence, not least 
to uncover strategies of ‘window dressing’. In the words of the above-cited 
Zimbabwean scholar Masipula Sithole, groups are often ‘not given any post near 
power’.
This becomes evident when looking at conflict-ridden Uganda. Here, the ‘inner core’ of 
political power has mostly been dominated by certain tribal groups, including the 
‘Nubian-Kakwa’ core group under Amin, the Baganda under Lule and Binaisa, and the 
Banyankole and Baganda under Museveni. The only partial exceptions were the two 
Obote regimes, in particular the Obote I administration -  tellingly the most peaceful 
period in Uganda’s history. Even more importantly, the top command positions in the 
Ugandan army -  arguably the real locus of power since the mutiny of 1964 -  have 
always been monopolised by small minorities, including the Acholi, Langi and West 
Nilers under Obote I, the ‘Nubian-Kakwa’ core under Amin, the Acholi and Langi
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under Obote II, and the Banyankole (especially from the Bahima subgroup) under 
Museveni. This extreme bias in the distribution of ‘real’ power and influence has been a 
prominent concern in many of Uganda’s post-colonial violent conflicts (see chapters 4 
and 5). In post-1986 Acholiland, for example, allegations of neglect are almost 
exclusively framed in terms of missing access to the ‘juicy positions’.
In peaceful Zambia, by contrast, access to the ‘inner core’ of state power has always 
been shared more equitably. This was especially true under Kaunda where all five major 
language groups enjoyed enduring access not only to the ‘inner core’ of political power 
but also to key positions in the ruling party, the major parastatals and the army. After 
the return to multi-party politics, this overall pattern remained largely unchanged. Even 
the generally underrepresented Nyanja-speaking group continued to be -  in sharp 
contrast to Northerners in post-1986 Uganda -  represented in the ‘inner core’ of 
political power, evident in the fact that three out of six Vice-Presidents since 1991 were 
Nyanja-speakers.
(3) The scope of the elite bargain
Third, there is reason to argue that the likelihood of civil war depends on the scope of 
the elite bargain, i.e. the extent to which all of the different spheres o f state power 
(political, economic, military, territorial) are shared between competing social groups.
The Zambian elite bargains have been large in scope since independence in 1964. While 
levels of territorial power-sharing have remained low, access to all three spheres of 
central state power (political, economic, and military) has on average been shared 
equitably between the country’s five major language groups. This is not to deny that 
some groups have at times been underrepresented in one sphere of state power. But this 
lack of power-sharing in one area has typically been compensated for by high levels of 
power-sharing in another area. North-Westerners, for instance, were underrepresented in 
the parastatal sector throughout the Second Republic but played a prominent role in 
party and government. During the Third Republic, Nyanja-speakers were 
underrepresented in government but received largely proportional representation in the 
civil service and the army. The fact that patterns of exclusion have never been
856 Various interviews.
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consistent across all dimensions of state power has arguably prevented the emergence of 
cohesive group grievances and thereby undermined the risk of violent conflict.
The Ugandan elite bargains, by contrast, have been limited in scope with more thorough 
patterns of inter-group exclusion. Under Obote I, the powerful Baganda monarchists 
were not only excluded from military power but also suffered from declining influence 
in national government and the abrogation of constitutional provisions for territorial 
power-sharing. Under Amin, the Acholi and Langi were systematically purged from all 
spheres of state power, whereas the same happened to West Nilers under UNLF. Under 
Museveni, the Acholi and Itesot were not only deprived of their positions in the security 
forces but also fobbed off with little more than ‘token’ representation in government. 
These cases of consistent exclusion across all dimensions of state power have given rise 
to feelings of total disempowerment and marginalisation and thereby provided a fertile 
breeding ground for violent rebellion. More recently, however, violent conflict over 
imbalances at the centre has been eased by increased territorial power-sharing since the 
mid-1990s, which has provided the local leadership in all parts of the country with 
access to jobs and resources and thereby integrated them into the elite bargain. This 
indicates that patterns of exclusion at the central state level can be compensated for by 
patterns of inclusion at the local level.
(4) The authenticity of the elite bargain
Fourth, my research suggests that a country’s vulnerability to civil war depends on the 
authenticity of the elite bargain, i.e. the degree to which the included elites are really 
considered as legitimate representatives of the social groups they belong to. This draws 
attention to the fact that many of the ethnic, regional or religious groups we are dealing 
with are by no means coherent, unitary actors but typically characterised by internal
ocn
divisions and contradictions. In this sense, it is simply not sufficient to share power 
with any representative of a particular social group. Instead, it is crucial to prioritise the 
representativity of the included actors by ensuring that they have sufficient political 
clout among ‘their’ groups.
In the case of Uganda, the importance of ‘truly’ representative elite bargains for 
maintaining peace and stability has become evident on several occasions. In the early
857 Brubaker 2004.
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post-colonial days, Obote used the end of the UPC-KY alliance in 1964 to dismiss all 
Baganda monarchists -  the dominant faction among the Baganda -  from his 
government and replaced them with those Baganda who had previously crossed the 
floor to UPC. As the latter were regarded as traitors by the monarchists and the majority 
of the population, the Buganda Kingdom was effectively fully excluded from political 
power from the mid-1960s -  a constellation that contributed to the violent clash of 
1966. Similar problems occurred under Obote II. While the President again made sure 
to include a proportional number of Baganda ministers in his government, the latter 
were all long-standing UPC members and therefore lacked political clout among the 
alienated Baganda monarchist and DP centrist factions. Similarly, the fact that Obote II 
had many Banyankole in his government could hardly appease Museveni and his 
Bahima followers since the Banyankole ministers were all from the rivalling Bairu 
subgroup. Under Museveni, finally, many of the few ministers from the North actually 
lack a substantial constituency in their home areas and are therefore not regarded as 
‘true’ representatives of their tribal groups, which means that the widespread feelings of 
marginalisation and alienation persist. In the words of a Ugandan academic:
‘When they [NRM] pick somebody from there [the North], they pick somebody who does 
not have the social and political base. They actually pick somebody who does not have a 
following. So he is perceived as not representing them’.858
Problems surrounding the authenticity of the elite bargain can also be observed in the 
case of Zambia. While Barotse-speakers were clearly over-represented in Kaunda’s 
post-independence government, this did not ensure support in Western Province due to 
the deep divisions in the Lozi ruling class. As most Lozi ministers in government 
belonged to the ‘nationalist’ faction, the powerful faction of Lozi ‘traditionalists’ -  at 
the time still the key player in Western Province -  remained largely outside the ruling 
coalition. In a similar vein, many of the Tonga-speaking UNIP leaders during the 1960s 
lacked a substantial power base in their home areas, especially when compared with 
their ANC counterparts who retained a mass following in Southern Province. This 
situation improved only with the one-party state of the 1970s and 1980s when Kaunda 
made sustained efforts to integrate both Lozi traditionalist and former ANC stalwarts 
into the elite bargain.
It is however important to recognise that the need to integrate ‘truly’ representative 
elites is largely confined to the sphere of political power-sharing. While political leaders
858 Interview, Mwambutsya Ndebesa.
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are really only leaders if they represent a certain constituency, civil servants, parastatal
OfQ
directors, army officers , or ambassadors can hardly be considered to be immediate 
and accountable representatives of certain ethnic, regional, or religious groups. Here, 
the challenge is more to ensure an ‘ethnic, regional or religious arithmetic’, which 
demonstrates that competing social groups are provided with largely proportional access 
to positions of administrative, economic and military power.
(§) The perception of the elite bargain
Finally, there is reason to believe that a country’s propensity for war or peace depends 
on the dominant perception of the elite bargain, i.e. the degree to which an elite bargain 
is perceived to be either as inclusive or as exclusionary. This means that it does not only 
matter what the ‘objective facts’ are -  that is, whether a certain group is in fact 
discriminated against by the government -  but also how people ‘subjectively’ interpret 
the situation. Even though it is plausible to assume that there will always be some link 
between subjective perceptions and objectively observable realities, the two will by no 
means always be entirely congruent.
In the case of Uganda, the importance of subjective perceptions has become most 
evident in the Museveni period. In the context of the entrenched ‘North-South divide’ 
and unabated distrust for Museveni in the North, the NRM elite bargain is certainly 
commonly perceived to be even more exclusionary than it actually is. As a 
consequence, any attempt to bridge the ‘North-South divide’ is often immediately
RAHdismissed as negligible or dishonest, especially among the Acholi. Accordingly, most 
NRM ministers from the North are branded as ‘sell-outs’ and lose popular support once 
they are appointed to government, while Northern appointees in the civil service or 
government are dismissed as powerless figureheads. Such extreme perceptions of full­
blown neglect seem strikingly entrenched and make it rather difficult for the 
government to build support in the North.
In Zambia, the post-colonial elite bargains are -  in line with my figures -  widely 
perceived as inclusive. Accordingly, the country’s elites make continuous reference to 
the motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ and Kaunda’s practise of ‘tribal balancing’,
859 The case is different for former rebel leaders who also tend to represent more or less clearly defined 
groups.
860 Various interviews.
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which is commonly said to be an integral part of the country’s political culture. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence for discrepancies between subjective perceptions and 
objective realities. Under Chiluba, for instance, both Tonga- and Barotse-speakers were 
overrepresented in government, party and administration. This did, however, not put an 
end to perceptions of Bemba-domination among the two groups, which ultimately 
favoured the rise of UPND. Under Mwanawasa, Bemba-speakers continued to be well- 
represented but often perceived themselves as losing out, which facilitated the rise of 
Sata’s PF. This underlines that the actual shape of the elite bargain may be 
overshadowed by conflicting perceptions and interpretations.
The above Jive lessons show that power-sharing is a highly complex undertaking: 
Differences in civil war occurrence depend not only on the relative trend, depth, scope 
and authenticity o f the elite bargain but also on how the latter is perceived by the 
involved actors.
COMPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS
(1) Violent state repression
First, the Uganda-Zambia comparison shows that civil war is driven not only by the 
existence of exclusionary elite bargains but also by concurrent violent state repression 
against marginalised groups. The occurrence or non-occurrence of violent state 
repression has clearly emerged as the single most important competing -  yet 
complementary -  explanatory factor.
In Uganda, all civil wars involved violent state repression against marginalised tribal 
groups, the ADF insurgency in Western Uganda being the only exception. In some 
cases, violent state repression against both former combatants and civilians was 
possibly even the more immediate trigger of violent conflict. This is true not only for 
the two anti-Amin rebellions but also for the FUNA, UNRF, UPDA and UPA 
insurgencies, which are all often portrayed as defensive wars of survival. In other cases, 
the exclusion aspect seems to have been paramount, including the ‘Battle of Mengo’ as 
well as the NRA, UFM, FEDEMO, LRA, UNRF II and WNBF civil wars. In the end, 
however, it was arguably the combination of both exclusion and repression along tribal 
lines that was behind the seemingly endless cycles of civil war in post-colonial Uganda.
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Zambia, by contrast, has not only been characterised by the persistence of inclusive elite 
bargains but also by the absence of violent state repression against any of its linguistic 
or tribal groups. This is not to deny that the one-party state of the Second Republic was 
autocratic in nature and did not hesitate to victimise those individuals who challenged 
its authority. Yet, there is no evidence that any group as a whole was ever persecuted 
and repressed. Known or suspected UPP members, for example, were prevented from 
re-joining politics or even imprisoned throughout much of the 1970s. Yet, there was 
never any sign of state-directed violence against the Bemba as a group (neither as a 
language group nor as a tribe). As a result, group-specific concerns of self-preservation 
and survival that prompted so many of Uganda’s civil wars could never arise.
(2) Socioeconomic inter-group inequalities
Second, differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia depend not only on 
political inequalities at the elite level but also on socioeconomic inequalities at the mass 
level. While the former were clearly more decisive, the latter have also played a role in 
both countries.
Uganda has a long history of inter-group inequalities at the mass level, evident in the 
enduring socioeconomic marginalisation of tribal groups from Northern and parts of 
Eastern Region. For the period between 1962 and 1986, these inequalities can hardly be 
directly related to recurrent civil war since all insurgencies originated among tribal 
groups that did not suffer from relative socioeconomic deprivation. The post-1986 
rebellions, by contrast, were clearly facilitated by the socioeconomic neglect of the 
North-East. As tribal groups from the North and parts of the East were disadvantaged at 
both the elite and mass levels, Northern and Eastern rebel leaders found it easier to 
recruit mass followers. This supports Stewart et al’s hypothesis that consistent
• * o/: thorizontal inequalities facilitate violent political mobilisation.
In Zambia, inter-group inequalities at the mass level have always been less pronounced 
than in Uganda, yet not entirely absent. The relative socioeconomic deprivation of 
Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces after independence did however not 
translate into violent conflict, especially because the affected groups were always
861 Stewart 2008.
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included in political terms. More recently, declining socioeconomic disparities between 
provinces have arguably helped to further entrench Zambia’s peace and stability. This 
can be interpreted as evidence that civil war is especially unlikely if there are no 
horizontal inequalities at both the elite and mass levels.
(3) Political leadership
Third, there is evidence that a country’s propensity for peace or conflict depends not 
only on the inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on the presence or absence of 
political leadership that is perceived as a credible mediator between competing social 
groups.
In Zambia, political leadership in the form of a credible mediator has always been 
present since independence. The most prominent example would be the first President 
Kenneth Kaunda who was essentially a political outsider considered ‘above tribe’ due to 
his Nyasaland parentage. The Bemba could respect him because he had grown up 
among them, while the other tribes could accept him because he was not a ‘real’ Bemba 
-  a constellation that earned him the status of a unifier and enabled him to hold the 
fragile elite bargain together even during the hefty factional struggles of the late 1960s. 
The second President Frederick Chiluba, while more controversial than Kaunda, was 
strongly rooted in the urban, non-tribal trade unions and therefore also qualified as a 
mediator. Moreover, he was a Bemba-speaker but from the small Lunda tribe in 
Luapula Province, which may have eased old fears of Bemba domination. Levy 
Mwanawasa, the country’s third President, was essentially a compromise candidate who 
had been Vice-President in the early 1990s but had largely stayed away from the intra- 
MMD struggles surrounding the ‘third term’ debate. Also, his parentage from the small 
Lenje and Lamba tribes allowed him to defuse unabated fears of Bemba domination. 
Unsurprisingly, the current President Rupiah Banda is also a political outsider within 
MMD in that he is a former UNIP member from the so far underrepresented Nyanja- 
speaking East. As such, he is again a credible mediator between the different parts of 
the country.
Uganda’s post-colonial leaders, by contrast, have never been credible mediators 
between competing tribal groups. The country’s first President, Edward Mutesa, was at 
the same time the King of the much-resented Baganda, while the First Prime Minister
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Milton Obote belonged to the largest Northern tribe (the Langi) and headed a political 
party (the UPC) with distinct anti-Baganda roots. As a consequence, both post­
independence leaders were -  unlike Kaunda in Zambia -  hardly credible mediators 
‘above tribe’. Idi Amin belonged to a small tribe on the periphery of the Ugandan state 
(the Kakwa). Yet, his potential as a mediator was undermined by a number of factors, 
including his military background, his personal involvement in the 1966 attack on the 
Kabaka’s palace, and his leading role in the tribal struggles within the military that led 
to the 1971 coup. Yusuf Lule, the first UNLF President, was initially regarded a 
compromise candidate between the various UNLF factions but soon discredited as a 
mediator by his obvious association with the Baganda monarchists, which heighted 
long-standing fears of Baganda domination. The current President Yoweri Museveni, 
finally, could never be considered a credible mediator due to his long-standing conflict 
with the pro-Obote forces and his status as the protagonist of the NRA war -  the 
country’s major incidence of civil war that was rooted in a Bantu-alliance with the 
Baganda and for the first time deprived the North of political and military power.
(4) Levels of urbanisation
Fourth, my research suggests that the likelihood of civil war depends not only on the 
inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on levels o f urbanisation.
In peaceful Zambia, the salience of language and tribe as the predominant social 
cleavages has been blurred by high levels of urbanisation, which go back to the growth 
of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930s. Urban migration has reduced 
language barriers in that many Bemba- speakers on the Copperbelt and Nyanja-speakers 
in Lusaka are no longer from one of the Bemba- or Nyanja-speaking tribes. Moreover, it 
has resulted in high levels of inter-tribal marriages (about 50% of all Zambians in urban 
areas) who have less of a tribal outlook and whose off-springs are considered ‘proper’ 
Zambians. At the same time, PF’s successful populist campaign around issues of urban 
poverty in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt shows that cross-cutting class cleavages have 
become more important. This is not to deny that language and tribe remain very relevant 
social cleavages -  evident in recent patterns of electoral competition -  and therefore 
continue to require political accommodation. Yet, it seems safe to claim that high levels 
of urbanisation and inter-tribal marriages have made extreme collective action based on 
language or tribe less likely.
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In conflict-ridden Uganda, levels of urbanisation have been much lower whereby tribe 
as the main social cleavage is less blurred than in Zambia. At the same time, cross­
cutting class cleavages seem also less developed. The largely unmitigated salience of 
tribal divides by itself does of course not explain recurrent violent conflict. But in the 
context of persistently exclusionary elite bargains, low levels of urbanisation and 
underdeveloped cross-cutting class cleavages may have further facilitated violent 
mobilisation along tribal lines.
(5) Regional spillover effects
Finally, there is reason to expect that a country’s vulnerability to civil war depends not 
only on the inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on regional spillover effects. This 
is in line with findings from the quantitative civil war literature.862
In Uganda, four out of the seven anti-Museveni insurgencies -  namely the LRA, 
WNBF, UNRF II and ADF -  also involved important regional spillover effects in that 
they were part of a ‘proxy war’ between Uganda and Sudan where the Sudanese 
government provided Ugandan rebel groups with financial and military aid, while the 
NRM backed John Garang’s SPLA. The extreme case of the ADF apart, it is however 
important to recognise that the regional spillover effects did not by themselves cause the 
anti-Museveni rebellions. Instead, the Sudanese destabilisation attempts were only 
successful in combination with Museveni’s exclusionary elite bargain, which made it 
rather easy for the Sudanese regime to identify disgruntled groups and help them to take 
up arms against the NRM government. Conversely, Sudan would have found it much 
harder to destabilise Uganda if Museveni had forged a truly inclusive elite bargain. 
Altogether, regional conflict complexes in combination with exclusionary elite bargains 
make civil war onset especially likely.
In Zambia, by contrast, the regional spillover effects of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s did 
not lead to civil war. Accordingly, the liberation wars in many of Zambia’s 
neighbouring countries (Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique) and especially 
recurrent destabilisation attempts from apartheid South Africa could not undermine the 
country’s remarkable peace and stability, most evident in the failure of the South
862 Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1998.
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Africa-supported Mushala rebellion. This confirms the above claim that regional 
spillover effects by themselves are not sufficient to cause violent conflict. Instead, the 
persistence of inclusive elite bargains has not only insulated Zambia against the effects 
of regional instability but even proved to be an integrating factor: Rather than causing 
internal conflict, the presence of an external threat strengthened UNIP’s domestic 
authority and ultimately helped to further unify the country. Altogether, there is reason 
to argue that regional conflict complexes in combination with inclusive elite bargains 
make civil war avoidance especially likely.
The above four lessons show that differences in civil war occurrence depend not only on 
the inclusiveness o f the elite bargain but also on violent state repression, socioeconomic 
inter-group inequalities, political leadership, levels o f urbanisation and regional 
spillover effects.
8.2 Three avenues for future research
What are avenues for future research? In what follows, I will briefly outline three 
different possible approaches, which focus on (1) extending the number of cases; (2) 
explaining the inclusiveness of the elite bargain; and (3) theorising the link between the 
elite bargain and economic development.
EXTENDING THE NUMBER OF CASES
A first avenue for future research would be to extend the number of cases in order to see 
whether variation in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain can also account for 
differences in civil war occurrence beyond Uganda and Zambia.
A brief glance at the Africanist literature suggests that my findings may indeed be 
transferable to a larger number of cases. Accordingly, many of the civil war ‘immune’ 
African countries listed in chapter 1 seem to be characterised by sustained attempts for 
power-sharing between competing social groups. In Tanzania, to begin with, the ruling 
party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) (later Chama cha Mapinduzi -  
CCM) has resisted any form of sectarian favouritism and forged an elite bargain that is
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• • * • • o/:ibroadly representative of the country’s tribal, regional and religious divisions. In 
Cameroon, the ‘politics of regional and ethnic balance’ have been an important feature 
of both the Ahidjo and Biya administrations.864 In Ghana, the informal convention of 
ethno-regional balancing in government has ensured high levels of political power- 
sharing since independence, which in turn meant that group leaders had few incentives 
to mobilise their constituents along ethno-regional lines. Similar balancing policies in 
the distribution of government appointments became also evident in Gnassingbe
O f . f i
Eyadema’s Togo and Sekou Toure’s Guinea. Many of Africa’s civil war prone 
countries, by contrast, seem to be characterised by extremely exclusionary elite 
bargains. In Sudan, successive Northern-based governments have resisted fully 
providing genuine Southern leaders with access to the inner circles of state power867 -  a 
situation that seems to have changed only with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) of 2005.868 Similarly, conflict-ridden Chad has since independence been plagued 
by a pronounced ethno-regional bias in government and the army, first in favour of the
O^ Q
South (under Tombalbaye), and later in favour of the North (under Habre and 
Deby). In Burundi, the minority Tutsi have -  at least until the power-sharing attempts
871from the mid-1990s -  monopolised positions of political and military power at the
expense of the majority Hutu,872 while the regionally confined civil wars in Senegal and 
Mali seem to be related to the political and economic marginalisation of the
870
Casamancais (especially the Diola) and the nomadic groups in Azawad. In Cote 
d’Ivoire, finally, Houphouet-Boigny’s inclusive post-colonial coalition based on a 
system of ethnic quotas broke down after his death in 1993 and was followed by the 
progressive political marginalisation of Northern groups, which became a key driver 
behind violent conflict from the late 1990s.874
863 Lindemann & Putzel 2010. More recently, there have however been signs that the ruling party’s 
inclusive nationalist coalition may be unravelling (Kelsall 2002; Cameron & Dorman 2009).
864 Bayart 1979; Nyamnjoh 1999.
865 Langer 2007.
866 Rothchild & Foley 1988.
867 Rothchild 1997: 64p.
868 Raftopoulos & Alexander 2006.
869 Decalo 1980; Lemarchand 1986.
870 Lemarchand 2005.
871 Vandeginste 2006; Lemarchand 2007.
872 Lemarchand 1994; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2005.
873 Humphreys & Mohamed 2005.
874 Langer 2005.
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Nevertheless, there is also clear evidence that exclusionary elite bargains do not always 
lead to violent conflict. A closer look at Andreas Wimmer’s Ethno-Power-Relations 
(EPR) dataset, for example, reveals that not all politically relevant ethnic groups who 
are excluded from executive level state power actually engage in armed insurgency 
against the central government. To give a few examples, the indigenous peoples in 
Ecuador, the Berbers in Morocco, the Luba-Kasai in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Sunni Kurds in Syria or the Uyghurs in China were all powerless for long 
periods of time but nonetheless refrained from violence. Other ethnic groups like the 
Roma in Slovakia, the Hindus in Bangladesh, the Bataks in Indonesia, the Mapuche in 
Chile or the Ndebele in Zimbabwe have even peacefully endured open discrimination 
and violent repression. Again other groups like the Igbo in Nigeria or the Fur in Sudan 
have repeatedly suffered from exclusion and repression, yet violent rebellion has 
remained the exception rather than the norm. In the light of these contradictions, there is 
need to better understand the conditions that are likely to favour peace despite the odds, 
i.e. in situations when ethnicity has been politicised and politics is perceived as a matter 
of unequal power relations between ethnic communities and their leaders.
This is the aim of a research project at the Max Planck Institute for the Study o f 
Religious and Ethnic Diversity in which I am involved.875 Here, we will compare pairs 
of ethnic groups that suffer from similar degrees of exclusion and can therefore be 
expected to display the same propensity for armed rebellion, yet display strikingly 
different behaviours: One group travels down the road of violence, while the other one 
maintains peace. To account for these different outcomes, we rely on a theoretical
QH/l
framework that draws on the often overlapping literatures on ‘contentious politics’ ,
OHH ono
social revolutions and civil war . We focus on two sets of factors. One is related to 
differences in group-specific endowments, including political leadership, social 
networks, economic resources and geographical concentration. The other one is related 
to the broader political opportunity structure in which the ethnic groups operate, 
including the territorial reach of the state, state repression, elite divisions and regularity 
of leader entry. On the whole, we hypothesise that the effects of ethnic exclusion are 
conditioned on both group-specific endowments and the capacity of the state.
875 http://www.mmg.mpg.de/research/all-projects/conditions-of-conviviality-and-conflict/.
876 E.g. Me Adam et al. 2001; Tilly 2003; Tilly & Tarrow 2007.
877 E.g. Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978; Goodwin 2001.
878 E.g. Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003.
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EXPLAINING THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE ELITE BARGAIN
A second avenue for future research would be to try to explain variation in the 
inclusiveness of the elite bargain. Why did Zambia’s post-colonial leaders forge and 
maintain inclusive elite bargains? Why did Ugandan leaders rely on more or less 
extreme minority regimes? And why did Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire establish 
an inclusive coalition based on ethnic quotas, while his successors did not?
These are arguably important questions that have so far received surprisingly little 
academic attention. A first possible approach when trying to explain variation in the 
inclusiveness of the elite bargain would be to theorise the pivotal role of personal 
agency. Here, one could -  in line with the ‘Great Men of History’ approach -  focus on 
personal character traits of political leaders such as sanity, fear or greed. With a view to 
the role of a leader’s sanity, one could build on Decalo’s879 work on the ‘psychoses of 
power’, which may help to shed light on the genesis of Idi Amin’s extreme minority 
regime. As for the role of fear, one could draw on Joel Migdal’s work on the ‘politics of 
survival’, which suggests that rulers may fear to share access to state structures as this
O O A
could help potential opponents to gain leverage or create competing power centres. 
According to interview evidence, this may be one of the reasons why Museveni has
oo 1
been hesitant to establish a truly broad-based government and army. With respect to 
the role of greed, one could hypothesise that some leaders are simply greedier than 
others and therefore refuse to share access to state resources. This may again help to 
explain the absence of broadbasedness in Museveni’s Uganda. As Museveni and his
» ♦ OOAcronies draw considerable material benefits from the civil wars in the North, they 
may have little interest in an inclusive and peaceful political order.
While a focus on sanity, fear and greed could yield pertinent answers, such personal 
character traits are inherently difficult to measure. As a consequence, there may be 
reason to theorise the role of personal agency not in terms of personal character traits 
but rather in terms of a leader’s geographical, social, professional and politico- 
ideological background. This is precisely what Sean Fox and I are currently trying to do 
in the context of a small project on ‘Leadership and political stability in post­
879 Decalo 1989.
880 Migdal 1988.
881 Various interviews.
882 For details see Tangri & Mwenda 2001; Dolan 2009.
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independence Africa’ where we compile a basic set of biographic data on Sub-Saharan
DO')
Africa’s post-independence leaders. We hope to identify those individual background 
characteristics that predict which leaders will seek out inclusive political coalitions and 
thereby reduce the probability of political instability or outright civil war.
A first focus is to determine the geographical background of a political leader, which 
means that we collect information on weather he/she was bom and raised inside or 
outside the country and in rural or urban areas. The hypothesis is that leaders who are 
bom and raised outside the country or in urban areas may be more suitable as credible 
mediators between competing social groups. A second focus is to establish the social 
background of a leader, including information not only on the individual’s ethnicity and 
religion but also on how many of the country’s official languages he/she speaks, his/her 
place in the age hierarchy and the social background of his/her parents. The idea is that 
political leaders who do not belong to the country’s main ethnic or religious group, 
speak all official languages and come from an economic-administrative rather than 
traditional elite family may be more likely to forge inclusive coalitions. A third focus is 
to shed light on the leader’s professional background by compiling information on 
his/her level of education and major prior occupations. Our hunch is that leaders with a 
high level of formal education and a non-military professional background may 
facilitate the emergence of inclusive elite bargains. A final focus of our project is to 
determine the politico-ideological background of Africa’s leaders, which means that we 
look for prior membership in labour unions, cooperative unions, civil service 
associations or tribal associations. The hypothesis is that elected leaders with a 
background in labour unions, cooperative unions or civil service associations are more 
likely to seek out inclusive political coalitions.
A second possible approach when trying to explain variation in the inclusiveness of the 
elite bargain would be to focus on structural constraints, especially on the role of 
historical path dependency. Again using the examples of Uganda and Zambia, Obote 
inherited a colonial army heavily dominated by Northerners, whereas Kaunda found 
himself with a colonial army that was more balanced in composition. Similarly, 
Museveni came to power with the help of a rebel force almost entirely composed of 
Westerners and Baganda, while Chiluba and Mwanawasa in Zambia could build on
883 http://csrcafricanleadershipproject.wikispaces.com/. Note that we define leaders as the de facto holders 
of state power, which is typically the President or the Prime Minister.
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UNIP’s achievement of a non-tribal military. Moreover, Uganda has suffered from an 
especially pronounced historical North-South divide with huge discrepancies in 
educational indicators, which may have hampered the recruitment of sufficiently skilled 
Northerners in both the civil service and the parastatal sector. In Zambia, the Lozi were 
also favoured in terms of early access to education but these discrepancies were clearly 
less pronounced than in Uganda. This is not to claim that history has predetermined 
different outcomes, which are always contingent on subsequent political agency. Yet, 
varying historical path dependency may have influenced the prospect of forging 
inclusive elite bargains, at least in the short- and medium term.
THEORISING THE LINK BETWEEN THE ELITE BARGAIN 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A third avenue for future research would be to theorise the link between a country’s 
elite bargain and its level of economic development. What are the economic 
consequences of inclusive versus exclusionary elite bargains?
While there is abundant research on the link between power-sharing and violent 
conflict, we know a lot less about the relationship between power-sharing and economic 
development. There is of course a large literature on how ethnic fractionalisation affects 
economic development.884 Yet, this literature mainly relies on demographic measures of 
ethnic fractionalisation that tell us little about whether power is shared between 
competing groups. I argue that the absence of power-sharing is likely to hamper 
economic development both indirectly and directly. First, a lack of power-sharing is 
likely to lead to violent conflict, which will in turn undermine economic activity. 
Second, there is also reason to assume a more direct relationship. Regimes based on an 
exclusionary elite bargain lack an ‘encompassing interest’ in society and therefore 
resemble Mancur Olson’s ‘roving bandit’ who prefers predation and consumption over 
public goods provision and productive investment -  a constellation that is prone to 
economic decline.885 As mentioned in chapter 1, such unproductive forms of rent- 
seeking and the corresponding political and economic collapse became most evident in 
Idi Amin’s Uganda. Yet, the relationship between exclusionary elite bargains and 
economic decline is by no means entirely straightforward. Instead, Museveni’s 
exclusionary elite bargain was accompanied by an internationally acclaimed record of
884 See, among others, Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina & La Ferrara 2005.
885 Olson 1993.
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economic recovery.886 Against this background, there is need to better understand under 
which conditions exclusionary elite bargains and the related violent conflict may lead to 
developmental outcomes. This is especially the case since processes of economic
oo7
transformation have historically been extremely violent in nature.
Inversely, one is intuitively inclined to think that inclusive elite bargains are conducive 
to economic development. As broad-based regimes have a large stake in society, they 
could be expected to develop an ‘encompassing interest’ and assume the role of Olson’s 
‘stationary bandit’ who engages in public goods provision and the promotion of 
productive economic activities. In reality, however, the case of Zambia underscores the  ^
fact that all good things do not go together. While the country’s inclusive elite bargain 
has clearly helped to avoid civil war, it has at the same time constrained the prospects of 
economic development. In this sense, there has been a trade-off between enduring peace 
and economic stagnation -  a dilemma of unproductive peace.888 This is explicitly 
recognised by Zambian intellectuals who deplore the fact that their country’s peace and 
stability has been largely unproductive in nature and benefitted only competing elites 
rather than the population as a whole.889 The political quest for an inclusive elite bargain 
is of course not the only driver behind Zambia’s economic stagnation. Nevertheless, the 
Zambian case shows that there is an important distinction between a resilient state890 
and a developmental state -  inclusive elite bargains and the corresponding peace and 
stability do not automatically lead to higher state effectiveness and developmental 
outcomes. Instead, inclusive rent-sharing policies follow a logic of politics, not of 
economic efficiency -  redistributive consumption dominates productive investment. 
This means that economic performance will tend to remain constrained by the 
unproductive imperatives of building and maintaining inclusive elite bargains, at least in
OQ 1
the short- and medium term.
Altogether, the lens of the elite bargain offers many different avenues for the study of 
the broader issues of war, peace and economic development. In relation to this 
ambitious agenda, my PhD thesis has hopefully made a modest contribution.
886 Reinikka & Collier 2001.
887 See Cramer 2006.
888 For a detailed version of this argument see Lindemann 2010.
889 Interview, Dr. Gilbert Mudenda; Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.
890 DiJohn & Putzel 2009.
891 For a similar argument on Tanzania see Khan & Gray 2006.
259
9 Bibliography
Abu-Lughod, Janet. 2007. ‘The Challenge of Comparative Case Studies’, City 11(3): 
399-404.
ACR -  Africa Contemporary Record. Various Years. Annual Survey and Documents. 
New York: Holmes & Meier.
Agyeman-Duah, B. 1992. ‘Civilian Control of the Military in Africa: The Case of 
Zambia’, in C. P. Danopoulos (ed), Civilian Rule in the Developing World: 
Democracy on the March? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 141-159.
Ahmad, Ehtisham, Brosio, Giorgio and Gonzalez, Maria. 2006. ‘Uganda: Managing 
More Effective Decentralisation’, IMF Working Paper 06/279, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund.
Alesina, Alberto F. and La Ferrara, Eliana. 2005. ‘Ethnic Diversity and Economic 
Performance’, Journal o f Economic Literature 43(3): 762-800.
Ali, Taisier M. and Matthews, Robert O. 2000. Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and 
Resolution. Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Allen, Chris. 1995. ‘Understanding African Politics’, Review o f African Political 
Economy 22(65): 301-320.
Allen, Tim. 1991. ‘Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement in Context’, 
Africa 61(3): 370-399.
Amaza, Oondoga O. 1998. Museveni’s Long March: From Guerrilla to Statesman. 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
Amselle, Jean-Loup and M’Bokolo, Elikia (eds). 1999. Au Cceur de VEthnie. Ethnies, 
Tribalisme etEtat en Afrique. Paris: Editions La Decouverte.
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Anderson, Per-Ake, Bigsten, Arne and Persson, Hakan. 2000. ’Foreign Aid, Debt and 
Growth in Zambia’, Research Report 112, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
Anguria, Omongole (ed). 2006. Apollo Milton Ohote: What Others Say. Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers.
Avirgan, Tony and Honey, Martha. 1982. War in Uganda: The Legacy o f Idi Amin. 
London: Zed Books.
Baechler, Gunther, Boge, Volker, Klotzli, Stefan, Libiszewski, Stephan and Spillmann, 
Kurt (eds). 1996. Kriegsursache Umweltzerstdrung -  Okologische Konflikte in der 
Dritten Welt und Wege ihrer friedlichen Bearbeitung. Zurich: Ruegger.
260
Bardhan, Pranab. 2000. ‘Institutional Impediments to Development’, in Mancur Olson 
and Satu Kahkonen (eds), A Not-So-Dismal Science: A Broader View o f 
Economies and Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 245-267.
Barkan, Joel, Kayunga, Sallie S., Ng'ethe, Njuguna and Titsworth, Jack. 2005. ‘The 
Political Economy of Uganda: The Art of Managing a Donor-Financed Neo- 
Patrimonial State’, Kampala: The World Bank.
Barongo, Yoramu. 1989. ‘Ethnic Pluralism and Political Centralization: The Basis of 
Political Conflict’, in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed), Conflict Resolution in Uganda. 
Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 65-90.
Bartlett, Daniel M. 2000. ’Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study’, 
Journal o f Southern African Studies 26(3): 429-446.
Bates, Robert H. and Collier, Paul. 1995. ‘The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform 
in Zambia’, Journal o f African Economies 4(1): 115-143.
Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1979. L ’Etat au Cameroun. Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
Bayart, Jean-Franfois. 1981. ‘Le Politique par le Bas en Afrique Noire: Questions de 
Methode’, Politique Africaine 1(1): 53-82.
Bayart, Jean-Franfois. 1989. L Etat en Afrique. La Politique du Ventre. Paris: Fayard.
Bayart, Jean-Franfois, Ellis, Stephen and Hibou, Beatrice. 1999. The Criminalisation o f 
the State in Africa. Oxford: James Currey.
Baylies, Carolyn. 1984. ‘Luapula Province: Economic Decline and Political Alienation 
in a Rural UNIP Stronghold’, in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris 
Szeftel (eds), The Dynamics o f the One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 163-205.
Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. ‘Elections in the One-Party State’, in 
Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), The Dynamics o f the 
One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 29-57.
Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris, 1992. ‘The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in 
Zambia’, Review o f African Political Economy 19(54): 75-91.
Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1997. ‘The 1996 Zambian Elections: Still 
Awaiting Democratic Consolidation’, Review o f African Political Economy 
24(71): 113-128.
Beblawi, Hazem. 1990. ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’, in Giacomo Luciani 
(ed.), The Arab State. London: Routledge, 85-98.
Behrend, Heike. 1999. Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits. Oxford: James Currey.
261
Berman, Bruce. 1984. ‘Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States of Colonial 
Africa’, Development and Change 15(2): 161-202.
Berman, Bruce. 1998. ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of 
Uncivil Nationalism’, African Affairs 97(388): 305-342.
Berry, Sara. 1993. No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics o f Agrarian 
Change in Subsaharan Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Blattman, Christopher and Miguel, Edward. 2010. ‘Civil War’, Journal o f Economic 
Literature 48(1): 3-57.
Boas, Morten and Dunn, Kevin C. (eds). 2007. African Guerrillas. Raging Against the 
Machine. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Boone, Catherine. 1994. ‘States and Ruling Classes in Sub-Saharan Africa: The 
Enduring Contradictions of Power’, in Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue 
(eds), State Power and Social Forces. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
108-142.
Boone, Catherine. 2004. Political Topographies o f the African State. Territorial 
Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Branch, Adam. 2005. ‘Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in 
Northern Uganda, 1986-1998’, African Studies Quarterly 8(2): 1-31.
Brett, Edward A. 1995. ‘Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the 
Military in Politics’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies 33(1): 129-152.
Brown, Graham K. 2008. ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Separatism in Southeast Asia: A 
Comparative Perspective’, in Frances Stewart (ed), Horizontal Inequalities and 
Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 252-281.
Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. 2008. Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda 
Remembering after Violence. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Burdette, Marcia. 1988. Zambia: Between Two Worlds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Burnell Peter. 2001. ‘The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium 
Dawn or Millennium Sunset?’, Contemporary Politics 7(2): 95-111.
Burnell, Peter. 2002. ‘Zambia’s 2001 Elections: The Tyranny of Small Decisions, Non- 
Decisions and Not Decisions’, Third World Quarterly 23(6): 1103-1120.
Burnell, Peter. 2003. ‘The Tripartite Elections in Zambia, December 2001’, Electoral 
Studies 22(2): 388-395.
Burnell Peter. 2005. ‘From Low-Conflict Polity to Democratic Civil Peace: Explaining 
Zambian Exceptionalism’, African Studies 64(2): 107-133.
Burton, Michael G. and Higley, John. 1987. ‘Elite Settlements’, American Sociological 
Review 52(3): 295-307.
Burton, Michael G. and Higley, John. 1998. ‘Political Crises and Elite Settlements’, in 
Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins o f Regimes. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 47-70.
Bussmann, Margit, Hasenclever, Andreas und Schneider, Gerald. 2009. ‘Identitat, 
Institutionen und Okonomie: Ursachen und Scheinursachen innenpolitischer 
Gewalt‘, in Margit Bussmann, Andreas Hasenclever und Gerald Schneider (eds), 
Identitat, Institutionen und Okonomie. Ursachen innenpolitischer Gewalt. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 9-38.
Bwengye, Francis A. 1985. The Agony o f Uganda: From Idi Amin to Obote. London: 
Regency Press.
Cameron, Greg and Dorman, Sara. 2009. ‘Problems of Nationalism and Democracy in 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania’, Paper Prepared for the Conference ‘Democratization in 
Africa: Retrospective and Future Prospects’, 4-5 December 2009, Leeds.
Cammack, Diana, Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, Kanyongolo, Fidelis and O’Neil, Tam. 
2007. ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda 
and Malawi in 2006’, Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction 
Working Paper Series 2, London: Overseas Development Institute.
Caplan, Gerald C. 1968. ‘Barotseland: The Secessionist Challenge to Zambia’, The 
Journal o f Modem African Studies 6(3): 343-360.
Carbone, Giovanni M. 2008. No-Party Democracy?: Ugandan Politics in Comparative 
Perspective. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Carr, Edward H. 1961. What Is History? London: Penguin.
Caumartin, Corinne, Molina, George G. and Thorp, Rosemary. 2008. ‘Inequality, 
Ethnicity and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia, 
Guatemala and Peru’, in Frances Stewart (ed), Horizontal Inequalities and 
Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 227-251.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Weidmann, Nils B. 2010a. ‘Horizontal 
Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison’, 
Unpublished Manuscript, Zurich: Center for Comparative and International 
Studies.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Wimmer, Andreas and Min, Brian. 2010b. ‘Why Do Ethnic 
Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis’, World Politics 62(1): 87-119.
Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 1999. Africa Works. Disorder as Political 
Instrument. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. ‘What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?’, Annual Review 
o f Political Science 9(1): 397-424.
Cheeseman, Nic and Hinfelaar, Maija. 2010. ‘Parties, Platforms and Political 
Mobilization: The Zambian Presidential Elections of 2008’, African Affairs 
109(434): 51-76.
Chikulo, Bomwell C. 1981. ‘The Zambian Administrative Reforms: An Alternative 
View', Public Administration and Development 1(1): 55-65.
Chikulo, Bomwell C. 1985. ‘Reorganization for Local Administration in Zambia: An 
Analysis of the Local Administration Act, 1980’, Public Administration and 
Development 5(1): 73-81.
Chikulo, Bomwell. 1996. ‘Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Third 
Republic, 1991-1994’, in Owen Sichone and Bomwell Chikulo (eds), Democracy 
in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic. Harare: Sapes Books, 25-52.
Chikulo, Bomwell C. 2000. ‘Corruption and Accumulation in Zambia’, in Hope R. 
Kempe and Bomwell C. Chikulo (eds), Corruption and Development in Africa. 
Lessons from Country Case-Studies. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 161-182.
Chikulo, Bomwell C. 2009. ‘Local Governance Reforms in Zambia: A Review’, 
Commonwealth Journal o f Local Governance 2: 98-106.
Chisala, Victoria, Geda, Alemayehu, Dagdeviren, Hulya, McKinley, Terry, Saad-Filho, 
Alfredo, Oya, Carlos and Weeks, John. 2006. ‘Economic Policies for Growth, 
Employment and Power Reduction: Case Study of Zambia’, Lusaka: UNDP.
Chodak, Szymon. 1964. ‘The Societal Functions of Party Systems in Subsaharan 
Africa*, in Erik Allardt and Yijo Littunen (eds), Cleavages, Ideologies and Party 
Systems. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 256-261.
Clapham, Christopher. 1985. Third World Politics. London: Helm.
Clapham, Christopher. 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics o f State 
Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clapham, Christopher (ed). 1998. African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey.
CMB -  Coffee Marketing Board. 1973. ‘Annual Report 1969’, Kampala: CMB.
264
Coleman, James S. 1975. ‘Tradition and Nationalism in Tropical Africa’, in Martin 
Kilson (ed), New States in the Modem World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 3-36.
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2002. ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’, 
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 46(1): 13-28.
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford 
Economic Papers 56(4): 563-595.
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2007. ‘Civil War’, in Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley 
(eds), Handbook o f Defense Economics. Volume 2: Defense in in a Globalized 
World. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 711-740.
Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (eds). 2005. Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: 
Africa. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Cramer, Christopher. 2005. ‘Inequality and Conflict. A Review of an Age-Old 
Concern’, Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Paper 11, Geneva: United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development.
Cramer, Christopher. 2006. Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing. Accounting for Violence in 
Developing Countries. London: Hurst & Company.
Craig, John R. 2000. ‘Evaluating Privatisation in Zambia: A Tale of Two Processes’, 
Review o f African Political Economy 27(85): 357-366.
Craig, John R. 2001. ‘Putting Privatisation into Practise: The Case of Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines Limited’, The Journal o f Modern African Studies 
39(3): 389-410.
Craig, John R. 2002. ‘Privatisation and Indigenous Ownership: Evidence from Africa’, 
Annals o f Public and Cooperative Economics 73(4): 559-576.
CSO -  Central Statistical Office. 1973. ‘Census of Population and Housing 1969: Final 
Report Volume I -  Total Zambia’, Lusaka: CSO.
CSO -  Central Statistical Office. 1985. ‘1980 Population and Housing Census of 
Zambia: Analytical Report Volume III’, Lusaka: CSO.
CSO -  Central Statistical Office. 2003. ‘Zambia 2000 Census Report: Volume 10’, 
Lusaka: CSO.
CSO -  Central Statistical Office. 2006. ‘Living Conditions Monitoring Survey V’, 
Lusaka: CSO.
CSRC -  Crisis States Research Centre. 2006. ‘War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: 
Phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme’, Crisis States Working Papers Series 2 1, 
London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.
Decalo, Samuel. 1980. ‘Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad’, The 
Journal o f Modem African Studies 18(1): 23-56.
Decalo, Samuel. 1989. Psychoses Of Power: African Personal Dictatorships. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press.
Delavignette, Robert. 1950. Freedom and Authority in French West Africa. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
De Soysa, Indra. 2002a. ‘Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?’, Global 
Environmental Politics 2(4): 1-34.
De Soysa, Indra. 2002b. ‘Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil 
War, 1989-99’, Journal o f Peace Research 39(4): 395-416.
De Soysa, Indra and Neumayer, Eric. 2007. ‘Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil 
War Onset: Results from a New Dataset of Natural Resource Rents, 1970-1999’, 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 24(3): 201-218.
DiJohn, Jonathan. 2002. ‘Mineral Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: 
A Critical Assessment of the Rentier State Model’, Crisis States Working Papers 
Series 1 20, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.
DiJohn, Jonathan and Putzel, James. 2009. ‘Political Settlements’, GSDRC Issues 
Paper, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, International Development 
Department.
Dolan, Chris. 2009. Social Torture: The Case o f Northern Uganda, 1986-2006. Oxford: 
Berghahn Books.
Dresang, Dennis. 1974. ‘Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development 
Administration: The Zambian Case’, American Political Science Review 68(4): 
1605-1617.
Dresang, Dennis and Young, Ralph. 1980. ‘The Public Service’, in William Tordoff 
(ed), Administration in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 68- 
103.
Duverger, Maurice. 1959. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the 
Modem State. London: Methuen.
East African Statistical Department. 1960. ‘Uganda General African Census 1959: 
Tribal Analysis for Protectorate Province -  District & Counties’, Entebbe: East 
African Statistical Department, Uganda Unit.
Easterly, William and Levine, Ross. 1997. ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and 
Ethnic Divisions’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics 112(4): 1203-1250.
266
Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. ‘Why Are There So Many Civil 
Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict’, Journal o f 
African Economies 9(3): 244-269.
Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. ‘How Much War Will We See? 
Estimating the Prevalence of Civil War in 161 Countries, 1960-1999’, Journal o f  
Conflict Resolution 46(3): 307-334.
Englebert, Pierre. 2000. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner.
Englebert, Pierre. 2005. ‘Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in 
Barotseland and Casamance’, Africa Spectrum 39(1): 29-59.
Englebert, Pierre. 2007. ‘Whither the Separatist Motive’, in Morten Boas and Kevin C. 
Dunn (eds), African Guerrillas. Raging Against the Machine. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 55-68.
Erdmann, Gero. 2007. ‘Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation -  an 
African Case: Zambia’, GIGA Working Paper 45, Hamburg: German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies.
Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf. 2006. ‘Neopatrimonialism Revisited -  Beyond a Catch- 
All Concept’, GIGA Working Paper 16, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies.
Erdmann, Gero and Simutanyi, Neo. 2003. ‘Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of 
the Third Republic’, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Occasional Papers, Lilongwe: 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
Fearon, James D. 2003. ‘Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A 
Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups’, Paper Presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 29 August -  1 September 
2002, Boston.
Fearon, James. 2005. ‘Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War’, Journal o f Conflict 
Resolution 49(4): 483-507.
Fearon, James. 2010. ‘Governance and Civil War Onset4, Background Paper Prepared 
for the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, Washington DC: World 
Bank.
Fearon, James and Laitin, David. 2000. ‘Ordinary Language and External Validity: 
Specifying Concepts in the Study of Ethnicity’, Paper Presented at the Second 
Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes Meeting, Philadelphia.
267
Fearon, James and Laitin, David. 2003. ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, 
American Political Science Review 97(1): 75-90.
Ferguson, Niall. 2000. Virtual History: Alternatives and Counter/actuals. New York: 
Basic Books.
Finnstrdm, Sverker. 2008. Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday 
Moments in Uganda. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Flint, Julie and De Waal, Alex. 2008. Darfur: A Short History o f a Long War. London: 
Zed Books.
Francis, Paul and James, Robert. 2003. ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen 
Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralisation Program’, World 
Development 31(2): 325-337.
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerring, John. 2007. Case Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Gersony, Robert. 1997. ‘The Anguish of Northern Uganda. Results of a Field-Based 
Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda’, Kampala: United States 
Embassy/ USAID.
Gertzel, Cherry. 1980. ‘Uganda after Amin: The Continuing Search for Leadership and 
Control’, African Affairs 79(317): 461-489.
Gertzel, Cherry. 1984a. ‘Dissent and Authority in the Zambian One-Party State’, in 
Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), The Dynamics o f the 
One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 79-118.
Gertzel, Cherry. 1984b. ‘Western Province: Tradition, Economic Deprivation and 
Political Alienation’, in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), 
The Dynamics o f the One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 206-236.
Gertzel, Cherry and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. ‘Politics in an African Urban Setting: The 
Role of the Copperbelt in the Transition to the One-Party State, 1964-1973’, in 
Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), The Dynamics o f the 
One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 118-162.
Gertzel, Cherry, Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. ‘Introduction: The Making 
of the One-Party State’, in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel
268
(eds), The Dynamics o f the One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1-28.
Ginywera-Pinchwa, A. G. 1989. ‘Is there a Northern Question’, in Kumar Rupesinghe 
(ed), Conflict Resolution in Uganda. Oslo: International Peace. Research Institute: 
44-64.
Goldstone, Jack, Bates, Robert H., Epstein, David L., Gurr, Ted R., Lustik, Michael B., 
Marshall, Monty G., Ulfelder, Jay and Woodward, Mark. 2010. ‘A Global 
Forecasting Model of Political Instability’, American Journal o f Political Science 
54(1): 190-208.
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 1999. Decentralisation, Democracy, and Development 
Administration in Uganda, 1986-1996: Limits to Popular Participation. London: 
University of London, unpublished PhD thesis.
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 2005. ‘Reassessing Popular Participation in Uganda’, 
Public Administration and Development 24(4): 289-304.
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 2008. ‘Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An 
Analytical Narrative in State-Making’, Crisis States Working Papers Series 2 27, 
London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.
Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945- 
1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gordon, David. 2008. ‘Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa Conflict Revisited’, in 
Jan-Bart Gewald, Maija Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), One Zambia, Many 
Histories. Towards a History o f Post-Colonial Zambia. Leiden: Brill, 45-76.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 1991. ‘Uganda Government Directory’, Entebbe: 
GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 1994a. ‘The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations’, 
Kampala: GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 1994b. ‘Decentralisation in Uganda: The Policy and its 
Implications’, Kampala: Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation 
Secretariat, GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 2005. ‘The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act 2005, 
Acts Supplement No. 5 to the Uganda Gazette No. 56 Volume XCVIII dated 2 
September 2005’, Entebbe: GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 2008a. ‘List of Permanent Secretaries, 2008’, Kampala: 
Office of the President, GOU, unpublished.
269
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 2008b. ‘List of Chiefs and Directors of UPDF’, 
Kampala: GOU, unpublished.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 2008c. ‘Statutory Report of the Privatisation and 
Utility Sector Reform Project for the Periods July to December 2004, 2005, 
2006’, Kampala: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 2009a. ‘The Official Report of the Parliament of 
Uganda (Hansard), 12 May 2009’, Kampala: GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. 2009b. ‘The Official Report of the Parliament of 
Uganda (Hansard), 29 April 2009’, Kampala: GOU.
GOU -  Government of Uganda. Various Years. ‘The Official Report of the Parliament 
of Uganda (Hansard)’, Kampala: GOU.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. 2002. ‘The National Decentralisation Policy: Towards 
Empowering the People’, Lusaka: Office of the President, GOZ.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. 2007. ‘Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary 
Debates, 30 March 2007’, Lusaka: GOZ.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. 2009. ‘Decentralisation Implementation Plan, 2009- 
2013’, Lusaka: Decentralisation Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing, GOZ.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. Various Years a. ‘Official Verbatim Report of the 
Parliamentary Debates’, Lusaka: GOZ.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. Various Years b. ‘Zambian Government Gazette’, 
Lusaka: GOZ.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. Various Years c. ‘Economic Report’, Lusaka: Ministry 
of Finance, GOZ.
GOZ -  Government of Zambia. Various Years d. ‘List of Permanent Secretaries’, 
Lusaka: Cabinet Office, GOZ, unpublished.
Gould, Jeremy. 2007. ‘Zambia’s 2006 Elections: The Ethnicization of Politics?’, News 
from the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
Green, Elliot D. 2006. ‘Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Central 
Uganda’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44(3): 370-388.
Green, Elliott D. 2008. ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda’, Conflict, Security 
and Development 8(4): 436-448.
Green, Elliott D. 2010. ‘Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 45(1): 83-103.
Gurr, Ted R. 1993a. Minorities at Risk: A Global View o f Ethnopolitical Conflict. 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Gurr, Ted R. 1993b. ‘Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal 
Mobilization and Conflict since 1945’, International Political Science Review 
14(2): 161-201.
Gurr, Ted R. 2000. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. 
Washington DC : United States Institute of Peace Press.
Haantobolo, Godfrey. 2008. Civil Control of the Military in Zambia. Johannesburg: 
University of the Witwatersrand, unpublished PhD thesis.
Hall, Richard 1976. Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period. London: Longman.
Hampwaye, Godfrey. 2008. ‘The Limits of Decentralisation in Urban Zambia’, Urban 
Forum 19(4): 347-361.
Hansen, Holger B. 1977. ‘Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda: A Study of Ethnicity 
as a Political Factor in Uganda’, Research Report 43, Uppsala: Nordic Africa 
Institute.
Harden, Blaine. Dispatches from a Fragile Continent. New York: Norton.
Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew. 2003. ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing 
and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal o f Political Science 
47(2): 318-332.
Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing 
Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement o f Civil Wars. Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Hauge, Wenche and Ellingsen, Tanja. 1998. ‘Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal 
Pathways to Conflict’, Journal o f Peace Research 35(3): 299-317.
Hawthorn, Geoffrey. 1993. Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History 
and the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hegre, Havard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gates, Scott and Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 2001. ‘Toward 
a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816- 
1992’, American Political Science Review 95(1): 33-48.
Hegre, Havard and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. ‘Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical 
Results on Civil War Onset’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 50(4): 508-535.
Higley, John and Burton, Michael G. 2006. Elite Foundations o f Liberal Democracy. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Hinfelaar, Maija. 2008. ‘Legitimizing Powers: The Political Role of the Roman 
Catholic Church, 1972-1991’, in Jan-Bart Gewald, Maija Hinfelaar and Giacomo
271
Macola (eds), One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History o f Post-Colonial 
Zambia. Leiden: Brill, 129-143.
Hoddie, Matthew and Hartzell, Caroline. 2005. ‘Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: 
Initiating the Transition from Civil War’, in Philip G. Roeder and Donald 
Rothchild (eds), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. 
Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press, 83-106.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994. ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: 
Evidence from the Cases’, International Security 19(1): 5-40.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1999. Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Hovil, Lucy and Werker, Eric. 2004. ‘Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An Account of 
Rational, Sub-Optimal Violence in Uganda’, Rationality and Society 17(1): 5-34.
Hulterstrom, Karolina. 2004. In Pursuit Of Ethnic Politics: Voters, Parties and Policies 
in Kenya and Zambia. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: 
Uncovering the Mechanisms’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508-537.
Humphreys, Macartan and Mohamed, Habaye ag. 2005. ‘Senegal and Mali’, in Paul 
Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds), Understanding Civil War. Volume I: Africa. 
Washington DC: The World Bank, 247-302.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World
Order. New York: Simon and Shuster.
ICG -  International Crisis Group. 2004. ‘Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving 
the Conflict’, ICG Africa Report 77, Nairobi/Brussels: ICG.
ICG -  International Crisis Group. 2007. ‘Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for 
Peace’, ICG Africa Report 124, Kampala/Nairobi/Brussels: ICG.
ICG -  International Crisis Group. 2008. ‘Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, With or 
Without Kony’, ICG Africa Report 148, Nairobi/Kampala/Juba/Brussels: ICG.
Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1995. ‘From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi- 
Party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia4,
Canadian Journal o f African Studies 29(1): 1-25.
272
IISS -  International Institute for Strategic Studies. Various Years. The Military Balance. 
London: Routledge.
IMF -  International Monetary Fund. 2009. Government Finance Statistics. Manchester: 
ESDS International, University of Manchester.
INDECO -  Industrial Development Corporation. Various Years. ‘Annual Report’, 
Lusaka: INDECO.
Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G. 1982. Personal Rule in Black Africa. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Jarstad, Anna K. and Nilsson, Desiree. 2008. ‘From Words to Deeds: The 
Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords’, Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 25(3): 206-223.
Johns, Sheridan. 1980. ‘The Parastatal Sector’, in William Tordoff (ed), Administration 
in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 104-129.
Jorgensen, Jan J. 1981. Uganda: A Modem History. London: Croom Helm.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic o f Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2007. ‘Civil Wars’, in Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook o f Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4 lb- 
434.
Kaplan, Robert D. 1994. ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, 
Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet’, 
The Atlantic Monthly 73(2): 44-76.
Karl, Terry L. 1997. The Paradox o f the Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Kasfir, Nelson. 1976. The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in 
African Politics, with a Case Study o f Uganda. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Kasfir, Nelson. 1998. ‘No Party Democracy in Uganda’, Journal o f Democracy 9(2): 
49-63.
Kasfir, Nelson. 2000. ‘Movement Democracy, Legitimacy and Power in Uganda’, in 
Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), No-Party Democracy in Uganda: 
Myths and Realities. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 60-78.
Kasfir, Nelson. 2005. ‘Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance 
Army in Uganda, 1981-86’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies 43(2): 271- 
296.
Kasozi, Abdu B. 1994. The Social Origins o f Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985. 
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Kayunga, Sallie S. 2000. ‘The Impact of Armed Opposition on the Movement System 
in Uganda’, in Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), No-Party Democracy 
in Uganda: Myths and Realities. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 109-126.
Kelsall, Tim. 2002. ‘Shop Windows and Smoke-Filled Rooms: Governance and the Re­
politicisation of Tanzania’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies 40(4): 597- 
619.
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2000a. ‘Rents, Efficiency and Growth’, in Mushtaq H. Khan and 
Jomo Kwame Sundaram (eds), Rents, Rent-seeking and Economic Development: 
Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 21-69.
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2000b. ‘Rent-Seeking as Process’, in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo 
Kwame Sundaram (eds), Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory 
and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 70-144.
Khan, Mushtaq and Gray, Hazel. 2006. ‘State Weakness in Developing Countries and 
Strategies of Institutional Reform -  Operational Implications for Anti-Corruption 
Policy and a Case Study of Tanzania’, London: DFID.
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Kirunda-Kivejinja, A. M. 1995. Uganda: The Crisis o f Confidence. Kampala: 
Progressive Publishing House.
Kiiza, Julius, Makara, Sabiti and Rakner, Lise (eds). 2008. Electoral Democracy in 
Uganda. Understanding the Institutional Processes and Outcomes o f the 2006 
Multiparty Elections. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
Klugman, Jeni, Neyapti, Bilin, and Stewart, Frances. 1999. Conflict and Growth in 
Africa, Vol. 2: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Paris: OECD.
Kohli, Athul. 2004. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization 
in the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kyemba, Henry. 1997. A State o f Blood: The Inside Story o f Idi Amin. Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers.
Lamb, David. 1982. The Africans. New York: Random House.
Lamwaka, Caroline C. 1998. ‘Civil War and the Peace Process in Uganda, 1986-1997’, 
East African Journal o f Peace and Human Rights 4(2): 139-169.
274
Langer, Amim. 2005. ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilization in Cote 
d'Ivoire’, Oxford Development Studies 33(1): 25-45.
Langer, Amim. 2009. ‘Living with Diversity: The Peaceful Management of Horizontal 
Inequalities in Ghana’, Journal o f International Development 21(4): 534-546.
Langer, Amim, Mustapha, Abdul M. and Stewart, Frances. 2007. ‘Horizontal 
Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire: Issues and Policies’, CRISE 
Working Paper 45, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security 
and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
Larmer, Miles. 2005. ‘Reaction & Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia’, Review o f 
African Political Economy 32(103): 29-45.
Larmer, Miles. 2006a. ‘Zambia’s Mineworkers and the Labour Movement’s Resistance 
to the One-Party State, 1973-1981’, South African Historical Journal 56(1): 154- 
176.
Larmer, Miles. 2006b. ‘The Hour Has Come at the Pit: The Mineworkers’ Union of 
Zambia and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 1982-1991’, Journal o f 
Southern African Studies 32(2): 293-312.
Larmer, Miles. 2008. ‘Enemies Within? Opposition to the Zambian One-Party State, 
1972-1980’, in Jan-Bart Gewald, Maija Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), 
One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History o f Post-Colonial Zambia. 
Leiden: Brill, 98-128.
Larmer, Miles and Fraser, Alastair. 2007. ‘Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist 
Politics and Zambia’s 2006 Election’, African Affairs 106(425): 611-637.
Larmer, Miles and Macola, Giacomo. 2007. ‘The Origins, Context and Political 
Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State’, 
International Journal o f African Historical Studies 40(3): 471-496.
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1967. Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und politische 
Kultur in der Schweiz und in Osterreich. Tubingen: Mohr.
Lemarchand, Rene. 1986. ‘Chad: The Misadventures of the North-South Dialectic’, 
African Studies Review 29(3): 27-41.
Lemarchand, Rene. 1994. Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lemarchand, Rene. 2005. ‘Ou va le Tchad?’, Afrique contemporaine 215(3): 117-128.
Lemarchand, Rene. 2007. ‘Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, 
Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs 106(422): 1- 
20 .
275
Lewis, Arthur W. 1965. Politics in West Africa. London: Allen & Unwin.
Lijphart, Arendt. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Lijphart, Arendt. 2008. Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule 
in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.
Lindemann, Stefan. 2010. ‘Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma of Unproductive
tViPeace: Evidence from Zambia’, Paper Presented at the 60 Political Studies 
Association Annual Conference ‘Sixty Years of Political Studies: Achievements 
and Futures’, 29 March -  1 April 2010, Edinburgh.
Lindemann, Stefan and Putzel, James. 2010. ‘Understanding Peace and Stability in 
Tanzania: An Analytical Narrative in State-Making’, Crisis States Working 
Papers Series 2 (forthcoming), London: Crisis States Research Centre, London 
School of Economics.
Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: 
Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press.
Lomo, Zachary and Hovil, Lucy. 2004a. ‘Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflicts in 
Uganda’s West Nile Region’, Refugee Law Project Working Paper 12, Kampala: 
Refugee Law Project.
Lomo, Zachary and Hovil, Lucy. 2004b. ‘Behind the Violence. Causes, Consequences 
and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda’, Refugee Law 
Project Working Paper 11, Kampala: Refugee Law Project.
Lonsdale, John. 1981. ‘States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical 
Survey’, African Studies Review 24(2-3): 139-225.
Lujala, Paivi, Gleditsch, Nils Petter and Gilmore, Elisabeth. 2005. ‘A Diamond Curse? 
Civil War and a Lootable Resource’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 49(4): 538- 
562.
Macola, Giacomo. 2008. ‘Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the Roots of 
Authoritarianism in Nationalist Zambia’, in Jan-Bart Gewald, Maija Hinfelaar and 
Giacomo Macola (eds), One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History o f Post- 
Colonial Zambia. Leiden: Brill, 17-44.
Malthus, Thomas R. 1803/ 1992. An Essay on the Principle o f Population. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1976. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. London: 
Heinemann.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1983. Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda. Nairobi: Heinemann.
276
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy 
o f Late Colonialism. London: James Currey.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and 
the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.
Marchal, Ronald. 2002. ‘Liberia, Sierra Leone et Guinee: Une Guerre Sans Frontieres?’, 
Politique Africaine 88: 5-13.
Mamham, Patrick. 1979. Fantastic Invasion: Dispatches from Africa. New York: 
Penguin.
Marshall, Monty G. and Jaggers, Keith. 2005. Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Dataset Users ’ Manual. Arlington, 
VA: George Mason University.
Matovu, John M. and Stewart, Frances. 2001. ‘Uganda: The Social and Economic Costs 
of Conflict’, in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald (eds), The Economic and 
Social Consequences o f Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 240-288.
McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney and Tilly, Charles. 2001. Dynamics o f Contention. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan. 2004. The Northern Ireland Conflict: 
Consociational Engagements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Medard, Jean-Fran9ois. 1982. ‘The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political 
Clientelism or Neo-Patrimonialism’, in Christopher Clapham (ed.), Private 
Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modem State. London: 
Frances Pinter, 162-192.
Mehler, Andreas. 2009. ‘Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A not so Obvious 
Relationship’, African Affairs 108(432): 453-473.
Migdal, Joel. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Milanovic, Branko. 2005. Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global 
Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
MINDECO -  Mining Development Corporation. Various Years. ‘MINDECO Mining 
Yearbook’, Lusaka: MINDECO.
Mirzeler, Mustafa and Young, Crawford. 2000. ‘Pastoral Politics in the Northeast 
Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as Change Agent’, The Journal o f Modem African 
Studies 38(3): 407-429.
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2001. ‘Thinking About Development States in Africa’, 
Cambridge Journal o f Economics 25(3): 289-313.
277
MMD -  Movement for Multiparty Democracy. 2008. ‘National Executive Committee 
Members’, Lusaka: MMD Secretariat, unpublished.
Molteno, Robert. 1974. ‘Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: A Study in 
Sectionalism’, in William Tordoff (ed), Politics in Zambia. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 62-106.
Momba, Jotham C. 1989. ‘The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political 
Participation in Zambia: The Case of Southern Province’, African Affairs 88(352): 
331-357.
Montalvo, Jose G. and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2005. ‘Ethnic Polarization, Potential 
Conflict, and Civil Wars’, The American Economic Review 95(3): 796-816.
Moore, Mick. 2004. ‘Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in 
Developing Countries’, International Political Science Review 25(3): 297-319.
Morris, Nsamba A. 2009. ‘Breeding Fragmentation? Issues in the Policy and Practise of 
Decentralisation in Uganda’, Issue Paper 1, Kampala: Beyond Juba Project.
Mphaisha, Chisepo. 1996. ‘Retreat From Democracy in Post One-Party State Zambia’, 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 34(2): 65-84.
Mudoola, Dan M. 1991. ‘Institution-Building: The Case of the NRM and the Military, 
1986-1989’, in Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds), Changing Uganda: 
The Dilemmas o f Structural Adjustment & Revolutionary Change. London: James 
Currey, 230-246.
Mudoola, Dan M. 1993. Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers.
Muhereza, Frank E. and Omurangi Otim, Peter. 1998. ‘Neutralizing Ethnicity in 
Uganda’, in Mohamed M. Salih and John Markakis (eds), Ethnicity and the State 
in Eastern Africa. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 190-203.
Muhumuza, William. 2008. ‘Pitfalls of Decentralisation Reforms in Transitional 
Societies: The Case of Uganda’, Africa Development 33(4): 59-81.
Mukwena, Royson M. 2001. ‘Situating Decentralization in Zambia in a Political 
Context’, Tangier: African Training and Research Center in Administration for 
Development.
Murshed, Mansoob S. and Gates, Scott. 2005. ‘Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the 
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, Review o f Development Economics 9(1): 121-134.
Museveni, Yoweri K. 1997. Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and 
Democracy in Uganda. Oxford: Macmillan.
278
Museveni, Yoweri K. 2000. What is Africa's Problem? Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota 
University Press.
Mutesa, Edward. 1967. The Desecration o f My Kingdom. London: Constable.
Mutibwa, Phares. 1992. Uganda since Independence: A Story o f Unfulfilled Hopes. 
London: Hurst & Company.
Mutibwa, Phares. 2008. The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics. Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers.
Mwenda, Andrew. 2007. ‘Personalising Power in Uganda’, Journal o f Democracy 
18(3): 23-37.
Mwenda, Andrew and Tangri, Roger. 2005. ‘Patronage Politics, Donor Reform and 
Regime Consolidation in Uganda’, African Affairs 104(416): 449-467.
Nabudere, Dan. 2003. ‘The Hidden War, The Forgotten People: War in Acholiland and 
its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda’, KampalaJ Vancouver: 
Human Rights & Peace Centre, Faculty of Law, Makerere University/ Liu 
Institute for Global Issues.
Nafziger, Wayne and Auvinen, Juha. 2002. ‘Economic Development, Inequality, War, 
and State Violence’, World Development 30(2): 153-163.
Nathan, Laurie. 2003. ‘The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Critique of 
Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War’, Crisis States Working Papers 
Series 1 11, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.
Ngaruko, Floribert and Nkurunziza, Janvier D. 2005. ‘Civil War and Its Duration in 
Burundi’, in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds), Understanding Civil War. 
Volume 1: Africa. Washington DC: The World Bank, 35-62.
Ngoga, Pascal. 1998. ‘Uganda: The National Resistance Army’, in Christopher 
Clapham (ed), African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Curry, 91-106.
Nordlinger, Eric A. 1972. ‘Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies’, Occasional 
Papers in International Affairs 29, Cambridge, MA: Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University.
North, Douglas C., Wallis, John J. and Weingast, Barry R. 2009. Violence and Social 
Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2008. Driving Democracy. Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
NRM -  National Resistance Movement. 2008. ‘Members of the NRM Central 
Executive Committee, 2008’, Kampala: NRM Secretariat, unpublished.
Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 1999. ‘Cameroon: A Country United by Ethnic Ambition and 
Difference’, African Affairs 98(390): 101-118.
Obote, Milton A. 1962. ‘A Plan for Nationhood’. Transition 6/7: 15-18.
Okuku, James. 2002. ‘Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in 
Uganda’, Discussion Paper 17, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
Oloka-Onyango, Joe. 2000. ‘New Wine Or New Bottles? Movement Politics and One- 
Partyism in Uganda’, in Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), No-Party 
Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 40- 
59.
O’Leary, Brendan. 2005. ‘Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory 
Arguments’, in Sid Noel (ed), From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict 
Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 3-43.
Olson, Mancur. 1993. ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political 
Science Review 87(3): 567-576.
Olzak, Susan. 2006. The Global Dynamics o f Racial and Ethnic Mobilization. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press.
Omara-Otunnu, Amii. 1987. Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985. London: 
Macmillan Press.
Omara-Otunnu, Amii. 1992. ‘The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda’, The Journal o f 
Modem African Studies 30(3): 443-463.
Osei-Hwedie, Bertha. 1998. ‘The Role of Ethnicity in Multi-Party Politics in Malawi 
and Zambia’, Journal o f Contemporary African Studies 16(2): 227-247.
Ostby, Gudrun. 2008a. ‘Inequalities, the Political Environment and Civil Conflict: 
Evidence from 55 Developing Countries’, in Frances Stewart (ed), Horizontal 
Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic 
Societies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 136-159.
Ostby, Gudrun. 2008b. ‘Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil 
Conflict’, Journal o f Peace Research 45(2): 143-162.
Ostby, Gudrun, Nordas, Ragnhild and Rod, Jan K. 2009. ‘Regional Inequalities and 
Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’, International Studies Quarterly 53(2): 301- 
324.
Parker, Richard B. 1993. The Politics o f Miscalculation in the Middle East. Bloomfield, 
IN: Indiana University Press.
280
Pettman, Jan. 1974. ‘Zambia’s Second Republic -  The Establishment of a One-Party 
State’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies 12(2): 231-244.
Phillips, Anne. 1989. The Enigma o f Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa. 
London: James Currey.
Phiri, Bizeck J. 2002. ‘Civil Control of the Zambian Military since Independence and its 
Implication for Democracy’, in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane 
Abrahams (eds), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence 
Transformation in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 3-16.
Phiri, Bizeck J. 2006. A Political History o f Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 
3rd Republic. Trenton, NJ: Africa Research & Publications.
Posner, Daniel N. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Project Ploughshares. 2009. ‘Armed Conflicts Report 2009’, Waterloo: Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College.
Prunier, Gerard. 2004. ‘Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the 
Congo\  African Affairs 103(412): 359-383.
Prunier, Gerard. 2009. Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the 
Making o f a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raftopoulos, Brian and Alexander, Karin (eds). 2006. Peace in the Balance: The Crisis 
in Sudan. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.
Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press.
Ragin, Charles C. 2004. ‘Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges 
Variable-Oriented Research’, in Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds), 
Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 123-138.
Rakner, Lise. 2003. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001. 
Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
Randall, Vicky. 2001. ‘Party Systems and Voter Alignments in the New Democracies of 
the Third World’, in Lauri Karvonen (ed), Party Systems and Voter Alignments 
Revisited. London: Routledge, 238-260.
Ranger, Terence. 1983. ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa’, in Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention o f Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 211-262.
281
Rasmussen, Thomas. 1969. ‘Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in 
Zambia’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies 7(3): 407-424.
Ravenhill, F. J. 1974. ‘Military Rule in Uganda: The Politics of Survival’, African 
Studies Review 17(1): 229-260.
Regan, Patrick and Norton, Daniel. 2005. ‘Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil 
Wars’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 49(3): 319-36.
Reinikka, Ritva and Collier, Paul (eds). 2001. Uganda's Recovery: The Role o f Farms, 
Firms, and Government. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Reno, William. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner.
Richards, Paul. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra 
Leone. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Riker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown & Company.
Roberts, Andrew D. 1976. A History o f Zambia. London: Heinemann.
Ron, James. 2005. ‘Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War’, 
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 49(4): 443-450.
Ross, Michael L. 2004a. ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?’, 
Journal o f Peace Research 41(3): 337-356.
Ross, Michael L. 2004b. ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence 
from Thirteen Cases’, International Organisation 58(1): 35-67.
Ross, Michael L. 2006. ‘A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War’, Annual 
Review o f Political Science 9(1): 265-300.
Rotberg, Robert L. 1967. ‘Tribalism and Politics in Zambia’, Africa Report 12(9): 29- 
35.
Rothchild, Donald. 1997. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives 
for Cooperation. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Rothchild, Donald. 2005. ‘Reassuring Weaker Parties after Civil Wars: The Benefits 
and Costs of Executive Power-Sharing Systems in Africa’, Ethnopolitics 4(3): 
247-267.
Rothchild, Donald and Foley, Michael W. 1988. ‘African States and the Politics of 
Inclusive Coalitions’, in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), The 
Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
233-264.
282
Rubogoya, Joshua B. 2007. Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda: Pax Musevenica. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Saasa, Oliver S. 2002. Aid and Poverty Reduction in Zambia: Mission Unaccomplished. 
Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
Saasa, Oliver S., Steffensen, Jesper, Trollegaard, Svend, Mwanawina, Inyambo and 
Likulunga, Mwikisa. 1999. ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Sub-National 
Government Finances in Relation to Infrastructure and Service Provision in 
Zambia’, Washington DC: The World Bank.
Saito, Fumihiko. 2003. Decentralization and Development Partnership: Lessons from 
Uganda. Tokyo: Springer.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004a. ‘What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical 
Complexities of an Operational Definition’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 48(6): 
814-858.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004b. ‘Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence: A 
Review and Some Conjectures’, in Susan M. Collins and Carol Graham (eds), 
Brookings Trade Forum 2004. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 165-211.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2005. ‘Conclusion: Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the 
Theory of Civil War’, in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds), 
Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: Africa, Washington DC: The World Bank, 
303-334.
Sandbrook, Richard. 1985. The Politics o f Africa's Economic Stagnation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sathyamurthy, Tennalur V. 1982. ‘Central-Local Relations: The Case of Uganda’, 
Manchester Papers on Development 5, Manchester: Department of
Administrative Studies, University of Manchester.
Scarritt, James R. and Mozaffar, Shaheen. 1999. ‘The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages 
and Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in 
Contemporary Africa’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 5(1): 82-117.
Schneider, Gerald and Wiesehomeier, Nina. 2006. ‘Ethnic Polarization, Potential 
Conflict, and Civil Wars: Comment’, unpublished manuscript.
Scott, Ian. 1978. ‘Middle Class Politics in. ZmxA)ia.\ African Affairs 77(308): 321-334.
Scott, Ian. 1980. ‘Party and Administration under the One-Party State’, in William 
Tordoff (ed), Administration in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 139-161.
283
Sichone, Owen and Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. ‘The Ethnic and Regional Questions, Ethnic 
Nationalism and the State in Zambia: The Case of Barotseland, 1964-1994’, in 
Owen Sichone and Bomwell C. Chikulo (eds), Democracy in Zambia: Challenges 
for the Third Republic. Harare: Sapes Books, 173-196.
Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. ‘The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia’, Third World 
Quarterly 17(4): 825-839.
Sithole, Masipula. 1994. ‘Is Multi-Party Democracy Possible in Multi-Ethnic African 
States?: The Case of Zimbabwe’, in Ulf Himmelstrand, Kabiru Kinyanjui, and 
Edward Mburugu (eds), African Perspectives on Development: Controversies, 
Dilemmas and Openings. London: James Curry, 152-165.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f 
France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Small, Melvin and Singer, David J. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 
1816-1980. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins o f Nations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Smith, Benjamin. 2004. ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 
1960-1999’, American Journal o f Political Science 48(2): 232-246.
Snyder, Richard. 2006. ‘Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?: A Political Economy 
of Extraction Framework’, Comparative Political Studies 39(8): 943-968.
Snyder, Richard and Bhavnani, Ravi. 2005. ‘Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue- 
Centred Framework for Explaining Political Order’, Journal o f Conflict 
Resolution 49(4): 563-597.
Southall, Aiden W. 1970. ‘The Illusion of Tribe’, Journal o f Asian and African Studies 
5(1-2): 28-50.
Spears, Ian S. 2002. ‘Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing’, Journal o f Democracy 
13(3): 123-136.
Sriram, Chandra L. 2008. Peace as Governance: Power-sharing, Armed Groups and 
Contemporary Peace Negotiations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ssewankambo, Emmanuel, Steffensen, Jesper and Tidemand, Per. 2008. ‘Local Level 
Service Delivery, Decentralisation and Governance: Uganda Case Report’, 
Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation/ Japan International Cooperation 
Agency.
Steffensen, Jesper, Tidemand, Per, and Ssewankambo, Emmanuel. 2004. ‘A 
Comparative Analysis of Decentralisation in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: 
Country Report Uganda’, Washington DC: The World Bank.
Steiner, Susan. 2007. ‘Decentralisation and Poverty: Conceptual Framework and 
Application to Uganda’, Public Administration and Development 27(2): 175-185.
Stewart, Frances. 2000. ‘Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities’, Oxford 
Development Studies 28(3): 245-262.
Stewart, Frances. 2002. ‘Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of 
Development’, CRISE Working Paper 1, Oxford: Centre for Research on 
Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.
Stewart, Frances (ed). 2008. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding 
Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stewart, Frances. 2010. ‘Horizontal Inequalities in Kenya and the Political Disturbances 
of 2008: Some Implications for Aid Policy’, Conflict, Security & Development 
10(1): 133-159.
Stewart, Frances and Fitzgerald, Valpy (eds). 2001. The Economic and Social 
Consequences o f Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Szeftel, Morris. 1982. ‘Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia -  the State as a 
Resource in Itself, Review o f African Political Economy 9(24): 4-21.
Szeftel, Morris. 2000. ‘Eat With Us: Managing Corruption and Patronage under 
Zambia’s Three Republics, 1964-99’, Journal o f Contemporary African Studies 
18(2): 207-224.
Tangri, Roger. 1999. The Politics o f Patronage in Africa: Parastatals, Privatization and 
Private Enterprise. Oxford: James Currey.
Tangri, Roger and Mwenda, Andrew. 2001. ‘Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda's 
Privatisation in the 1990s’, African Affairs 100(398): 117-133.
Taylor, Charles L. and Hudson, Michael C. 1972. World Handbook o f Political and 
Social Indicators. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Therkildsen, Ole and Tidemand, Per. 2007. ‘Staff Management and Organisational 
Performance in Tanzania and Uganda: Public Servants Perspectives’,
Copenhagen: Danish Institute For International Studies.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Tilly, Charles. 2003. The Politics o f Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Tilly, Charles and Tarrow, Sidney. 2007. Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers.
285
Tindigarukayo, Jimmy K. 1988. ‘Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition’, The 
Journal o f Modem African Studies 26(4): 607-622.
Tordoff, William. 1980a. ‘Introduction’, in William Tordoff (ed), Administration in 
Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-42.
Tordoff, William. 1980b. ‘Rural Administration’, in William Tordoff (ed), 
Administration in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 185-214.
Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert. 1974a. ‘Introduction’, in William Tordoff (ed), 
Politics in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-39.
Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert. 1974b. ‘Government and Administration’, in 
William Tordoff (ed), Politics in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 242-287.
Tordoff, William and Scott, Ian. 1974. ‘Political Parties: Structures and Policies’, in 
William Tordoff (ed), Politics in Zambia. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 107-154.
Tosh, John. 1978. Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History o f 
an East African Stateless Society, c. 1800-1939. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Treisman, Daniel. 2007. The Architecture o f Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Tuchman, Barbara W. 1984. The March o f Folly. New York: Knopf
Tull, Denis and Mehler, Andreas. 2005. ‘The hidden costs of power-sharing: 
Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa’, African Affairs 104 (416): 375-398.
UBOS -  Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2006a. ‘Uganda National Household Survey 
2005/2006’, Kampala: UBOS.
UBOS -  Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2006b. ‘2002 Uganda Population and Housing 
Census: Analytical Report Population Composition’, Kampala: UBOS.
UCDA -  Uganda Coffee Development Authority. Various Years. ‘Annual Report’, 
Kampala: UCDA.
UCDP -  Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2009. Uppsala: Uppsala University, available 
at: http://www.ucdp.uu.se.
Uganda Districts Information Handbook. 2007. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
UNDP -  United Nations Development Programme. 2007. ‘Uganda Human 
Development Report 2007. Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development’, 
Kampala: UNDP.
UNIP -  United National Independence Party. Various Years. ‘Annual Report’, Lusaka: 
UNIP.
286
UNU-WIDER -  World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United 
Nations University. 2008. World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c. 
Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, available at http ://www. wider.
unu.edu/research/Database/en GB/database/.
UPC -  Uganda People’s Congress. 2008. ‘List of UPC Party Cabinet, 1964-1971 & 
1980-1985’, Kampala: UPC Party Secretariat, unpublished.
Urdal, Henrik. 2005. ‘People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental 
Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited’, Journal o f Peace Research 42(4): 
417-434.
USAID -  United States Agency for International Development. 2005. ‘Conflict 
Baseline Study Report Conducted in the Karamajong Cluster of Kenya and 
Uganda’, Washington DC: USAID.
Van Acker, Frank. 2004. ‘Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: The New Order No 
One Ordered’, African Affairs 103(412): 335-357.
Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. African Economies and the Politics o f Permanent Crisis, 
1979-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vandeginste, Stef. 2006. ‘Theorie Consociative et Partage du Pouvoir au Burundi4, 
Cahier (Anvers) 4, Anvers: Institut de Politique et de Gestion du Developpement, 
Universite d’Anvers.
Van Donge, Jan K. 1995. ‘Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba. Enduring patterns of Political 
Culture’, in John A. Wiseman (ed), Democracy and Political Change in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. London: Routledge, 193-219.
Van Donge, Jan K. 2009. ‘The Plundering of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba 
and his Friends: A Case Study of the Interaction between National Politics and the 
International Drive towards Good Governance’, African Affairs 108(430): 69-90.
Von Soest, Christian. 2007. ‘How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? 
The Case of Tax Collection in Zambia’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies 
45(4): 621-645.
Vreeland, James R. 2008. ‘The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking 
Anocracy’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution 52(3): 401-435.
Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg. 1998. ‘Armed Conflict and Regional 
Conflict Complexes, 1989-97’, Journal o f Peace Research 35(5): 621-634.
Walter, Barbara F. 2002. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement o f Civil Wars. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
287
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society: An outline in Interpretive Sociology. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Wele, Patrick. 1987. Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story. Lusaka: 
Multimedia Publications.
Wele, Patrick. 1995. Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe. 
Solwezi: PMW.
Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics o f Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Willets, Peter. 1975. ‘The Politics of Uganda as a One-Party State’, African Affairs 
74(296): 278-299.
Wimmer, Andreas, Cederman, Lars-Erik and Min, Brian. 2009. ‘Ethnic Politics and 
Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set’, American 
Sociological Review 74(2): 316-337.
Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank. 2003. ‘Zambia Public Expenditure Management and Financial 
Accountability Review’, Report 26162-ZA, Washington DC: The World Bank.
World Bank. 2009. World Development Indicators. Manchester: ESDS International, 
University of Manchester.
Zartman, William I. 2005a. ‘Comparative Case Studies’, International Negotiation 
10(1): 3-15.
Zartman, William I. 2005b. Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly 
Conflict and State Collapse. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
ZCCM -  Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines. Various Years. ‘Annual Report’, Lusaka: 
ZCCM.
ZIMCO -  Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation. Various Years. ‘Annual Report’, 
Lusaka: ZIMCO.
ZPA -  Zambia Privatisation Agency. 2006a. ‘Zambia Privatisation Agency Status 
Report as at 30th November, 2006’, Lusaka: ZPA.
ZPA -  Zambia Privatisation Agency. 2006b. ‘Privatisation Transaction Summary 
Sheets, 1992-2005’, Lusaka: ZPA.
288
10 List of Interview Partners
10.1 Uganda
Name & Function of interviewee Location & date of interview
(1) Hussein Kyanjo
■ Member of Parliament (MP), Justice Forum (JEEMA)
Kampala, 25 November 2008
(2) John Baptist Kawanga
■ Member of Parliament (MP), Democratic Party (DP)
Kampala, 26 November 2008
(3) Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere
■ NRM Minister of Relief and Disaster Preparedness
■ Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement 
(NRM)
■ Former NRM Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office
■ Former NRM Minister of Local Government
■ Former UNLF Minister of Land & Natural Resources (under 
Lule, Binaisa & the Military Commission)
Kampala, 27 November 2008
(4) Jaberi Bidandi Ssali
■ President, People's Progressive Party (PPP)
■ Former NRM Minister of Local Government
Kampala, 28 November 2008
(5) Kintu Musoke
■ Senior Presidential Advisor/Presidential Affairs
■ Former NRM Prime Minister
■ Former NRM Minister of Presidential Affairs
■ Former NRM Minister of Information & Broadcasting
■ Former UNLF Minister of Transport (under the Military 
Commission)
Kampala, 2 December 2008
(6) Mwambutsya Ndebesa
■ University Lecturer, Department of History, Makerere 
University
Kampala, 2 December 2008
(7) Paul Ssemogerere
■ Former President, Democratic Party (DP)
■ Former NRM Second Deputy Prime Minister
■ Former NRM Minister of Foreign Affairs & Regional 
Cooperation
■ Former NRM Minister of Internal Affairs
■ Former UNLF Minister of Labour (under Binaisa)
Kampala, 3 December 2008
(8) Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga
■ University Lecturer, Department of Political Science, 
Makerere University
Kampala, 3 December 2008
(9) Imam Idi Kasozi
■ Chairperson, Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly
Kampala, 4 December 2008
(10) Jimmy Akena
■ Member of Parliament (MP), Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC)
Kampala, 5 December 2008
(11) Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu
■ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC)
■ Former commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA)/
Kampala, 9 December 2008
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■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of General Education, Youth 
& Sports
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Development Planning
Lusaka 25 July 2008
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■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Higher Education
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Legal Affairs
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Tourism
■ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)
(17) Dr. Patrick Manda
■ Research Officer, House of Chiefs
Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(18) Dr. Mabel Milimo
■ Gender Advisor, Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Lusaka
Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(19) Mbita Chitala
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Finance & National 
Planning (under Mwanawasa)
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Local Government & 
Housing (under Mwanawasa)
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister at the Vice President’s Office 
(under Chiluba)
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Finance (under Chiluba)
■ Former Member, MMD National Executive Committee 
(NEC)
■ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD)
Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(20) Njekwa Anamela
■ Vice-President, United National Independence Party (UNIP)
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office
Lusaka, 30 July 2008
(21) Tentani Mwanza
■ Former President, National Democratic Party (NDP)
■ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD)
Lusaka, 30 July 2008
(22) Grieve Sibale
■ Former Managing Director, National Agricultural Marketing 
Board (NAMBOARD)
Lusaka, 31 July 2008
(23) Dr. Godfrey H. Haantobolo
■ Deputy Chief Research Officer, National Assembly
Lusaka, 31 July 2008
(24) Reverend Foston Sakala
■ Reformed Church of Zambia
■ Former President, Foundation for Democratic Process 
(FODEP)
Lusaka, 1 August 2008
(25) Rueben Lifuka
■ President, Transparency International Zambia
Lusaka, 1 August 2008
(26) Samuel Mulafulafu
■ Director, Caritas Zambia, Zambia Episcopal Conference
Lusaka, 2 August 2008
(27) Sakwiba Sikota
■ President, United Liberal Party (ULP)
■ Member of Parliament (MP), United Liberal Party (ULP)
Lusaka, 6 August 2008
(28) Hakainde Hichilema
■ President, United Party for National Development (UPND)
Lusaka, 6 August 2008
(29) Dr. Markus Nuding
■ Senior Advisor, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 
Lusaka
Lusaka, 7 August 2008
(30) Gen. Malimba Masheke
■ Former UNIP Prime Minister
Lusaka, 7 August 2008
294
■ Former UNIP Minister of Defence
■ Former Zambia Army Commander (under Kaunda)
■ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)
■ Former Board Member, Zambia Industrial and Mining 
Corporation (ZIMCO)
(31) Robert Liebenthal
■ National Coordinator, Millennium Challenge Account- 
Zambia (MCAZ)
■ Former World Bank Economist
Lusaka, 12 August 2008
(32) Peter J. Henriot
■ Director, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR)
Lusaka, 12 August 2008
(33) Newton Isaiah Ng’uni
■ Deputy Secretary, National Constitutional Conference (NCC)
■ Secretary General, Forum for Democracy and Development 
(FDD)
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Science, Technical 
Education & Vocational Training (under Chiluba)
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Education (under Chiluba)
Lusaka, 13 August 2008
(34) Simon Zukas
■ Former MMD Minister of Works & Supply (under Chiluba)
■ Former MMD Minister of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries 
(under Chiluba)
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister at the Vice President’s Office 
(under Chiluba)
■ Former Board Member, Industrial and Development 
Corporation (INDECO)
Lusaka, 13 August 2008
(35) Emily Sikazwe
■ Executive Director, Women for Change 
Vincent Akamandisa
■ Field Animator, Women for Change
Lusaka, 15 August 2008
(36) Roger Chongwe
■ Former MMD Minister of Legal Affairs (under Chiluba)
Lusaka, 9 September 2008
(37) Dipak Patel
■ Former MMD Minister of Commerce, Trade & Industry 
(under Mwanawasa)
■ Former MMD Minister of Commerce, Trade & Industry 
(under Chiluba)
Lusaka, 9 September 2008
(38) Philip Chilimo
■ Chairperson, Zambia Indigenous Business Association 
(ZIBA)
Lusaka, 10 September 2008
(39) Reverend Suzanne Matale
■ General Secretary, Council of Churches in Zambia
Lusaka, 11 September 2008
(40) Gerd Botterweck
■ Resident Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka 
Kathy Banda Sikombe
■ Programme Coordinator, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka
Lusaka, 11 September 2008
(41) Birgit Pickel
■ Counsellor, Development Cooperation, Embassy o f the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Lusaka
Lusaka, 12 September 2008
(42) Haswell Mwale
■ Former UNIP Minister of Works & Supply
■ Former UNIP Minister of Public Works
Lusaka, 15 September 2008
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■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister for Power, Transport & 
Works
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister for Central Province
■ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Works
■ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)
■ Former Board Member, Zambia Industrial and Mining 
Corporation (ZIMCO)
(43) Dr. Chileshe Mulenga
■ Researcher, Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(INESOR)
Lusaka, 16 September 2008
(44) Kaputo M. Chenga
■ Senior Expert, German Technical Corporation (GTZ), 
Lusaka
Lusaka, 18 September 2008
(45) Bob Sichinga
■ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Local Government and 
Housing (under Chiluba)
■ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD)
Lusaka, 18 September 2008
(46) Dr. Neo Simutanyi
■ Executive Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue
Lusaka, 22 September 2008
(47) Patricia Palale
■ Public Sector Management Specialist, The World Bank, 
Lusaka
Lusaka, 23 September 2008
(48) Dr. Cosmas Musumali
■ Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research
Lusaka, 23 September 2008
(49) Dr. Gilbert Mudenda
■ Director, Institute for Policy Studies
Lusaka, 24 September 2008
(50) Murray & Eva Sanderson
■ Zambia Institute for Public Policy Analysis
Kitwe, 29 September 2008
(51) Austin C. Muneku
■ Director of Research, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU)
Kitwe, 30 September 2008
(52) ‘Mama’ Kankasa
■ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)
Lusaka, 2 October 2008
(53) Sikota Wina
■ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD)
■ Former UNIP Minister of Information, Broadcasting & 
Tourism
■ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government & Housing
■ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government
■ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)
Lusaka, 4 October 2008
(54) Dr. Siteke Mwale
■ Special Envoy and National Co-ordinator for Great Lakes 
Region
■ Former UNIP Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lusaka, 6 October 2008
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11 Annex
11.1 Dataset
11.1.1 Uganda
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT, 1962-2008
inner core’ o f political
Ministers of State/Deputy Ministers
Year: 1962 (OBC>TEI)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Prime Minister A. M. Obote Langi Northern Protestant
G. B. Magezi Munyoro Western Protestant
A. A. Ojera Acholi Northern Catholic
Justice G. S. Ibingira Munyankole Western Protestant
Finance A. K, Sempa Muganda Central Protestant
S. N. Odaka Musamia Eastern Protestant
Economic affairs J, T, Simpson English
J. S. Mayanja- 
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
S. K. Nkutu Musoga Eastern Muslim
Regional
Administrations
C. J. Obwangor Iteso Eastern Catholic
C. B. Katiti Munyankole Western Protestant
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
J. K. Babiiha Mutoro Western Catholic
K. K. Karegyesa Muhororo Western Protestant
Health Muganda Central Catholic
J. N. Wakholi Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
M. M. Ngobi Musoga Eastern Catholic
L. Lubowa Muganda Central Protestant
Works & Labour Madi Northern Catholic
S. K. Masembe- 
Kabali
Muganda Central Catholic
Minerals & Water 
Resources
J. W. Lwamafa Mukiga Western Protestant
892 Note that the members of the ‘inner core’ of political power are also included as ministers.
893 Including Parliamentary Secretaries in 1962, 1964 and 1966.
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Education Dr, J. S. Zake Muganda Central Protestant
W. Kalema Muganda Central Protestant
Without Portfolio B. K. Kiiya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Community
Development
L. Kalule-Settala Muganda Central Catholic
Mrs. F. Lubega Muganda Central Catholic
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
.................................
A. A, Nekyan
■•'-HV;'
Langi Northern Muslim
P. Munyagwa- 
Nsibirwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Internal Affairs N. M. Patel Indian
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1964
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Prime Minister, 
Foreign Affairs, 
Defence
A. M. Obote Langi Northern Protestant
G. B. Magezi Munyoro Western Protestant
S. N. Odaka Musamia Eastern Protestant
S. K. Nkutu Musoga Eastern Muslim
Justice G. S. lbingi ra Munyankole Western Protestant
Finance A, K. Sempa Muganda Central Protestant
Regional
Administrations
C. J. Obwangor Iteso Eastern Catholic
C. B. Katiti Munyankole Western Protestant
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
J. K. Babiiha Mutoro Western Catholic
K. K. Karegyesa Muhororo Western Protestant
Health Dr. E. B. Lumu Muganda Central Catholic
J. N. Wakholi Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Works B. K. Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Minerals & Water 
Resources
• w  T u/a f aJ. W. Lwamata Mukiga Western Protestant
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
M. M. Ngobi Musoga Eastern Catholic
L. Lubowa Muganda Central Protestant
Industry & 
Communications
L. Kalule-Settala Muganda Central Catholic
Education Dr. J. S. Zake Muganda Central Protestant
W. W. Kalema Muganda Central Protestant
Internal Affairs F. K. Onama Madi Northern Catholic
M. L. Choudry Karamajong Eastern Catholic
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Commerce J. S. Mayanja- Muganda Central Protestant
E. B. Bwambale Mukonzo Western Protestant
Community 
Development & 
Labour
A. A. Ojera
'  . V
Acholi Northern Catholic
Mrs. F. Lubega Muganda Central Catholic
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
Langi Northern Muslim
P. Munyagwa- 
Nsibirwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1966
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Prime Minister A. M. Gbote Langi Northern Protestant
G. S. Ibingira Munyankole Western Protestant
E. Y. Lakidi Acholi Northern Protestant
Foreign Affairs S. N. Odaka Musamia Eastern Protestant
V. K. Rwamwaro Mutoro Western Catholic
Defence F. K. Onama Madi Northern Catholic
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
J. K. Babiiha Mutoro Western Catholic
K. K. Karegyesa Muhororo Western Protestant
Internal Affairs B. K. Batarmgaya Munyankole Western Catholic
S. E. Isiagi Iteso Eastern Protestant
Works & 
Communications
W. W. Kalema Muganda Central Protestant
S. K. Okurut Iteso Eastern Catholic
Finance L. Kalule-Settala Muganda Central Catholic
Minerals & Water 
Resources
B. K. Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Commerce & 
Industry
L. Lubowa Muganda Central Protestant
E. B. Bwambale Mukonzo Western Protestant
Health Dr. E. B .Lum u Muganda Central Catholic
S. W. Uringi Alur Northern Protestant
Education Dr. J. S. Zake Muganda Central Protestant
S. K. Nkutu Musoga Eastern Muslim
Regional
Administrations
J. W. Lwamafa Mukiga Western Protestant
C. B. Katiti Munyankole Western Protestant
Housing & Labour G. B. Magezi—--- —----- -—- -- ---—— Munyoro Western Protestant
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A. Y. Lobidra Lugbara Northern Catholic
Planning & 
Community Dev°
A. A. Nekyan Langi Northern Muslim
M. L. Choudry Karamajong Northern Catholic
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
M. M/Ngobi Musoga Eastern Catholic
J. N. Wakholi Mugisu Eastern Protestant
A. K. Balinda Mutoro Western Catholic
Justice C. J, Obwangoi Iteso Eastern Catholic
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
A A O* Acholi Northern Catholic
J. S. Ochola Japadhola Eastern Protestant
P. Munyagwa- 
Nsibirwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1968
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President A. M. Obote Langi Northern Protestant
Vice-President, 
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
J. K. Babiiha Mutoro Western Catholic
K. K. Karegyesa Muhororo Western Protestant
Foreign Affairs S* N. Odaka Musamia Eastern Protestant
Dr. E. Babumba Muganda Central Protestant
V. K. Rwamwaro Mutoro Western Catholic
Internal Affairs B. K, Bataringaya Munyankole Western Catholic
Mineral & Water 
Resources
M. L. Choudry Karamajong Northern Catholic
Agriculture, 
Forestry & 
Cooperatives
1. B. Kakonge
T i\
Munyoro Western Protestant
A. K. Balinda Mutoro Western Muslim
Commerce & 
Industry
W. W. Kalema Muganda Central Protestant
Finance L. Kalule-Settala Muganda Central Catholic
Culture & 
Community 
Development
C. B. Katiti Munyankole Western Protestant
E. B. Bwambale Mukonzo Western Protestant
Labour L. Lubowa Muganda Central Protestant
A. Y. Lobidra Lugbara Northern Catholic
Education Dr. J. S. Zake Muganda Central Protestant
Health J. W. Lwamafa Mukiga Western Protestant
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S. W. Uringi Alur Northern Protestant
Works, 
Communications & 
Housing
S. K. Nkutu Musoga Eastern Muslim
S. K. Okurut Iteso Eastern Catholic
Regional
Administrations
J. S. Ochoia Japadhola Eastern Protestant
S. E. Isiagi Iteso Eastern Protestant
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
A. A. Ojera Acholi Northern Catholic
P. Munyagwa- 
Nsibirwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
J. M. Okac Langi Northern Protestant
Defence F. K. Onama Madi Northern Catholic
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
J. N. Wakholi Mugisu Eastern Protestant
E. Y. Lakidi Acholi Northern Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1970
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, National 
Service
A  M. Obote Langi Northern Protestant
J. 0  Anyoti Iteso (Kumam) Eastern Protestant
Vice-President, 
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
I K .  Babiiha
....... . .. ..... ......
Mutoro Western Catholic
K. K. Karegyesa Muhororo Western Protestant
Marketing & 
Cooperatives
Muganda Central Protestant
Internal Affairs B. K. Bataringaya Munyankole Western Catholic
Mineral & Water 
Resources
----------
M. L. Choudry Karamajong Northern Catholic
Agriculture & 
Forestry
Munyoro Western Protestant
A. K. Balinda Mutoro Western Catholic
Commerce & 
Industry
W. W. Kalema Muganda Central Protestant
Finance 3L Kalule-Settala Muganda Central Catholic
Culture & 
Community Dev°
C. B. Katiti Munyankole Western Protestant
E. B. Bwambale Mukonzo Western Protestant
Labour E. Y. Lakidi Acholi Northern Protestant
A. Y. Lobidra Lugbara Northern Catholic
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Justice L. Lubowa Muganda Central Protestant
Education Dr. J. S. Zake Muganda Central Protestant
Health J. W. Lwamafa Mukiga Western Protestant
S. W. Uringi Alur Northern Protestant
Works, Communi0 
& Housing
S. K. Nkutu Musoga Eastern Muslim
S. K. Okurut Iteso Eastern Catholic
Regional
Administrations ■IHj Japadhola Eastern Protestant
S. E. Isiagi Iteso Eastern Protestant
Foreign Affairs S. N. Odaka Musamia Eastern Protestant
V. K. Rwamwaro Mutoro Western Catholic
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
■
A. A. Ojera Acholi Northern Catholic
P. Munyagwa- 
Nsibirwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Planning & 
Economic Dev0
J. M. Okae Langi Northern Protestant
Defence F. K. Onama Madi Northern Catholic
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
J. N. Wakholi Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1971 (AMIN)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Maj.-Gen, Idi 
Amin
Kakwa Northern Muslim
Finance E. B. Wakfaweya Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Apolo Kironde
+' ' j i V
Muganda Central Protestant
Internal Affairs Lt-Col. E. A. 
Obitre Gama
Lugbara Northern Protestant
Foreign Affairs Wanume Kibedi Musoga Eastern Protestant
Defence A. C: Oboth- 
Ofumi
Japadhola Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Local 
Administration
A. V. Ovonji Alur Northern Catholic
Agriculture, 
Forestry & 
Cooperatives
F. L. Okwaare Iteso Eastern Catholic
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
W. B. Banage Mutoro Western Protestant
Commerce, 
Industry &
Wilson Lutara Acholi Northern Protestant
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Tourism
Information & 
Broadcasting
William Naburi Karamajong Northern Protestant
Works, 
Communications & 
Housing
J. M. Zikusoka Musoga Eastern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Langi Northern Protestant
Minerals & Water 
Resources
Wilson Oryema Acholi Northern Protestant
Education Abu Manyanja Muganda Central Muslim
Health Dr. J. M. Gessa Mug were Eastern Protestant
Labour J. M. Byagagaire Mukiga Western Protestant
Justice/ Attorney- 
General
P. J. Nk&mbo 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.
Year: 1973
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Internal 
Affairs
Maj.-Gen. Idi 
Amin
Kakwa Northern Muslim
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
E. B. Wakhweya Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Foreign Affairs Wanume Kibedi Musoga Eastern Protestant
Defence A, C. Oboth- 
Oftrnri
Japadhola Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Local 
Administration
J. M. Byagagaire Mukiga Western Protestant
Agriculture, 
Forestry & 
Cooperatives
F. L. Okwaare
IS
Iteso Eastern Catholic
Animal Industry, 
Game & Fisheries
W. B. Banage Mutoro Western Protestant
Commerce & 
Industry
Wilson Lutara Acholi Northern Protestant
Tourism
'
Apolo Kironde Muganda Central Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
William Naburi Karamajong Northern Protestant
Works & Housing J. M. Zikusoka Musoga Eastern Protestant
Transport & 
Communications
-------------------------
Lt-Col. E. A. 
Obitre Gama
Lugbara Northern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Yekosofati Engura Langi Northern Protestant
Minerals & Water Wilson Oryema Acholi Northern Protestant
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Resources
Education E. B. Rugumayo Mutoro Western Protestant
Health Dr. J. M. Gessa Gwere Eastern Protestant
Labour Abu Manyanja Muganda Central Muslim
Justice/ Attorney- 
General
P. J. Nkambo 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.
Year: 1975
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Majv-Gen. fdi 
Amin
Kakwa Northern Muslim
P. 0 . Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
Army Chief of 
Staff, MOS 
Defence
M. Adrisi
' / 'iS:;
Lugbara Northern Muslim
Air Force 
Commander
S. Guweddeko Muganda Central Protestant
Finance, Internal 
Affairs
A. C„ Oboth- 
Ofiimi
Japadhola Eastern Protestant
M. S. Kiingi Muganda Central Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
E. B. Wafchweya Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Foreign Affairs Juma A. Oris Madi Northern Muslim
Provincial
Administration
Moses Ali Madi Northern Muslim
Public Affairs & 
Cabinet
R. Nshekanabo Mukiga Western Catholic
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
M. Ramathan Nubian Northern Muslim
Agriculture & 
Animal Industry
J. M. Byagagaire Mukiga Western Protestant
Commerce Noah Mohammed Alur Northern Muslim
Industry & Power Dusman Sabuni Sudanese Northern Muslim
Tourism John D. Onaah Lugbara Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
E. L. Athiyo Karamajong Northern Protestant
Works & Housing S. Lukakamwa Musoga Eastern Protestant
Transport & 
Communications
M. L. Obado Iteso Eastern Catholic
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Sarnia Eastern Catholic
Land & Water 
Resources
Wilson Oryema Acholi Northern Protestant
Education Barnabas Kili Lugbara Northern Catholic
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Health H. Kyemba Musoga Eastern Protestant
Labour L. Katagyira Munyankole Western Protestant
Justice/ Attorney- 
General
G. S. LuJe Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.
Year: 1977
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Maj.-Gen.idi
Amin
Kakwa Northern Muslim
P. 0 . Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
Vice-President, 
Defence, Army 
Chief of Staff
M. Adxisi Lugbara Northern Muslim
Air Force 
Commander
S. Guweddeko
■ ; Muganda Central
Protestant
Finance, Internal 
Affairs
Moses All Madi Northern Muslim
M. S. Kiingi Muganda Central Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
I. K. Kabanda Muganda Central Muslim
Foreign Affairs Juma A. Oris Madi Northern Muslim
Provincial
Administration
W. Ali Fadhul Sudanese Northern Muslim
Public Affairs & 
Cabinet
R. Nshekanabo Mukiga Western Catholic
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
M. Ramathan Nubian Northern Muslim
Agriculture & 
Animal Industry
J. M. Byagagaire Mukiga Western Protestant
Commerce Noah Mohammed Alur Northern Muslim
Industry & Power DusmanSabuni Sudanese Northern Muslim
Tourism John D. Onaah Lugbara Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
E. L. Athiyo Karamajong Northern Protestant
Works & Housing S. Lukakamwa Musoga Eastern Protestant
Transport & 
Communications
M. L. Obado Iteso Eastern Catholic
Culture & 
Community 
Development
F. Nyangweso Sarnia Eastern Catholic
Education Barnabas Kill Lugbara Northern Catholic
Labour L. Katagyira Munyankole Western Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.
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Year: 1979
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Foreign 
Affairs, Tourism, 
Information & 
Broadcasting, 
Health
Maj.-Gcn. ldi
Amin
■f'VV ‘ - . C
V HP r , ■'
Kakwa Northern Muslim
Vice-President M.Adrisi Lugbara Northern Muslim
Air Force 
Commander, Army 
Chief of Staff
-
Yusuf Go won Kakwa Northern Muslim
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
J. Masagazj Muganda Central Muslim
Internal Affairs Farouk Minawa Sudanese Northern Muslim
Defence Demixo Mondo Madi Northern Catholic
Provincial
Administration
W. Ali Fadhul Sudanese Northern Muslim
Public Affairs & 
Cabinet
R. Nshekanabo Mukiga Western Catholic
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
M. Ramatban Nubian Northern Muslim
Agriculture Ibrahim Garandi Musoga Eastern Muslim
Animal Industry Ismail Sebi Lugbara Northern Muslim
Commerce Bakhiti Alur Northern Muslim
Industry & Power Dusman Sabuni
.................................  .
Sudanese Northern Muslim
Works & Housing S. Lukakamwa
.................................................................................
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Transport & 
Communications, 
MOS Office of the 
President
P. 0 . Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Mary Astles 
Senkatuka
Muganda Central Protestant
Land & Water 
Resources
Juma A. Oris Madi Northern Muslim
Education Barnabas Kili Lugbara Northern Catholic
Labour L. Katagyira Munyankole Western Protestant
Justice M| B. Matovu Muganda Central Catholic
Without Portfolio Hussein Marijan Nubian Northern Muslim
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.
Year: 11 April 1979 (UNLF-  Lule)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Yusuf K. Lule Muganda Central Protestant
Yoweri Museveni Munyankole Western Protestant
William Omaria Iteso Eastern Protestant
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Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
Sam Sebagereka Muganda Central Protestant
Internal Affairs Paulo Muwanga Muganda Central Protestant
Andrew Kayiira Muganda Central Catholic
Foreign Affairs Otema AHimadi Acholi Northern Protestant
Sam Karugire Munyankole Western Protestant
Local government Mathias Ngobi Musoga Eastern Catholic
Reconstruction & 
Rehabilitation
Andrew Adimola Acholi Northern Catholic
Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fisheries 
& Animal Industry
J. Dungu Muganda Central Catholic
Commerce & 
Industry
A D  UA. Byararuha Munyankole Western Protestant
Power, Posts & 
Communications
Akena P’Ojok Acholi Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
Ateker Ejalu Iteso Eastern Protestant
Land & Natural 
Resources
T. Kabwegyere Munyankole Western Catholic
Education A. Wandira Musoga Eastern Protestant
Health Arnold Bisase Muganda Central Protestant
P. Senabulya Muganda Central Catholic
Justice Dan Nabudere Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Attorney General G. Kanyeihamba Mukiga Western Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 338p.
Year: 25 June 1979 (UNLF -  Binaisa)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Foreign 
Affairs
Godfrey Binaisa Muganda Central Protestant
Sam Karugire Munyankole Western Protestant
Finance Jack Ssentongo Muganda Central Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Anthony Ocaya Acholi Northern Catholic
Internal Affairs a tPaulo Muwanga Muganda Central Protestant
Regional
Cooperation
Iteso Eastern Protestant
Defence Yowerl Museveni Munyankole Western Protestant
William Omaria Iteso Eastern Protestant
Local government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Cabinet & Public 
Service
Wilson Okwenje Musamia Eastern Protestant
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Reconstruction & 
Rehabilitation
Andrew Adimola
....... ' I ,
Acholi Northern Catholic
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Yona Kanyomozi Muhororo Western Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development D" “
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Agriculture Mathias Ngobi Musoga Eastern Catholic
Animal Industry su uga Muganda Central Protestant
Sam Mugwisa Muganda Central Protestant
Commerce P. Kaboha Mutoro Western Catholic
Industry Y. Kyersimira Musoga Eastern Protestant
Power, Posts & 
Communications
Akena P’Ojok Acholi Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
A. Picho Owinyi Alur Northern Protestant
Housing, Urban 
Development & 
Works
Abraham Waiigo Muganda Central Protestant
Land & Natural 
Resources
T. Kabwegyere Munyankole Western Catholic
Tourism & 
Wildlife
J. Obua-Otua Langi Northern Protestant
Education G. N. Bitamazire Muganda Central Catholic
Health Arnold Bisase Muganda Central Protestant
R. Rugunda Mukiga Western Protestant
Labour Paul Ssemogerere Muganda Central Catholic
Justice Stephen O. Atiko---------- -----,—----- - - Iteso Eastern Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 338p.
Year: 18 May 1980 (UNLF -  Military Commission)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Military
Commission
(President,
Defence)
Paulo Muwanga 
(Chairma)
Muganda Central Protestant
Yoweri Museveni 
(Vive-Chairman)
Munyankole Western Protestant
Tito Okello Acholi Northern Catholic
Oyite-Ojok Langi Northern Protestant
William Omaria Iteso Eastern Protestant
............. --------------  — -----
Zcddi Mantru Munyankole Western Protestant
Raphael
Bitamazire
Mutoro Western Catholic
Finance Lawrence Sebalu Muganda Central Catholic
Planning & Anthony Ocaya Acholi Northern Catholic
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Economic
Development
Internal Affairs
—,-----------***— ,— ,—........—
Sam Tewungwa Musoga Eastern Protestant
Christopher Okoth Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Foreign Affairs Otema Allimadi Acholi Northern Protestant
Sam Karugire Munyankole Western Protestant
Regional
Cooperation
A. Pincho Owinyi Alur Northern Protestant
Local government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Cabinet & Public 
Service
Wilson Okwenje Musamia Eastern Protestant
Reconstruction & 
Rehabilitation
M aseteKuuya Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
J. Ohua-Otua Langi Northern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
A. Tiberondwa Munyankole Western Protestant
Agriculture Mathias Ngobi Musoga Eastern Catholic
Animal Industry E. R. Nkwasibwe Mukiga Western Protestant
Commerce Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Industry Obonyo Acholi Northern Catholic
Power, Posts & 
Communications
Akena P ’Ojok Acholi Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
David Anyoti Iteso (Kumam) Eastern Protestant
Housing, Urban 
Development & 
Works
Abraham Waligo Muganda Central Protestant
Transport Kintu Musoke Muganda Central Protestant
Supply Moses Apiliga Madi Northern Catholic
Land & Natural 
Resources
T. Kabwegyere Munyankole Western Catholic
Tourism & 
Wildlife
Ephraim Kamuntu Munyankole Western Protestant
Education G. N. Bitamazire Muganda Central Catholic
Max Choudry Karamajong Northern Catholic
Health Ntege Lubwama Muganda Central Muslim
R. Rugunda Mukiga Western Protestant
Labour J. Luwuliza- 
Kirunda
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Matiya Kasaija Munyoro Western Catholic
Justice Stephen 0 . Ariko Iteso Eastern Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 338p.
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Year: 1981 (OBO TEII)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance
Apollo Milton Langi Northern Protestant
C. Rwakasisi Munyankole Western Protestant
Dr. Picho Owiny Alur Northern Protestant
H. Makmot Langi Northern Protestant
Vice-President,
Defence
Paulo Muwanga Muganda Central Protestant
P. Otai Iteso Eastern Protestant
Prime Minister Erifasi Otema 
Alimadi
Acholi Northern Protestant
E. Rurangarange Munyankole Western Protestant
W. A. Osindek 
Wangwor
Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Agriculture & 
Forestry
Samuel Mugwisa Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. P. Rubaihayo Munyankole Western Protestant
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. John J. Otim Acholi Northern Catholic
I. 0 . Okwakol Iteso Eastern Protestant
Commerce Joel M. Aliro- 
Omara
Langi Northern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Dr. James M. 
Rwanyayare
Mukiga Western Protestant
A. 0 . Olanya- 
Olenge
Acholi Northern Protestant
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Yona Kanyomozi Muhororo Western Protestant
Education
Pr0fOjokC N
Langi Northern Protestant
Dr. P. Mateke Mufumbira Western Protestant
Health Dr. Ezra R. 
Nkwasibwe
Mukiga Western Protestant
Mrs. T. Odongo- 
Oduka
Langi Northern Catholic
Industry Dr. Adonia 
Tiberondwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
R. Bandanyanya Lugbara Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
Dr. David O. 
Anyoti
Iteso (Kumam) Eastern Protestant
M. Kisembo Munyoro Western Catholic
Internal Affairs Dr. JohnM. 
Luwuliza-Kirunda
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Col. W. Omaria Iteso Eastern Protestant
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Justice Stephen O. Ariko Iteso Eastern Protestant
Labour Anthony Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
H. Tungakwo Mutoro Western Catholic
Housing & Urban 
Development Waligo
Muganda Central Protestant
B. Etonu Iteso Eastern Catholic
Local Government Lawrence Kulele- 
Settala
Muganda Central Catholic
P. Mwondha Musoga Eastern Protestant
Lands, Mineral & 
Water Resources
Max Choudry
, V - V  v
Karamajong Northern Catholic
A. Bazira Mukonzo Western Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Sara N. Odaka
If j ||
Musamia Eastern Protestant
Power &
T elecommunications
Akena P’Ojok Acholi Northern Protestant
Regional
Cooperation
SamTewunga Musoga Eastern Protestant
Rehabilitation Peter Masette- 
Kuuya
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
Wilson Okwenje Musamia Eastern Protestant
Transport Yosamu Mugenyi Munyoro Western Protestant
J. Akol Karamajong Northern Protestant
Tourism & Wildlife Mohammed
Ntege-Lubwana
Muganda Central Muslim
Supplies Dr. Moses T. 
Apiliga
Madi Northern Catholic
Works A. Nan’gwale Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Without Portfolio Shafiq Arain 
.......................................
Indian (Muslim)
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1983
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance
Apollo Milton 
Ofeote
Langi Northern Protestant
C. Rwakasisi Munyankole Western Protestant
Dr. Picho Owiny Alur Northern Protestant
H. Makmot Langi Northern Protestant
Vice-President,
Defence
Paulo Muwanga Muganda Central Protestant
P. Otai Iteso Eastern Protestant
Prime Minister Erifasi Otema 
Alimadi
Acholi Northern Protestant
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E. Rurangarange Munyankole Western Protestant
W. A. Osindek 
Wangwor
Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Agriculture & 
Forestry
Samuel Mugwisa Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. P. Rubaihayo Munyankole Western Protestant
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. John J. Otim Acholi Northern Catholic
I. 0 . Okwakol Iteso Eastern Protestant
Commerce Joel M. Aliro- 
Omara
Langi Northern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Mukiga Western Protestant
A. 0 . Olanya- 
Olenge
Acholi Northern Protestant
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Yona Kanyomozi
........ ................... -....-.
Muhororo Western Protestant
Education Prof. Isaac N. 
Ojok
Langi Northern Protestant
Dr. P. Mateke Mufumbira Western Protestant
Health Dr. Ezra R. 
Nkwasibwe
Mukiga Western Protestant
Mrs. T. Odongo- 
Oduka
Langi Northern Catholic
Industry Dr. Adonia 
Tiberondwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
R. Bandanyanya Lugbara Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
Dr. David 0 . 
Anyoti
Iteso (Kumam) Eastern Protestant
M. Kisembo Munyoro Western Catholic
Internal Affairs Dr. John ML 
Luwuliza-Kininda
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Col. W. Omari a Iteso Eastern Protestant
Justice Stephen O. Ariko Iteso Eastern Protestant
Labour Lugbara Northern Catholic
H. Tungakwo Mutoro Western Catholic
Housing & Urban 
Development Waligo
Muganda Central Protestant
B. Etonu Iteso Eastern Catholic
Local Government ■■■■■I
Settala
• ■ - ■
Muganda Central Catholic
P. Mwondha Musoga Eastern Protestant
Lands, Mineral & 
Water Resources
Max Choudry Karamajong Northern Catholic
A. Bazira Mukonzo Western Protestant
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Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Sam N. Odaka Musamia Eastern Protestant
Power &
T elecommunications
Akena P’Ojok Acholi Northern Protestant
Regional
Cooperation
SamTewunga Musoga Eastern Protestant
Rehabilitation
P“ “ e-
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
Wilson Okwenje Musamia Eastern Protestant
Transport Yosamu Mugenyi Munyoro Western Protestant
J. Akol Karamajong Northern Protestant
Tourism & Wildlife Mohammed
Ntege-Lubwana
Muganda Central Muslim
Supplies Dr. Moses T. 
Apiliga
Madi Northern Catholic
Works A. Nan’gwale Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Without Portfolio Shafiq Aram Indian (Muslim)
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1985
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance
Apollo Milton 
Obote
Langi Northern Protestant
C. Rwakasisi Munyankole Western Protestant
Dr. Picho Owiny Alur Northern Protestant
H. Makmot Langi Northern Protestant
Vice-President,
Defence
Paulo Muwanga Muganda Central Protestant
P. Otai Iteso Eastern Protestant
Prime Minister Erifasi Otema 
Alintadi
Acholi Northern Protestant
E. Rurangarange Munyankole Western Protestant
W. A. Osindek 
Wangwor
Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Agriculture & 
Forestry
Samuel Mugwisa Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. P. Rubaihayo Munyankole Western Protestant
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. John J. Otim Acholi Northern Catholic
I. 0 . Okwakol Iteso Eastern Protestant
Commerce Joel M. Aliro- 
Omara
Langi Northern Protestant
Culture & 
Community 
Development
Dr. James M. 
Rwanyayare
Mukiga Western Protestant
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A. 0 . Olanya- 
Olenge
Acholi Northern Protestant
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Yona Kanyomozi
• 1 I S I r  g l l  l l i l■
Muhororo Western Protestant
Education Prof. Isaac N. 
Ojok
Langi Northern Protestant
Dr. P. Mateke Mufumbira Western Protestant
Health Dr. Ezra R. 
Nkwasibwe
Mukiga Western Protestant
Mrs. T. Odongo- 
Oduka
Langi Northern Catholic
Industry Dr. Adonia 
Tiberondwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
R. Bandanyanya Lugbara Northern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting DrS ° Iteso (Kumam) Eastern Protestant
M. Kisembo Munyoro Western Catholic
Internal Affairs Dr. John M. 
Luwuliza-Kinmda
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Col. W. Omaria Iteso Eastern Protestant
Justice Stephen 0* Ariko Iteso Eastern Protestant
Labour Anthony Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
H. Tungakwo Mutoro Western Catholic
Housing & Urban 
Development
Abraham P. 
Waligo
Muganda Central Protestant
B. Etonu Iteso Eastern Catholic
Local Government Lawrence Kuiele- 
Settala
Muganda Central Catholic
P. Mwondha Musoga Eastern Protestant
Lands, Mineral & 
Water Resources
Max Choudry Karamajong Northern Catholic
A. Bazira Mukonzo Western Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Sam N. Odaka
k  f
Musamia Eastern Protestant
Power &
T elecommunications
, , ' .■■".........■.......
Akena P’Ojok Acholi Northern Protestant
Regional
Cooperation
Sam Tewunga Musoga Eastern Protestant
Rehabilitation Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
Musamia Eastern Protestant
Transport Yosamu Mugenyi Munyoro Western Protestant
J. Akol Karamajong Northern Protestant
Tourism & Wildlife Mohammed Muganda Central Muslim
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Ntege-Lubwana
Supplies Dr, Moses T. 
Apiliga
Madi Northern Catholic
Works A. Nangwale Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Without Portfolio r- AShafiq Arain Indian (Muslim)
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1986 (MUSEVENI)
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
B. K. Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
S. Njuba Muganda Central Protestant
Defence Dr. R. Bata Madi Northern Catholic
Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
Vice-Chairman
NRM/NRC
Haji M. Kigongo Muganda Central Muslim
Prime Minister Dr. S. B. Kisekka Muganda Central Protestant
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Mrs. Betty 
Bigombe
Acholi Northern Catholic
Rehabilitation Mrs. C. Njuba Muganda Central Protestant
Finance Dr. C. Ktyonga Munyabindi Western Protestant
A. Kafumbe 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Muslim
Agriculture & 
Forestry
R. Kitariko Mukiga Western Catholic
Mrs. V. 
Ssekitoleko
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. S. Masaba Mugisu Eastern Catholic
W. Nyakatura Mutoro Western Catholic
Commerce Dr. G. 
Kanyeihamba
Mukiga Western Protestant
Youth, Culture & 
Sport
. ........... ■ ■ ll,'lv
S. K. Okurut Iteso Eastern Protestant
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
J Sscb^ EHE Kizito Muganda Central Protestant
Education J S Mavania Lviaya j
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
J. Ntimba Munyankole Western Catholic
Health Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Dr. J. Batwala Musoga Eastern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
A. K. Mayanja Muganda Central Muslim
315
J. Maumbe 
Mukwana
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Energy, Labour J. Bidandi Sali Muganda Central Muslim
Environment Langi Northern Catholic
Internal Affairs Paul K. 
Ssemogerere
Muganda Central Catholic
Kiiza Besigye Muhororo Western Protestant
Housing & Urban 
Development
J. Wapakabulo Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Local Government Dr. E. Kakonge Munyoro Western Protestant
Kahinda Otafiire Munyankole Western Catholic
Industry & 
Technology
Prof. S. Tumwine Munyankole Western Protestant
Y. Sabiiti Munyankole Western Protestant
Lands & Survey Ben Qkello 
Luwum
Acholi Northern Protestant
Mineral & Water 
Development
B. Chango Macho Musamia Eastern Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Prof. Y. Kyesimira Musoga Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
D. Kibirango Muganda Central Catholic
Foreign Affairs I. Mukiibi Muganda Central Muslim
Transport & 
Communications
A. Kirunda 
Kivejinja
Musoga Eastern Muslim
R. Ekinu Munyankole Central Protestant
Regional
Cooperation
Prof. P. S. 
Mulema
Muganda Central Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife Moses Ali Madi Northern Muslim
Justice J. Mulenga Mufumbira/
Munyarwanda
Western Catholic
Works D. Kigozi Muganda Central Protestant
Without Portfolio A. Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
Without Portfolio T. Rubale Mutoro Western Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1988
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
B. K. Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
S. Njuba Muganda Central Protestant
Defence Dr. R. Bata Madi Northern Catholic
Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
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Vice-Chairman
NRM/NRC
Haji M . Kigongo Muganda Central Muslim
Prime Minister Dr. S. B. Kisekka Muganda Central Protestant
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Mrs. Betty 
Bigombe
Acholi Northern Catholic
Finance Munyabindi Western Protestant
A. Kafumbe 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Muslim
Agriculture & 
Forestry
R. Kitariko Mukiga Western Catholic
Mrs. V. 
Ssekitoleko
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. S. Masaba Mugisu Eastern Catholic
W. Nyakatura Mutoro Western Catholic
Commerce Dr. G. 
Kanyeihamba
Mukiga Western Protestant
Youth, Culture & 
Sport
S. K. Okurut Iteso Eastern Protestant
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
J. Ssebaana Kizito Muganda Central Protestant
Education J. S. Mayanja 
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
J. Ntimba Munyankole Western Catholic
Health Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Dr. J. Batwala Musoga Eastern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
A. K, Mayanja Muganda Central Muslim
J. Maumbe 
Mukwana
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Energy, Labour J. Bidandi Sali Muganda Central Muslim
Environment Langi Northern Catholic
Internal Affairs Paul K. 
Ssemogerere
Muganda Central Catholic
Kiiza Besigye Muhororo Western Protestant
Housing & Urban 
Development
J. Wapakabulo Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Local Government Dr. E. Kakongc Munyoro Western Protestant
Kahinda Otafiire Munyankole Western Catholic
Industry & 
Technology
Prof. S. Tumwine Munyankole Western Protestant
Y. Sabiiti Munyankole Western Protestant
Lands & Survey Ben Okello 
Luwum
Acholi Northern Protestant
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Mineral & Water 
Development
B. Change Macho Musamia Eastern Protestant
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Prof. Y. Kycsimira Musoga Eastern Protestant
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
D. Kibirango Muganda Central Catholic
Foreign Affairs
............................ . , ,
I. Mukiibi Muganda Central Muslim
Transport & 
Communications
A. Kirunda 
Kivejinja
Musoga Eastern Muslim
R. Ekinu Munyankole Central Protestant
Regional
Cooperation Mule™
Muganda Central Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife Moses Ali Madi Northern Muslim
Justice J. Muienga Mufiimbira/
Munyarwanda
Western Catholic
Works D. Kigozi Muganda Central Protestant
Rehabilitation Dr. A. Ofumbi Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Mrs. C. Njuba Muganda Central Protestant
Without Portfolio A. Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
Without Portfolio T. Rubale Mutoro Western Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1990
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Chief Political 
Commissar
Kiiza Besigye Muhororo Western Protestant
Karamoja Affairs A. Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
Security Balaki Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Women Mrs. Byekwaso 
Lubega
Muganda Central Catholic
Special Duties Ateker Ejalu Iteso Eastern Protestant
Defence David Tmyefuza Munyankole Central Protestant
Fred Rwigyema Munyarwanda Western Catholic
Vice-Chairman
NRM/NRC
Haji M. Kjgongo Muganda Central Muslim
Prime Minister Dr. S. B. Kisekka Muganda Central Protestant
Mrs. Betty 
Bigombe
Acholi Northern Catholic
Mrs. Gertrude 
Njuba
Muganda Central Protestant
First Deputy Prime 
Minister
Eriya Kategaya
........' ...................
Munyankole
__________________________________________
Western Protestant
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Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Foreign Affairs & 
Regional 
Cooperation
Paul K 
Ssentogerere
Muganda Central Catholic
Prof. Tarsis 
Kabwegyere
Munyankole Western Catholic
Omara Atubo Langi Northern Protestant
Argad Didi Madi Northern Catholic
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister
A. K. Mayanja Muganda Central Muslim
Finance Dr. C. Kiyonga Munyabindi Western Protestant
A. Kafumbe 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Muslim
S. Kavuma Muganda Central Protestant
Agriculture Mrs. V. 
Ssekitoleko
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Yafesi Sabiiti Munyankole Central Protestant
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Prof. Gorge M. 
Kagonyera
Mukiga Western Protestant
Henry Kyemba Musoga Eastern Protestant
Dr. Aporu Okol Iteso Eastern Catholic
Dr. Oteng Langi Northern Catholic
Commerce Paul Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
I. Kayonde Munyarwanda Central Protestant
Charles Alai Acholi Northern Catholic
Youth, Culture & 
Sport
Bng. Moses Ah
' . ■ ' -
Madi Northern Muslim
Mrs. Betty Okwir Acholi Northern Catholic
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
r ...  . . .  J. Wapakabulo Mugisu Eastern Protestant
S. Kiingi Muganda Central Protestant
Peter Akure Iteso Eastern Protestant
Education
1 . ...........
Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
J. Ntimba Munyankole Western Catholic
Mrs. J. Npanga Muganda Central Protestant
Health Z. Kaheru Munyoro Western Protestant
Dr. Ronald Bata Madi Northern Catholic
Information & 
Broadcasting
Muganda Central Protestant
Energy Munyankole Western Protestant
Salim Bachou Jonam Northern Muslim
Environment 
Protection & 
Forestry “T “
Musoga Eastern Muslim
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Internal Affairs Ibrahim Mukiibi Muganda Central Muslim
Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Housing & Urban 
Development
John Ssebaana 
Kizito
Muganda Central Protestant
Mutebi Mulwanira Muganda Central Catholic
Local Government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Dr. S. Chebrot Sabiny Eastern Catholic
Mrs. F. K. 
Nkurukenda
Munyoro Western Catholic
Industry & 
Technology
Dr. E. T. Adriko
;/■;/ ..fy ; VV;
Lugbara Northern Protestant
Dr. W. S. Kazibwe Musoga Eastern Catholic
A. Kiiza Amooti Munyoro Western Catholic
Lands & Survey Ben Okello 
Luwum
Acholi Northern Protestant
Isoke Baguma Munyoro Western Catholic
Minerals & Water 
Development
Henry Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
David Pulkol Karamajong Northern Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
J. S. Mayanja 
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
Matthew
Rukikaire
Muhororo Western Protestant
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
TomRubale Mutoro Western Protestant
Rhoda Kalema Muganda Central Protestant
Transport & 
Communications D Ru“
Mukiga Western Protestant
John Kawanga Muganda Central Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife Sam Sebagereka Muganda Central Protestant
Prof. W. Nadiope Musoga Eastern Protestant
Labour S. K. Okurut Iteso Eastern Protestant
C. Karusoke Mutoro Western Catholic
Justice Dr. G, 
Kanyeihamba
Mukiga Western Protestant
Works D. KlgOZl Muganda Central Protestant
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Constitutional
Affairs
Muganda Central Protestant
Relief & Social 
Rehabilitation
AdokoNekyon Langi Northern Muslim
Deo Rwabiita Munyankole Western Catholic
Without Portfolio David Kibirango Muganda Central Catholic
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
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Year: 1992
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Karamoja Affairs A. Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
Security Balaki Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Presidential Affairs Kintu Musoke Muganda Central Protestant
Defence David Tinyefuza Munyankole Central Protestant
Vice-Chairman
NRM/NRC
Haji M. Kigongo Muganda Central Muslim
Vice-President, 
Internal Affairs
Dr, S. B. Kisekka Muganda Central Protestant
Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Prime Minister Cosmas Adyebo Langi Northern Catholic
Mrs. Betty 
Bigombe
Acholi Northern Catholic
Moses Kintu Musoga Eastern Muslim
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, National 
Political 
Commissar
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Foreign Affairs
Paul K, 
Ssemogerere
Muganda Central Catholic
Kirunda Kivejinja Musoga Eastern Muslim
Argad Didi Madi Northern Catholic
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister, Justice
A. K. Mayanja Muganda Central Muslim
Sam Njuba Muganda Central Protestant
Finance Dr. C. Kiyonga Munyabindi Western Protestant
A. Kafumbe 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Muslim
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Mrs. V. 
Ssekitoleko
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Ojok
O’Bwangamoi
Acholi Northern Catholic
Commerce, 
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Richard Kaijuka
'; *)< jlC.v p x
Munyankole Western Protestant
Gerald Sendaula Muganda Central Catholic
Education & Sports Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
David Pulkol Karamajong Northern Catholic
Health
Makumb!
Muganda Central Protestant
Information Paul Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
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Energy, Minerals & 
Environment 
Protection
Henry Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Land, Housing & 
Urban 
Development
Lugbara Northern Protestant
Besweri Mulondo Muganda Central Protestant
Local Government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Dr. S. Chebrot Sabiny Eastern Catholic
Industry & 
Technology
James F. 
Wapakabulo
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Bart Katureebe Munyankole Western Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
J. $. Mayanja 
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
Matthew
Rukikaire
,
Muhororo Western Protestant
Public Service TomeRubale Mutoro Western Protestant
Charles Alai Acholi Northern Catholic
Women in 
Development, 
Culture & Youth
Dr. Speciosa 
Wandira Kazibwe
Musoga Eastern Catholic
Works, Transport & 
Communications
Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Labour & Social 
Welfare
Ateker Ejalu Iteso Eastern Protestant
Betty Okwir Acholi Northern Catholic
Tourism, Wildlife 
& Antiquities
Sam Sebagereka Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1994
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President, Defence Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Karamoja Affairs A. Butele Lugbara Northern Catholic
Security Balaki Kirya Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Presidential Affairs Kintu Musoke Muganda Central Protestant
Luwero Affairs Kisamba Mugerwa Muganda Central Protestant
Defence David Tutyefuza Munyankole Central Protestant
Vice-Chairman
NRM/NRC
Haji M. Kigoixgo Muganda Central Muslim
Vice-President, 
Internal Affairs
Dr. S. B. Kisekka Muganda Central Protestant
Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Prime Minister Cosmas Adyebo Langi Northern Catholic
322
Mrs. Betty 
Bigombe
Acholi Northern Catholic
Moses Kintu Musoga Eastern Muslim
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, National 
Political 
Commissar
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Foreign Affairs
Paul K. 
Ssemogererc
Muganda Central Catholic
Kirunda Kivejinja Musoga Eastern Muslim
Argad Didi Madi Northern Catholic
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister, Justice
A. K. Mayanja Muganda Central Muslim
Sam Njuba Muganda Central Protestant
Finance Dr. C. Kiyonga Munyabindi Western Protestant
A. Kafumbe 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Muslim
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Mrs. V. 
Ssekitoleko
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Ojok
O’Bwangamoi
Acholi Northern Catholic
Commerce, 
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Riclwd Kaijuka Munyankole Western Protestant
Gerald Sendaula Muganda Central Catholic
Education & Sports Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
David Pulkol Karamajong Northern Catholic
Health Dr. James Muganda Central Protestant
Information Paul Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
Energy, Minerals & 
Environment 
Protection
Henry Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Land, Housing & 
Urban 
Development
Lugbara Northern Protestant
Besweri Mulondo Muganda Central Protestant
Local Government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Dr. S. Chebrot Sabiny Eastern Catholic
Industry & 
Technology
James F. 
Wapakabulo
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Bart Katureebe Munyankole Western Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
J. S. Mayanja 
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
Matthew Muhororo Western Protestant
323
Rukikaire
Public Service Tome Rubale Mutoro Western Protestant
Charles Alai Acholi Northern Catholic
Women in 
Development, 
Culture &. Youth
Dr. Speciosa 
Wandira Kazibwe
Musoga Eastern Catholic
Works, Transport & 
Communications
Dr. Ruhakana Mukiga Western Protestant
Labour & Social 
Welfare
AtekerEjalu Iteso Eastern Protestant
Betty Okwir Acholi Northern Catholic
Tourism, Wildlife 
& Antiquities
Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1996
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Yowert K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Economic
Monitoring
Syda Bbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Security Wilson M. 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Protestant
Luwero Edward K. 
Makubuya
Muganda Central Protestant
Karamoja Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Political Affairs Med Kaggwa Muganda Central Muslim
Defence (General) Amama Mbabazi Mukiga Western Protestant
Defence (Training) Col. Odongo Jeje Iteso Eastern Muslim
Vice-President, 
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. Speciosa 
Wandifa Kazibwe
Musoga Eastern Catholic
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Dr. Kezimbira 
Miyingo
Muganda Central Catholic
Prime Minister Kintu Musoke Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. Kisamba 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Owiny-Dollo
Chigamoy
Acholi Northern Catholic
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Foreign 
Affairs
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Alitwala K. 
Rebecca
Musoga Eastern Protestant
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Dr. Martin Aliker Acholi Northern Protestant
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Tourism & Wildlife
Madi Northern Muslim
Otim 0 . Yafest Lango Northern Protestant
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister, Labour & 
Social Services
Paul O. Etiang 
.....'..;..................... ■...
Iteso Eastern Protestant
Finance J. S. Mayanja 
Nkangi
Muganda Central Protestant
Matthew
Rukikaire
Muhororo Western Protestant
Basoga Nsadhu Musoga Eastern Protestant
Tomasi S. 
Kiryapawo
Mugwere Eastern Catholic
Trade & Industry Henry Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Dr. Abel 
Rwendeire
Mukiga Western Catholic
Education & Sports Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
Francis E. Babu Muganda Central Catholic
Brig. Jim K. 
Muhwezi
Muhororo Western Protestant
Health Dr. C. Kiyonga Munyabindi Western Protestant
Information Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Philip Byaruhanga Munyoro Western Catholic
Natural Resources Gerald
Ssendawula
Muganda Central Catholic
Matiya B. Isoke Munyoro Western Catholic
Internal Affairs Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Col. William 
Omaria
Iteso Eastern Protestant
Lands, Housing & 
Urban 
Development
Francis Ayume Kakwa Northern Protestant
Jovino A. Akaki Langi Northern Catholic
Local Government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Col. Kahinda 
Otafiire
Munyankole Western Catholic
Andraule Awuzu Lugbara Northern Catholic
Gender & 
Community 
Development
Muganda Central Muslim
Jane F. Kuka Sabiny Eastern Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Richard Kaijukai Munyankole Western Protestant
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Sam Kutesa Munyankole Western Protestant
Public Service Prof. Apolo 
Nsibambi
Muganda Central Protestant
Mavenjana
Akumu
Alur Northern Catholic
Works, Transport & 
Communications
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Sylvester W. 
Wasieba
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Justice Bart Katureebc Munyankole Western Catholic
Emmanuel
Kirenga
Muganda Central Catholic
Without Portfolio Kirunda Kivijinja __ _________ Musoga Eastern Muslim
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 1998
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Economic
Monitoring
Syda Bbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Security Wilson M. 
Mukasa
Muganda Central Protestant
Luwero Edward K. 
Makubuya
Muganda Central Protestant
Karamoja Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Political Affairs Amama Mbabazi Mukiga Western Protestant
Vice-President; 
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr, Speciosa 
Wandira Kazibwe
Musoga Eastern Catholic
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Dr. Kezimbira 
Miyingo
Muganda Central Catholic
Prime Minister Kintu Musoke Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. Kisamba 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Owiny-Dollo
Chigamoy
Acholi Northern Catholic
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Foreign 
Affairs
Eriya Kaiegaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Alitwala K. 
Rebecca
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Dr. Martin Aliker Acholi Northern Protestant
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister,
Moses Ali Madi Northern Muslim
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Tourism & Wildlife
Otim 0 . Yafest Lango Northern Protestant
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister, Labour & 
Social Services
Paul O. Etiang Iteso Eastern Protestant
Finance ■ I S .  Mayanja 
NLangi
Muganda Central Protestant
Matthew
Rukikaire
Muhororo Western Protestant
Basoga Nsadhu Musoga Eastern Protestant
Tomasi S. 
Kiryapawo
Mugwere Eastern Catholic
Trade & Industry Henry Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Dr. Abel 
Rwendeire
Mukiga Western Catholic
Education & Sports Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
Francis E. Babu Muganda Central Catholic
Brig. Jim K. 
Muhwezi
Muhororo Western Protestant
Health Dr. C. Kiyonga Munyabindi Western Protestant
Information Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Philip Byaruhanga Munyoro Western Catholic
Natural Resources Gerald
Ssendawula
Muganda Central Catholic
Matiya B. Isoke Munyoro Western Catholic
Internal Affairs Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Col. William 
Omaria
Iteso Eastern Protestant
Lands, Housing & 
Urban 
Development
Francis Ayume
'
Kakwa Northern Protestant
Jovino A. Akaki Langi Northern Catholic
Local Government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Col. Kahinda 
Otafiire
Munyankole Western Catholic
Andraule Awuzu Lugbara Northern Catholic
Gender & 
Community 
Development
Muganda Central Muslim
Jane F. Kuka Sabiny Eastern Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Richard Kaijukai Munyankole Western Protestant
Sam Kutesa Munyankole Western Protestant
Public Service Prof. Apolo 
Nsibambi
Muganda Central Protestant
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Mavenjana
Akumu
Alur Northern Catholic
Works, Transport & 
Communications
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Sylvester W. 
Wasieba
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Justice Bart Katureebe Munyankole Western Catholic
Emmanuel
Kirenga
Muganda Central Catholic
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 2000
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Yowert K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Minister in charge 
of the Presidency
Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Minister in charge 
of Information
Basoga Nsadhu Musoga Eastern Protestant
Minister in charge 
of security
Wilson M. Mukasa Muganda Central Protestant
Minister in charge 
of Economic 
Monitoring
Kweronda
Ruhemba
Munyankole Western Protestant
Defence Stephen Kavtnxm Muganda Central Protestant
Vice-President Dr. Speciosa 
Wandira Kazibwe
Musoga Eastern Catholic
Betty Okwir Acholi Northern Catholic
Prime Minister Prof. Apolo 
Nsibambi
Muganda Central Protestant
Mukiga Western Protestant
Omwony Ojwok Karamajong Northern Catholic
Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Ruth Nankabirwa 
Sentamu
Muganda Central Catholic
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Foreign 
Affairs
Eriya Kategaya
H H H H
Munyankole Western Protestant
Amama Mbabazi Mukiga Western Protestant
Dr. Alfred 
Mubanda
Muganda Central Catholic
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Tourism, Trade & 
Industry
Moses All Madi Northern Muslim
Jovino A. Akaki Langi Northern Catholic
Vincent Nyanzi Muganda Central Catholic
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Disaster 
Preparedness & 
Refugees
Maj. Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Jane F. Kuka Sabiny Eastern Catholic
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
Gerald
Ssendawuk
Muganda Central Catholic
Privatisation Manzi
Tumubweinee
Mukiga Western Protestant
Gabriel Opio Musamia Eastern Protestant
Education & Sports
PrMa“ K-
Muganda Central Protestant
Namirembe
Bitamazire
Muganda Central Catholic
Dr. Abel 
Rwendeire
Mukiga Western Catholic
Alfred O. Ogaba Acholi Northern Catholic
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. Kisamba 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Dr. Fabius 
Byaruhanga
Mutagwenda
(Munyankole)
Western Catholic
Fred Mukisa Musamia Eastern Catholic
Health Dr. Crispus 
Kiyonga
Munyabindi Western Protestant
Phillip
Byaruhanga
Munyoro Western Catholic
Beatrice W. 
Mukaye
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Internal Affairs Prof. Edward 
Rugumayo
Mutoro Western Protestant
Sarah S. 
Namusoke
Muganda Central Protestant
Water, Lands & 
Environment
Henry M. Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Matiya B. Isoke Munyoro Western Catholic
Dr. Kezimbira 
Miyingo
Muganda Central Catholic
Local Government Bidandi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Betty A. Okullu Acholi Northern Catholic
Gender, Labour & 
Social 
Development
Janat B. Mukwaya Muganda Central Muslim
Tomasi S. 
Kiryapawo
Mugwere Eastern Catholic
Dr. Philemon Mufiimbira Western Protestant
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Mateke
Mary N. Kakembo Muganda Central Protestant
Nayiga Florence Muganda Central Catholic
Grace Akello Iteso Eastern Catholic
Energy & Minerals Syda Bbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Francis E. Babu Muganda Central Catholic
Public Service Amanya Mushega Munyankole Western Protestant
Mavenjima
Akumu
Alur Northern Catholic
Benigna Mukiibi Munyoro West Catholic
Works, Housing & 
Communications
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Michael W. 
Kafabusa
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Omax Omeda Iteso Eastern Catholic
Andruale Awuzu Lugbara Northern Catholic
Justice & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
J. S. Mayattja 
Nkangt
Muganda Central Protestant
Attorney General Bart Katureebe Munyankole Western Catholic
Ethics & Integrity Miria Matembe Munyankole Western Protestant
Parliamentary
Affairs
Rebecca K. Musoga Eastern Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 2002
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President YowcrlK.
Musevepi
Munyankole Western Protestant
Minister in charge 
of the Presidency
Dr. Gilbert 
Bukenya
Muganda Central Catholic
Vice-President Dr. Speciosa 
Wandira Kazibwe
Musoga Eastern Catholic
Prime Minister Prof. Apolo 
Nsibambi
Muganda Central Protestant
p£ “
Mukiga Western Protestant
Felix Okot Ogong Langi Northern Catholic
Miria Matembe Munyankole Western Protestant
Omwony Ojwok Karamajong Northern Catholic
Northern Uganda Agard Didi Madi Northern Catholic
Karamoja Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Luwero Tim Lwanga Muganda Central Protestant
Information Basoga Nsadhu Musoga Eastern Protestant
Security Muruli Mukasa Muganda Central Protestant
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First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Internal 
Affairs
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Sarah K. 
Namusoke
Muganda Central Protestant
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Disaster 
Preparedness & 
Refugees
Madi Northern Muslim
Christine A. 
Aporu
Iteso Eastern Catholic
Third Deputy Prime 
Minster, Foreign 
Affairs
James
Wapakabulo
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Col. Kahinda 
Otafiire
Munyankole Western Catholic
Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
Gerald
Ssendawula
Muganda Central Catholic
Rukutuna
Mwesigwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
Sam Kutesa Munyankole Western Protestant
Issac Musumba Musoga Eastern Muslim
Prof. Peter 
Kasenene
Munyankole Western Catholic
Defence Amama Mbabazi Mukiga Western Protestant
Ruth Nankabirwa 
Sentamu
Muganda Central Catholic
Education & Sports Prof. Edward KL 
Makubuya
Muganda Central Protestant
Namirembe
Bitamazire
Muganda Central Catholic
Betty Akech 
Okullu
Acholi Northern Catholic
Henry Oryem 
Okello
Acholi Northern Protestant
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. Kisamba 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Mary R. 
Mugyenyi
Munyankole Western Protestant
Dr. Fabius 
Byaruhanga
Munyoro Western Catholic
Health Brig. Jim 
Muhwezi
Muhororo Western Protestant
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Mike Mukula Iteso Eastern Protestant
Beatrice W. 
Mukaye
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Tourism, Trade & 
Industry
Prof. Edward 
Rugumayo
Mutoro Western Protestant
Jo vino A. Akaki Langi Northern Catholic
Richard Nduhuura Munyankole Western Protestant
Dr. Abel 
Rwendeire
Mukiga Western Catholic
Water, Lands & 
Environment Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Matiya B. Isoke Munyoro Western Catholic
Dr. Kezimbira 
Miyingo
Muganda Central Catholic
Maria Mutagamba Muganda Central Catholic
Local Government Bidaiidi Ssali Muganda Central Muslim
Phillip
Byaruhanga
Munyoro Western Catholic
Gender, Labour & 
Social 
Development
Bakoko B. Zoe Lugbara Northern Catholic
Sam Bitangaro Mufumbira Western Protestant
Henry Obbo Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Alex Kamugisha Muhororo Western Catholic
Florence Nayiga Muganda Central Catholic
Grace Akello Iteso Eastern Catholic
Energy & Minerals Syda Bbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Daudi Migereko Musoga Eastern Protestant
Kamanda
Bataringaya
Mwamba Western Catholic
Public Service Henry M.Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Okumu Ringa 
Aloysius
Alur Northern Catholic
Benigna Mukiibi Munyoro Western Catholic
Works, Housing & 
Communications
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Michael W. 
Kafabusa
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Francis E. Babu Muganda Central Catholic
Andruale Awuzu Lugbara Northern Catholic
Justice & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
Janat B. Mukwaya Muganda Central Muslim
Attorney General Francis J. Ayume Kakwa Northern Protestant
Without Portfolio Dr. Crispus 
......- ....-............................................ .........
Munyabindi Western Protestant
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| Kiyonga ~
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 2004
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Minister in charge 
of the Presidency
Kirunda KiveiiniaJ  J Musoga Eastern Muslim
Vice-President Dr. Gilbert 
Bukenya
Muganda Central Catholic
Adolf Mwesige Mutoro Western Catholic
Prime Minister Prof. Apolo 
Nsibambi
Muganda Central Protestant
Prof. Mondo 
Kagonyera
Mukiga Western Protestant
Parliamentary
Affairs
Hope Mwesigye Mukiga Western Protestant
Ethics & Integrity Tim Lwanga Muganda Central Protestant
Northern Uganda Grace Akello Iteso Eastern Catholic
Karamoja Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Luwero Prof. Semakula 
Kiwanuka
Muganda Central Catholic
Agard Didi Madi Northern Catholic
Information Nsaba Buturo Mufumbira Western Protestant
Security Betty A. Okullu Acholi Northern Catholic
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Disaster 
Preparedness & 
Refugees
Lt.-Gen. Moses 
Ali
Madi Northern Muslim
Christine A. 
Aporu
Iteso Eastern Catholic
Second Deputy 
Prime Minster, 
Foreign Affairs
James
Wapakabulo
% ' :  - ^  v  - **^4 v- 'W'" *IIIIIHBIMIHIIIBIMIIIIHIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Nshimye Sebutulo Munyarwanda Central Catholic
Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister, Public 
Service
Henry M. Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Okumu Ringa 
Aloysius
Alur Northern Catholic
Benigna Mukiibi Munyoro Western Catholic
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
Gerald
Ssendawula
Muganda Central Catholic
Omwony Ojwok Karamajong Northern Catholic
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Rukutuna
Mwesigwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
Sam Kutesa Munyankole Western Protestant
Issac Musumba Musoga Eastern Muslim
Prof. Peter 
Kasenene
Munyankole Western Catholic
Defence A mama Mbabazi Mukiga Western Protestant
Ruth Nankabirwa 
Sentamu
Muganda Central Catholic
Internal Affairs Dr. Ruhakana Mukiga Western Protestant
Dr. Kezimbira 
Miyingo
Muganda Central Catholic
Education & Sports
PrMakubu>da K'
Muganda Central Protestant
Namirembe
Bitamazire
Muganda Central Catholic
Beatrice W. 
Mukaye
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Henry Oryem 
Okello
Acholi Northern Protestant
Agriculture, Animal 
Industry & 
Fisheries
Dr. Ki samba 
Mugerwa
Muganda Central Protestant
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Mary R. 
Mugyenyi
Munyankole Western Protestant
Dr. Fabius 
Byaruhanga
Munyoro Western Catholic
Health Brig. Jim
Muhwezi. .....  ..................... .
Muhororo Western Protestant
Mike Mukula Iteso Eastern Protestant
Dr. Alex 
Kamugisha
Muhororo Western Catholic
Tourism, Trade & 
Industry
Prof Edward 
Rugumayo
Mutoro Western Protestant
Jovino A. Akaki Langi Northern Catholic
Richard Nduhuura Munyankole Western Protestant
Jennipher
Namuyangu
Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Water, Lands & 
Environment C° o “
Munyankole Western Catholic
Matiya B. Isoke Munyoro Western Catholic
Lt.-Gem. Jeje 
Odongo
Iteso Eastern Muslim
Maria Mutagamba Muganda Central Catholic
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Local Government Prof. Tarsis 
Kabwegyere
Munyankole Western Catholic
Phillip
Byaruhanga
Munyoro Western Catholic
Gender, Labour & 
Social 
Development
Bakoko B. Zoe Lugbara Northern Catholic
Sam Bitangaro Mufumbira Western Protestant
Henry Obbo Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Felix Okot Ogong Langi Northern Catholic
Florence Nayiga Muganda Central Catholic
Energy & Minerals Syda Bbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Daudi Migereko Musoga Eastern Protestant
Kamanda
Bataringaya
Mwamba Western Catholic
Works, Housing & 
Communications
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Michael W. 
Kafabusa
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Francis E. Babu Muganda Central Catholic
Andruale Awuzu Lugbara Northern Catholic
Justice & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
Janat B. Mukwaya
./ .. ..................
Muganda Central Muslim
Attorney General Francis J. Ayume Kakwa Northern Protestant
Without Portfolio Dr. Crispus 
Kiyonga
Munyabindi Western Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 2006
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President i Yoweri K. 
| Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
Minister in charge 
of the Presidency Wabudeya
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Vice-President Dr. Gilbert 
Bukcnya
Muganda Central Catholic
Phillip
Byaruhanga
Munyoro Western Catholic
Prime Minister Prof Apolo 
Nsibambi
Muganda Central Protestant
Kagonyera
Mukiga Western Protestant
Parliamentary
Affairs
Hope Mwesigye Mukiga Western Protestant
Ethics & Integrity Tim Lwanga Muganda Central Protestant
Northern Uganda Grace Akello Iteso Eastern Catholic
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Karamoja Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Luwero Beatrice Z. 
Magoola
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Agard Didi Madi Northern Catholic
Information Nsaba Buturo Mufumbira Western Protestant
Security Betty A. Okullu Acholi Northern Catholic
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Disaster 
Preparedness & 
Refugees
Madi Northern Muslim
Christine A. 
Aporu
Iteso Eastern Catholic
Third Deputy Prime 
Minister, Public 
Service
Henry M. Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Okumu Ringa 
Aloysius
Alur Northern Catholic
Benigna Mukiibi Munyoro Western Catholic
Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa Munyankole Western Protestant
Nshimye Sebutulo Munyarwanda Central Catholic
Henry Oryem 
Okello
Acholi Northern Protestant
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
Dr. Ezra Suruma Mukiga Western Protestant
Omwony Ojwok Karamajong Northern Catholic
Rukutuna
Mwesigwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
Prof. Semakula 
Kiwanuka
Muganda Central Catholic
Issac Musumba Musoga Eastern Muslim
Prof. Peter 
Kasenene
Munyankole Western Catholic
Defence Amama Mbabazi Mukiga Western Protestant
Ruth Nankabirwa 
Sentamu
Muganda Central Catholic
Internal Affairs Dr. Ruhakana
Rugutida
Mukiga Western Protestant
Dr. Kezimbira 
Miyingo
Muganda Central Catholic
Education & Sports Namirembe
Bitamazire
Muganda Central Catholic
Nyombi Thembo Muganda Central Protestant
Simon Mayende Sarnia Eastern Protestant
Charles
Bakkabulindi
Muganda Central Catholic
Agriculture, Animal Janat B. Mukwaya Muganda Central Muslim
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Industry & 
Fisheries
•
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Mary R. 
Mugyenyi
Munyankole Western Protestant
Health Brig. Jim 
Muhwezi
Muhororo Western Protestant
Mike Mukula Iteso Eastern Protestant
Dr. Alex 
Kamugisha
Muhororo Western Catholic
Tourism, Trade & 
Industry
Daudi Migereko Musoga Eastern Protestant
Jovino A. Akaki Langi Northern Catholic
Jennipher
Namuyangu
Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Igeme Nabeta Musoga Eastern Protestant
Water, Lands & 
Environment
Col. Kahinda 
Otafiire
Munyankole Western Catholic
Matiya B. Isoke Munyoro Western Catholic
Lt.-Gem. Jeje 
Odongo
Iteso Eastern Muslim
Maria Mutagamba Muganda Central Catholic
Local Government Prof. Tarsis 
Kabwegyere
Munyankole Western Catholic
Richard Nduhuura Munyankole Western Protestant
Gender, Labour & 
Social 
Development
........
Bakoko B. Zoe Lugbara Northern Catholic
Sam Bitangaro Mufiimbira Western Protestant
Henry Obbo Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Felix Okot Ogong Langi Northern Catholic
Florence Nayiga Muganda Central Catholic
Energy & Minerals Syda Bbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Michael W. 
Kafabusa
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Kamanda
Bataringaya
Mwamba Western Catholic
Works, Housing & 
Communications
John Nasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Francis E. Babu Muganda Central Catholic
Andruale Awuzu Lugbara Northern Catholic
Tom Butime Mutoro Western Catholic
Justice & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
Dr. Edward K. 
Makubuya
Muganda Central Protestant
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Adolf Mwesige Mutoro Western Catholic
Without Portfolio
■■■'■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' : 'x ■
Dr. Crispus 
Kiyonga
Munyabindi Western Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
Year: 2008
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
President Yoweri K. 
Museveni
Munyankole Western Protestant
The Minister, 
Office of the 
President
Beatrice Mugisu Eastern Catholic
The Minister, 
Office of the 
President (Security)
Araaxna Mbabazi
;; - 7.
Mukiga Western Protestant
Vice-President Dr. Gilbert 
Bukenya
Muganda Central Catholic
James Baba Kakwa Northern Protestant
Prime Minister Prof. Apolo
Nsibambi
~ ■ ....*.....
Muganda Central Protestant
The Minister, 
Office of the Prime 
Minister
Prof. Tarsis 
Kabwegyere
Munyankole Western Catholic
Musa Ecweru Iteso Eastern Protestant
The Minister, 
Office of the Prime 
Minister
Adolf Mwesige Mutoro Western Catholic
Ethics & Integrity Nsaba Buturo Mufiimbira Western Protestant
Northern Uganda David Wakikona Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Karamoja Aston Kajara Mutoro Western Catholic
Luwero Nyombi Thembo Muganda Central Protestant
First Deputy Prime 
Minister, East 
African Affairs
Eriya Kategaya Munyankole Western Protestant
Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Public Service
Henry M. Kajura Munyoro Western Protestant
Prisca B. Mbaguta 
Sezi
Muhororo Western Catholic
Third Deputy 
Prime Minister, 
Information & 
National Guidance
-
Kirunda Kivijinja Musoga Eastern Muslim
Foreign Affairs SamKutesa Munyankole Western Protestant
Issac Musumba Musoga Eastern Muslim
Henry Oryem 
Okello
Munyankole Western Catholic
Finance, Planning Dr. Ezra Suruma Mukiga Western Protestant
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& Economic 
Development
Caleb
Akandwanaho
Munyankole Western Protestant
Kagimu Kiwanuka Muganda Central Catholic
Fred Omach Alur Northern Catholic
Prof. Semakula 
Kiwanuka
Muganda Central Catholic
Omwony Ojwok Karamajong Northern Catholic
Rukiya
Chekamondo
Kulany
Sabiny Eastern Muslim
Defence Dr. Crispus 
Kiyonga
Munyabindi Western Protestant
Ruth Nankabirwa 
Sentamu
Muganda Central Catholic
Internal Affairs Dr. Ruhakana 
Rugunda
Mukiga Western Protestant
Matia Kasaija Munyoro Western Catholic
Education & Sports Namirembe
Bitamazire
Muganda Central Catholic
Peter Lokeris Karamajong Northern Catholic
Gabriel Opio Musamia Eastern Protestant
Charles
Bakkabulindi
Muganda Central Catholic
Agriculture, 
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Hilary Gnek
^  y f / ; :
Acholi Northern Catholic
Dr. Sebunya 
Kibirige
Muganda Central Catholic
Maj. Bright 
Rwamirama
Munyankole Western Protestant
Fred Mukisa Musamia Eastern Catholic
Health Dr. Stephen 
Mallinea
Iteso Eastern Protestant
Richard Nduhuura Munyankole Western Protestant
Emmanuel 0 . 
Otaala
Jopadhola Eastern Catholic
Tourism, Trade & 
Industry
Janat B. Mukwaya Muganda Central Muslim
Serapio Rukundo Mukiga Western Catholic
Ephraim Kamuntu Munyankole Western Protestant
Nelson Gagawala 
Wambuzi
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Lands, Housing & 
Urban 
Development
OmaraAtubo Langi Northern Catholic
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Dr. Kasirivu 
Atwoki
Munyoro Western Catholic
Urban Tibamanya Munyankole Western Catholic
Michael W. 
Kafabusa
Mugisu Eastern Catholic
Water & 
Environment
Muganda Central Catholic
Jessica Eriyo Madi Northern Catholic
Jennipher
Namuyangu
Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Local Government CoL Kahinda 
Otatiire
Munyankole Western Catholic
Hope Mwesigye Mukiga Western Protestant
Gender, Labour & 
Social 
Development
SydaBbumba Muganda Central Muslim
Rukia Isanga Busoga Eastern Muslim
Rukutuna
Mwesigwa
Munyankole Western Protestant
Maj. James 
Kinobe
Muganda Central Protestant
Sulaimani Madada Muganda Central Muslim
Energy & Mineral 
Development
Daudi Migereko Musoga Eastern Protestant
Simon d ’Ujanga Alur Northern Catholic
Kamanda
Bataringaya
Mwamba Western Catholic
Works & Transport JohnNasasira Munyankole Western Protestant
Simon Ejua Iteso Eastern Protestant
John Byabagambi Munyankole Western Catholic
Justice & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
Dr. Edward K. 
Makubuya
Muganda Central Protestant
Fred Ruhindi Munyankole Western Protestant
Information
Communication
Technology
Mulira
Muganda Central Protestant
Alintuma Nsambu Muganda Central Catholic
Without Portfolio Dorothy Hyuha Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.
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DISTRIBUTION OF UPC PARTY CABINET, 1964-71
Year: 1964-1971
Name Tribe Region Religion
Dr. A. M. Obote 
(President)
Langi Northern Protestant
Dr. John Babiiha 
(Vice-President)
Mutoro Western Catholic
Felix Onama 
(Secretary General)
Madi Northern Catholic
E. Y. Lakidi
(Assistant Secretary 
General)
Acholi Northern Protestant
William W. Kalema 
(National Treasurer)
Muganda Central Protestant
Joshua N. Wakholi 
(Assistant Treasurer)
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Shaban K. Nkutu 
(National Chairman)
Musoga Eastern Muslim
Source: Compiled based on UPC 2008.
DISTRIBUTION OF NRM CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (CEC), 2008s94
Year: 2008
Name Tribe Region Religion
Yoweri Museveni 
(National Chairman)
Munyankole Western Protestant
A1 Hajji Moses Kigongo
(1st National Vice 
Chairma)
Muganda Central Muslim
Rebecca Kadaga 
(2nd National Vice 
Chairman)
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Gilbert Bukenya
(Vice Chairman - Central 
Region)
Muganda Central Catholic
Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Moses Ali
(Vice Chairman - 
Northern Region)
Madi Northern Muslim
Brig, (rtd.) Matayo 
Kyaligonza
(Vice Chairman - 
Western Region)
Munyoro Western Catholic
Fit. Capt. Michael 
Mukula
Iteso Eastern Protestant
894 Note that the religious affiliation of some CEC members could not be established.
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(Vice Chairman - 
Eastern Region)
Amama Mbabazi 
(Secretary General)
Mukiga Western Protestant
Dorothy Hyuha
(Deputy Secretary 
General)
Mugwere Eastern Protestant
Ndawula Kawesa 
(National Treasurer)
Muganda Central
Parminder Singh 
Katongole
(Deputy National 
Treasurer)
Indian
Ruhakana Rugunda
(Chairperson, NRM 
Electoral Commission)
Mukiga Western Protestant
Kabakumba Masiko
(Chairperson, NRM 
Parliamentary Caucus)
Munyoro Western Protestant
Kirunda Kivejinja
(Chairperson, NRM 
Historical Leaders' 
Forum)
Musoga Eastern Muslim
Namirembe Bitamazire
(Chairperson, NRM 
Women League)
Muganda Central
Jim Muhwezi 
(Chairperson, NRM 
Veterans' League)
Muhororo Western Protestant
Fred Mukisa
(Chairperson, NRM 
Elders' League)
Musamia Eastern Catholic
Florence Naiga Sekabira
(Chairperson, 
NRM People With 
Disability League)
Muganda Central
Charles Bakabulindi
(Chairperson, NRM 
Veterans' League)
Muganda Central
Hassan Basajabalaba
(Chairperson, NRM 
Entrepreneurs' League)
Munyankole Western Muslim
Abbas Agaba
(Chairperson, NRM 
Youth League)
Mutagwenda
(Munyankole)
Western Muslim
Source: Compiled based on NRM 2008.
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DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES, 1991 & 2007895
Year: 1991
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Office of the 
President
H. J. Obbo Japadhola Eastern Catholic
Azaria J. Kigge Muganda Central Protestant
Mrs. J. Magezi Munyoro Western
Vice President’s 
Office
Nyanzi Musoke Muganda Central
Office of the Prime 
Minister
Emmanuel L. 
Sendawula
Muganda Central Catholic
Nathan Obore Iteso Eastern Protestant
Agriculture T. E. Ogwal Langi Northern
J. K. Mukiibi Muganda Central
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
John B. Bushara Munyankole Western Protestant
Commerce N. Odol Northern
Constitutional
Affairs
Thecla Kinalwa Muganda Central Catholic
Cooperatives & 
Marketing
Sam Rutega Muhororo Western Protestant
Defence Maj. Oketcho Japadhola Eastern Protestant
Education Rev. Fr. Pius 
Tibanyendera
Mutoro Western Catholic
Chris M. Kassami Mutoro Western Protestant
Energy Ben Dramadri Lugbara Northern Catholic
Environment
Protection
Opika-Opoka Acholi Northern
Finance James Kahoza Muhororo Western Protestant
L. Lukwago Muganda Central
Foreign & 
Regional Affairs
Ernest Rusita Muhororo Western Protestant
J. R. Kyalimpa Mutoro Western Protestant
Health Nangodi Gubi Mugisu Eastern Protestant
Housing & Urban 
Development
M. A. N. Lwanga Muganda Central
Industry & 
Technology
George E. L. Okutu Teso Eastern Protestant
Information & 
Broadcasting
John Baptist 
Walusimbi
Muganda Central Catholic
Internal Affairs Mrs. E. Mugasha Munyankole Western
Justice 0 . M. J. Ndawula Muganda Central
895 Note that the religious affiliation of some permanent secretaries could not be established.
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Labour Alphonse Oseku Iteso Eastern Catholic
Lands & Survey Paul
Bakashabaruhanga
Munyankole Western Protestant
Local Government Francis K. Gasasira Mufumbira Western Catholic
Planning & 
Economic 
Development
Emmanuel
Tumusiime
Mutebile
Mukiga Western Catholic
Public Service & 
Cabinet Affairs
Martin Orech Langi Northern Protestant
Erima Baingana Munyankole Western Protestant
Relief & Social 
Rehabilitation
E. R. Kagazi Munyankole Western
Tourism & 
Wildlife
Ben Otto Langi Northern Protestant
Transport & 
Communications
Wilson 0 . 
Wanyama
Musamia Eastern Protestant
Water & Mineral 
Development
Mrs. Ocaya Lakidi Langi Northern Protestant
Works P. Ssebbowa Muganda Central
Youth, Culture & 
Sports
Augistine
Karugaba
Mukiga Western Catholic
Source: Compiled based on GOU 1991.
Year: 2007
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Office of the 
President
Mrs. Thecla 
Kinalwa
Muganda Central Catholic
State House Richard Muhinda Munyankole Western Protestant
Office of the Prime 
Minister
Mr. Martin John 
Odwedo
Acholi Northern Catholic
Defence Ms. Rosettie 
Byengoma
Munyankole Western Protestant
Public Service Mr. Jimmy R. 
Lwamafa
Mukiga Western Protestant
Foreign Affairs Amb. James 
Mugume
Munyankole Western Protestant
Justice & 
Constitutional 
Affairs
Mrs. Kiggundu 
Jane F. B.
Munyankole Western Catholic
Finance, Planning 
& Economic 
Development
Ms. Betty 
Kasimbazi
Munyankole Western Protestant
Internal Affairs Dr. Kagoda 
Samuel Paulo
Musoga Eastern Protestant
Agriculture, 
Animal Industry & 
Fisheries
Mr. Vincent R. 
Rubarema
Mufiunbira Western Catholic
Local Government Mr. V. Ssekono Muganda Central Catholic
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Lands, Housing & 
Urban 
Development
Mr. Gabindadde- 
Musoke
Muganda Central Protestant
Education and 
Sports
Mr. Francis Xavier 
Lubanga
Muganda Central Catholic
Health Ms. Mary L. 
Nannono
Muganda Central Catholic
Tourism, Trade & 
Industry
Dr. Sam G. 
Nahamya
Munyankole Western Protestant
Works and 
Transport
Mr. Muganzi 
Amooti Charles
Mutoro Western Protestant
Energy & Mineral 
Development
Mr. F. A. 
Kabagambe- 
Kaliisa
Munyankole Western Protestant
Gender, Labour 
and Social 
Development
Ms. Christine 
Guwatudde Kintu
Muganda Central Catholic
Water and 
Environment
Mr. David 0 . 0 . 
Obong
Lango Northern Protestant
Information & 
Communication 
Technology
Dr. Jimmy Pat 
Saamanya
Mugisu Eastern Protestant
East African 
Community Affairs
Mrs. Edith N 
Mwanje
Muganda Central Protestant
Source: Compiled based on GOU 2008a.
DISTRIBUTION OF COFFEE MARKETING BOARD (CMB) MEMBERS, 1969896
Year: 1969
Name Tribe Region Religion
Roger J. Mukasa 
(Chairman)
Muganda Central
F. Kayemba 
(Masaka)
Muganda Central
K. Kabakyenga 
(Banyankole-Kweterana)
Munyankole Western
T. Nangalama 
(Bugisu)
Mugisu Eastern
Y. Bigirwa 
(Bunyoro)
Munyoro Western
S. Kaisa 
(Busoga)
Musoga Eastern
J. Nyondo 
(West Nile)
Lugbara Northern
A. Ekule Mukonzo Western
896 Note that the religious affiliation of CMB members could not be established.
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(Bwamba-Rwenzori)
B. S. Lubwago 
(Secretary)
Muganda Central
Source: Compiled based on CMB 1969.
DISTRIBUTION OF UGANDA COFFEE 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (UCDA) POSITIONS, 1996-2005897 
Year: 1996
Name Tribe Region Religion
F. W. Nagimesi 
(Chairman)
Mugisu Eastern
John Kanakulya Muganda Central
H. Karuhanga Munyankole Western
P. Muyiyi Mutoro Western
L. B. Mubiru Muganda Central
Jack Bigirwa Munyankole Western
S. Banya West Nile Northern
Fred Mwesigye Mutoro Western
Sam Semanda Muganda Central
C. Karamagi Mutoro Western
T. N. Bucyanayandi 
(Managing Director)
Mufumbira Western
W. G. Naigaga 
(Board Secretary
Musoga Eastern
Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.
Year: 1999
Name Tribe Region Religion
J. B. Muganga 
(Chairman)
Muganda Central
H. Karuhanga Munyankole Western
Gregory Stough
Ms. Olivia Wonekha Mugisu Eastern
Hajj Elias Kisutut Muganda Central
Mr. B. A. Mungu-Acel West Nile/ Acholi Northern
Jack Bigirwa Munyankole/ Munyoro Western
Dr. Peter Ngetegize Mukiga/ Munyankole Western
Fred Mwesigye Mutoro Western
Keith Muhakanizi Munyankole Western
T. N. Bucyanayandi Mufumbira Western
897 Note that the religious affiliation of UCDA members could not be established.
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(Managing Director)
William G. Naigaga 
(Board Secretary)
Musoga Eastern
Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.
Year: 2002
Name Tribe Region Religion
Paul Sempa Mugambwa 
(Chairman)
Muganda Central
Rev. Fr. Dr. Joseph 
Kiseeka
Muganda Central
Hajji Eng. Ishak 
Lukenge
Muganda Central
Mrs. Jane Frances Kuka Sabiny Western
Mrs. Robina Sabano Musoga Eastern
Keith Muhakanizi Munyankole Western
Dr. Denis T. Kyetere Munyankole Western
Mrs. Faith J. Mutebi Muganda Central
Mr. B. A. Mungu-Acel West Nile/ Acholi Northern
Yorokamu Abainenamar Munyankole Western
Henry Ngabirano 
(Managing Director)
Munyarwanda Western
William G. Naigaga 
(Board Secretary)
Musoga Eastern
Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.
Year: 2005
Name Tribe Region Religion
Paul Sempa Mugambwa 
(Chairman)
Muganda Central
Mrs. Faith J. Mutebi Muganda Central
Mrs. Robina Sabano Musoga Eastern
Joseph Apell Iteso Eastern
Zadok Ekirapa Iteso Eastern
Hajji Eng. Ishak 
Lukenge
Muganda Central
Dr. James Ogwang Langi Northern
Kenneth Mugamba Mutoro Western
Dr. Hussein A. Shire Karamajong Northern
Rev. Fr. Dr. Joseph 
Kiseeka
Muganda Central
Yorokamu Abainenamar Munyankole (Bahima) Western
Heny Ngabirano Munyankole (Bahima) Western
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(Managing Director)
Fred Luzinda 
(Board Secretary)
Muganda Central
Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.
DISTRIBUTION OF UPDF TOP COMMAND, 2007898
Year: 2007
Position Name Tribe Region Religion
Commander of 
Defence Forces 
(CDF)
Gen. Aronda 
Nyakarima
Munyankole Western
Deputy 
Commander of 
Defence Forces 
(DCDF)
Lt. Gen. Ivan 
Koreta
Munyankole Western
Joint Chief of Staff 
(JCOS)
Brig. Robert 
Rusoke
Mutoro Western
Commander Land 
Forces (CLF)
Lt. Gen. Katumba 
Wamala
Muganda Central
Commander Air 
Forces (CAF)
Maj. Gen. Jim 
Owoyesigire
Munyankole Western
Chief of Staff Land 
Forces (COS-LF)
Brig. Geoffrey 
Muheesi
Munyankole Western
Chief of Staff Air 
Forces (COS-AF)
Brig. Sam 
Turyagenda
Mukiga Western
Chief of Medical 
Services (CMS)
Brig. Dr. James 
Mukumbi
Muganda Central
Chief Political 
Commissar (CPC)
Brig. Francis 
Okello
Acholi Northern
Chief of 
Operations and 
Training (COT)
Brig. Silver 
Kayemba
Muganda Central
Chief of Logistics 
and Engineering 
(CLE)
Col. Jacob 
Musajjawaza
Muganda Central
Chief of Personnel 
and Administration 
(CPA)
Col. Phinehas 
Katirima
Munyankole Western
Chief of Military 
Intelligence (CMI)
Col. Leo Kyanda Munyoro Western
Chief of Legal 
Services (CLS)
Col. Ramadhan 
Kyamulesire
Munyankole Western
cso Col Y. Kizza Munyankole Western
Chief of 
Construction 
(COC)
Col. Timothy 
Sabiiti
Mukiga Western
898 Note that the religious affiliation of army officers could not be established.
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Chief of Finance 
(CCF)
Lt. Col. Musanyufu Munyankole Western
Chief of Pensions 
(COP)
Lt. Col. 
Kyomukama 
Kasula
Muganda Central
1st Division 
Commander
Col. Burundi 
Nyamunywanisa
Munyankole Western
2nd Division 
Commander
Brig. Hudson 
Mukasa
Muganda Central
3rd Division 
Commander
Brig. Patrick 
Kankiriho
Munyankole Western
4th Division 
Commander
Brig. George 
Etyang
Iteso Eastern
5th Division 
Commander
Col. Lucky Kidega Acholi Northern
Source: Compiled based on GOU 2008b.
DISTRIBUTION OF UPDF TOP FIVE RANKS, 2007899
Year: 2007
Name Tribe Region Religion
Gen. Aronda Nyakarima Munyankole Western
Lt. Gen. Ivan Koreta Munyankole Western
Lt. Gen. Katumba 
Wamala
Muganda Central
Maj. Gen. Jim 
Owoyesigire
Mukiga Western
Maj. Gen. Fredrick 
Oketcho
Jopadhola Eastern
Maj. Gen. James Kazini Musongora Western
Maj. Gen. Julius Oketta Acholi Northern
Maj. Gen. Ali Bamuze Aringa (Lugbara) Northern
Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Samuel 
Nanyumba
Musoga Eastern
Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Emilio 
Mondo
Madi Northern
Brig. Robert Rusoke Mutoro Western
Brig. Geoffrey Muheesi Munyankole Western
Brig. Sam Turyagenda Mukiga Western
Brig. Hussein Adda Kakwa Northern
Brig. Hudson Mukasa Muganda Central
Brig. James Makumbi Muganda Central
Brig. George Etyang Iteso Eastern
899 Note that the religious affiliation of army officers could not be established.
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Brig. Francis Okello Acholi Northern
Brig. Silver Kayemba Muganda Central
Brig. Sam Lwanga Muganda Central
Brig. Andrew Guti Karamajong Northern
Brig. Kasirye Gwanga Muganda Central
Brig. David Wakalo Muganda Central
Brig. Sam Wasswa Muganda Central
Brig. James Ssebagala Muganda Central
Brig. Fred Mugisha Munyankole Western
Brig. Nakibus Lakara Karamajong Northern
Brig. Sam Kawagga Muganda Central
Brig. Geoffrey Taban Munyankole Western
Brig. Peter Kerim Alur Northern
Brig. Pecos Kutesa. Munyankole Western
Brig. Elly Kayanja Muganda Central
Brig. Nelson Katagara Mukiga Western
Brig. Sam Kolo Acholi Northern
Brig. Kenneth Banya Acholi Northern
Col. Gavas Mugyeny Munyankole Western
Col. Fred Mugisha Munyankole Western
Col. Jacob Musajjawaza Muganda Central
Col. Phinehas Katirima Munyankole Western
Col. Leo Kyanda Munyoro Western
Col. James Mugira Munyankole Western
Col. Charles Otema 
Awany
Acholi Northern
Col. Burundi 
Nyamunywanisa
Munyankole Western
Col. Jacob Asiimwe Munyankole Western
Col. Eric Mukasa Mutoro Western
Col. Ramadhan 
Kyamulesire
Munyankole Western
Col Y. Kizza Munyankole Western
Col. M. Lukyamuzi Muganda Central
Col. Mark Kodil Madi Northern
Col. S. Othieno Jopadhola Eastern
Col. John Mateeka Munyankole Western
Col. Ambrose Musinguzi Mukiga Western
Col. Sam Kiwanuka Muganda Central
Col. Livingstone 
Katerega
Muganda Central
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Col. Timothy Sabiiti Mukiga Western
Col. Stephen Rwabantu Munyankole Western
Col. Potel Kivuna Munyankole Western
Col. Dr. F. Ochen Acholi Northern
Col. Albert Kareeba Munyankole Western
Col. Kasiita Gowa Muganda Central
Col. Nelson Ssemwezi Muganda Central
Col. J. K. Anywar Acholi Northern
Col. J. W. Byarugaba Munyoro Western
Col. Mbuga Kojja Muganda Central
Col. (Rtd) Fred 
Mwesigye
Munyankole Western
Col. Diiba Sentongo Muganda Central
Col. John Baptist 
Mulindwa
Muganda Central
Col. Patrick Kankiriho Munyankole Western
Col. Joseph Arocha Iteso Eastern
Col. Lucky Kidega Acholi Northern
Col. John Lorot Karamajong Northern
Col. Fred Bogere Muganda Central
Col. George Olanya 
Ojara
Acholi Northern
Col. (Rtd) William 
Omaria
Iteso Eastern
Col. Onen Kamdulu Acholi Northern
Lt. Col. Musanyufu Munyankole Western
Lt. Col. Kyomukama 
Kasula
Muganda Central
Source: Compiled based on GOU 2008b.
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11.1.2 Z am bia
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT, 1964-2008900
ner core’ of political power
 !
Ministers
Ministers of State/Deputy Ministers902_____________________________
Year: 1964 (KAUNDA)
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
L. Changufu Bemba Bemba Northern
Vice-President R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
A. M. Milner White
Foreign Affairs S. M< Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
Home affairs M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
F. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Finance Arthur L. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
Housing & Social 
Development
H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
Labour & Mines M. J. Chimba Bemba Bemba Northern
M. Nalilungwe Lozi Barotse Western
Lands & Natural 
Resources
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
Agriculture E. H. Mudetida Tonga Tonga Southern
M. S. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
Commerce & 
Industry
N. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
Z. A. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Education J. M. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
W. Nkanza Lunda North-Western North-Western
C. H. Thomicroft White
Health M. Sipalo Lozi Barotse Western
J. K. Chivunga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Local Government Lozi Barotse Western
N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Transport & A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
900 Note that government lists for 1988 and 2000 were not available.
901 Note that the members of the ‘inner core’ o f political power are also included as ministers.
902 Including Parliamentary Secretaries in 1964, 1966 and 1968.
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Works
........ —................... .
J. Chisata Bemba Bemba Northern
Information & 
Postal Services
P. W. Matoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
H. B. Kalanga Lenje Tonga Central
Justice J. J. Skinner White
Luapula A. S. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Luapula
North Western H. Kikombe Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Northern R. S. Maskasa Bemba Bemba Northern
Barotse J.H. Monga Tonga Tonga Southern
Western A. B. Mutemba Bemba Bemba Northern
Southern M. M. Sakubita Lozi Barotse Western
Central H. Shamabanse Lenje Tonga Central
Eastern A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1966
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Vice President R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. J. Skinner White
A. M. Milner White
J. K. Chivunga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
D. C. Mwiinga Tonga Tonga Southern
M. Sipalo Lozi Barotse Western
H. B. Kalanga Lenje Tonga Central
Foreign Affairs S. M. Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
T. R. Sikasula Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Home Affairs Mi M  Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
F. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Finance L  L, Wina Lozi Barotse Western
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
Transport & 
Works
H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
Commerce & 
Industry
M. J. Chimba
.
Bemba Bemba Northern
J. Chisata Bemba Bemba Northern
Lands & Natural 
Resources
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
S. Sikombe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Health P. W. Matoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
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J. C. Ngoma Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Agriculture E, M. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
M. S. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
Ministry of 
Education
J. M. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
W. Nkanza Lunda North-Western North-Western
C. H. Thomicroft White
Local Government 
& Housing
S. Wina• ' ' Lozi Barotse Western
Mines & 
Cooperatives
_______ _ _______
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Mukwae Nakatindi 
Yeta Nganga
Lozi Barotse Western
Information & 
Postal Services
L. Changufu Bemba Bemba Northern
J. M. Mutti Nkoya Barotse Western
Justice K, D. Konoso Lozi Barotse Western
P. M. Kapika Swaka Bemba Central
Luapula A. S. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Luapula
North Western H. Kikombe Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Northern R. S. Masaka Bemba Bemba Northern
Barotseland J.H. Monga Tonga Tonga Southern
Western A. B. Mutemba Bemba Bemba Northern
Southern M. M. Sakubita Lozi Barotse Western
Central H. Shamabanse Lenje Tonga Central
Eastern A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1968
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Vice President S, M. Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
A. M. Milner White
H. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
T. R. Sikasula Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Foreign Affairs R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
R. S. Makasa Bemba Bemba Northern
Without Portfolio M. M Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
Finance E. H. Mudenda. Tonga Tonga Southern
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U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
Home affairs A. 0 . Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Education A. N. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
C. H. Thomicroft White
Cooperatives, 
Youth & Social 
Development
H. D. Banda
■ ■ ■ ■ I
Senga Tumbuka Eastern
A. B. Mutemba Bemba Bemba Northern
M. S. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
Mukwae 
Nakatindi Yeta 
Nganga
Lozi Barotse Western
Labour Bemba Bemba Northern
M. P. Kapika Swaka Bemba Central
Commerce, 
Industry & Foreign 
Trade
M, J. Cbimba Bemba Bemba Northern
J. Chisata Bemba Bemba Northern
Transport, Power 
& Communications
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
H. M. Kikombe Kaonde North-Western North-Western
H. B. Kalanga Lenje Tonga Central
Z. A. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Lands & Mines J. M. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
M. Nalilungwe Lozi Barotse Western
J. K. Chivunga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Local Government 
& Housing
S. Whm Lozi Barotse Western
S. Sikombe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Works P W M t k Lunda North-Western North-Western
H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Legal Affairs J. J. Skinner White
Natural Resources 
& Tourism
D. K. Konoso Lozi Barotse Western
N. S. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
Agriculture M. Sipalo Lozi Barotse Western
J. C. Ngoma Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Health D. C. Mwiinga Tonga Tonga Southern
M. J. Chapoloko Bemba Bemba Northern
Luapula N. Ngalande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
North Western N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Northern M. M. Sakubita Lozi Barotse Western
Barotse F. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
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Western P. Chanda Bemba Bemba Northern
Southern H. Shamabanse Lenje Tonga Southern
Central J. H. Monga Tonga Tonga Southern
Eastern A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1970
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Vice President S. M. Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
J. M. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
F. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
J. K. Chivunga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
C. H. Thomicroft White
P. Chanda Bemba Bemba Northern
M. Ngalande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
M. Nkama Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. B. Siyomunji Lozi Barotse Western
Rural
Development
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. M. Mutti Nkoya Barotse Western
N. S. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
Development & 
Finance
£. H« Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
K. H. Nkwabilo Soli Tonga Central
Defence Msa— w Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Home Affairs L  Changufu Bemba Bemba Northern
C. M. 
Mwananshiku
Lunda Bemba Luapula
National Guidance M. J. Chimba Bemba Bemba Northern
M. J. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Lands & Natural 
Resources
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Tonga
T. J. Kankasa 
.........  ...............
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
v V '
Lozi Barotse Western
A. I. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Trade FI. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Labour & Social 
Services
F. M. Muhkita Lozi Barotse Western
J. Chisata Bemba Bemba Northern
M. J. Chapoloko Bemba Bemba Northern
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Education
■ ' "" ' 
W. P. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
V. S. Musakanya Bemba Bemba Northern
Power, Transport 
& Works
A. M. Milner White
I. W. Masaiti Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. Mambwe Bemba Bemba Northern
Western Province S. M. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
F. Liboma Lozi Barotse Western
Eastern Province W .Nkanza Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. C. Sinyangwe Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Copperbelt A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
Northern S. C. Mibilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
P. M. Kapika Swaka Bemba Central
Southern H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
J. H. Monga Tonga Tonga Southern
Luapula Province R. S. Makasa Bemba Bemba Northern
N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
North- Western 
Province
H. Shamabanse Lenje Tonga Southern
J. C. Ngoma Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Central A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1972
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K, D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Vice-President M, M. Chotrn Tonga Tonga Southern
A. M. Milner White
F. Liboma Lozi Barotse Western
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
B. F. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
A. M. Simbule Namwanga Mambwe Northern
J. C. Ngoma Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
S. Soko Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
S. M. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
Rural
Development
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
0 . T. Vibetti Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
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M. Nkholoma Lenje Tonga Central
Foreign Affairs E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
T. J. Kankasa Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Defence A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
C. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
Home Affairs L, Changufu Bemba Bemba Northern
Finance J. Mwanakatwe
m m m m tr W m B liim m m i I u iiiuiiiii iin
Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Lands & Natural 
Resources
S. Kalulu
. ■ hi jggf
• '  V ^  '
Soli Tonga Southern
W. K. Sikalumbi Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
S. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
J. B. Litana Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Local Government 
& Housing
P. W, Matoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. H. Monga Tonga Tonga Southern
Mines & Mining 
Development
■
H. Muiemba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Power, Transport 
& Works
F. M. Mulikita Lozi Barotse Western
H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
N. S. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
Education & 
Culture
W. P. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Tumbuka
C. H. Thomicroft White
M. J. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Trade & Industry A, J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
S. Tembo Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Legal Affairs F. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
Labour & Social 
Services
Bemba Bemba Luapula
S. Sikombe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Health A. B. Chikwanda Bemba Bemba Northern
S. K. Loloma Lenje Tonga Central
Central Province P. M. Kapika Swaka Bemba Central
J. B. Kanyuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
Western J. B. Siyomunji Lozi Barotse Western
M. Silumesii Lozi Barotse Western
Eastern W. Nkanza Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. C. Sinyangwe Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Northern P. K. Kasutu Bemba Bemba Northern
J. Mambwe Bemba Bemba Northern
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Southern A. B. Mutemba Bemba Bemba Northern
A. Z. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
North-Western J. M, Mutti Nkoya Barotse Western
M. M. Lumande Lozi Barotse Western
Copperbelt A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
J. C. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
Luapula S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
B. K. Mumba Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1974
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
Major-General G. 
K. Chinkuli
Lenje Tonga Central
Air Commodore P. 
Zuze
Chikunda Nyanja Eastern
A. K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Local Government 
& Housing
P. W. Matoka
' < 1
Lunda North-Western North-Western
Home Affairs A. M. Milner White
F. Chela Bemba Bemba Northern
Power, Transport 
& Works
A. i. Soko
>
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
T. J. Kankasa Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Education F. M. Mulikitai ............ , , , Lozi Barotse Western
Planning & 
Finance
A. B. Chikwanda
: /  &vyj• . ^
Bemba Bemba Northern
L. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
Foreign Affairs V. J. Mwaanga Tonga Tonga Southern
Labour & Social 
Services
H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
Lands, Natural 
Resources & 
Tourism
N S. Muknga Bemba Bemba Northern
A. Z. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Rural
Development
P. J Lusaka
m Sm KSSBBSSSK
Soli Tonga Central
M. Silumesii Lozi Barotse Western
M. J. Lumina Tonga Tonga Southern
Health M. M. Bull Lozi Barotse Western
Mines & Industry E. A. Kashita Bemba Bemba Northern
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Commerce ?<. KhhcId Lala Bemba Central
S. K. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Information & 
Broadcasting
C. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
Legal Affairs A. M. Siltmgwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
P. L. 
Chibesakunda
Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern U .G .M w ila Bemba Bemba Northern
Eastern W. Nkanza Lunda North-Western North-Western
Central F. M. Liboma Lozi Barotse Western
Copperbelt A. Chalikulima Bemba Bemba Luapula
Southern W. R. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
North-Western A. I.Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Luapula B. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
Western ... .............................. Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1976
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D, Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister E H . Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Major-General G. 
K. Chinkuli
Lenje Tonga Central
Air Commondore 
P. Zuze
Chikunda Nyanja Eastern
L. A. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
A. K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Legal Affairs M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
Development
Planning
P. W. Matoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
Home Affairs A. M, Milner White
F. Chela Bemba Bemba Northern
Mines & Industry A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
R. Chisupa N g’umbo Bemba Luapula
M. M. 
Tambatamba
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Education F. M. Mulifcita Lozi Barotse Western
M. Mumbuna Lozi Barotse Western
Local Government 
& Housing
A. B. Chikwanda Bemba Bemba Northern
M. J. Lumina Tonga Tonga Southern
Labour & Social H. D. Banda------------------- ----- Senga Tumbuka Eastern
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Services
J. B. Mwemba Tonga Tonga Southern
Lands, Natural 
Resources & 
Tourism
N. S. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
J. T. Kankasa Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Information & 
Broadcasting
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
Rural Development P. J. Lusaka Soli Tonga Central
M. Silumesii Lozi Barotse Western
N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Health M. M. Bull Lozi Barotse Western
J. C. Mumpanshya Soli Tonga Central
Commerce M.
Mwanattshiku
Lunda Bemba Luapula
H. K. Matipa Bemba Bemba Luapula
Power, Transport 
& Communications
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Z. A. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. B. Kanyuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
Foreign Affairs R. B. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
G. B. Silwizya Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Finance L. J. Mwattanshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
Northern M. Ngaiande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Eastern S. M. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
Central J. B. Siyomunji Lozi Barotse Western
Copperbelt J. C. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
Southern S. K. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
North-Western N. Mundia Soli Barotse Western
Luapula W. R. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lusaka R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
Western W .Nkanza Lunda North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1978
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister M. M, Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
M. J. Lumina Tonga Tonga Southern
Lieutenant- 
General P. D. 
Zuze
Chikunda Nyanja Eastern
A. K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
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Legal Affairs D. M. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
Economic & 
Technical 
Cooperation
P. W. Matoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
L. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
Finance J. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Local Government 
& Housing
j. B. Siyomunji Lozi Barotse Western
N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Lands & 
Agriculture
A. B. Chikwanda Bemba Bemba Northern
H. K. Matipa Bemba Bemba Luapula
Labour & Social 
Services
H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
J. B. Mwemba Tonga Tonga Southern
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
M. M. 
Tambatamba
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Power, Transport 
& Communications
P. J. Lusaka Soli Tonga Central
J. B. Kanyuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
J. C. Mumpanshya Soli Tonga Central/Lusaka
Ministry of Health C. M. 
Mwananshiku
Lunda Bemba Luapula
M. Silumesii Lozi Barotse Western
Commerce & 
Foreign Trade
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Education L. K. Goma Senga Tumbuka Eastern
A. D. Chilimboyi Soli Tonga Lusaka
Foreign Affairs S. G. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
G. B. Silwizya Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Public Works H. Y. Mwaie Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mines Major-General G. 
K. Chinkuli
Lenje Tonga Central
Industry R. Chisupa N g’umbo Bemba Luapula
Water & Natural 
Resources M usotow ane
Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
Home Affairs W. J. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Central M. Mumbuna Lozi Barotse Western
Copperbelt S. M. Chisembele Ushi Bemba Luapula
Eastern J, C  Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern N. Ngalande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
North-Western N. Munida Lozi Barotse Western
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Luapula Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lusaka R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
Southern W. R. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
Western S. K. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1980
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister D. M. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
B. R. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
P. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
Defence A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
0 . Musuka Lala Bemba Central
Health R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
J. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lands & Natural 
Resources
C. M. 
Mwananshiku
Lunda Bemba Luapula
N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Education & 
Culture
L. K. Goma Senga Tumbuka Tumbuka
A. D. Chilimboyi Soli Tonga Lusaka
A. Chibanda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Works & Supply B; Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
M. S. Beyani Tonga Tonga Southern
Tourism R. C. Sakuhuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
M. M. Sianga Lozi Barotse Western
Power, Transport 
& Communications
Gen. G. K. 
Chinkuli
Lenje Tonga Central
M. K. Lufoma Lozi Barotse Western
F. B. Chembe Lala Bemba Central
Commerce & 
Industry
R. Chisupa
' r* * **’
Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
L. S. Subulwa Lozi Barotse Western
Mines M. Muraburia Lozi Barotse Western
F. Kalimaposo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Finance K S .
Musokotwaae......... :
Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
J. K. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
Home Affairs W. J. Phin Chewa Nyanja Eastern
E. Mulenje Soli Tonga Lusaka
Legal Affairs F. M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
363
G. G. Chigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Labour & Social 
Services
M. J. Lumina Tonga Tonga Southern
J. P. Chafwa Swaka Bemba Central
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
Tambatamba
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
C. J. Banda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Foreign Affairs W7M. Chakuiya Bemba Bemba Luapula
M. M. Bull Lozi Barotse Western
National Guidance A, K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Agriculture & 
Water 
Development
U. G. Mwila
* * vt 1
Bemba Bemba Northern
J. J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
N. S. Dilamonu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Youth & Sport B. C. Kakoma Lunda North-Western North-Western
Z. Ndhlovu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1982
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister N. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
M. M. Bull Lozi Barotse Western
F. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
Secretary of State 
for Defence & 
Security
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Defence W. M. Chakuiya Bemba Bemba Luapula
Health B. C. Kakoma Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lands & Natural 
Resources
C, ML Lunda Bemba Luapula
B. Ng’andu Tonga Tonga Southern
Education & 
Culture
F. S. Hapunda Tonga Tonga Southern
A. D. Chilimboyi Soli Tonga Lusaka
C. Chibanda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Works & Supply H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
E. Muonga Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Tourism R. C. Sakuhuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
A. Nkumbula Bemba Bemba Northern
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Power, Transport R. Kunda Lala 
& Communication
Bemba Central
M. K. Lufoma Lozi Barotse Western
F. B. Chembe Lala Bemba Central
Commerce & 
Industry
R. Chisupa Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
L. S. Subulwa Lozi Barotse Western
Mines M. Mumbtma Lozi Barotse Western
M. Makayi Luvale North-Western North-Western
Finance HBMUh h
Musokotwatie
Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
J. K. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
Home Affairs R M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
E. Mulenje Soli Tonga Lusaka
Legal Affairs G. G. Chig&ga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
M. M. Sianga Lozi Barotse Western
Labour & Social 
Services
B. R. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
C. Masongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
M. Tambatamba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
C. J. Banda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
National 
Commission for 
Development 
Planning
H, M. Meebeto Lozi Barotse Western
Z. Ndhlovu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Foreign Affairs L. K. Goma Senga Tumbuka Tumbuka
0 . S. Musuka Lala Bemba Central
National Guidance A. K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Agriculture & 
Water 
Development
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
J. J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
N. S. Dilamonu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Youth & Sport
G ™ IK'
Lenje Tonga Central
A. R. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
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Year: 1984
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister N. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
J. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
L. Mulimba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
Secretary of State 
for Defence & 
Security
A. G, Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Defence C.M.
Mwananshiku
Lunda Bemba Luapula
Health M. Tambatamba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
P. R. Chanshi Bemba Bemba Luapula
Commerce & 
Industry
L. S. Subulwa
■
Lozi Barotse Western
R. S. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
National 
Commission for 
Development 
Planning
H, S. Meebelo Lozi Barotse Western
M. L. Muyunda Lenje Tonga Central
Works & Supply H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
N. S. Dilamonu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Tourism R. C. Sakuhuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
Brigadier-General 
E. M. Haimbe
Tonga Tonga Southern
Higher Education R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
M. M. Sianga Lozi Barotse Western
Power, Transport 
& Communications
F. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
S. C. Kalaba Bemba Bemba Northern
K. K. Musangu Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lands & Natural 
Resources
F. Chela Bemba Bemba Northern
C. Masongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
General Education 
& Culture Musokotwane
Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
R. V. Chota Bemba Bemba Northern
K. M. Shepande Sala Tonga Central
Finance L. J Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
J. K. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
Home Affairs F. M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
E. Mulenje Soli Tonga Lusaka
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Mines B. R. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
N. D. Siafwa Lozi Barotse Western
Legal Affairs G. G. Chigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Cooperatives J. J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
R. K. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Labour & Social 
Services
Tonga Tonga Southern
L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
. ■ . .
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Foreign Affairs L. K. Goma Senga Tumbuka Tumbuka
0 . S. Musuka Lala Bemba Central
National Guidance
. .........  " ■
A. K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Agriculture & 
Water 
Development
General G, K. 
Chrafcuii
Lenje Tonga Central
D. Munkombwe Tonga Tonga Southern
Youth & Sport B. C. Kakoma Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. C. Kasongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1986
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K. D. Kaunda 
~~™“  ^
Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister ICS.
Musokotwane
Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
J. Mwondela Luvale North-Western North-Western
C. Masongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
Secretary of State 
for Defence & 
Security
A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
Defence General M, M. 
Masheke
Lozi Barotse Western
Health P. S. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
P. R. Chanshi Bemba Bemba Luapula
Commerce & 
Industry
L. S. Subulwa Lozi Barotse Western
R. S. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Decentralisation H. S. Meebelo Lozi Barotse Western
M. L. Muyunda Lenje Tonga Central
Works & Supply R  Y. Mwate Chewa Nyanja Eastern
N. S. Dilamonu Lunda North-Western North-Western
367
Tourism R. C. Sakuhuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
Brigadier-General 
E. M. Haimbe
Tonga Tonga Southern
Higher Education R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
Power, Transport 
& Communications
Tonga Tonga Southern
S. C. Kalaba Bemba Bemba Northern
K. K. Musangu Ushi Bemba Luapula
General Education 
& Culture
B. R. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
R. V. Chota Bemba Bemba Northern
K. M. Shepande Sala Tonga Central
Finance & National 
Commission for 
Development 
Planning
L, J. Mwauanshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
M. M. Sianga Lozi Barotse Western
L. Mulimba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Home Affairs F. M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
E. Mulenje Soli Tonga Lusaka
Mines J, K. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
N. D. Siafwa Lozi Barotse Western
Legal Affairs G. G. Cliigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Cooperatives i. J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
Labour & Social 
Services
F. S. Hapunda Tonga Tonga Southern
R. K. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
C. Chibanda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. C. Mukando Lala Bemba Central
Foreign Affairs L. K. Goma Senga Tumbuka Tumbuka
0 . S. Musuka Lala Bemba Central
National Guidance
'
A. K. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Agriculture & 
Water 
Development
........ iiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii I.
General G. K. 
Chinkuli
w K B K M M
Lenje Tonga Central
D. Munkombwe Tonga Tonga Southern
Youth & Sport B. C. Kakoma Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. C. Kasongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
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Year: 1990
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President K, D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Prime Minister General ML M, 
Masheke
Lozi Barotse Western
N. E. Anamela Lozi Barotse Western
S. C. Kalaba Bemba Bemba Northern
M. C. Sata Bisa Bemba Northern
E. Mulenje Soli Tonga Lusaka
M. Sipalo Lozi Barotse Western
0 . S. Musuka Lala Bemba Central
S. L. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
N. J. Mvula Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
I. Yeta Lozi Barotse Western
A. B. Katotobwe Ushi Bemba Luapula
Secretary of State 
for Defence & 
Security
A. K, Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
E. L. Muwowo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Agriculture J. J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
B. C. Nkumbula Ila Tonga Southern
Commerce & 
Industry
R, M. Chongo Bemba Bemba Northern
C. U. Sibetta Lozi Barotse Western
Defence Lieutenant-General 
H. B. Lungu
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
D. C. Syatalimi Ila Tonga Central
Finance & National 
Commission for 
Development 
Planning
G. G. Chigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. K. Miyato Mbunda Barotse Western
J. C. Chizu Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Foreign Affairs L. J. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
W. C. Wonani Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
General Education, 
Youth & Sport
E. H. 
Mwanang’onze
Tonga Tonga Southern
M. M. Sianga Lozi Barotse Western
B. L. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Health M. L. Muyunda Lenje Tonga Central
J. B. Chijikwa Ila Tonga Southern
Higher Education, 
Science & 
Technology
L. K. Goma Senga Tumbuka Tumbuka
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J. C. Kasongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
Home Affairs G. | f  Orinkuii Lenje Tonga Central
Major W. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
A. K, Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
D. T. Nkhata Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Labour, Social 
Development & 
Culture
L. Mulimba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
L. Tembo Chewa Nyanja Eastern
R. K. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Legal Affairs F. M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
Mines mmmmm Kaonde North-Western North-Western
P. R. Chanshi Bemba Bemba Luapula
Power, Transport 
& Communications
Brigadier-General 
E. M. Haimbe
Tonga Tonga Southern
C. Masongo Lunda Bemba Luapula
B. N. Fumbelo Luvale North-Western North-Western
Tourism P. S. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
K. K. Musangu Ushi Bemba Luapula
Water, Lands & 
Natural Resources
P. Malukutila
.
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
A. D. Ndalama Lala Bemba Central
B. Munkombwe Tonga Tonga Southern
Works & Supply H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
F. T. Kapansa Swaka Bemba Central
Eastern N. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
North-Western B. M. Mukumbi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1992 (CHILUBA)
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President F. T. Chiluba Lunda Bemba Luapula
Vice-President
.".............................
L. P. Mwanawasa Lenje Tonga Central
D. N. Mung’omba Lungu Bemba Northern
S. B. Zukas White
Without Portfolio Brigadier-General 
G. Miyanda
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Agriculture, Food 
& Fisheries
—
G. L. Scott White
C. L. Kalima Ila Tonga Southern
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G. Nkausu Soli Tonga Lusaka
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
R. D. Penza Mambwe Mambwe Northern
D. K. Patel Asian
Communications & 
Transport
A. E. Kashita Bemba Bemba Northern
G. K. Mululu Lenje Tonga Central
Community 
Development & 
Social Welfare
G. K. Maka Swaka Bemba Central
C. M. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
Defence B. Y. Mwila Lunda Bemba Luapula
Major C. K. 
Chibamba
Bemba Bemba Northern
Education A. N. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
K. Kayongo Mbunda Barotse Western
Energy & Water 
Development
A. S. Hambayi Tonga Tonga Southern
E. Z. Nawakwi Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Environment & 
Natural Resources
K. S. Walubita Lozi Barotse Western
Finance E. G. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
D. Chitala Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Foreign Affairs V, J. Mwaanga Tonga Tonga Southern
R. G. Mushota Chishinga Bemba Luapula
Health
.
B. M. Kawimbe Lungu Bemba Northern
K. Kalumba Tabwa Bemba Northern
Home Affairs N. L, Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Lieutenant- 
Colonel E. C. 
Sosala
Bemba Bemba Northern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
Reverend H. S. White
Reverend D. C. 
Pule
Ushi (Kabende) Bemba Luapula
Labour & Social 
Security
L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
P. D. Machungwa Twa Bemba Luapula
Lands D. L. Lupunga Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
E. N. 
Shimwandwe
Soli Tonga Central
Legal Affairs R. M. Chongwe Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Local Government 
& Housing
M. C. Sata
- ............................ '
Bisa Bemba Northern
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V. W. Kayope Ushi Bemba Luapula
Mines & Mineral 
Development
M. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
M. M. Mpande Lenje Tonga Central
Science, Technical 
Education & 
Vocational 
Training
A. Mbikusita- 
Lewanika
Lozi Barotse Western
S. M. Desai Indian
Tourism C. S. Tembo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Princess Nakatindi 
Wina
Lozi Barotse Western
Works & Supply E. C. Chibwe Ushi Bemba Luapula
S. P. Madyenkuku Tonga Tonga Southern
Youth, Sport & 
Child Development
M. B. Nkumbula Ila Tonga Southern
K. M. Maine Bemba Bemba Northern
Central W. W. Sinkala Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Copperbelt K. Nsuluka Bemba Bemba Northern
Eastern H. J. Soko Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Luapula E. Muonga Lungu Bemba Northern
Lusaka E. M. Chipimo Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern D. V. Kapapa Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western P. K. Kaping’a Lunda North-Western North-Western
Southern P. H. Muunga Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1994
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President F.T.Chiiub Lunda Bemba Luapula
Vice-President L. P. Mwanawasa Lenje Tonga Central
C. S. Tembo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
D. Chitala Mambwe Mambwe Northern
E. B. Chisha Ushi Bemba Luapula
P. D. Machungwa Twa Bemba Luapula
Without Portfolio Brigadier-General 
G. Miyanda
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Agriculture, Food 
& Fisheries
S, B. Zukas White
G. Nkausu Soli Tonga Lusaka
A. Sejani Tonga Tonga Southern
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
D. K. Patel Asian
L. J. Shimaponda Ila Tonga Southern
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H. M. Kabika Lozi Barotse Western
Communications & 
Transport
W. J. Harrington Lozi Barotse Western
G. K. Mululu Lenje Tonga Central
M. Ngalande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Community 
Development & 
Social Welfare
K. Kayongo Mbunda Barotse Western
S. M. Manjata Luvale North-Western Western
Defence B. Y. Mwila Lunda Bemba Luapula
D. Buumba Tonga Tonga Southern
Education A. S. Hambayi Tonga Tonga Southern
N. K. Mangilashi Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
D. C. Matutu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Energy & Water 
Development
E. Z. Nawakwi Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Lieutenant-Colonel 
P. Kafumakache
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Environment & 
Natural Resources
D. L. Lupunga Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. M. Desai Indian
Finance R. D. Penza Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Reverend D. C. 
Pule
Ushi Bemba Luapula
K. G. Shengamo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Foreign Affairs R. G. Mushora Chishinga Bemba Luapula
W. W. Membe Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Health M. C. Sata Bisa Bemba Northern
K. Kalumba Tabwa Bemba Northern
Home Affairs C. ML Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
H. J. Soko Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
S. K. Walubita Lozi Barotse Western
E. S. Silwamba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Labour & Social 
Security
N. L. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
G. K. Mandandi Nkoya Barotse Western
Lands C. L. Kalima Ila Tonga Southern
E. N. Shimwandwe Soli Tonga Central
Legal Affairs L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Local Government 
& Housing
B. H. Mwiinga Tonga Tonga Southern
V. W. Kayope Ushi Bemba Luapula
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B. Sichinga Bemba Bemba Northern
Mines & Mineral 
Development
P. K. Kaping’a Lunda North-Western North-Western
M. M. Mpande Lenje Tonga Central
Science, Technical 
Education & 
Vocational 
Training
G. K. Maka Swaka Bemba Central
S. C. Ngombo Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
A. K. 
Mwanamwambwa
Lozi Barotse Western
Reverend P. 
Chintala
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Tourism C. S. Tembo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
S. P. Madyenkuku Tonga Tonga Southern
Works & Supply A. E. Kashita................................ Bemba Bemba Northern
Major C. K. 
Chibamba
Bemba Bemba Northern
S. M. Kunyanda Lozi Barotse Western
Central S. D. Mpamba Lenje Tonga Central
Copperbelt K. Nsuluka Bemba Bemba Northern
Eastern Z. P. Mumba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Luapula N. K. Chibamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lusaka E. M. Chipimo Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern D. V. Kapapa Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western Reverend A. 
Chipawa
Lunda North-Western North-Western
Southern P. H. Muunga Tonga Tonga Southern
Western L. S. Subulwa Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1996
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President F. T, Chiluba Lunda Bemba Luapula
Vice-President Brigadier-General 
G. Miyanda
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
E. S. Silwamba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
H. M. Kabika Lozi Barotse Western
B. S. Sikanyika Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Rev. D. C. Pule Ushi (Kabende) Bemba Luapula
M. Ngalande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Agriculture, Food 
& Fisheries
S. M. Desai Asian
M. M. Mpande Lenje Tonga Central
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D. C. Matutu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
i), K. fW i Asian
S. K. Syamujaye Tonga Tonga Southern
A. K. Lienda Nkoya Barotse Western
Communications & 
Transport
.........
D. L. Lupunga. ... .. ...... Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
G. K. Mululu Lenje Tonga Central
Z. P. Mumba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Community 
Development & 
Social Welfare
p K Kaping’a Lunda North-Western North-Western
S. M. Manjata Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lieutenant-Colonel 
S. Ngoma
Chikunda Nyanja Eastern
Defence B. Y. Mwila Lunda Bemba Luapula
D. Buumba Tonga Tonga Southern
Education A. S. Hambayi Tonga Tonga Southern
N. I. Ng’uni Bisa Bemba Northern
S. Miyanda Soli Tonga Central
Energy & Water 
Development
E. Z, Nawakwi Namwanga Mambwe Northern
E. C. Mwansa Bemba Bemba Northern
Environment & 
Natural Resources
W. J. Harrington Lozi Barotse Western
G. Nkausu Soli Tonga Lusaka
Finance R. D. Penza Bemba Bemba Northern
P. S. Tembo Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
K. G. Shengamo Lamba Bemba North-Western
Foreign Affairs Lieutenant-General 
C. S, Tembo
Tumbuka Tumbuka Easton
P. D. Machungwa Twa Bemba Northern
Health M. C. Sata Bisa Bemba Northern
K. Kalumba Tabwa Bemba Northern
Home Affairs C. M, Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
P. H. Muunga Tonga Tonga Southern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
Lozi Barotse Western
V. W. Kayope Ushi Bemba Luapula
Labour & Social 
Security
N. L. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
S. P. Madyenkuku Tonga Tonga Southern
Lands L. J. Shimaponda Ila Tonga Southern
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E. N. Shimwandwe Soli Tonga Central
Legal Affairs R. G. Mutosha Chishinga Bemba Luapula
Local Government 
& Housing
B. H. Mwiinga
m u n i H U
Tonga Tonga Southern
W. W. Membe Chewa Nyanja Eastern
B. Sichinga Bemba Bemba Northern
Mines & Mineral 
Development
■ M j Lozi Barotse Western
A. Nkole Bemba Bemba Northern
Science, Technical 
Education & 
Vocational 
Training
Mbunda Barotse Western
K. Nsuluka Bemba Bemba Northern
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
Lieutenant-Colonel Kaonde North-Western North-Western
P. Kafomakache............................ .....
Rev. P. Chintala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Tourism G. K. Maka Swaka Bemba Central
N. K. Mangilashi Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Works & Supply S. B. Zukas White
Major C. K. 
Chibamba
Bemba Bemba Northern
G. K. Mandandi Nkoya Barotse Western
Central S. D. Mpamba Lenje Tonga Central
Copperbelt C. C. Museba Bemba Bemba Northern
Eastern H. J. Soko Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Luapula N. K. Chibamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lusaka E. M. Chipimo Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern D. V. Kapapa Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western Rev. A. Chipawa Lunda North-Western North-Western
Southern E. M. Miyanda Tonga Tonga Southern
Western L. S. Subulwa Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 1998
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President F. T. Chtluba Lunda Bemba Luapula
Vice-President
.... ............................... ,........ ........... . ,r...............
; ■■:. ''  ' ,
Lieutenant-General 
C. S. Tembo
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
E. S. Silwamba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
P. L. Chintala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. C. Chishala Lunda Bemba Luapula
D.C. Saviye Luvale North-Western North-Western
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Without Portfolio M. C; Sat# Bisa Bemba Northern
Agriculture, Food 
& Fisheries
■ . - ■
E. Z. Nawakwi Namwanga Mambwe Northern
A. Sejani Tonga Tonga Southern
Lieutenant-Colonel 
Y. J. Ngulube
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
E. P. Kavindele Luchazi North-Western North-Western
A. Nkole Bemba Bemba Northern
J. Chikwakwa Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Communications & 
Transport
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
D. C. Matutu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
D. K. Kalingeme Bemba Bemba Northern
Community 
Development & 
Social Welfare
S. S. Miyanda Soli Tonga Lusaka
S. M. Manjata Luvale North-Western North-Western
J. Chikwata Ila Tonga Southern
Defence C. M. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
M. I. Mulongoti Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Education Brigadier-General 
G. Miyanda
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
M. M. Mpande Lenje Tonga Central
B. Membe Mambwe Mambwe Eastern
Energy & Water 
Development
B. Y. Mwila Lunda Bemba Luapula
Major C. K. 
Chibamba
Bemba Bemba Northern
Environment & 
Natural Resources
A. S. Hambayi Tonga Tonga Southern
G. Nkausu Soli Tonga Lusaka
Finance R. D. Penza Bemba Bemba Northern
Rev. D. C. Pule Ushi (Kabende) Bemba Luapula
G. Simasiku Lozi Barotse Western
Foreign Affairs S. K. Walubita Lozi Barotse Western
V. W. Kayope Ushi Bemba Luapula
Health K. Kalumba Tabwa Bemba Northern
N. P. Luo Bemba Bemba Northern
Home Affairs P. D. Machungwa Twa Bemba Luapula
P. H. Muunga Tonga Tonga Southern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
S. D. Mpamba
■ ■ "
Lenje Tonga Central
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E. C. Mwansa Bemba Bemba Northern
Labour & Social 
Security
N. L. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
S. P. Madyenkuku Tonga Tonga Southern
Lands Rev. A. Chipawa Lunda North-Western North-Western
G. K. Mululu Lenje Tonga Central
Legal Affairs V. Malambo Tonga Tonga Southern
Local Government 
& Housing
B. H. Mwiinga Tonga Tonga Southern
B. Mpundu Bemba Bemba Northern
E. Kalenga Lunda North-Western North-Western
Mines & Mineral 
Development
S.K. Syamujaye
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Tonga Tonga Southern
K. R. Lembalemba Bemba Bemba Luapula
Science, Technical 
Education & 
Vocational 
Training
Swaka Bemba Central
N. I. Ng’uni Bisa Bemba Northern
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
W. J. Harrington Lozi Barotse Western
E. K. Chitika Chishinga Bemba Luapula
Tourism A. K. 
Mwanamwambwa
Lozi Barotse Western
F. Mando Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
Works & Supply S, M. Desai Asian
M. H. Muyuni Tonga Tonga Southern
G. K. Mandandi Nkoya Barotse Western
Central A. M. Chambeshi Lala Bemba Central
Copperbelt M. S. Mulanda Bemba Bemba Northern
Eastern C. T. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Luapula N. K. Chibamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lusaka S. P. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern D. V. Kapapa Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western D. S. 
Kambilumbilu
Lunda North-Western North-Western
Southern E. M. Miyanda Tonga Tonga Southern
Western M. M. Mabenga Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
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Year: 2002 (MWANAWASA)
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President L. P. Mwanawasa Lenje Tonga Central
Vice-President E. P. Kavindele Luchazi North-Western North-Western
K. N. Simbao Mambwe Mambwe Northern
S. C. Mukuka Bemba Bemba Northern
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
M. Sikatana Lozi Barotse Western
W. D. Kamwendo Lala Bemba Central
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
B. Namuyamba Ila Tonga Southern
E. B. Appel Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
A. M. Musanya Bemba Bemba Northern
Communications & 
Transport
A'FMwaPe Bemba Bemba Northern
W. Nsanda Bemba Bemba Luapula
Community 
Development & 
Social Welfare
N. K.. Chibamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
G. C. Chola Lala Bemba Central
Defence Vacant
W. Muliokela Lozi Barotse Western
Education A. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
R. Chipampe Lunda Bemba Luapula
E. C. Kasukumya Lunda North-Western North-Western
Energy & Water 
Development
R. K. Lembalemba Bemba Bemba Luapula
S. M. Manjata Luvale North-Western Western
Finance & National 
Planning
E. G. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
F. K. Kalifungwa N g’umbo Bemba Luapula
F. C. Mutati Bemba Bemba Northern
Foreign Affairs T. ICMwansa Lunda Bemba Luapula
C. Namugala Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Health B. Chituwo Kaonde North-Western Central
G. C. Chulumanda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Home Affairs L. M. Mapushi Lenje Tonga Central
K. M. Sakeni N g’umbo Bemba Luapula
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
N. L. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
W. Chipili Bemba Bemba Northern
Labour & Social 
Security
W. K. Nalumango 
___ ______ _ ___
Bemba Bemba Northern
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J. Mwaimba Tonga Tonga Southern
Lands
Kapijimpanga
Bias Bemba Northern
M. Sokontwe Ushi Bemba Luapula
Legal Affairs G. Kurnia Lala Bemba Northern
Local Government 
& Housing
M. M. Mabettga
i l l l W I H I I I I H I M l l l l l l M M I I I I I l l f l i y i
Lozi Barotse Western
M. C. Chitala Mambwe Mambwe Northern
S. C. Mungo Lunda Bemba Luapula
Mines & Mineral 
Development
D. MuMa Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
R. Kazala-Lazki Lunda North-Western North-Western
Science, 
Technology & 
Vocational 
Training
Lala Bemba Central
H. W. Mazimba Tonga Tonga Southern
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
L. A. Mumba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
J. C. Chisupa N g’umbo Bemba Luapula
Tourism M. M. Nsingo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
C. C. Silavwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Works & Supply L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
P. C. Katema Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Central A. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Copperbelt Lieutenant- 
Colonel P. 
Kafumakache
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Eastern N. Sambwa Lunda North-Western North-Western
Luapula A. M. Chama Lunda Bemba Luapula
Lusaka P. A. Ngoma Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
Northern P. H. Filamba Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western B. M. Mushala Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Southern G. W. Mpombo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Western S. Namakando Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 2004
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President L P. Mwanawasa Lenje Tonga Central
Vice-President A. F. Mwape Bemba Bemba Northern
W. Chipili Bemba Bemba Northern
R. C. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Agriculture & M. Sikataaa Lozi Barotse Western
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Cooperatives
M. K. Mubanga Lunda Bemba Luapula
J. Katoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
D. K. Patel Asian
E. B. Appel Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
G. M. Samukonga Luchazi North-Western North-Western
Communications & 
Transport
A. M. Chambeshi Lala Bemba Central
A. M. Chama Lunda Bemba Luapula
H. W. Mazimba Tonga Tonga Southern
Community 
Development & 
Social Services
Vacant
S. Namakando Lozi Barotse Western
R. J. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Defence Vacant
W. Muliokela Lozi Barotse Western
Education A. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
E. C. Kasukumya Lunda North-Western North-Western
G. C. Chola Lala Bemba Central
Energy & Water 
Development
G. W. Mpombo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. M. Manjata Luvale North-Western Western
S. K. Mukuka Bemba Bemba Northern
Finance & National 
Planning
P. M. Magande Tonga Tonga Southern
M. C. Chitala Mambwe Mambwe Northern
F. C. Mutati Bemba Bemba Northern
Foreign Affairs Lieutenant-
General
Shikapwasha
Lenje Tonga Central
D. Mulela Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Health B. Chituwo Kaonde North-Western Central
K. N. Simbao Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Home Affairs T. K. Mwansa Lunda Bemba Luapula
J. S. Chilufya Chishinga Bemba Luapula
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
.
W. K. Nalumango Bemba Bemba Northern
G. F. Sichilima Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Justice G, Kunda Lala Bemba Central
Labour & Social 
Services
Vacant
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J. C. Ng’uni Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Lands J. M. 
Kapijimpanga
Bisa Bemba Northern
A. M. Musanya Bemba Bemba Northern
Local Government 
& Housing
S. T. Masebo Soli Tonga Lusaka
N. K. Chibamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
J. Mwaimba Tonga Tonga Southern
Mines & Mineral 
Development
K. Lembalemba Bemba Bemba Luapula
S. C. Mukuka Bemba Bemba Northern
A. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Science, 
Technology & 
Vocational 
Training
Ila Tonga Southern
J. C. Chisupa Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
Rev. G. Z. 
Nyirongo
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
G. C. Chulumanda Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
R. Kazala-Laski Lunda North-Western North-Western
Tourism, 
Environment & 
Natural Resources
P. K. Kalifungwa Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
P. H. Filamba Bemba Bemba Northern
N. Nzowa Tonga Tonga Southern
Works & Supply M. M. Nsingo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
K. M. Shepande Sala Tonga Central
Central W. D. Kamwendo Lala Bemba Central
Eastern P. C. Katema Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Luapula K. M. Sakeni N g’umbo Bemba Luapula
Lusaka P. A. Ngoma Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
Northern C. C. Silavwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
North-Western B. M. Mushala Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Southern S. C. Kazenene Lunda North-Western North-Western
Western S. Kabanje Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 2006
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President L. P. Mwanawasa 
. ... . -  ________....
Lenje Tonga Central
Vice-President Mr. Rupiah Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Ms. Lundwe Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Mr. Taima Kaonde North-Western North-Western
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Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
Mr. Kapha Swaka Bemba Central
Mr. Kalenga Lunda North-Western North-Western
Mr. Mulonga Bemba Bemba Northern
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
Mr. Konga Luvale North-Western North-Western
Ms. Siliya Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Communications & 
Transport ' ' \  ■ '•
Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Mubika Lozi Barotse Western
Community 
Development & 
Social Services ^Cv '- '' Vs' • ;
Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Mr. Nicholas 
Banda
Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Muchima Lunda North-Western North-Western
Defence Mr. Mpombo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Mr. Akakandelwa Lozi Barotse Western
Education Prof. Lungwangwa Mbunda Barotse Western
Ms. Changwe Lala Bemba Central
Energy & Water 
Development
Mr. Mutati Bemba Bemba Northern
Mr. G. F. Sichilima Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Mr. Malwa Swaka Bemba Central
Finance & National 
Planning
Mr. Magande Tonga Tonga Southern
Mr. Shakafuswa Lenje Tonga Central
Foreign Affairs Mr. Sikatatm Lozi Barotse Western
Mr. Mulongoti Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Gender-in-
Development
Ms. Sayifwanda Lunda North-Western North-Western
Health Ms. Cifire Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Dr. Puma Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Home Affairs Lieutenant-General
Shikapwasha
Lenje Tonga Central
Mr. Musosha Ushi Bemba Luapula
Ms. Njapau Luvale North-Western North-Western
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
Mr. Mwaanga Tonga Tonga Southern
Mr. David Phiri Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Justice Mr. G. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
Mr. Machila Tonga Tonga Southern
Labour & Social 
Security
Mr. Mukama Luvale North-Western North-Western
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Mr. Liato Nkoya Barotse Western
Lands Rev. Nyirongo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Mr. Muteteka Lenje Tonga Central
Local Government 
& Housing
Mrs. S T . Masebo Soli Tonga Lusaka
Mr. Kazonga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mines & Mineral 
Development
Dr. Mwansa Lunda Bemba Luapula
Mr. Maxell Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Mangani Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Science, 
Technology & 
Vocational 
Training
Dr. Chituwo Kaonde North-Western Central
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
Mr. Namuiambe Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Ms. Mulasikwanda Lozi Barotse Western
Tourism, 
Environment & 
Natural Resources
Mr. Pande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Ms. Tembo Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Kaingu Lozi Barotse Western
Works & Supply Mr. Simbao Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Mr. Tetamashimba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Copperbelt Mr. Mbulakulima Ushi Bemba Luapula
Eastern Mr. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Luapula Mr. Chinyanta Lunda Bemba Luapula
Lusaka Mr. Shawa Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Northern Mr.
Chibombamilimo
Lungu Bemba Northern
North-Western Mr. Chipungu Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
Southern Mr. Mulyata Mbunda Barotse North-Western
Western Mr. Mufalali Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
Year: 2008
Position Name Tribe Language Province
President L. P. Mwanawasa Lenje Tonga Central
Vice-President Mr, Rupiah Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Malwa Swaka Bemba Central
Presidential Affairs Mr. Holmes White
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
Ms. Sayifwanda Lunda North-Western North-Western
Mr. Kalenga Lunda North-Western North-Western
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Mr. Mulonga Bemba Bemba Northern
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
Mr. Mutati Bemba Bemba Northern
Communications & 
Transport
Ms. Siliya Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Mubika Lozi Barotse Western
Community 
Development & 
Social Services
Ms. Namugala Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Mr. Chinyanta Lunda Bemba Luapula
Mr. Akakandelwa Lozi Barotse Western
Defence Mr. Mpombo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Mr. Muchima Lunda North-Western North-Western
Education Prof. Lungwangwa Mbunda Barotse Western
Mr. Sinyinda Lozi Barotse Western
Energy & Water 
Development
Luvale North-Western North-Western
Mr. G. F. Sichilima Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Ms. Lundwe Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Finance & National 
Planning
Mr. Magande Tonga Tonga Southern
Mr. Shakafuswa Lenje Tonga Central
Foreign Affairs Mr, Pande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Prof. Fashion Phiri Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Gender-in-
Development
Ms. Mulasikwanda Lozi Barotse Western
Health Dr. Chituwo. Kaonde North-Western Central
Dr. Puma Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Home Affairs Lieutenant-General
Shikapwasha
Lenje Tonga Central
Ms. Njapau Luvale North-Western North-Western
Mr. Bonshe Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Mr. David Phiri Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Justice Mr. G. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
Labour & Social 
Security
Mr. Mukama Luvale North-Western North-Western
Mr. Liato Nkoya Barotse Western
Lands Mr. Machila Tonga Tonga Southern
Mr. Hamir Indian
Local Government 
& Housing
Mrs, S. T. Masebo Soli Tonga Lusaka
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Mr. Kazonga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Tetamashimba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Mines & Mineral 
Development
Dr. MwansarriiiaiT Lunda Bemba Luapula
Mr. Maxell Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Science, 
Technology & 
Vocational 
Training
. . ,. , 
Mr. Daka Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Ms. Changwe Lala Bemba Central
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
Mr. Namulambe Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Ms. Cifire Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Taima Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Tourism, 
Environment & 
Natural Resources
Mr. Kaingu Lozi Barotse Western
Ms. Tembo Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Mr. Chilembo Senga Tumbuka Eastern
Works & Supply Mr. Simbao Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Mr. Ndalamei Lozi Barotse Western
Central Mr. Ackimson 
Banda
Lala Bemba Central
Copperbelt Mr. Mbulakulima Ushi Bemba Luapula
Eastern Mr. Shawa Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Luapula Mr. Musosha Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lusaka Mr. Mangani Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Northern Mr.
Chibombamilimo
Lungu Bemba Northern
North-Western Mr. Chipungu Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
Southern Mr. Munkombwe Tonga Tonga Southern
Western Mr. Mufalali Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.
DISTRIBUTION OF UNIP CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC), 1964-1988
Year: 1964
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
A. Milner White
S. M. Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
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N. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
L. Changufu Bemba Bemba Northern
H Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
S. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
J. B. Nkonde Bemba Bemba Northern
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
Princess N. Y. 
Nakatindi
Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years. 
Year: 1967
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
S. M. Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
M. J. Chimba Bemba Bemba Northern
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
L. Changufu Bemba Bemba Northern
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
S. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
H. D. Banda Senga Tumbuka Eastern
Source: Compiled based c 
Year: 1969 (Interim
>n UNIP Various Years. 
Executive Committee)
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
S. M. Kapwepwe Bemba Bemba Northern
S. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
M. J. Chimba Bemba Bemba Northern
W. P. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
H. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western Central
A. D. Chikwanda Bemba Bemba Bemba
W. M. Chakulya Bemba Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.
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Year: 1973
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
F. M. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. Wina Lozi Barotse Western
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
H. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western Central
A. B. Mutemba Bemba Bemba Northern
J. Mutti Nkoya Barotse Western
D. M. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
S. Sikombe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
S. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
J. B. Litana Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
B. F. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
M. K. Fulano Swaka Bemba Central
P. W. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
A. K  Chongo Bemba Bemba Northern
B. C. Kankasa Bemba Bemba Northern
A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
P. Kawandami Bemba Bemba Luapula
M. Liso Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years. 
Year: 1976
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
S. Kalulu Soli Tonga Central
H. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western Central
P. W. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
A. B. Mutemba Bemba Bemba Northern
F. M. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. B. Litana Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
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D. M. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
S. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
P. Kawandami Bemba Bemba Luapula
B. C. Kankasa Bemba Bemba Northern
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
M. K. Fulano Swaka Bemba Central
S. Sikombe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
B. F. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
E. M. Liso Tonga Tonga Southern
Chief Mapanza Tonga Tonga Southern
F. M. Mulikita Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years. 
Year: 1979
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
M. M. Chona Tonga Tonga Southern
D. M. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
H. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western Central
P. W. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
J. B. Litana Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
N. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
K. Makasa Bemba Bemba Northern
F. Liboma Lozi Barotse Western
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
S. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
B. C. Kankasa Bemba Bemba Northern
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
M. K. Fulano Swaka/Lala Bemba Central
B. F. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
E. M. Liso Tonga Tonga Southern
J. C. Mumpanshya Soli Tonga Lusaka
F. J. Luputa Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
P. K. Kasutu Bemba Bemba Northern
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H. K. Matipa Bemba Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years. 
Year: 1982
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
H. Mulemba Kaonde North-Western Central
N. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
D. M. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
J. B. Litana Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
K. Makasa Bemba Bemba Northern
B. F. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
H. K. Matipa Bemba Bemba Luapula
F. Liboma Lozi Barotse Western
S. C. Mbilishi Luvale North-Western North-Western
S. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
B. C. Kankasa Bemba Bemba Northern
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
M. K  Fulano Swaka Bemba Central
E. M. Liso Tonga Tonga Southern
J. C. Mumpanshya Soli Tonga Lusaka
F. J. Luputa Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
P. K. Kasutu Bemba Bemba Northern
J. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
M. S. Beyani Tonga Tonga Southern
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years. 
Year: 1985
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
K. S. Musokotwane Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
D. M. Lisulo Lozi Western Western
B. C. Kankasa Bemba Bemba Northern
A. K  Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
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E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
B. F. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
F. N. Bulawayo Lunda North-Western North-Western
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
J. C. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
J. C. Mumpanshya Soli Tonga Lusaka
M. K. Fulano Soli Tonga Lusaka
F. J. Luputa Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
M. S. Beyani Tonga Tonga Southern
B. C. Chilunga Luvale North-Western North-Western
J. B. Simuyandi Lozi Barotse Western
C. M. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
R. T. Sikasula Namwanga Mambwe Northern
L. M. Ng’andu Bemba Bemba Northern
Z. Ndhlovu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
I. Yeta Lozi Barotse Western
A. Kamalondo Ushi Bemba Luapula
L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years. 
Year: 1988
Name Tribe Language Province
K. D. Kaunda Bemba Bemba Northern
K. S. Musokotwane Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
A. G. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
A. K. Shapi Ushi Bemba Luapula
R. C. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
E. H. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
J. C. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
M. K. Fulano Soli Tonga Lusaka
B. C. Chilunga Luvale North-Western North-Western
C. M. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
Z. Ndhlovu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
B. Kapulu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
R. T. Sikasula Namwanga Mambwe Northern
A. Kamalondo Ushi Bemba Luapula
F. J. Luputa Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
L. M. Ng’andu Bemba Bemba Northern
I. Yeta Lozi Barotse Western
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J. B. Simuyandi Lozi Barotse Western
M. S. Beyani Tonga Tonga Southern
L. S. Sondashi Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Gen. G. Kalenge Ila Tonga Southern
Gen. Lungu Nsenga Nynaga Eastern
H. Mtonga Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Gen. J. Manuwele Luvale North-Western North-Western
E. Kavindele Luchazi North-Western North-Western
E. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
F. H. Kaunda Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
M. Mwinga Tonga Tonga Southern
T. Walamba Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. Sichone Namwanga Mambwe Northern
B. Nalubamba Ila Tonga Southern
K. Shepande Sala Tonga Central
E. Mulenje (Chieftainess 
Nkomeshya)
Soli Tonga Lusaka
M. M. Sianga Lozi Barotse Western
L. Mulimba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
M. Muzungu Kaonde North-Western North-Western
F. Malawo Tonga Tonga Southern
H. Shamabanse Lenje Tonga Central
F. Chifiinda Bemba Bemba Northern
M. Kanyungulu Luvale North-Western North-Western
C. Mulundika Soli Tonga Lusaka
H. Meebelo Lozi Barotse Western
P. Matoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. M. Chiwela Chewa Nyanja Eastern
A. Nyikosa Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. M. Nyaywa Lozi Barotse Western
L. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
M. Masheke Lozi Barotse Western
K. Chinkuli Lenje Tonga Central
L. Goma Senga Tumbuka Eastern
B. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
H. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
F. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
J. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
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R. Sakuhuka Luvale North-Western North-Western
B. Kakoma Lunda North-Western North-Western
P. Malukutila Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
G. Chigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
F.Hapunda Tonga Tonga Southern
M. Punabantu Tonga Tonga Southern
A. Simuchimba Namwanga Mambwe Northern
F. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
B. Chipango Luvale North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.
DISTRIBUTION OF MMD NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC), 2008 
Year: 2008
Name Tribe Language Province
L. P. Mwanawasa Lenje Tonga Southern
M. Mabenga Lozi Barotse Western
K. Pande Kaonde North-Western North-Western
K. Kalumba Tabwa Bemba Luapula
G. J. Kaande Lozi Barotse Western
S. Desai Indian
J. Chikwakwa Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
R. Shikapwasha Lenje Tonga Central
K. Mwansa Lunda Bemba Luapula
B. S. Chiti Bemba Bemba Northern
N. P. Magande Tonga Tonga Southern
M. Mubanga Lunda Bemba Luapula
S. Kopulande Lunda Bemba Luapula
A. Nkole Bemba Bemba Northern
B. Namuyamba Ila Tonga Southern
B. Chituwo Kaonde North-Western Central
P. Daka Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
W. M. Nalumango Bemba Bemba Northern
R. K. Lembalemba Bemba Bemba Luapula
J. Kapijimpanga Bias Bemba Northern
B. Tetamashimba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
St. Manjata Luvale North-Western Western
M. Mulongoti Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. Masebo Soli Tonga Lusaka
G. Mpombo Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
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V. T. Chiluba Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
P. B. Musonda Bemba Bemba Northern
B. Mutonka Lamba Lamba Copperbelt
J. Chilambwe Lala Bemba Northern
K. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
W. Nsakasha Soli Tonga Lusaka
G. Chumbwe Tonga Tonga Southern
G. C. Sikasote Lungu Mambwe Northern
J. Katoka Lunda North-Western North-Western
S. Muzyamba Tonga Tonga Southern
S. Namakando Lozi Barotse Western
Rupiah Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
G. Njapau Luvale North-Western North-Western
G. Namulambe Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
G. Mulando Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
C. Mutesha Soli Tonga Lusaka
M. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
M. S. Nkatya Lala Bemba Northern
R. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
C. Namugala Namwanga Mambwe Northern
A. Lukanga Bemba Bemba Northern
M. Mukwiza Namwanga Mambwe Northern
M. I. Watala Lozi Barotse Western
R. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Rose Banda Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Frank Moyo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Sarah Siafwanda Lunda North-Western North-Western
J. Mwakalombe Tonga Tonga Southern
H. Mbushi Soli Tonga Lusaka
A. M. Chungu Bemba Bemba Northern
W. Lisulo Lozi Barotse Western
S. Madyenkuku Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on MMD 2008.
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DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES, 1964-2008
Year: 1964
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the 
President
L. Bean White
Cabinet Office A. W. Gaminara White
Foreign Affairs P. S. Thirsk White
Home Affairs P. S. Madocks White
Finance K. J. Knaggs White
Housing & Social 
Development
J. B. Siyomunji Lozi Barotse Western
Labour & Mines E. W. Dunlop White
Lands & Natural 
Resources
E. L. Button White
Information & 
Postal Services
G. F. Tredwell White
Agriculture G. M. Levack White
Commerce & 
Industry
L. E. Bradbury White
Education W. A. Gorman White
Health D. A. Rittey White
Justice A. R. Porter White
Local Government J. R. Brown White
Transport & 
Works
E. C. Thomson White
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.
Year: 1968
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Cabinet Office and 
Presidential Offices
V. S. Musankanya Bemba Bemba Northern
J. B. Siyomunji Lozi Barotse Western
A. S. Masiye Chewa Nyanja Eastern
P. Ngoma Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
A. M. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Office of the Vice- 
President
L. M. Lishomwa Lozi Barotse Western
Foreign Affairs F. M. Mulikata Mbunda Barotse Western
Finance E. J. Knaggs White
E. G. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
Home Affairs B. M. Bwalya Bemba Bemba Northern
Education D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Central
Cooperatives, K. C. Nyalugwe Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
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Youth & Social 
Development
Labour & Health J. B. Nyirongo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
M. M. Nalumango Lozi Barotse Western
Commerce, 
Industry & Foreign 
Trade
A. S. Sardanis White
Transport, Power 
& Communications
G. H. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
Local Government E. B. Mbozi Tonga Tonga Southern
Lands & Mines J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Works & Housing I. H. Muchangwe Tonga Tonga Southern
Legal Affairs G. L. McLoughlin White
Natural Resources 
& Tourism
W. R. Mwondela Lunda North-Western North-Western
Agriculture E. A. Kashita Lunda Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.
Year: 1972
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the 
President
C. F. Munkonge Bemba Bemba Northern
Central W. K. Mayondi Lunda North-Western North-Western
Western H. M. Nzunga Tonga Tonga Southern
Eastern D. N. 
Muttendango
Lozi Barotse Western
Northern B. M. Situmbeko Lozi Barotse Western
Southern G. I. Yeta Lozi Barotse Western
North-Western F.N. Jere Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Copperbelt H. D. Ngwane Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Luapula D. R. Chlao Soli Tonga Lusaka
Office of the Vice- 
President
H. S. Meebelo Lozi Barotse Western
Rural
Development
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Foreign Affairs E. G. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
Defence D. Bowa Bemba Bemba Northern
Home Affairs J. K. Mulwanda Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Finance E. C. Chibwe Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lands & Natural 
Resources
F. X. Nkhoma Bisa Bemba Northern
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
J. C. Punabantu Tonga Tonga Southern
Local Government J. A. Sakala Chewa Nyanja Eastern
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& Housing
Mines & Mining 
Development
K. C. Nyalugwe Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Power, Transport 
& Works
P. A. Siwo Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Education V. M. Lavu Chikunda Nyanja Central
Trade & Industry J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Legal Affairs S. S. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Labour & Social 
Services
J. B. Nyirongo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Health N. M. Nalumango Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.
Year: 1976
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the 
President
W. J. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
F. P. Muyawala Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Office of the Prime 
Minister
S. J. Kazunga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
V. M. Lavu Chikunda Nyanja Central
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
D. A. Simonda Lunda North-Western North-Western
R. K. Chinambu Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Commerce J. A. Sakala Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Development
Planning
W. K. Nkowani Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Education P. A. Siwo Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Finance F. M. Walusiku Lozi Barotse Western
Foreign Affairs P. M. Ngonda Lozi Barotse Western
Health N. N. Kalala Luvale North-Western North-Western
Home Affairs D. R. Chilao Soli Tonga Lusaka
Labour & Social 
Services
S. D. Sachika Lunda North-Western North-Western
Lands, Natural 
Resources & 
Tourism
A. D. Ndalama Lala Bemba Central
Legal Affairs R. M. Kapembwa Lungu Bemba Northern
Local Government 
& Housing
A. J. Adamson White
Mines & Industry A. L.
Chitulang’oma
Bemba Bemba Northern
Power, Transport 
& Communications
B. M. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
Rural Development D. D. Ngwane Chewa Nyanja Eastern
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Northern M. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
Eastern E. G. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
Central S. K. Mutuna Lunda North-Western North-Western
Copperbelt J. Mutakwa Lenje Tonga Central
Southern J. H. Monga Tonga Tonga Southern
Luapula A. E. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Lusaka G. B. Wamulume Lozi Barotse Western
Western M. Mumbwe Mbunda Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b. 
Year: 1980
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the 
President
L. S. Chivuno Tonga Tonga Southern
Office o f the Prime 
Minister
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
F. M. Walusiku Lozi Barotse Western
V. M. Lavu Chikunda Nyanja Central
A. J. Adamson White
J. Mutakwa Lenje Tonga Central
J. A. Sakala Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Central R. K. Sambondu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Copperbelt J. M. Munkanta Ushi Bemba Luapula
Eastern W. S. Mufana Lozi Barotse Western
Luapula L. E. Kawesha Bemba Bemba North-Western
Lusaka R. K. Ching’ambu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Northern D. S. Chipeta Chewa Nyanja Eastern
North-Western B. Chabafimbi Lala Bemba Central
Southern M. V. Sivale Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Western S. K. Mubukwanu Lozi Barotse Western
Defence & 
Security
I. C. Sikazwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
A. K. Mb ewe Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Agriculture & 
Water 
Development
A. Hamaamba Tonga Tonga Southern
Commerce & 
Industry
K. S. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Education & 
Culture
P. A. Siwo Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Finance L. C. Sichilongo Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Foreign Affairs P. L. Kasanda Bemba Bemba Northern
Health J. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
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Home Affairs P. K. Musukwa Tumbuka Tumbuka Northern
Information, 
Broadcasting & 
Tourism
E. M. Lubinda Lozi Lozi Western
Labour & Social 
Services
R. B. Lukutati Bemba Bemba Northern
Lands & Natural 
Resources
B. M. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
Legal Affairs C. C. Manyema Bemba Bemba Northern
Mines N. N. Kalala Luvale North-Western North-Western
National Guidance E. P. Mumba Bemba Bemba Northern
Power, Transport 
& Communications
E. S. Nebwe Tonga Tonga Southern
Tourism G. C. Konie Bemba Bemba Luapula
Works & Supply Y. K. Libakeni Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Youth & Sports C. A. Lamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b. 
Year: 1985
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the 
President
S. X. Shimabale Lenje Tonga Central
Office of the Prime 
Minister
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
F. M. Walusiku Lozi Barotse Western
V. M. Lavu Chikunda Nyanja Central
J. Mutakwa Lenje Tonga Central
S. J. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
M. V. Siwale Namwanga Namwanga Northern
P. K. Musakwa Tumbuka Tumbuka Northern
J. M. Munkanta Ushi Bemba Luapula
P. Malukutila Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Agriculture & 
Water 
Development
N. P. Magande Tonga Tonga Southern
Commerce & 
Industry
F. S. Kazunga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Cooperatives Y. K. Libakeni Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Decentralisation S. K. Mubukwanu Lozi Barotse Western
Central E. M. Lubinda Lozi Barotse Western
Copperbelt A. W. Mukelabai Lozi Barotse Western
Eastern B. Chabafimbi Lala Bemba Central
Luapula D. H. Ng’wane Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Lusaka D. H. Kaona Bemba Bemba Northern
399
Northern I. R. Manda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
North-Western E. K. Shiaka Soli Tonga Lusaka
Southern P. K. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Western R. K. Chinambu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Finance E. S. Nebwe Tonga Tonga Southern
J. M. Mtonga Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Foreign Affairs P.L. Kasanda Bemba Bemba Northern
General Education 
& Culture
M. R. Banda Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Health E. H. HimuNyanja Tonga Tonga Southern
Higher Education C. M. Sikazwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
I. C. Sikazwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Labour & Social 
Services
V. J. Malauni Bemba Bemba Northern
Lands & Natural 
Resources
N. Mukutu Lozi Barotse Western
Legal Affairs J. M. Chitundu Bemba Bemba Northern
Mines K. S. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
National Guidance J. L. Masaninga Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Power, Transport 
& Communications
N. B. Nyoni Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Tourism C. A. Lamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
Works & Supply G. M. Pelekamoyo Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Youth & Sport M. B. Nguvu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.
Year: 1992
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the 
President
S. D. Sacika Lunda North-Western North-Western
S. L. Mbula Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
S. X. Shimabala Lenje Tonga Central
Central A. S. Mweemba Tonga Tonga Southern
Copperbelt D. A. Kaona Bemba Bemba Northern
Eastern N. E. Mumba Bemba Bemba Northern
Luapula C. A. Lamba Ushi Bemba Luapula
Lusaka D. M. Mumbe Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern J. M. Ngo Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western K. Kangwa Bemba Bemba Northern
Southern G. F. Lungu Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Western C. M. Itwi Tonga Tonga Southern
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National 
Commission for 
Development 
Planning
L. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
M. M. Liswaniso Lozi Barotse Western
Defence P. K. Musukwa Tumbuka Tumbuka Northern
Foreign Affairs J. M. Kabinga Bemba Bemba Northern
Finance J. M. Mtonga Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
B. Mweene Tonga Tonga Southern
Home Affairs N. A. Kalala Soli Tonga Lusaka
Local Government 
& Housing
N. J. Mapala Soli Tonga Lusaka
Health K. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Education B. N. Nguvu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
J. Nkunika Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Community 
Development & 
Social Services
H. K. Matanda Ushi Bemba Luapula
Labour & Social 
Security
E. J. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Communication & 
Transport
C. M. Sikazwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Energy & Water 
Development
R. C. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
Agriculture, Food 
& Fisheries
N. Mukutu Lozi Barotse Western
K. M. Maimbo Tonga Tonga Southern
Lands W. K. Kawana Lunda North-Western North-Western
Legal Affairs C. K. Banda Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
B.M.
Mwanakaoma
Ushi Bemba Luapula
Environment & 
Natural Resources
A. N. Chimuka Tonga Tonga Southern
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Mines & Minerals 
Development
F. M. Siame Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Science, Technical 
Education and 
Vocational 
Training
V. G. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
S. J. Mudenda Tonga Tonga Southern
Tourism G. M. Mulapesi Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Works & Supply M. X. Mufwaya Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.
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Year: 1998
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the Vice- 
President
A. S. Mweemba Tonga Tonga Southern
R. C. Musenge Bemba Bemba Northern
Cabinet Office K. T. Mwansa Lunda Bemba Luapula
R. H. Mataka Chewa Nyanja Eastern
G. M. Mulapesi Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. L. Kanganja Lunda North-Western North-Western
E. C. Chiyenge Bemba Bemba Northern
Finance & 
Economic 
Development
Prof. B. Mweene Tonga Tonga Southern
J. M. Mtonga Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
B. Nonde Tonga Tonga Southern
Home Affairs J. C. Kasongo Ushi Bemba Luapula
Communications & 
Transport
X. E. Vlahakis White
Agriculture, Food 
& Fisheries
M. R. Mulele Lozi Barotse Western
Defence P. K. Musukwa Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
H. K. Mantanda Ushi Bemba Luapula
Science, 
Technology & 
Vocational 
Training
J. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Environment & 
Natural Resources
J. M. Masinja Lala Bemba Central
Education S. M. Kasanda Bemba Bemba Northern
Legal Affairs E. V. Jhala Tonga Tonga Southern
Tourism R. C. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
Mines & Minerals 
Development
A. M. Kashimu Bemba Bemba Northern
Foreign Affairs N. Simbyakula Luvale North-Western North-Western
Local Government 
& Housing
0 . M. Banda Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Health K. M. Bulaya Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
A. C. Sichinga Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Community 
Development & 
Social Welfare
M. K. Nkole Bemba Bemba Northern
Energy & Water 
Development
P. L. Mwamfuli Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
Lands B. M. Ushi Bemba Luapula
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Mwanakaoma
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
S. Sikaneta Lozi Barotse Western
Works & Supply G. P. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Without Portfolio W. Mulubisha Soli Tonga Lusaka
Northern S. M. Mpishi Soli Tonga Lusaka
Central F. Nduna Lenje Tonga Central
Eastern W. B. Silweya Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Southern M. C. Chalimbana Soli Tonga Lusaka
Western G. S. Akafekwa Lozi Barotse Western
Luapula R. C. Mukuma Lunda North-Western North-Western
Copperbelt A. Yoyo Lozi Barotse Western
North-Western M. Mubanga Bemba Bemba Luapula
Lusaka H. M. Mtonga Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d. 
Year: 2002
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the Vice- 
President
W. Mulubisha Mambwe Mambwe Northern
B. M. Simpokolwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Cabinet Office S. L. Mbula Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
R. H. Mataka Chewa Nyanja Eastern
R. C. Musenge Bemba Bemba Northern
D. C. Sadoki Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
0 . M. Kalabo Lozi Barotse Western
M. N. Zimba Lunda Bemba Luapula
A. B. Ponga Bemba Bemba Northern
C. G. Kaluba Tumbuka Tumbuka Northern
Finance & National 
Planning
0 . A. Chifungula Lenje Tonga Central
R. Chizyuka Tonga Tonga Southern
L. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Defence J. K. Chitafu Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Home Affairs P. Mumba Bemba Bemba Northern
Foreign Affairs S. Akapelwa Lozi Barotse Western
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
M. R. Mulele Lozi Barotse Western
E. J. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mines & Minerals 
Development
S. Mpishi Soli Tonga Lusaka
Health S. Miti Chewa Nyanja Eastern
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Education B. Chilangwa Bemba Bemba Northern
Labour & Social 
Security
A. J. Chirva Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Local Government 
& Housing
J. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
Mbikusita W. 
Lewanika
Lozi Barotse Western
Communications & 
Transport
Dr. Kwendakwema Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Tourism, 
Environment & 
Natural Resources
L. E. Kapulu Ila Tonga Southern
Works & Supply Lt. Col. B. 
Nkunika
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Legal Affairs N. Simbyakula Luvale North-Western North-Western
Energy & Water 
Development
A. C. Sichinga Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Community 
Development & 
Social Services
P. L. Mwamfuli Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
Science & 
Technology
G. P. Mukala Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Information & 
Broadcasting 
Services
D. Kashweka Mbunda North-Western North-Western
Sport, Youth & 
Child Development
M. G. Nkole Bemba Bemba Northern
Lands G. Kawatu Lunda North-Western North-Western
Western Maswabi
Maimbolwa
Lozi Barotse Western
Eastern Frank Moyo Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Central Patrick Kashinka Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Lusaka Lameck
Chibombamilimo
Bemba Bemba Northern
Luapula Major Chib we 
Nsakasha
Bemba Bemba Northern
Northern Major E. S. Chisha Bemba Bemba Northern
North-Western Gabriel
Namulambe
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Southern Darious Hakayobe Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.
Year: 2008
Position Name Tribe Language Province
Office of the Vice- 
President
A. C. Sichinga Namwanga Mambwe Northern
N. A. Susiku Lozi Barotse Western
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Cabinet Office J. L. Kanganja Lunda North-Western North-Western
R. H. Mataka Chewa Nyanja Eastern
L. Ndalamei Lala Bemba Central
R. C. Musenge Bemba Bemba Northern
0 . M. Kalabo Lozi Barotse Western
G. Kawatu Lunda North-Western North-Western
I. Kashoka Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
M. M. Yeta Lozi Barotse Western
Defence M. D. Lisati Lozi Barotse Western
Home Affairs S. Sikaneta Lozi Barotse Western
Finance & National 
Planning
Mbikusita W. 
Lewanika
Lozi Barotse Western
N. Ngulube Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. Mulungushi Soli Tonga Lusaka
Foreign Affairs T. C. Kapoma Soli Tonga Lusaka
Agriculture & 
Cooperatives
S. Mundia Lozi Barotse Western
I. K. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mines & Minerals 
Development
L. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Health S. K. Miti Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Education L. E. Kapulu Ila Tonga Southern
Labour & Social 
Security
N. Chisupa Ushi Bemba Luapula
Commerce, Trade 
& Industry
D. Chilipamunshi Lenje Tonga Central
Communications & 
Transport
Brig. Gen. P. 
Tembo
Chewa Nyanja Central
Local Government 
& Housing
J. Ngo Bemba Bemba Northern
Tourism, 
Environment & 
Natural Resources
M. R. Mulele Lozi Barotse Western
Works & Supply Lt. Col. B. 
Nkunika
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Justice G. M. Imbwae Soli Tonga Lusaka
M. Malila Lenje Tonga Central
Energy & Water 
Development
P. Mumba Bemba Bemba Northern
Community 
Development & 
Social Services
T. Kasonso Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Science & 
Technology
B. G. Nsemukila Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
Information & 
Broadcasting
E. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
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Services
Lands B. S. Namachila Ila Tonga Southern
Sport, Youth and 
Child Development
B. Samakayi Lunda North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.
DISTRIBUTION OF ZAMBIA INDUSTRIAL AND MINING 
CORPORTAION (ZEMCO) POSITIONS, 1974-1990 
Year: 1974
Position Name Tribe Language
Directors
K. D. Kaunda (Chair) Bemba Bemba Northern
H. Mulemba (Vice) Kaonde North-Western Central
W. M. Chakulya Bemba Bemba Luapula
A. B. Chikwanda Bemba Bemba Northern
P. J. Chisanga Bemba Bemba Northern
S. B. Kafumakache Kaonde North-Western North-Western
F. H. Kaunda Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
B. R. Kuwani Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
L. M. Lishomwa Lozi Barotse Western
M. Makwaya Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
J. B. Mubanga Lunda Bemba Luapula
I. H. Muchangwe Tonga Tonga Southern
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
N. S. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
G. M. Munkonge Bemba Bemba Northern
L. S. Muuka Lozi Barotse Western
J. M. Mwanza Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
J. B. Nyirongo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
D. A. Phiri Chewa Nyanja Eastern
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.
Year: 1978
Position Name Tribe Language
Directors
D. M. Lisulo (Chairman) Lozi Barotse Western
W. P. Nyirenda (Vice- 
Chairman)
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
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M. J Lumina Tonga Tonga Southern
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
P. T. Miller White
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
J. M. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
L. J. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
K. H. Nkwabilo Soli Tonga Central
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
F. M. Walusiku Lozi Barotse Western
Management
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
L. M. Chileshe Bemba Bemba Northern
P. J. Chisanga Bemba Bemba Northern
I. H. Muchangwe Tonga Tonga Southern
T. B. Chintu Bemba Bemba Northern
M. V. Muhsin Lala Bemba Central
Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years. 
Year: 1982
Name Tribe Language Province
Directors
N. Mundia (Chairman) Lozi Barotse Western
E. H. Mudenda (Vice- 
Chairman)
Tonga Tonga Southern
R. Chisupa Bemba Bemba Luapula
R. Kunda Lala Bemba Central
M. Mumbuna Lozi Barotse Western
K. S. Musokotwane Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
B. R. Kuwani Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
P. T. Miller White
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
J. M. Mwanakatwe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
F. M. Walusiku Lozi Barotse Western
Management
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
P. J. Chisanga Bemba Bemba Northern
I. H. Muchangwe Tonga Tonga Southern
L. S. Muuka Lozi Barotse Western
M. V. Muhsin Lala Bemba Central
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T. B. Chintu Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years. 
Year: 1986
Name Tribe Language Province
Directors
K. D. Kaunda 
(Chairman)
Bemba Bemba Northern
K. S. Musokotwane 
(Vice-Chairman)
Toka-Leya Tonga Southern
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
G. G. Chigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Gen. G. K. Chinkuli Lenje Tonga Central
F. Chuula Tonga Tonga Southern
B. R. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Luapula
J. K. Kalaluka Lozi Barotse Western
H. S. Meebelo Lozi Barotse Western
H. Y. Mwale Chewa Nyanja Eastern
U. G. Mwila Bemba Bemba Northern
L. S. Subulwa Lozi Barotse Western
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
H. Bweupe Bemba Bemba Northern
F. T. Chiluba Lunda Bemba Luapula
I. S. Chivuno Tonga Tonga Southern
F. H. Kaunda Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
V. M. Lavu Chikunda Nyanja Central
S. B. Lungu Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
P. T. Miller White
C. M. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
N. L. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Management
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
D. Bowa Bemba Bemba Northern
R. M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
I. H. Muchangwe Tonga Tonga Southern
L. S. Muuka Lozi Barotse Western
M. V. Muhsin Lala Bemba Central
R. L. Bwalya Bemba Bemba Northern
E. C. Kaunga Soli Tonga Central
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G. M. Mumbi Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years. 
Year: 1990
Name Tribe Language Province
Directors
K. D. Kaunda 
(Chairman)
Bemba Bemba Northern
G. M. Masheke (Vice- 
Chairman)
Lozi Barotse Western
A. J. Soko Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
G. G. Chigaga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Gen. E. Haimbe Tonga Tonga Southern
B. N. Fumbelo Luvale North-Western North-Western
F. M. Chomba Bisa Bemba Central
0 . S. Musuka Lala Bemba Central
L. Mulimba Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
P. S. Chitambala Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
J. J. Mukando Swaka Bemba Central
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
F. H. Kaunda Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
F. X. Nkhoma Bisa Bemba Northern
F. T. Chiluba Lunda Bemba Luapula
N. L. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
C. M. Sampa Bemba Bemba Northern
H. Bweupe Bemba Bemba Northern
S. B. Lungu Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. M. Mwanza Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
Management
E. I. Willima Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
E. C. Kaunga Soli Tonga Central
A. D. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
M. S. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
Y. K. Libakeni Lozi Barotse Western
E. D. Kasunga Luvale North-Western North-Western
A. J. Adamson White
T. V. Ramanathan Asian
G. W. Simukoko Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.
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DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION (INDECO) POSITIONS, 1967-1991
Year: 1967
Name Tribe Language Province
A. S. Sardanis 
(Chairman and 
Managing Director)
White
P. Attala White
D. B. Banda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
G. S. Comhill White
M. Gersh White
E. A. Kashita Bemba Bemba Luapula
H. Malenga Kaonde North-Western North-Western
G. H. Mutale Bemba Bemba Northern
S. B. Zukas White
J. B. Zulu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
C. H. Goodwin (Deputy 
Manager)
White
F. K. Mwanza 
(Secretary)
Lunda Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
Year: 1971
Name Tribe Language Province
E. A. Kashita (Executive 
Chairman)
Bemba Bemba Luapula
G. S. Comhill White
E. G. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
W. L. Lewis White
H. Malenga Kaonde North-Western North-Western
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
V. S. Musakanya Bemba Bemba Northern
A. S. Sardanis White
H. G. Shikopa Lala Bemba Central
E. Thawe White
S. B. Zukas White
A. M. Sinyangwe 
(Secretary)
Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
410
Year: 1975
Name Tribe Language Province
A. J. Soko (Chairman) Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
J. B. Nyirongo 
(Managing Director)
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
P. K. Chiwenda Lamba Bemba Central
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
G. S. Comhill White
S. B. Kafumakache Kaonde North-Western North-Western
B. R. Kuwani Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
L. S. Muuka Lozi Barotse Western
P. T. Miller White
L. J. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
J. D. Sichone Mambwe Mambwe Northern
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
J. M. Mwanza Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
T. B. Chintu (Secretary) Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
Year: 1979
Name Tribe Language Province
J. C. Mapoma 
(Chairman)
Bemba Bemba Luapula
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
L. C. Sichilongo Namwanga Mambwe Northern
L. S. Muuka (Managing 
Director)
Lozi Barotse Western
L. J. Mwananshiku Lunda Bemba Luapula
J. D. Sichone Mambwe Mambwe Northern
P. T. Miller White
G. S. Comhill White
N. D. Muttendango Lozi Barotse Western
L. M. Chileshe Bemba Bemba Northern
G. M. Mumbi 
(Secretary)
Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
Year: 1983
Name Tribe Language Province
J. C. Mapoma 
(Chairman)
Bemba Bemba Luapula
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nynaga Eastern
A. D. Zulu (Managing Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
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Director)
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
B. H. Kuwani Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
L. A. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
K. S. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
P. T. Miller White
H. C. Golson White
F. Nkhoma Bisa Bemba Northern
J. D. Sichone Mambwe Mambwe Northern
G. M. Mumbi 
(Secretary)
Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
Year: 1987
Name Tribe Language Province
E. I. Willima (Chairman) Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
A. D. Zulu (Managing 
Director)
Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
D. A. Simonda Lozi Barotse Western
L. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
L. A. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
L. S. Chivuno Tonga Tonga Southern
F. Nkhoma Bisa Bemba Northern
H. C. Golson White
P. T. Miller White
J. D. Sichone Mambwe Mambwe Northern
C. C. Musonda 
(Secretary)
Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
Year: 1991
Name Tribe Language Province
E. I. Willima (Chairman) Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
M. Mwinga (Managing 
Director)
Tonga Tonga Southern
J. C. Mapoma Bemba Bemba Luapula
L. A. Monze Tonga Tonga Southern
J. D. Sichone Mambwe Mambwe Northern
F. Nkhoma Bisa Bemba Northern
J. W. Shaw White
B. P. Kapota Kaonde North-Western North-Western
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J. M. Nyaywa Luvale North-Western North-Western
I. M. Kamanga Chewa Nyanja Eastern
L. Nkhata Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
D. H. Lwiindi 
(Secretary)
Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.
DISTRIBUTION OF MINING PARASTATAL POSITIONS, 1970-1998
Year: 1970 (MINDEiCO)
Name Tribe Language Province
D. C. Mulaisho 
(Executive Chairman)
Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
E. G. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
I. H. Muchangwe Tonga Tonga Southern
A. S. Sardanis White
E. A. Kashita Bemba Bemba Luapula
F. C. Sumbwe Namwanga Mambwe Northern
B. Mufonka Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
P. H. Brownrigg White
Source: Compiled based on MINDECO Various Years.
Date: 1974 (MINDECO)
Name Tribe Language Province
A. J. Soko (Chairman) Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
L. S. Muuka (Managing 
Director)
Lozi Barotse Western
P. H. Brownrigg White
N. Zimba Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
P. K. Chiwenda Lamba Bemba Central
F. H. Kaunda Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
J. B. Nyirongo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
J. M. Mwanza Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
F. C. Sumbwe Namwanga Mambwe Northern
E. G. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on MINDECO Various Years.
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Date: 1978 (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines)
Name Tribe Language Province
‘A directors’
J. C. Mapoma (Chairman) Bemba Bemba Luapula
F. H. Kaunda (Managing 
Director)
Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
P. H. Brownrigg White
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
L. C. Sichilongo Namwanga Mambwe Northern
F. C. Sumbwe Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Source: Compiled based on MINDECO Various Years.
Date: 1982 (ZCCM)
Name Tribe Language Province
‘A’ Directors
F. H. Kaunda (Chairman 
and Chief Executive)
Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
R. L. Bwalya Bemba Bemba Northern
B. R. Kuwani Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
L. C. Mutakasha Lenje Tonga Central
L. S. Muuka Lozi Barotse Western
E. H. Mwanang’onze Lozi Barotse Western
M. N. Siamwiza Ila Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.
Date: 1986 (ZCCM)
Name Tribe Language Province
‘A ’ Directors
F. H. Kaunda (Chairman 
and Chief Executive)
Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
L. S. Chivuno Tonga Tonga Southern
L. C. Mutakasha Lenje Tonga Central
J. K. Ngwisha Bemba Bemba Northern
K. S. Nyirenda Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
M. N. Siamwiza Ila Tonga Southern
T. M. Walamba Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.
Date: 1990 (ZCCM)
Name Tribe Language Province
‘A’ Directors
F. H. Kaunda (Chairman 
and Chief Executive)
Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
4 1 4
J. A. Bussieres White
P. K. Chiwenda Lamba Bemba Central
L. C. Mutakasha Lenje Tonga Central
J. K. Ngwisha Bemba Bemba Northern
M. N. Siamwiza Ila Tonga Southern
J. H. Simakuni Toka Leya Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.
Date: 1994 (ZCCM)
Name Tribe Language Province
‘A ’ Directors
R. L. Bwalya (Chairman) Bemba Bemba Northern
E. K. Shamutete (Chief 
Executive)
Tonga Tonga Southern
J. M. Mtonga Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
D. C. Mulaisho Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
D. Chanda Bemba Bemba Northern
F. S. Kunda Chewa Nyanja Eastern
J. K. Phiri Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.
Date: 1998 (ZCCM)
Name Tribe Language Province
‘A ’ Directors
S. L. Shimukowa 
(Chairman)
Tonga Tonga Southern
E. K. Shamutete (Chief 
Executive)
Tonga Tonga Southern
J. M. Mwanza Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
A. M. Kashimu Bemba Bemba Northern
G. G. Chabwera Kaonde North-Western North-Western
F. H. Kaunda Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
P. K. Nkanza Soli Tonga Lusaka
Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.
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DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATISED ASSETS, 1992-2005
Companies sold to political leaders & public officers
Company Purchaser Tribe Language Province
Eagle Travel Limited Quantum Investors 
Mr Yoram Godwin Mumba
Bemba Bemba Northern
Hartley Farms Gilbwest Holdings Limited Hon 
Gilbert Mululu
Luvale North-Western North-Western
Nchanga - Mbala Farms RDS Investments Limited 
Chibulu Jane Penza 
Willa D Mung’omba 
Ben Soko (directors)
Mambwe Mambwe Northern
La Hacienda Hotel Mr Stanford Makosonke Hlazo Tonga Tonga Southern
Lake Hotels Hon Bennie Himainza Wycliffe 
Mwiinga, MP
Tonga Tonga Southern
Consolidated Tyre Services 
Limited
Amon Kambole Sikazwe 
Chibulu Jane Penza
Mambwe Mambwe Northern
National Drug Company (NDC) 
Monze
Mandes Supermarket, Monze 
Hon Suresh Desai, MP
Asian
National Home Stores - Sichili Hon. Leonard Subulwa, MP 
Minister for Western Province
Lozi Barotse Western
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National Home Stores - Mongu Hon. Leonard Subulwa, MP 
Minister for Western Province
Lozi Barotse Western
National Home Stores - Kaoma Hon. Stephen Manjata, MP 
Deputy Minister
Luvale North-Western North-Western
National Home Stores - Lukulu Hon. S C Ngombo, MP, Deputy 
Minister -  Education
Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Zambia National Wholesale & 
Marketing Co. - Sesheke
Tusa Security Limited 
Hon. Richard N'ganga, MP
Lozi Barotse Western
National Home Stores - Sesheke Tusa Security Limited 
Hon. Richard N'ganga, MP
Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Consumer Buying Corporation of 
Zambia - Kabompo
Hon Anoshi Chipawa, MP, 
Deputy Minister - N/Westem 
Province.
Lunda North-Western North-Western
Consumer Buying Corporation of 
Zambia - Kasempa
Hon Patrick Kafumakache, MP - 
Cabinet Minister
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
National Home Stores - Namwala Hon Chulu Kalima, MP Ila Tonga Southern
National Home Stores - Siavonga ZEFA Trading Limited 
Hon Frederick Hapunda, MP
Tonga Tonga Southern
National Home Stores -  
Sinazongwe
Hon S Madyenkuku, MP - 
Deputy Minister
Tonga Tonga Southern
Source: Compiled based on ZPA 2006b.
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Companies sold to Zambian individuals
Company Purchaser Tribe Language Province
AFE Limited Mr Friday Ndhlovu Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Coolwell System Limited Professor Francis Yamba Bemba Bemba Northern
Indeco Milling Limited - Luangwa 
Mill
Mr Goodward Mulubwa Bemba Bemba Northern
Indeco Milling - Ndola Plant Dr Raj an Mahtani Asian
Kafubu Dairy Farm Mr Ernest Mtamboh Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Lyambai Hotel Mr Josiah Situmbeko Songolo 
Mr Mulozi Samuel Lisibani 
Mr Greeves Sitwala
Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Mansa Dairy Farm Mr Protassio Chipulu Lunda Bemba Luapula
Nkwazi Manufacturing Limited Mr M K  Patel Asian
Supa Baking Kitwe Factory Mr Henry Bruce Rennie of Kitwe White
Simmental Stud Ranch Mr Lloyd Chongo, Director of 
Credit ZANACO
Bemba Bemba Northern
Crested Crane Hotel - Mpika Mr Charles Mpundu Bemba Bemba Northern
ZUVA ZAMBIA Mr Louis C Wapamesa 
Mrs C M Wapamesa
Lozi Barotse Western
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Zambia Clay Industries Limited- 
Kalulushi Brick Works
MR Evans Chibiliti, Chairman of 
the Investment Centre
Lamba Bemba Copperbelt
Zambia Cold Storage Corporation 
Limited - Kabwe Retail Outlet
Raymond G Lewis Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Zamhort Mkushi Plant EI Dawoodjee & Protein Food Asian
Zambia Pork Products Limited Mr Webster Musukwa Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
ZCSC Fountains Farm Moses K Nawa Lozi Barotse Western
Lundazi Castle Chifumu Banda S.C 
Mr Rodgers Nkunika
Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Mununshi Banana Estate Mr Terence Ian Findlay White
Katito Crop Farm (ZADL) Griver Sikasote Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Zambia Steel & Building Supplies 
- Lusaka Door Factory
Mr Sebastian Kopulande Lunda Bemba Luapula
Source: Compiled based on ZPA 2006b.
Companies sold to Zambian corporate bodies
Company Purchaser Owners/ directors Tribe Language Province
AutoCare Limited Astro Holdings Limited, 
Lusaka
Mr. S R Patel 
Mr. V R Patel
Asian
Chainda Dairy Farms H S Limited Mr H.G. Shikopa Bemba Bemba Northern
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Chilongolo Dairy Farms ZAMDAELL Limited Mr Murray Dewar 
Mr Faustin Kabwe 
Mr Aaron Chungu 
Mr Gaudenzio 
M Rossi (directors)
Bemba Bemba Northern
Chipata Dairy Farm Eastern Dairy Limited Mr Ziyauddin Daya 
Mr Elyas Daya 
Mr Yousuf Daya 
Mr Mohamed Daya 
Mr Ayub Daya
Asian
Cleanwell Dry Cleaners Swan Dry Cleaners Mr J C Chalansi 
Mr P L Ng’andwe
Ng’umbo Bemba Luapula
Dairy Produce Board -  
Chipata Factory
Payanjala Farms of 
Chipata
Mr Ziyauddin Daya 
Mr Elyas Daya 
Mr Yousuf Daya 
Mr Mohamed Daya 
Mr Ayub Daya
Asian
Dairy Produce Board -  
Kabwe Factory
Kabwe Farmers Co­
operative Society
Mr B P Kapota 
Mr D Gamie 
Mr 0  E Gondwe 
Mr K Moyo 
Mr T Kasapo
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
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Mr R Lewis 
Mrs M Chatterton
Dairy Produce Board - Northern Dairies Limited R A B Brown White
Ndola Depot Mrs M Cheelo
L de la Lucia
S T Jaffray
M Jele
B D S Kapita
K Kasama
GNkhata
Mrs J Phiri
M Sichizya
D Smail
J Stephenson
A M Vashee
Elephant’s Head Hotel Chainama Hotel Limited Mr. Sonny P. Mulenga Bemba Bemba Northern
General Pharmaceuticals Mutashi Limited Mr. J. M. Kasonde Bemba Bemba Northern
Limited Mrs. (Dr.) D. K. Kasonde
Holding Farm (ZADL) Evergreen Farms Limited Mr Ayub Patel (Indian Asian
national)
Khalil Ahmed Patel
(Zambian national)
Sheft Altaf Yakub (Indian
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national).
Kakoma Dairy Farm 
(ZADL)
Yitzhak Sarig Yitzhak Sarig 
(Israeli national)
White
Kasama Dairy Farm 
(ZADL)
Bwikashi Properties 
Limited
Charles H Sichangwa 
Rosemary M Sichangwa 
Lingson Chikoti 
Christopher Sinyangwe
Namwanga Mambwe Northern
National Drug Company - 
Head Office & Factory
Nachera Holdings Limited 
(75%) and Patrick 
Chiumya (25%)
S Chiumya Tonga Tonga Southern
NIEC Farms Limited EBM Chambers E B Mwansa Ng’umbo Bemba Northern
Nkumba Piggery & 
Feedlot (ZADL)
R P Investments Limited Raphael Salasini 
Paul Salasini
Lenje Tonga Central
Solwezi Dairy Farm 
(ZADL)
Kansanshi Dynamics 
Limited
General Sande Kayumba 
Mr Teddy Mulonga
Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Zambia Cold Storage 
Corporation Limited - 
Mongu Plant
Mongu Meat Corporation 
Pic
Mr K Munganga 
(Chairman)
Mr K Muteto (Vice 
Chairman)
Mr K M Lewanika
Mr V Mukelabai
Dr F W D Oyat
Dr D Lance
Lozi Barotse Western
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Mr S Mukambo 
Mr R M Munyinda 
Mr S L Kwilimba 
M Mukumba 
Mr R M Muyunda.
Zambia Cold Storage 
Corporation Limited - 
Lusaka Plant
Kembe Estates Limited Mr Chris Spyron 
G.M. Spyron 
A. Chronis.
White
Zambia Cold Storage 
Corporation Limited - 
Chipata Plant
Mosali Agro Food 
Processors Limited
Idris Ugradar 
Mohamed Bilal 
Edrish Bhai Ugradar
Asian
Indeco Milling Limited - 
Kasama Mill
GBM Trucking (Z) 
Limited
Mr Geoffrey Bwalya 
Mwamba
Chama Mwenso Mwamba
Bemba Bemba Northern
Zambia Maltings Limited Sable Transport Limited F A Alloo Asian
Zambia Steel & Building 
Supplies - Kitwe Sales 
Outlet
Spectra Oils Limited Yuyi Lishomwa 
Hastings Gondwe,
Lozi Barotse Western
MIL Sawmilling & 
Joinery Limited
SGM Associates Limited Dr Siteke Mwale 
(Executive Chairman)
Mr Fisho P Mwale 
(Executive Director)
Chewa Nyanja Eastern
Norgroup Plastics Limited Simba Chemicals Dr Sharma (majority Asian
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shareholder)
Zambia Cashew Company 
Limited
Western Cashew 
Industries Limited
Mb uka Sinyinda 
Herbert Mutandengo 
Nkwilimba Lubinda 
Kabombo Mubita 
Kashina Kandala 
and 11 other directors.
Lozi Barotse Western
ZAFFICO - Dola Hill 
Sawmill
Wood Processing Limited R L Patel 
RK  Patel 
D S Patel.
Asian
New Savoy Hotel Limited Integrated Hospitality 
Solutions Limited
Mr Christy Lumpa. Lozi Barotse Western
Source: Compiled based on ZPA 2006b.
424
DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY COMMANDERS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Name Tribe Language Province
Zambia Army Commanders
Gen. G. K. Chinkuli Lenje Tonga Central
Lt.-Gen. B. N. Mibenge Bemba Bemba Luapula
Major-Gen. C. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Northern
Gen. M. N. Masheke Lozi Barotse Western
Lt.-Gen. C. S. Tembo Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Lt.-Gen. G. M. Kalenge Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lt.-Gen. F. G. Sibamba Lozi Barotse Western
Gen. N. M. Simbeye Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Lt.-Gen. S. L. Mumbi Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Lt.-Gen. Geojago R. 
Musengule
Lala Bemba Central
Lt.-Gen. Issac Chisuzi Soli Tonga Lusaka
Zambia Air Force Commanders
Lt.-Gen. P. D. Zuze Chikunda Nyanja Eastern
Maj.-Gen. C. Kabwe Bemba Bemba Northern
Maj.-Gen. Simbule Namwanga Mambwe Northern
Lt. Gen. A. Lungu Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Lt.-Gen. Simutowe Mambwe Mambwe Northern
Lt. -Gen. Ronnie 
Shikapwasha
Lenje Tonga Central
Lt.-Gen. Sande 
Kayumba
Kaonde North-Western North-Weston
Lt.-Gen. Christopher 
Singogo
Luvale North-Western North-Western
Lt. Gen. Samuel 
Mapala
Ngoni Nyanja Eastern
Zambia National Service Commanders
Brig.-Gen. C. J. 
Nyirenda
Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Brig.-Gen. F. S. 
Mulenga
Bemba Bemba Northern
Maj.-Gen. T. Fara Chikunda Nyanja Lusaka
Maj.Gen. Dickson Zulu Nsenga Nyanja Eastern
Lt.-Gen. W. G. Funjika Kaonde North-Western North-Western
Maj.-Gen. M. Mbao Tumbuka Tumbuka Eastern
Maj.-Gen. R. Chisheta Bemba Bemba Northern
Source: Compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke; Interview, Geofroy
Haantolobo.
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11.2 Interview Guidelines
11.2.1 Uganda
1) Uganda and recurrent civil war
Why -  intuitively -  do you think has Uganda been affected by recurrent civil war? What 
are the main driving forces behind instability and violent conflict?
Do you feel that the same factors were at play during the different civil wars over time?
2) Main cleavages in Ugandan society
What are the main cleavages/ dividing lines in Ugandan society? Tribe? Language? 
Region? Religion? Class?
To what extent do these different cleavages overlap? And what is ultimately the most 
important source of social cleavage?
Is tribal sentiment more or less pronounced than in other African countries? Why? To 
what extent is there intermarriage between different tribal groups? How does the low 
level of urbanisation play into this?
Has the importance of the various social cleavages changed over time? Have tribe 
and/or religion become less important? Have class issues become more important?
How are the key dividing lines in society related to recurrent civil war? Would you 
characterise past and current conflicts as ‘tribally’ or ‘religiously’ motivated?
3) The distribution o f jobs and resources
How inclusive or exclusionary have been the Obote/ Amin/ UNLF/ Museveni 
governments? To what extent have the different governments practised balancing 
policies?
What do you understand by ‘inclusive government’? Tribal/ linguistic/ regional/ 
religious inclusiveness? Political inclusiveness/ broad-basedness?
Where does inclusion vs. exclusion express itself? At the level of Cabinet? The 
administration? The ruling party? The parastatal sector? The army?
Do you feel that the distribution of government positions between competing social 
groups has been largely ‘fair’? What is a ‘fair’ distribution?
How are jobs in the civil service distributed? Recruitment based on merit or tribal/ 
linguistic/ regional affiliation? Do certain groups dominate the civil service?
How inclusive was the UPC as a ruling party? And how inclusive has been the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM)?
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What can you say about the distribution of jobs in the parastatal sector? What were the 
key parastatals under Obote and Amin? How has this changed with privatisation? Has 
any group benefitted disproportionally from privatisation?
How inclusive are the Ugandan armed forces? Are soldiers/ officers recruited on merit 
or along tribal lines? Has this changed over time? How would you describe the 
relationship between the political authorities and the armed forces?
4) The distribution o f jobs and resources and recurrent civil war
Do you think that there is a link between the inter-group distribution of jobs and 
resources and civil war?
To what extent have imbalances in access to jobs and resources driven violent conflict?
...the 1966 ‘Battle ofMengo’?
.. .the anti-Amin rebellions?
.. .the anti-UNLF/ anti-Obote II insurgencies?
.. .the anti-Museveni wars in the North? The West?
5) Other relevant factors
Which other factors explain Uganda’s recurrent civil war?
Colonial legacy: Colonial rule has arguably played a very negative role in 
Uganda (i.e. uneven regional development, Baganda dominance, etc.). To what 
extent was post-colonial violence inevitable? What could have been done to 
overcome the deep divisions in Ugandan society?
Economic performance: Uganda suffered from sharp economic decline during 
the first two decades of independence (especially under Idi Amin), whereas its 
economic record improved under Museveni. How is economic performance 
related to political stability?
Democracy: Some people argue that Museveni’s ‘Movement system’ was more 
democratic than previous governments. If you agree, why has this not led to 
peace and stability? And what has been the impact of the re-introduction of 
multi-party politics?
Regional instability: Uganda is located in a highly unstable region. How has this 
affected civil war in Uganda?
Role of international donors: Uganda is still receiving large amounts of foreign 
aid. What has been the role of donors in recurrent civil war? How has structural 
adjustment affected patterns of violent conflict?
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11.2.2 Zambia
1) Zambia and civil war avoidance
Why -  intuitively -  do you think Zambia has avoided civil war? What are the main 
driving forces behind the country’s lasting peace and stability?
What have been the main moments of instability and crisis? Has Zambia ever been close 
to civil war? If so, how were these crises overcome?
Do you think that Zambia has become more/less stable over time? Why?
2) Main cleavages in Zambian society
What are the main cleavages in Zambian society? Tribe? Language? Province? 
Religion? Class?
To what extent do these different cleavages overlap? And what is ultimately the most 
important source of social cleavage?
Is tribal sentiment more or less pronounced than in other African countries? Why? To 
what extent is there intermarriage between different tribal groups? How does the high 
level of urbanisation play into this?
Has the importance of the various social cleavages changed over time? Have tribe 
and/or language become less important? Have class issues become more important?
3) The distribution o f jobs and resources
How inclusive or exclusionary have been the Kaunda/ Chiluba/ Mwanawasa 
governments? To what extent have the different governments practised ‘tribal 
balancing’?
What do you understand by ‘inclusive government’? Tribal/ linguistic/ regional/ 
religious inclusiveness? Political inclusiveness/ broad-basedness?
Where does inclusion vs. exclusion express itself? At the level of Cabinet? The
administration? The ruling party? The parastatal sector? The army?
Do you feel that the distribution of government positions between competing social 
groups has been largely ‘fair’? What is a ‘fair’ distribution?
How are jobs in the civil service distributed? Recruitment based on merit or tribal/ 
linguistic/ provincial affiliation? Do certain groups dominate the civil service?
How inclusive was UNIP as a ruling party? And how inclusive is MMD?
What can you say about the distribution of jobs in the parastatal sector? What were the
key parastatals under Kaunda? How has this changed with privatisation? Has any group 
benefitted disproportionally from privatisation?
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How inclusive are the Zambian armed forces? Are soldiers/ officers recruited on merit 
or along tribal lines? Has this changed over time? How would you describe the 
relationship between the political authorities and the armed forces?
4) The distribution o f jobs and resources and civil war avoidance
Do you think that there is a link between the inter-group distribution of jobs and 
resources and the absence of civil war? Does ‘tribal balancing’ promote peace and 
stability? If so, would the absence of ‘tribal balancing’ undermine the country’s peace? 
Has the importance of ‘tribal balancing’ changed over time?
What was behind the failed Mushala rebellion? Why did it fail?
Is there a trade-off between Zambia’s peace and its economic development?
5) Other relevant factors
Which other factors explain Zambia’s peace and stability?
Colonial legacy: Zambia won independence after a fairly intense struggle against 
colonial rule and white domination. To what extent has the struggle against a 
common enemy (i.e. colonial rule) favoured national integration and unity?
Economic performance: Zambia has suffered from extreme economic decline 
and crisis from the late 1970s. Why has this not led to civil war?
Democracy: How has the Zambian one-party state affected peace and stability? 
And what has been the impact of the re-introduction of multi-party politics?
Regional instability: Zambia can be regarded an ‘oasis of peace’ in an otherwise 
highly unstable region. How has Zambia been able to protect itself from regional 
spillover effects?
Role of international donors: Zambia is still receiving large amounts of foreign 
aid. What has been the role of donors in maintaining peace and stability? And 
how has structural adjustment affected Zambia’s stability?
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